Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.pf.lilly
M. Lilly, Emily M. Walter, Dev Balkissoon
Spurred by a 2021 commitment by the European Union to adopt a carbon border adjustment mechanism to address carbon leakage in international trade, developed economies are giving such proposals serious consideration. This article considers the arguments for and against a border carbon adjustment (BCA) for Canada, considering the likely treatment of such measures by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and under Canada's major trade agreements with the European Union, the United States and Mexico, and Indo-Pacific partners. The authors analyze the likely impact of a BCA on carbon-intensive trade between Canada and these trading partners. They conclude that while a carefully designed Canadian BCA could be both WTO-legal and permissible under Canada's major trade agreements, serious political and economic challenges are likely to arise. Since BCAs are by nature protectionist, proponents must advance a stronger case for their effectiveness in addressing global carbon emissions if these mechanisms are to be widely adopted.
{"title":"Policy Forum: Trade Policy Pain for Marginal Climate Gain? The Complex Case for Border Carbon Adjustments in Canada","authors":"M. Lilly, Emily M. Walter, Dev Balkissoon","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.pf.lilly","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.pf.lilly","url":null,"abstract":"Spurred by a 2021 commitment by the European Union to adopt a carbon border adjustment mechanism to address carbon leakage in international trade, developed economies are giving such proposals serious consideration. This article considers the arguments for and against a border carbon adjustment (BCA) for Canada, considering the likely treatment of such measures by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and under Canada's major trade agreements with the European Union, the United States and Mexico, and Indo-Pacific partners. The authors analyze the likely impact of a BCA on carbon-intensive trade between Canada and these trading partners. They conclude that while a carefully designed Canadian BCA could be both WTO-legal and permissible under Canada's major trade agreements, serious political and economic challenges are likely to arise. Since BCAs are by nature protectionist, proponents must advance a stronger case for their effectiveness in addressing global carbon emissions if these mechanisms are to be widely adopted.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"348 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132607271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-04-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.fon
D. Lin
This article surveys the 2021-22 provincial and territorial budgets.
本文调查了2021-22年的省和地区预算。
{"title":"Finances of the Nation: Survey of Provincial and Territorial Budgets, 2021-22","authors":"D. Lin","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.fon","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2022.70.1.fon","url":null,"abstract":"This article surveys the 2021-22 provincial and territorial budgets.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133335494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.hickey
Ross Hickey
In this article, I ask, "What is the relationship between rules governing band council elections and property taxation across First Nations in British Columbia?" I outline the three major categories of First Nation electoral rules: default Indian Act elections, First Nations Elections Act rules, and custom election codes. I contend that First Nations who use custom election codes are more likely to exhibit stable governance than those who do not. This mechanism can be helpful in introducing property taxation. It can also reduce property tax uncertainty—a feature known to depress on-reserve property values. I also present some suggestions for First Nations wishing to improve perceptions of taxation in their communities.
{"title":"Policy Forum: First Nation Property Taxation and Governance in British Columbia","authors":"Ross Hickey","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.hickey","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.hickey","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I ask, \"What is the relationship between rules governing band council elections and property taxation across First Nations in British Columbia?\" I outline the three major categories of First Nation electoral rules: default Indian Act elections, First Nations Elections Act rules, and custom election codes. I contend that First Nations who use custom election codes are more likely to exhibit stable governance than those who do not. This mechanism can be helpful in introducing property taxation. It can also reduce property tax uncertainty—a feature known to depress on-reserve property values. I also present some suggestions for First Nations wishing to improve perceptions of taxation in their communities.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"121 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122691113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.chow
Grace Chow, Henry Shew
The Canadian Income Tax Act imposes limitations on the time period during which the minister is allowed to assess or reassess a taxpayer. Generally, the limitation period for assessment or reassessment is three or four years from the date of the original assessment. This article addresses the many provisions in the Act that give the minister the authority to assess or reassess without specifying a limitation period. The authors group these provisions into categories according to the circumstances that they address. Within this framework, they review the rationale behind the omission of a limitation period and consider whether that policy is justified. The authors then provide a summary discussion of the positions of the Canada Revenue Agency and the courts with respect to assessment beyond the normal limitation period, and the options available to taxpayers who seek to make changes to a statute-barred return. Finally, the authors present their recommendations for the amendment of specific provisions where a limitation period would be justified.
{"title":"Statute-Barred Date: Why Isn't There Always One?","authors":"Grace Chow, Henry Shew","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.chow","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.chow","url":null,"abstract":"The Canadian Income Tax Act imposes limitations on the time period during which the minister is allowed to assess or reassess a taxpayer. Generally, the limitation period for assessment or reassessment is three or four years from the date of the original assessment. This article addresses the many provisions in the Act that give the minister the authority to assess or reassess without specifying a limitation period. The authors group these provisions into categories according to the circumstances that they address. Within this framework, they review the rationale behind the omission of a limitation period and consider whether that policy is justified. The authors then provide a summary discussion of the positions of the Canada Revenue Agency and the courts with respect to assessment beyond the normal limitation period, and the options available to taxpayers who seek to make changes to a statute-barred return. Finally, the authors present their recommendations for the amendment of specific provisions where a limitation period would be justified.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127592608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.fon
L. di Matteo
In this article, Livio Di Matteo provides an overview of expenditures on health care in Canada over the long term. He examines changes in the size, relative importance, growth, and composition of health expenditures, with an additional focus on provincial-territorial government spending since the 1970s. Di Matteo links the evolution of health-care spending to factors affecting the demand for and supply of health services, including income, demographic changes, technological development, cost, policy, and public finances.
在本文中，Livio Di Matteo概述了加拿大长期医疗保健支出情况。他研究了卫生支出的规模、相对重要性、增长和构成的变化，并特别关注了自20世纪70年代以来省-地区政府的支出。迪马特奥将保健支出的演变与影响保健服务需求和供应的因素联系起来，这些因素包括收入、人口变化、技术发展、成本、政策和公共财政。
{"title":"Finances of the Nation: The Evolution of Health Expenditures in Canada, 1926-2019","authors":"L. di Matteo","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.fon","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.fon","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, Livio Di Matteo provides an overview of expenditures on health care in Canada over the long term. He examines changes in the size, relative importance, growth, and composition of health expenditures, with an additional focus on provincial-territorial government spending since the 1970s. Di Matteo links the evolution of health-care spending to factors affecting the demand for and supply of health services, including income, demographic changes, technological development, cost, policy, and public finances.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115206072","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.itp
Yan Xu, Zizheng Zhao
Expatriates have been fundamental to China's economic growth, contributing to the country's socioeconomic development and modernization. The second-largest group of expatriates in China are North Americans. Personal income taxation concessions for expatriate workers have been an important instrument to attract and retain skilled foreign labour since China opened its doors to foreign investment and an income tax was adopted four decades ago. A recent overhaul of the law on individual income tax introduced a number of changes to expatriate income taxation, including the winding back of some preferential concessions previously offered only to expatriates. A literal reading of these changes suggests that the new regime has led to harsher tax treatment of expatriates and increased their tax liability. This article considers whether this view holds up, by closely analyzing the new system's major features relating to individual income tax as they affect expatriates. The authors challenge the literal reading of the law and argue that the recent changes have not fundamentally altered the underlying policy on expatriate income taxation. Further, an economically stronger China has not observed any diminishment of the role of personal income taxation as an instrument of government policy, despite the recent changes. A generous interpretation of the legal terms and rules, and of the application of concessions under the amended system, may encourage more lenient treatment of Canadians and other expatriates working and living in China.
{"title":"International Tax Planning: China's New Regime for Taxing Expatriate Income: Tightening the Screws or Vintage Wine in a New Bottle?","authors":"Yan Xu, Zizheng Zhao","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.itp","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.itp","url":null,"abstract":"Expatriates have been fundamental to China's economic growth, contributing to the country's socioeconomic development and modernization. The second-largest group of expatriates in China are North Americans. Personal income taxation concessions for expatriate workers have been an important instrument to attract and retain skilled foreign labour since China opened its doors to foreign investment and an income tax was adopted four decades ago. A recent overhaul of the law on individual income tax introduced a number of changes to expatriate income taxation, including the winding back of some preferential concessions previously offered only to expatriates. A literal reading of these changes suggests that the new regime has led to harsher tax treatment of expatriates and increased their tax liability. This article considers whether this view holds up, by closely analyzing the new system's major features relating to individual income tax as they affect expatriates. The authors challenge the literal reading of the law and argue that the recent changes have not fundamentally altered the underlying policy on expatriate income taxation. Further, an economically stronger China has not observed any diminishment of the role of personal income taxation as an instrument of government policy, despite the recent changes. A generous interpretation of the legal terms and rules, and of the application of concessions under the amended system, may encourage more lenient treatment of Canadians and other expatriates working and living in China.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"178 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124407487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.f
Audrey Boissonneault
La Loi sur la gestion financière des premières nations (LGFPN) délègue aux conseils de bande le pouvoir de prélever l'impôt foncier. Le présent article décrit et analyse l'efficacité de la délégation de pouvoir comme outil d'autonomie gouvernementale. L'article 5(1) de la LGFPN permet aux conseils de bande de prélever l'impôt foncier afin d'améliorer leur situation économique — en leur fournissant une source de revenus — et d'améliorer leur autonomie gouvernementale. Toutefois, il comporte de nombreuses restrictions. Celles-ci incluent l'obligation de se conformer aux normes de gestions financières prévues par la Loi, ainsi que l'homologation des lois concernant l'impôt foncier par la Commission sur la fiscalité des premières nations (CFPN) (dont la majorité des membres sont nommés par le gouvernement fédéral). L'impôt foncier doit également respecter les règlements pris par le gouverneur en conseil en vertu de la Loi, qui concernent présentement l'évaluation des propriétés (incluant les appels concernant celle-ci), les intérêts et pénalités ainsi que l'inspection des propriétés. Les contribuables ont déposé à deux reprises des demandes en contrôle judiciaire visant à faire invalider les décisions de la CFPN. Considérant que ces deux tentatives se sont soldées par un échec, il importe de mitiger les critiques liées aux restrictions à l'autonomie gouvernementale qui semblent être imposées par le texte de la LGFPN. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le gouvernement fédéral conserve un contrôle important sur le processus législatif des Premières Nations en ce qui concerne l'impôt foncier. Lorsqu'il prend la forme de règlement, ce contrôle est direct, mais le gouvernement conserve également un contrôle indirect de par la présence de la CFPN. Une réforme s'impose : les pouvoirs doivent être véritablement délégués afin d'atteindre l'objectif d'améliorer de façon significative l'autonomie gouvernementale des Premières Nations participantes. Le pouvoir de prélever l'impôt foncier est délégué aux conseils de bande depuis la Loi sur les indiens de 1951. Il est temps que les Premières Nations puissent exercer ce droit sans ingérence fédérale. Une protection constitutionnelle de l'autonomie gouvernementale doit être l'objectif ultime.
{"title":"Policy Forum : Analyse critique de l'impôt foncier sous le régime de la Loi sur la gestion financière des premières nations comme outil d'autonomie gouvernementale","authors":"Audrey Boissonneault","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.f","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.f","url":null,"abstract":"La Loi sur la gestion financière des premières nations (LGFPN) délègue aux conseils de bande le pouvoir de prélever l'impôt foncier. Le présent article décrit et analyse l'efficacité de la délégation de pouvoir comme outil d'autonomie gouvernementale. L'article 5(1) de la LGFPN permet aux conseils de bande de prélever l'impôt foncier afin d'améliorer leur situation économique — en leur fournissant une source de revenus — et d'améliorer leur autonomie gouvernementale. Toutefois, il comporte de nombreuses restrictions. Celles-ci incluent l'obligation de se conformer aux normes de gestions financières prévues par la Loi, ainsi que l'homologation des lois concernant l'impôt foncier par la Commission sur la fiscalité des premières nations (CFPN) (dont la majorité des membres sont nommés par le gouvernement fédéral). L'impôt foncier doit également respecter les règlements pris par le gouverneur en conseil en vertu de la Loi, qui concernent présentement l'évaluation des propriétés (incluant les appels concernant celle-ci), les intérêts et pénalités ainsi que l'inspection des propriétés. Les contribuables ont déposé à deux reprises des demandes en contrôle judiciaire visant à faire invalider les décisions de la CFPN. Considérant que ces deux tentatives se sont soldées par un échec, il importe de mitiger les critiques liées aux restrictions à l'autonomie gouvernementale qui semblent être imposées par le texte de la LGFPN. Il n'en demeure pas moins que le gouvernement fédéral conserve un contrôle important sur le processus législatif des Premières Nations en ce qui concerne l'impôt foncier. Lorsqu'il prend la forme de règlement, ce contrôle est direct, mais le gouvernement conserve également un contrôle indirect de par la présence de la CFPN. Une réforme s'impose : les pouvoirs doivent être véritablement délégués afin d'atteindre l'objectif d'améliorer de façon significative l'autonomie gouvernementale des Premières Nations participantes. Le pouvoir de prélever l'impôt foncier est délégué aux conseils de bande depuis la Loi sur les indiens de 1951. Il est temps que les Premières Nations puissent exercer ce droit sans ingérence fédérale. Une protection constitutionnelle de l'autonomie gouvernementale doit être l'objectif ultime.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"99 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124672081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-01DOI: 10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.e
A. Boissonneault
The First Nations Fiscal Management Act (FMA) delegates the power to levy property taxes to band councils. The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze the effectiveness of the legislation as a self-government tool. Section 5(1) of the FMA allows band councils to levy property taxes both to increase their economic capacity—providing them with a source of income—and to improve self-government. However, this grant of power is subject to numerous conditions. These include compliance with the financial management requirements set out in the act, as well as approval of property tax laws by the First Nations Tax Commission (FNTC) (the majority of the members of which are appointed by the federal government). Also, the taxes imposed must comply with regulations set by the governor in council, which currently cover the property assessment process (including an appeal process), interest and penalties, and inspection of property. There have been two attempts by property taxpayers to overturn the decisions of the FNTC by way of judicial review. The fact that both were unsuccessful has somewhat mitigated criticism of the constraints on First Nation self-government imposed by the FMA. Overall, the federal government maintains significant control over the law-making process by which First Nations levy property taxes, both directly through regulations and indirectly through its dominant presence on the FNTC. Reform is needed: real powers need to be delegated to meet the stated objective of creating meaningful self-government for participating First Nations. The power to impose property taxes was first delegated to band councils by the Indian Act in 1951. Therefore, it is high time that First Nations be granted the right to exercise that power without federal intervention. Constitutional protection of the right to self-government must be the ultimate goal.
{"title":"Policy Forum: A Critical Analysis of Property Taxation Under the First Nations Fiscal Management Act as a Self-Government Tool","authors":"A. Boissonneault","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.e","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2021.69.3.pf.boissonneault.e","url":null,"abstract":"The First Nations Fiscal Management Act (FMA) delegates the power to levy property taxes to band councils. The purpose of this article is to describe and analyze the effectiveness of the legislation as a self-government tool. Section 5(1) of the FMA allows band councils to levy property taxes both to increase their economic capacity—providing them with a source of income—and to improve self-government. However, this grant of power is subject to numerous conditions. These include compliance with the financial management requirements set out in the act, as well as approval of property tax laws by the First Nations Tax Commission (FNTC) (the majority of the members of which are appointed by the federal government). Also, the taxes imposed must comply with regulations set by the governor in council, which currently cover the property assessment process (including an appeal process), interest and penalties, and inspection of property. There have been two attempts by property taxpayers to overturn the decisions of the FNTC by way of judicial review. The fact that both were unsuccessful has somewhat mitigated criticism of the constraints on First Nation self-government imposed by the FMA. Overall, the federal government maintains significant control over the law-making process by which First Nations levy property taxes, both directly through regulations and indirectly through its dominant presence on the FNTC. Reform is needed: real powers need to be delegated to meet the stated objective of creating meaningful self-government for participating First Nations. The power to impose property taxes was first delegated to band councils by the Indian Act in 1951. Therefore, it is high time that First Nations be granted the right to exercise that power without federal intervention. Constitutional protection of the right to self-government must be the ultimate goal.","PeriodicalId":375948,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Tax Journal/Revue fiscale canadienne","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123515813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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