Pub Date : 2021-09-01DOI: 10.32995/cogency.v13i1.367
Fabián Bernache Maldonado
¿Constituyen las analogías a priori un tipo de argumento distinto de los argumentos deductivos? Mi objetivo en este artículo es abordar esta larga polémica. Basándome en una tesis general acerca de la relación entre nuestra capacidad de aplicar conceptos y nuestra capacidad intuitiva de argumentar lógicamente, sostengo que los principios de fundamentación racional que empleamos en las analogías a priori son esencialmente los mismos que los que empleamos en la argumentación deductiva. Por consiguiente, al menos desde un punto de vista lógico, no hay razón para admitir que las analogías a priori constituyan un tipo distinto de argumento. No por ello debemos suponer, sin embargo, que el uso de analogías a priori es prescindible.
{"title":"Analogías a priori y aplicación de conceptos","authors":"Fabián Bernache Maldonado","doi":"10.32995/cogency.v13i1.367","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/cogency.v13i1.367","url":null,"abstract":"¿Constituyen las analogías a priori un tipo de argumento distinto de los argumentos deductivos? Mi objetivo en este artículo es abordar esta larga polémica. Basándome en una tesis general acerca de la relación entre nuestra capacidad de aplicar conceptos y nuestra capacidad intuitiva de argumentar lógicamente, sostengo que los principios de fundamentación racional que empleamos en las analogías a priori son esencialmente los mismos que los que empleamos en la argumentación deductiva. Por consiguiente, al menos desde un punto de vista lógico, no hay razón para admitir que las analogías a priori constituyan un tipo distinto de argumento. No por ello debemos suponer, sin embargo, que el uso de analogías a priori es prescindible.","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90972256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-30DOI: 10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.365
Gabriel Fortes, Antonia Larrain, Marisol Gómez
{"title":"Design of a teacher training program for the development of pedagogical knowledge on argumentation content","authors":"Gabriel Fortes, Antonia Larrain, Marisol Gómez","doi":"10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.365","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79330628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-30DOI: 10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.364
Nicola D'Alfonso
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of introducing a new theoretical model of deductive reasoning into the psychology of reasoning. This new theoretical model, which we will call here the theory of reasoning by goals, has as its main property to make every characteristic of deductive reasoning depend on the goal employed by an agent to be able to reason. The theoretical context within which this goal must be framed is therefore that of the agency, here understood in a generic way as the ability that each individual has, in his or her role as agent, to pursue his or her own ends through the achievement of specific goals.
{"title":"Theory of reasoning by goals","authors":"Nicola D'Alfonso","doi":"10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.364","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of introducing a new theoretical model of deductive reasoning into the psychology of reasoning. This new theoretical model, which we will call here the theory of reasoning by goals, has as its main property to make every characteristic of deductive reasoning depend on the goal employed by an agent to be able to reason. The theoretical context within which this goal must be framed is therefore that of the agency, here understood in a generic way as the ability that each individual has, in his or her role as agent, to pursue his or her own ends through the achievement of specific goals.","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73057281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-29DOI: 10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.360
Tasnim Lubis, A. Purba
{"title":"Metaphor and parallelism in political advertisements","authors":"Tasnim Lubis, A. Purba","doi":"10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.360","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85231090","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-29DOI: 10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.359
David Botting
Although large samples are always better than small samples and always confer greater justification on general claims than small samples, this paper argues for situations where even a small sample can justifiably be thought to be representative of the population and we are justified in believing, or having a pro-attitude towards, a general claim by generalizing from it. It is not fallacious to make inductive inferences in these situations from small samples. I will describe three such scenarios. On the other hand, when it cannot justifiably be thought to be representative of the population then it is always fallacious, irrespective of other considerations. I will describe one such scenario in which generalizing from a small sample has been claimed to be justified on the grounds of cognitive economy and will show that this claim is false unless the scenario reduces to one of the first three. Since generalizing from a single instance is a limiting case of generalizing from a small sample, I will focus on generalizing from a single instance. Whatever can be shown with regard to a single instance follows a fortiori for all small samples. As it turns out, it is very difficult for a reasoner reasoning in good conscience to commit to a fallacy of hasty generalization, and if a fallacy can only be committed by insincere reasoners and cannot be made by reasoners reasoning in good conscience, then it is not very interesting, as it is not really an error in reasoning. The reason for this is that for the reasoner to have reasoned fallaciously, they must have knowingly ignored evidence, and this is something that a sincere reasoner is not likely to have done. Equally, the charge that someone has committed this fallacy is not easy to substantiate and amounts to accusing the reasoner of insincerity.
{"title":"When is it responsible to generalize from a single instance?","authors":"David Botting","doi":"10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.359","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/COGENCY.V12I2.359","url":null,"abstract":"Although large samples are always better than small samples and always confer greater justification on general claims than small samples, this paper argues for situations where even a small sample can justifiably be thought to be representative of the population and we are justified in believing, or having a pro-attitude towards, a general claim by generalizing from it. It is not fallacious to make inductive inferences in these situations from small samples. I will describe three such scenarios. On the other hand, when it cannot justifiably be thought to be representative of the population then it is always fallacious, irrespective of other considerations. I will describe one such scenario in which generalizing from a small sample has been claimed to be justified on the grounds of cognitive economy and will show that this claim is false unless the scenario reduces to one of the first three. Since generalizing from a single instance is a limiting case of generalizing from a small sample, I will focus on generalizing from a single instance. Whatever can be shown with regard to a single instance follows a fortiori for all small samples. As it turns out, it is very difficult for a reasoner reasoning in good conscience to commit to a fallacy of hasty generalization, and if a fallacy can only be committed by insincere reasoners and cannot be made by reasoners reasoning in good conscience, then it is not very interesting, as it is not really an error in reasoning. The reason for this is that for the reasoner to have reasoned fallaciously, they must have knowingly ignored evidence, and this is something that a sincere reasoner is not likely to have done. Equally, the charge that someone has committed this fallacy is not easy to substantiate and amounts to accusing the reasoner of insincerity.","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85575632","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-01DOI: 10.32995/COGENCY.V11I1-2.330
J. Goñi
{"title":"Socio-epistemological challenges of democratic innovation: \"The ethics of invention\" by Sheila Jasanoff","authors":"J. Goñi","doi":"10.32995/COGENCY.V11I1-2.330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/COGENCY.V11I1-2.330","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73016033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-01DOI: 10.32995/cogency.v11i1-2.322
A. Larraín, Vivian Singer
La argumentación escrita es una habilidad relevante para la vida en sociedades complejas. Sin embargo, estas han sido escasamente focalizadas como objetivo pedagógico en el sistema educativo en Chile, y poco sabemos del desempeño en tareas de argumentación en escolares chilenos. Este estudio tiene por objetivo contribuir al conocimiento de las habilidades de escritura argumentativa en estudiantes chilenos y las variables socio-educativas que influyen en su desarrollo. Se evaluó una muestra de 674 estudiantes de cuarto año básico de 26 establecimientos subvencionados de la Región Metropolitana, Chile. Se realizó una regresión multinivel donde el nivel intersujeto corresponde a la edad y sexo de los estudiantes, y el nivel intrasujeto corresponde a las características del colegio, tipo de dependencia, índice de vulnerabilidad del colegio y los Puntajes SIMCE en lenguaje y matemáticas. Los hallazgos de este estudio dan cuenta de que el sexo, la dependencia del colegio y los puntajes SIMCE en lenguaje predicen de forma significativa
{"title":"Habilidades de argumentación de estudiantes de educación básica subvencionada en Chile y su relación con variables socio-educativas","authors":"A. Larraín, Vivian Singer","doi":"10.32995/cogency.v11i1-2.322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32995/cogency.v11i1-2.322","url":null,"abstract":"La argumentación escrita es una habilidad relevante para la vida en sociedades complejas. Sin embargo, estas han sido escasamente focalizadas como objetivo pedagógico en el sistema educativo en Chile, y poco sabemos del desempeño en tareas de argumentación en escolares chilenos. Este estudio tiene por objetivo contribuir al conocimiento de las habilidades de escritura argumentativa en estudiantes chilenos y las variables socio-educativas que influyen en su desarrollo. Se evaluó una muestra de 674 estudiantes de cuarto año básico de 26 establecimientos subvencionados de la Región Metropolitana, Chile. Se realizó una regresión multinivel donde el nivel intersujeto corresponde a la edad y sexo de los estudiantes, y el nivel intrasujeto corresponde a las características del colegio, tipo de dependencia, índice de vulnerabilidad del colegio y los Puntajes SIMCE en lenguaje y matemáticas. Los hallazgos de este estudio dan cuenta de que el sexo, la dependencia del colegio y los puntajes SIMCE en lenguaje predicen de forma significativa","PeriodicalId":37515,"journal":{"name":"Cogency","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72697308","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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