Leniency programs have become one of important tools in cartel enforcement. In recent years there has been a decrease in leniency applications, and growth of the applications, under current leniency programs based on Prisoner's Dilemma, is limited unless an institutional circumstance about the programs is changed. I suggest revising leniency programs by improving the coordination problem among cartel participants in order to stimulate the incentive of cartel participants to report collusion where no application is made. I suggest a leniency program with a minimum-evidence standard (i) giving applicants rewards funded by the fines paid by cartel participants that do not report collusion, and (ii) selecting candidates for immunity according to the order of application and reducing fines of candidates that provide evidence above a minimum-evidence standard.
{"title":"An Improvement of Leniency Programs Where There Exists the Coordination Problem","authors":"Sei Beom Won","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3554793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3554793","url":null,"abstract":"Leniency programs have become one of important tools in cartel enforcement. In recent years there has been a decrease in leniency applications, and growth of the applications, under current leniency programs based on Prisoner's Dilemma, is limited unless an institutional circumstance about the programs is changed. I suggest revising leniency programs by improving the coordination problem among cartel participants in order to stimulate the incentive of cartel participants to report collusion where no application is made. I suggest a leniency program with a minimum-evidence standard (i) giving applicants rewards funded by the fines paid by cartel participants that do not report collusion, and (ii) selecting candidates for immunity according to the order of application and reducing fines of candidates that provide evidence above a minimum-evidence standard.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":" 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120830420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is a well known fact that many dynamic games are subject to the curse of dimensionality, limiting the ability to use them in the study of real-world problems. I propose a new method to solve complex large-scale dynamic games using aggregation as an approximate solution. I obtain two fundamental characterization results. First, approximations with small within-state variation in the primitives have a smaller maximum error bound. I provide numerical results which compare the exact errors and the bound. Second, I find that for monotone games, order preserving aggregation is a necessary condition of any optimal aggregation. I suggest using quantiles as a straightforward implementation of an order preserving aggregation architecture for industry distributions. I conclude with an illustration, by solving and estimating a stylized dynamic reputation game for the hotel industry. Simulation results show maximal errors between the exact and approximated solutions below 6%, with average errors below 1%.
{"title":"An Aggregation Method for Large-Scale Dynamic Games","authors":"C. Santos","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3521302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3521302","url":null,"abstract":"It is a well known fact that many dynamic games are subject to the curse of dimensionality, limiting the ability to use them in the study of real-world problems. I propose a new method to solve complex large-scale dynamic games using aggregation as an approximate solution. I obtain two fundamental characterization results. First, approximations with small within-state variation in the primitives have a smaller maximum error bound. I provide numerical results which compare the exact errors and the bound. Second, I find that for monotone games, order preserving aggregation is a necessary condition of any optimal aggregation. I suggest using quantiles as a straightforward implementation of an order preserving aggregation architecture for industry distributions. I conclude with an illustration, by solving and estimating a stylized dynamic reputation game for the hotel industry. Simulation results show maximal errors between the exact and approximated solutions below 6%, with average errors below 1%.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"14 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127905249","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Saptarshi P. Ghosh, N. Jain, César Martinelli, J. Roy
Can public mood swings that make all voters undergo an ideological shift towards a policy, hurt the electoral performance of that policy? The answer depends interestingly on the operations of an apolitical, viewership-maximizing dominant media. The media chooses news quality about fundamental uncertainties. Ex-ante preferences and news quality affect the voters' ex-ante value for information and viewership, and ex-post policy preferences and votes. Public mood swings in a policy's favor can reduce the expected vote share and the probability of winning by affecting the news quality, crowding out the mass ideological gain that initiates the change.
{"title":"Mood Swings, Media Coverage, and Elections","authors":"Saptarshi P. Ghosh, N. Jain, César Martinelli, J. Roy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3492299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3492299","url":null,"abstract":"Can public mood swings that make all voters undergo an ideological shift towards a policy, hurt the electoral performance of that policy? The answer depends interestingly on the operations of an apolitical, viewership-maximizing dominant media. The media chooses news quality about fundamental uncertainties. Ex-ante preferences and news quality affect the voters' ex-ante value for information and viewership, and ex-post policy preferences and votes. Public mood swings in a policy's favor can reduce the expected vote share and the probability of winning by affecting the news quality, crowding out the mass ideological gain that initiates the change.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"91 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132530704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Voting systems based on decoy ballots aim at preventing real ballots from being bought. Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but are indistinguishable from real ballots. We introduce a “Devil’s Menu” consisting of several price offers and allocation rules, which can be used by a malevolent third party—called the adversary—to curb the protection offered by decoy ballots. In equilibrium, the adversary can buy the real ballots of any strict subset of voting districts at a price corresponding to the willingness to sell them. By contrast, the voters holding decoy ballots are trapped into selling them at a low or negligible price. Decoy ballots may thus be ineffective against vote-buying even if the adversary’s budget is limited.
{"title":"Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu","authors":"H. Gersbach, A. Mamageishvili, O. Tejada","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3088508","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3088508","url":null,"abstract":"Voting systems based on decoy ballots aim at preventing real ballots from being bought. Decoy ballots do not count in election outcomes, but are indistinguishable from real ballots. We introduce a “Devil’s Menu” consisting of several price offers and allocation rules, which can be used by a malevolent third party—called the adversary—to curb the protection offered by decoy ballots. In equilibrium, the adversary can buy the real ballots of any strict subset of voting districts at a price corresponding to the willingness to sell them. By contrast, the voters holding decoy ballots are trapped into selling them at a low or negligible price. Decoy ballots may thus be ineffective against vote-buying even if the adversary’s budget is limited.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"76 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116728181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite. (JEL C72, D82, Z13)
{"title":"Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games","authors":"Kiryl Khalmetski, Dirk Sliwka","doi":"10.1257/MIC.20170193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20170193","url":null,"abstract":"We study equilibrium reporting behavior in cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies, while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite. (JEL C72, D82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121070408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider games where individual contributions are costly but beneficial to other players, so that contributing nothing is a dominant strategy. Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditional on others' actions, we study a mechanism based on conditional commitment functions (CCFs). If players must choose their CCFs once and simultaneously, the mechanism contributes to the Nash program since its strong (or coalition-proof) equilibria realize precisely the core outcomes of the corresponding bargaining problem. If players can communicate, the outcome can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient. Even without communication, the core outcomes may be found by simple individual learning rules. We motivate the idea in a Cournot duopoly and a public good problem and then derive our results in a very general decision-theoretic framework and give further examples from different areas of economics.
{"title":"Efficient Non-Cooperative Provision of Costly Positive Externalities via Conditional Commitments","authors":"J. Heitzig","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3449004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449004","url":null,"abstract":"We consider games where individual contributions are costly but beneficial to other players, so that contributing nothing is a dominant strategy. \u0000 \u0000Considering that players may be unable to write binding agreements but may make binding unilateral commitments that are conditional on others' actions, we study a mechanism based on conditional commitment functions (CCFs). If players must choose their CCFs once and simultaneously, the mechanism contributes to the Nash program since its strong (or coalition-proof) equilibria realize precisely the core outcomes of the corresponding bargaining problem. If players can communicate, the outcome can thus be expected to be Pareto-efficient. Even without communication, the core outcomes may be found by simple individual learning rules. \u0000 \u0000We motivate the idea in a Cournot duopoly and a public good problem and then derive our results in a very general decision-theoretic framework and give further examples from different areas of economics.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133906925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent’s type is his private information, and his actions are imperfectly observed. Players’ flow payoffs depend on the agent’s action, and players’ lump-sum payoffs when the game stops depends on the agent’s type. Both players are long-lived and share a common discount factor. We study the limit of the equilibrium outcomes as both players get arbitrarily patient. Nash equilibrium payoff vectors converge to the unique Nash equilibrium payoff vector of an auxiliary, two-stage game with observed mixed actions. The principal learns some but not all information about the agent’s type. Any payoff-relevant information revelation takes place at the beginning of the game. We calculate the probability that the principal eventually stops the game, against each type of the agent.
{"title":"Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions","authors":"M. Ekmekci, Lucas J. Maestri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3617179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3617179","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a class of two-player dynamic games to study the effectiveness of screening in a principal-agent problem. In every period, the principal chooses either to irreversibly stop the game or to continue, and the agent chooses an action if the principal chooses to continue. The agent’s type is his private information, and his actions are imperfectly observed. Players’ flow payoffs depend on the agent’s action, and players’ lump-sum payoffs when the game stops depends on the agent’s type. Both players are long-lived and share a common discount factor. We study the limit of the equilibrium outcomes as both players get arbitrarily patient. Nash equilibrium payoff vectors converge to the unique Nash equilibrium payoff vector of an auxiliary, two-stage game with observed mixed actions. The principal learns some but not all information about the agent’s type. Any payoff-relevant information revelation takes place at the beginning of the game. We calculate the probability that the principal eventually stops the game, against each type of the agent.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":" 17","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132011729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the political economy of redistribution over a broad class of decision rules. Since the core is generically non-unique, we suggest a simple and elegant procedure to select a robust equilibrium. Our selected policy depends on the full income profile, and in particular, on the preferences of two decisive voters. The effect of increasing inequality on redistribution depends on the decision rule and the shape of the income distribution; redistribution will increase if both decisive voters are 'relatively poor', and decrease if at least one is sufficiently 'rich'. Additionally, redistribution decreases as the polity adopts increasingly stringent super-majority rules.
{"title":"Redistribution under General Decision Rules","authors":"Giri Parameswaran, Hunter Rendleman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3286377","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286377","url":null,"abstract":"We study the political economy of redistribution over a broad class of decision rules. Since the core is generically non-unique, we suggest a simple and elegant procedure to select a robust equilibrium. Our selected policy depends on the full income profile, and in particular, on the preferences of two decisive voters. The effect of increasing inequality on redistribution depends on the decision rule and the shape of the income distribution; redistribution will increase if both decisive voters are 'relatively poor', and decrease if at least one is sufficiently 'rich'. Additionally, redistribution decreases as the polity adopts increasingly stringent super-majority rules.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128347819","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a priority based allocation problem with general weak priorities. We focus on two strategy-proof mechanisms: the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism and the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. We give two conditions on weak priority structures whereby each of the DA mechanism and TTC mechanism with an arbitrarily fixed tie-breaking rule is stable and efficient. Our conditions are a generalization of each of Ergin (2002) 's and Kesten (2006)'s conditions about strict priorities. Our two conditions do not imply each other, whereas it is known that Kesten's condition implies Ergin's condition. Our analysis shows that a strategy-proof selection from stable and efficient matchings can be done for a larger domain of priority structures than the domain of Ehlers and Erdil (2010).
{"title":"On Two Competing Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems with General Weak Priorities","authors":"Wataru Ishida","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3098685","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098685","url":null,"abstract":"We consider a priority based allocation problem with general weak priorities. We focus on two strategy-proof mechanisms: the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism and the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. We give two conditions on weak priority structures whereby each of the DA mechanism and TTC mechanism with an arbitrarily fixed tie-breaking rule is stable and efficient. Our conditions are a generalization of each of Ergin (2002) 's and Kesten (2006)'s conditions about strict priorities. Our two conditions do not imply each other, whereas it is known that Kesten's condition implies Ergin's condition. Our analysis shows that a strategy-proof selection from stable and efficient matchings can be done for a larger domain of priority structures than the domain of Ehlers and Erdil (2010).","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133465473","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter λ to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are shown to be Markov perfect equilibria. Furthermore, the logit Markov QRE correspondence can be given a homotopy interpretation. We prove that for all games, this homotopy contains a branch connecting the unique solution at λ = 0 to a unique limiting Markov perfect equilibrium. This result can be leveraged both for the computation of Markov perfect equilibria, and also as a selection criterion.
{"title":"Markov Quantal Response Equilibrium and a Homotopy Method for Computing and Selecting Markov Perfect Equilibria of Dynamic Stochastic Games","authors":"Steffen Eibelshäuser, David Poensgen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3314404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3314404","url":null,"abstract":"We formally define Markov quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and prove existence for all finite discounted dynamic stochastic games. The special case of logit Markov QRE constitutes a mapping from precision parameter λ to sets of logit Markov QRE. The limiting points of this correspondence are shown to be Markov perfect equilibria. Furthermore, the logit Markov QRE correspondence can be given a homotopy interpretation. We prove that for all games, this homotopy contains a branch connecting the unique solution at λ = 0 to a unique limiting Markov perfect equilibrium. This result can be leveraged both for the computation of Markov perfect equilibria, and also as a selection criterion.","PeriodicalId":373527,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Game Theory (Topic)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122440897","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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