Do unbiased third-party peacekeepers build trust between groups in the aftermath of conflict? Theoretically, we point out that unbiased peacekeepers are the most effective at promoting trust. To isolate the causal effect of bias on trust, we use an iterated trust game in a laboratory setting. Groups that previously engaged in conflict are put into a setting in which they choose to trust or reciprocate any trust. Our findings suggest that biased monitors impede trust while unbiased monitors promote cooperative exchanges over time. The findings contribute to the peacekeeping literature by highlighting impartiality as an important condition under which peacekeepers build trust post-conflict.
{"title":"The Effect of Biased Peacekeepers on Building Trust","authors":"Jared Oestman, Rick K. Wilson","doi":"10.1017/XPS.2023.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.12","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Do unbiased third-party peacekeepers build trust between groups in the aftermath of conflict? Theoretically, we point out that unbiased peacekeepers are the most effective at promoting trust. To isolate the causal effect of bias on trust, we use an iterated trust game in a laboratory setting. Groups that previously engaged in conflict are put into a setting in which they choose to trust or reciprocate any trust. Our findings suggest that biased monitors impede trust while unbiased monitors promote cooperative exchanges over time. The findings contribute to the peacekeeping literature by highlighting impartiality as an important condition under which peacekeepers build trust post-conflict.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-06-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49398076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A. Aldama, Deshawn Sambrano, Mateo Vásquez-Cortés, Lauren E. Young
Abstract Cognitive appraisal theory predicts that emotions affect participation decisions around risky collective action. However, little existing research has attempted to parse out the mechanisms by which this process occurs. We build a global game of regime change and discuss the effects that fear may have on participation through pessimism about the state of the world, other players’ willingness to participate, and risk aversion. We test the behavioral effects of fear in this game by conducting 32 sessions of an experiment in two labs where participants are randomly assigned to an emotion induction procedure. In some rounds of the game, potential mechanisms are shut down to identify their contribution to the overall effect of fear. Our results show that in this context, fear does not affect willingness to participate. This finding highlights the importance of context, including integral versus incidental emotions and the size of the stakes, in shaping effect of emotions on behavior.
{"title":"An Experimental Test of the Effects of Fear in a Coordination Game","authors":"A. Aldama, Deshawn Sambrano, Mateo Vásquez-Cortés, Lauren E. Young","doi":"10.1017/XPS.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Cognitive appraisal theory predicts that emotions affect participation decisions around risky collective action. However, little existing research has attempted to parse out the mechanisms by which this process occurs. We build a global game of regime change and discuss the effects that fear may have on participation through pessimism about the state of the world, other players’ willingness to participate, and risk aversion. We test the behavioral effects of fear in this game by conducting 32 sessions of an experiment in two labs where participants are randomly assigned to an emotion induction procedure. In some rounds of the game, potential mechanisms are shut down to identify their contribution to the overall effect of fear. Our results show that in this context, fear does not affect willingness to participate. This finding highlights the importance of context, including integral versus incidental emotions and the size of the stakes, in shaping effect of emotions on behavior.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42121037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Joshua Freitag, Madeline Gochee, Mitchell Ransden, B. Nyhan, Kristy Roschke, D. Gillmor
Why are prominent news media retractions so rare? Using data from a survey experiment in which respondents view simulated Twitter newsfeeds, we demonstrate the dilemma facing news organizations that have published false information. Encouragingly, media retractions are effective at informing the public – they increase the accuracy of news consumers’ beliefs about the retracted reporting more than information from third parties questioning the original reporting or even the combination of the two. However, trust in the news outlet declines after a retraction, though this effect is small both substantively and in standardized terms relative to the increase in belief accuracy. This reputational damage persists even if the outlet issues a retraction before a third party questions the story. In a social media environment that frequently subjects reporting to intense scrutiny, the journalistic mission of news organizations to inform the public will increasingly conflict with organizational incentives to avoid admitting error.
{"title":"The Corrections Dilemma: Media Retractions Increase Belief Accuracy But Decrease Trust","authors":"Joshua Freitag, Madeline Gochee, Mitchell Ransden, B. Nyhan, Kristy Roschke, D. Gillmor","doi":"10.1017/xps.2023.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.4","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Why are prominent news media retractions so rare? Using data from a survey experiment in which respondents view simulated Twitter newsfeeds, we demonstrate the dilemma facing news organizations that have published false information. Encouragingly, media retractions are effective at informing the public – they increase the accuracy of news consumers’ beliefs about the retracted reporting more than information from third parties questioning the original reporting or even the combination of the two. However, trust in the news outlet declines after a retraction, though this effect is small both substantively and in standardized terms relative to the increase in belief accuracy. This reputational damage persists even if the outlet issues a retraction before a third party questions the story. In a social media environment that frequently subjects reporting to intense scrutiny, the journalistic mission of news organizations to inform the public will increasingly conflict with organizational incentives to avoid admitting error.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48256239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The gender gap in political knowledge is a well-established finding in Political Science. One explanation for gender differences in political knowledge is the activation of negative stereotypes about women. As part of the Systematizing Confidence in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) program, we conducted a two-stage preregistered and high-powered direct replication of Study 2 of Ihme and Tausendpfund (2018). While we successfully replicated the gender gap in political knowledge – such that male participants performed better than female participants – both the first (N = 671) and second stage (N = 831) of the replication of the stereotype activation effect were unsuccessful. Taken together (pooled N = 1,502), results indicate evidence of absence of the effect of stereotype activation on gender differences in political knowledge. We discuss potential explanations for these findings and put forward evidence that the gender gap in political knowledge might be an artifact of how knowledge is measured.
{"title":"Does Stereotype Threat Contribute to the Political Knowledge Gender Gap? A Preregistered Replication Study of Ihme and Tausendpfund (2018)","authors":"Flávio Azevedo, L. Micheli, D. Bolesta","doi":"10.1017/xps.2022.35","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2022.35","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The gender gap in political knowledge is a well-established finding in Political Science. One explanation for gender differences in political knowledge is the activation of negative stereotypes about women. As part of the Systematizing Confidence in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) program, we conducted a two-stage preregistered and high-powered direct replication of Study 2 of Ihme and Tausendpfund (2018). While we successfully replicated the gender gap in political knowledge – such that male participants performed better than female participants – both the first (N = 671) and second stage (N = 831) of the replication of the stereotype activation effect were unsuccessful. Taken together (pooled N = 1,502), results indicate evidence of absence of the effect of stereotype activation on gender differences in political knowledge. We discuss potential explanations for these findings and put forward evidence that the gender gap in political knowledge might be an artifact of how knowledge is measured.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43562179","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.
{"title":"The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats","authors":"Michal Smetana, M. Vranka, Ondřej Rosendorf","doi":"10.1017/xps.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we provide an empirical test for the theoretical claim that ambiguous nuclear threats create a “commitment trap” for American leaders: when deterrence fails, supposedly they are more likely to order the use of nuclear weapons to avoid domestic audience costs for backing down. We designed an original survey experiment and fielded it to a sample of 1,000 U.S. citizens. We found no evidence of a commitment trap when ambiguous nuclear threats are made. Unlike explicit threats, ambiguous ones did not generate domestic disapproval when the leader backed down; the decision to employ nuclear weapons led to more public backlash for the leader than being caught bluffing; and the threats did not influence public preference for nuclear use across our scenarios. Our findings contribute to the scholarly literature on nuclear crisis bargaining and policy debates over the future of US declaratory policy.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44073301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Electoral rules can affect who wins and who loses elections. Most cities select office holders through plurality rule, but an alternative, ranked-choice voting (RCV), has become increasingly popular. RCV requires voters to rank candidates, instead of simply selecting their most preferred candidate. Observers debate whether RCV will cure a variety of electoral ills or undermine representation. We test the effect of RCV on voter’s choices and perceptions of representation using survey experiments with large, representative samples of respondents. We find that candidates of color are significantly penalized in both plurality and RCV elections, with no significant difference between the rule types. However, providing respondents with candidates’ partisan affiliation significantly increases support for candidates of color.
{"title":"Ranking Candidates in Local Elections: Neither Panacea nor Catastrophe for Candidates of Color","authors":"Melody Crowder-Meyer, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Jessica Trounstine","doi":"10.1017/xps.2023.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.6","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Electoral rules can affect who wins and who loses elections. Most cities select office holders through plurality rule, but an alternative, ranked-choice voting (RCV), has become increasingly popular. RCV requires voters to rank candidates, instead of simply selecting their most preferred candidate. Observers debate whether RCV will cure a variety of electoral ills or undermine representation. We test the effect of RCV on voter’s choices and perceptions of representation using survey experiments with large, representative samples of respondents. We find that candidates of color are significantly penalized in both plurality and RCV elections, with no significant difference between the rule types. However, providing respondents with candidates’ partisan affiliation significantly increases support for candidates of color.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136155874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Oscar Castorena, Noam Lupu, Adam D. Wolsky, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister
Classic theories of public opinion suggest that negative shocks can undermine system support in weak democracies, but scant work has systematically assessed this thesis. We identify Peru’s explosive Vacuna-gate scandal as a most-likely case for finding a connection between corruption and political support. The scandal’s unexpected revelation in the middle of the 2021 AmericasBarometer Peru survey created conditions for a natural experiment. Applying an unexpected-event-during-survey design, we consider the consequences of the scandal for perceptions of corruption, system support, and support for democracy. We find robust evidence that the scandal increased even already high perceptions of corruption and lowered system support. Contrary to expectations derived from prior theories, we find no effect on explicit support for democracy. In the conclusion, we discuss the nuanced ways that scandal may shape democratic stability.
{"title":"Corruption and Political Support: The Case of Peru’s Vacuna-gate Scandal","authors":"Oscar Castorena, Noam Lupu, Adam D. Wolsky, Elizabeth J. Zechmeister","doi":"10.1017/xps.2023.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.7","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Classic theories of public opinion suggest that negative shocks can undermine system support in weak democracies, but scant work has systematically assessed this thesis. We identify Peru’s explosive Vacuna-gate scandal as a most-likely case for finding a connection between corruption and political support. The scandal’s unexpected revelation in the middle of the 2021 AmericasBarometer Peru survey created conditions for a natural experiment. Applying an unexpected-event-during-survey design, we consider the consequences of the scandal for perceptions of corruption, system support, and support for democracy. We find robust evidence that the scandal increased even already high perceptions of corruption and lowered system support. Contrary to expectations derived from prior theories, we find no effect on explicit support for democracy. In the conclusion, we discuss the nuanced ways that scandal may shape democratic stability.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42068263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We are excited to take the helm at JEPS and honored to follow previous editorial teams, who collectively have established JEPS as the journal of record for experimental research in political science. We are especially grateful to Kevin (Vin) Arceneaux who served as editor for 5 years. Under Vin’s leadership, the journal introduced new article formats and adopted a “strong” associate editor model. These policies have elevated the quality of the research that ultimately appears in the journal, and we plan to continue them. Before describing journal policies in more detail, we would like to introduce the team of Associate Editors who will serve with us. They are Bert Bakker (Senior Associate Editor), Claire Adida, Matthew Hayes, Holger Kern, Jonathan Renshon, John Barry Ryan, Beth Simas, and Gijs Schumacher. This is an impressive group of scholars whose expertise in different areas of experimental research will help ensure the methodological diversity of the journal. Consistent with the previous editorship, Associate Editors will have complete autonomy over manuscripts that have been assigned to them. The two Editors will share the task of reviewing with the Associate Editors, taking on submissions that are relevant to their expertise. The Senior Associate Editor will serve as Acting Editor when a submission presents a conflict of interest for either Editor. Since JEPS was founded in 2014, experiments have “evolved from an emergent method to an accepted method to a primary method” (Druckman and Green 2021, p. 1). This evolution reflects the distinctive advantages of experimentation when it comes to identifying causal effects. There’s no denying that it also is easier to conduct experiments today than it was two decades ago (e.g., in terms of data availability and technological advances). Yet, the ease of conducting experiments belies the challenges of using this method effectively. A high-quality experiment must provide: (1) a theoretical and/or empirical contribution, (2) appropriate comparisons in a well-powered design, and (3) statistical analyses that are informative and transparent. While JEPS takes a broad view of what counts as an experiment, authors must articulate how their design identifies the causal effect that they are studying. To preserve an already overburdened reviewer pool, submissions that do not meet the above criteria will be desk-rejected. Past practice at the journal has demonstrated that desk rejects can be used in a fair manner, and we strive to do the same.
{"title":"Welcome from the Editors","authors":"Jennifer Jerit, Scott Clifford","doi":"10.1017/XPS.2023.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.5","url":null,"abstract":"We are excited to take the helm at JEPS and honored to follow previous editorial teams, who collectively have established JEPS as the journal of record for experimental research in political science. We are especially grateful to Kevin (Vin) Arceneaux who served as editor for 5 years. Under Vin’s leadership, the journal introduced new article formats and adopted a “strong” associate editor model. These policies have elevated the quality of the research that ultimately appears in the journal, and we plan to continue them. Before describing journal policies in more detail, we would like to introduce the team of Associate Editors who will serve with us. They are Bert Bakker (Senior Associate Editor), Claire Adida, Matthew Hayes, Holger Kern, Jonathan Renshon, John Barry Ryan, Beth Simas, and Gijs Schumacher. This is an impressive group of scholars whose expertise in different areas of experimental research will help ensure the methodological diversity of the journal. Consistent with the previous editorship, Associate Editors will have complete autonomy over manuscripts that have been assigned to them. The two Editors will share the task of reviewing with the Associate Editors, taking on submissions that are relevant to their expertise. The Senior Associate Editor will serve as Acting Editor when a submission presents a conflict of interest for either Editor. Since JEPS was founded in 2014, experiments have “evolved from an emergent method to an accepted method to a primary method” (Druckman and Green 2021, p. 1). This evolution reflects the distinctive advantages of experimentation when it comes to identifying causal effects. There’s no denying that it also is easier to conduct experiments today than it was two decades ago (e.g., in terms of data availability and technological advances). Yet, the ease of conducting experiments belies the challenges of using this method effectively. A high-quality experiment must provide: (1) a theoretical and/or empirical contribution, (2) appropriate comparisons in a well-powered design, and (3) statistical analyses that are informative and transparent. While JEPS takes a broad view of what counts as an experiment, authors must articulate how their design identifies the causal effect that they are studying. To preserve an already overburdened reviewer pool, submissions that do not meet the above criteria will be desk-rejected. Past practice at the journal has demonstrated that desk rejects can be used in a fair manner, and we strive to do the same.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49310656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Conspiracy theories and misinformation have become increasingly prominent in politics, and these beliefs have pernicious effects on political behavior. A prominent line of research suggests that these beliefs are promoted by repeated exposure. Yet, as scholars have rushed to understand these beliefs, they have exposed countless respondents to conspiratorial claims, raising the question of whether researchers are contributing to their spread. We investigate this possibility using a pre-registered within-subjects experiment embedded in a panel survey. The results suggest that exposure to a standard conspiracy question causes a significant increase in the likelihood of endorsing that conspiracy a week later. However, this exposure effect does not occur with a question format that offers an alternative, non-conspiratorial explanation for the target event. Thus, we recommend that researchers reduce the likelihood of spreading conspiracy beliefs by adopting a question format that asks respondents to choose between alternative explanations for an event.
{"title":"Do Survey Questions Spread Conspiracy Beliefs?","authors":"Scott Clifford, Brian W. Sullivan","doi":"10.1017/XPS.2023.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2023.1","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Conspiracy theories and misinformation have become increasingly prominent in politics, and these beliefs have pernicious effects on political behavior. A prominent line of research suggests that these beliefs are promoted by repeated exposure. Yet, as scholars have rushed to understand these beliefs, they have exposed countless respondents to conspiratorial claims, raising the question of whether researchers are contributing to their spread. We investigate this possibility using a pre-registered within-subjects experiment embedded in a panel survey. The results suggest that exposure to a standard conspiracy question causes a significant increase in the likelihood of endorsing that conspiracy a week later. However, this exposure effect does not occur with a question format that offers an alternative, non-conspiratorial explanation for the target event. Thus, we recommend that researchers reduce the likelihood of spreading conspiracy beliefs by adopting a question format that asks respondents to choose between alternative explanations for an event.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47110234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Experiments on the responsiveness of elected officials highlight the tension between the freedom to carry out research and the right of subjects to be treated with respect. Controversy emerges from the power of politicians to block or object to experimental designs using identity deception. One way to resolve this conundrum is to consult citizens who, as constituents of politicians, have an interest in promoting the accountability of elected representatives. Building on the work of Desposato and Naurin and Öhberg, this survey experiment presented research designs to UK citizens for their evaluation. The findings show that citizens strongly approve of experimental research on Members of Parliament (MPs) and are glad to see their representatives participate. There are no differences in support whether designs use identity deception, debriefing, confederates or pre-agreement from MPs. Linked to high interest in politics, more citizens are glad their MPs participate in studies using identity deception than those deploying confederates.
{"title":"Using Citizen Voice to Evaluate Experiments on Politicians: A UK Survey Experiment","authors":"P. John, Kristina Kim, Luis Soto-Tamayo","doi":"10.1017/xps.2023.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/xps.2023.3","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Experiments on the responsiveness of elected officials highlight the tension between the freedom to carry out research and the right of subjects to be treated with respect. Controversy emerges from the power of politicians to block or object to experimental designs using identity deception. One way to resolve this conundrum is to consult citizens who, as constituents of politicians, have an interest in promoting the accountability of elected representatives. Building on the work of Desposato and Naurin and Öhberg, this survey experiment presented research designs to UK citizens for their evaluation. The findings show that citizens strongly approve of experimental research on Members of Parliament (MPs) and are glad to see their representatives participate. There are no differences in support whether designs use identity deception, debriefing, confederates or pre-agreement from MPs. Linked to high interest in politics, more citizens are glad their MPs participate in studies using identity deception than those deploying confederates.","PeriodicalId":37558,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Political Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41292644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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