Pub Date : 2020-10-29DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2022.2113671
L. Taylor, H. Mukiri-Smith, Tjaša Petročnik, Laura Savolainen, Aaron Martin
ABSTRACT Regulating the data market will be one of the major challenges of the twenty-first century. In order to think about regulating this market, however, we first need to make its dimensions and dynamics more accessible to observation and analysis. In this paper we explore what the state of the sociological and legal research on markets can tell us about the market for data: what kind of market it is, the practices and configurations of actors that constitute it, and what kinds of data are traded there. We start from the subjective opacity of this market to researchers interested in regulation and governance, review conflicting positions on its extent, diversity and regulability, and then explore comparisons from food and medicine regulation to understand the possible normative and practical implications and aims inherent in attempting to regulate how data is shared and traded. We conclude that there is a strong argument for a normative shift in the aims of regulation with regard to the data market, away from a prioritisation of the economic value of data and toward a more nuanced approach that aims to align the uses of data with the needs and rights of the communities reflected in it.
{"title":"(Re)making data markets: an exploration of the regulatory challenges","authors":"L. Taylor, H. Mukiri-Smith, Tjaša Petročnik, Laura Savolainen, Aaron Martin","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2022.2113671","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2022.2113671","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Regulating the data market will be one of the major challenges of the twenty-first century. In order to think about regulating this market, however, we first need to make its dimensions and dynamics more accessible to observation and analysis. In this paper we explore what the state of the sociological and legal research on markets can tell us about the market for data: what kind of market it is, the practices and configurations of actors that constitute it, and what kinds of data are traded there. We start from the subjective opacity of this market to researchers interested in regulation and governance, review conflicting positions on its extent, diversity and regulability, and then explore comparisons from food and medicine regulation to understand the possible normative and practical implications and aims inherent in attempting to regulate how data is shared and traded. We conclude that there is a strong argument for a normative shift in the aims of regulation with regard to the data market, away from a prioritisation of the economic value of data and toward a more nuanced approach that aims to align the uses of data with the needs and rights of the communities reflected in it.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"14 1","pages":"355 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43308722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-14DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2021.1977217
Laurence Diver
ABSTRACT This article introduces digisprudence, a theory about the legitimacy of software that both conceptualises regulative code’s potential illegitimacies and suggests concrete ways to ameliorate them. First, it develops the notion of computational legalism – code’s ruleishness, opacity, immediacy, immutability, pervasiveness, and private production – before sketching how it is that code regulates, according to design theory and the philosophy of technology. These ideas are synthesised into a framework of digisprudential affordances, which are translations of legitimacy requirements derived from legal philosophy into the conceptual language of design. The ex ante focus on code’s production is pivotal, in turn suggesting a guiding ‘constitutional’ role for design processes. The article includes a case study on blockchain applications and concludes by setting out some avenues for future work.
{"title":"Digisprudence: the design of legitimate code","authors":"Laurence Diver","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2021.1977217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2021.1977217","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article introduces digisprudence, a theory about the legitimacy of software that both conceptualises regulative code’s potential illegitimacies and suggests concrete ways to ameliorate them. First, it develops the notion of computational legalism – code’s ruleishness, opacity, immediacy, immutability, pervasiveness, and private production – before sketching how it is that code regulates, according to design theory and the philosophy of technology. These ideas are synthesised into a framework of digisprudential affordances, which are translations of legitimacy requirements derived from legal philosophy into the conceptual language of design. The ex ante focus on code’s production is pivotal, in turn suggesting a guiding ‘constitutional’ role for design processes. The article includes a case study on blockchain applications and concludes by setting out some avenues for future work.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"13 1","pages":"325 - 354"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46025217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1815402
Hin-Yan Liu, M. Maas, J. Danaher, Luisa Scarcella, Michaela Georgina Lexer, L. Van Rompaey
ABSTRACT Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly expected to disrupt the ordinary functioning of society. From how we fight wars or govern society, to how we work and play, and from how we create to how we teach and learn, there is almost no field of human activity which is believed to be entirely immune from the impact of this emerging technology. This poses a multifaceted problem when it comes to designing and understanding regulatory responses to AI. This article aims to: (i) defend the need for a novel conceptual model for understanding the systemic legal disruption caused by new technologies such as AI; (ii) to situate this model in relation to preceding debates about the interaction of regulation with new technologies (particularly the ‘cyberlaw’ and ‘robolaw’ debates); and (iii) to set out a detailed model for understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, examining both pathways stemming from new affordances that can give rise to a regulatory ‘disruptive moment’, as well as the Legal Development, Displacement or Destruction that can ensue. The article proposes that this model of legal disruption can be broadly generalisable to understanding the legal effects and challenges of other emerging technologies.
{"title":"Artificial intelligence and legal disruption: a new model for analysis","authors":"Hin-Yan Liu, M. Maas, J. Danaher, Luisa Scarcella, Michaela Georgina Lexer, L. Van Rompaey","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1815402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815402","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly expected to disrupt the ordinary functioning of society. From how we fight wars or govern society, to how we work and play, and from how we create to how we teach and learn, there is almost no field of human activity which is believed to be entirely immune from the impact of this emerging technology. This poses a multifaceted problem when it comes to designing and understanding regulatory responses to AI. This article aims to: (i) defend the need for a novel conceptual model for understanding the systemic legal disruption caused by new technologies such as AI; (ii) to situate this model in relation to preceding debates about the interaction of regulation with new technologies (particularly the ‘cyberlaw’ and ‘robolaw’ debates); and (iii) to set out a detailed model for understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, examining both pathways stemming from new affordances that can give rise to a regulatory ‘disruptive moment’, as well as the Legal Development, Displacement or Destruction that can ensue. The article proposes that this model of legal disruption can be broadly generalisable to understanding the legal effects and challenges of other emerging technologies.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"205 - 258"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49122353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1815404
Paweł Księżak, Sylwia Wojtczak
ABSTRACT In 2017, the European Parliament issued a Resolution calling on the Commission to elaborate new solutions based on civil law that could respond to the rapid present-day development of robotics and AI. The Resolution, pushing for the preparation of new tort law focusing on robots, postulates that a new definition of robot be prepared. Responding to the Resolution, this paper consists in a legal-cognitive-linguistic analysis which draws three conclusions: firstly, that the definitional method is not the best approach to determining the scope of the regulation of robotics and AI; secondly, that the Resolution is incorrect in assuming that a new civil law solution should turn on differentiating between AI and robots and that robots should be treated as focal in determining the scope of the regulation; and, thirdly, that any new norms should be rooted in the concept of AI and not, as proposed by the Resolution, in the concept of robot.
{"title":"AI versus robot: in search of a domain for the new European civil law","authors":"Paweł Księżak, Sylwia Wojtczak","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1815404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815404","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 2017, the European Parliament issued a Resolution calling on the Commission to elaborate new solutions based on civil law that could respond to the rapid present-day development of robotics and AI. The Resolution, pushing for the preparation of new tort law focusing on robots, postulates that a new definition of robot be prepared. Responding to the Resolution, this paper consists in a legal-cognitive-linguistic analysis which draws three conclusions: firstly, that the definitional method is not the best approach to determining the scope of the regulation of robotics and AI; secondly, that the Resolution is incorrect in assuming that a new civil law solution should turn on differentiating between AI and robots and that robots should be treated as focal in determining the scope of the regulation; and, thirdly, that any new norms should be rooted in the concept of AI and not, as proposed by the Resolution, in the concept of robot.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"297 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815404","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49180995","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1815403
J. Kaldor, Lisa Eckstein, D. Nicol, C. Stewart
ABSTRACT This paper interrogates the common characterisation of innovative health technologies ‘leading’, while law and regulation ‘lag’ behind. We analysed the case of faecal microbiota transplants (FMT), an innovative procedure whose regulatory status remains in flux worldwide. We searched the literature for papers that described the regulation of FMT, and coded these according to a simple analytic framework. We identified 21 relevant papers. To date, no jurisdiction has implemented FMT-specific regulation. Instead, FMT is dealt with under a range of approaches, which include fitting it within existing regulation, and the use of ‘soft’ law. We found that metaphor, or argument by analogy, played a central role in delineating the potential regulatory options. We also found the relationship between innovation and regulation to be more ‘dialogic’ than oppositional, dialectical, or akin to a race. These findings underscore the importance of case-by-case investigation to determine the applicability of general narratives about law and regulation to specific instances of innovative technologies.
{"title":"Regulating innovative health technologies: dialectics, dialogics, and the case of faecal microbiota transplants","authors":"J. Kaldor, Lisa Eckstein, D. Nicol, C. Stewart","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1815403","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815403","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper interrogates the common characterisation of innovative health technologies ‘leading’, while law and regulation ‘lag’ behind. We analysed the case of faecal microbiota transplants (FMT), an innovative procedure whose regulatory status remains in flux worldwide. We searched the literature for papers that described the regulation of FMT, and coded these according to a simple analytic framework. We identified 21 relevant papers. To date, no jurisdiction has implemented FMT-specific regulation. Instead, FMT is dealt with under a range of approaches, which include fitting it within existing regulation, and the use of ‘soft’ law. We found that metaphor, or argument by analogy, played a central role in delineating the potential regulatory options. We also found the relationship between innovation and regulation to be more ‘dialogic’ than oppositional, dialectical, or akin to a race. These findings underscore the importance of case-by-case investigation to determine the applicability of general narratives about law and regulation to specific instances of innovative technologies.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"284 - 296"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815403","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49481176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-07-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1815406
K. Syrett
ABSTRACT Growing concerns over the related problems of speedily bringing innovative pharmaceuticals (especially so-called precision medicines) to market, and addressing areas of unmet medical need, have engendered critical scrutiny of the existing process for the licensing of pharmaceutical products. The objective is to enable these products to receive approval sooner, but on the basis of the provision of less complete evidence, than was previously the case. This article examines the attempts made to tackle this issue at European Union level, through a pilot programme exploring ‘adaptive’ approaches to licensing operated by the European Medicines Agency. Responses to this initiative indicate significant difficulty in securing regulatory legitimacy in this context. This suggests that innovative pharmaceutical technologies are disruptive of existing regulatory frameworks, such that future attempts to accommodate them within these may be susceptible to failure.
{"title":"Regulation, innovation and disruption: the European Medicines Agency and adaptive licensing of pharmaceuticals","authors":"K. Syrett","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1815406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815406","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Growing concerns over the related problems of speedily bringing innovative pharmaceuticals (especially so-called precision medicines) to market, and addressing areas of unmet medical need, have engendered critical scrutiny of the existing process for the licensing of pharmaceutical products. The objective is to enable these products to receive approval sooner, but on the basis of the provision of less complete evidence, than was previously the case. This article examines the attempts made to tackle this issue at European Union level, through a pilot programme exploring ‘adaptive’ approaches to licensing operated by the European Medicines Agency. Responses to this initiative indicate significant difficulty in securing regulatory legitimacy in this context. This suggests that innovative pharmaceutical technologies are disruptive of existing regulatory frameworks, such that future attempts to accommodate them within these may be susceptible to failure.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"259 - 283"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1815406","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49519772","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-03DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299
B. Koops
ABSTRACT Function creep – the expansion of a system or technology beyond its original purposes – is a well-known phenomenon. Correction: it is a well-referenced phenomenon. Yearly, hundreds of publications use the term to criticise developments in technology regulation and data governance, but surprisingly, no-one has ever written a paper about the concept itself. This paper fills that gap in the literature, by analysing and defining ‘function creep’. This creates conceptual clarity that can help structure future debates and address function creep concerns. After analysing the term ‘function creep’ itself, I discuss concepts that share family resemblances, including other ‘creep’ concepts and many theoretical notions from STS, economics, sociology, public policy, law, and discourse theory. Function creep can be situated in the nexus of reverse adaptation and self-augmentation of technology, incrementalism and disruption in policy and innovation, policy spillovers, ratchet effects, transformative use, and slippery slope argumentation. Based on this, I define function creep as an imperceptibly transformative and therewith contestable change in a data-processing system’s proper activity. Argumentation theory illuminates how the pejorative ‘function creep’ functions in debates: it makes visible that what looks like linear change is actually non-linear, and simultaneously calls for a much-needed debate about this qualitative change.
{"title":"The concept of function creep","authors":"B. Koops","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Function creep – the expansion of a system or technology beyond its original purposes – is a well-known phenomenon. Correction: it is a well-referenced phenomenon. Yearly, hundreds of publications use the term to criticise developments in technology regulation and data governance, but surprisingly, no-one has ever written a paper about the concept itself. This paper fills that gap in the literature, by analysing and defining ‘function creep’. This creates conceptual clarity that can help structure future debates and address function creep concerns. After analysing the term ‘function creep’ itself, I discuss concepts that share family resemblances, including other ‘creep’ concepts and many theoretical notions from STS, economics, sociology, public policy, law, and discourse theory. Function creep can be situated in the nexus of reverse adaptation and self-augmentation of technology, incrementalism and disruption in policy and innovation, policy spillovers, ratchet effects, transformative use, and slippery slope argumentation. Based on this, I define function creep as an imperceptibly transformative and therewith contestable change in a data-processing system’s proper activity. Argumentation theory illuminates how the pejorative ‘function creep’ functions in debates: it makes visible that what looks like linear change is actually non-linear, and simultaneously calls for a much-needed debate about this qualitative change.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"13 1","pages":"29 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2021.1898299","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49019306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727058
M. Hyland
ABSTRACT Relative to the dual criteria of effectiveness and legitimacy, this article evaluates webblocking injunctions in the context of intellectual property law and with a particular focus on the vanguard role played by the English Courts. With regard to the first criterion, it is argued that there is reason to think that webblocking injunctions are viewed by IP owners as well as by legislators and courts as a relatively effective instrument in the protection of IP assets. Moreover, the extension of webblocking orders to trade marks together with their adoption in a number of legal systems, is further evidence that these orders, if not a silver bullet, at least have some utility. With regard to the second criterion, it is argued that the legitimacy of these orders is underwritten by both domestic and European legislation together with a jurisprudence that insists on the balancing of rights and a proportionate use of the orders.
{"title":"A critical evaluation of the effectiveness and legitimacy of webblocking injunctions","authors":"M. Hyland","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727058","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Relative to the dual criteria of effectiveness and legitimacy, this article evaluates webblocking injunctions in the context of intellectual property law and with a particular focus on the vanguard role played by the English Courts. With regard to the first criterion, it is argued that there is reason to think that webblocking injunctions are viewed by IP owners as well as by legislators and courts as a relatively effective instrument in the protection of IP assets. Moreover, the extension of webblocking orders to trade marks together with their adoption in a number of legal systems, is further evidence that these orders, if not a silver bullet, at least have some utility. With regard to the second criterion, it is argued that the legitimacy of these orders is underwritten by both domestic and European legislation together with a jurisprudence that insists on the balancing of rights and a proportionate use of the orders.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"30 - 59"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727058","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43226264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727063
B. Bennett, A. Daly
ABSTRACT This article considers the law’s response to the emergence of robots and artificial intelligence (AI), and whether they should be considered as legal persons and accordingly the bearers of legal rights. We analyse the regulatory issues raised by robot rights through three questions: (i) could robots be granted rights? (ii) will robots be granted rights? and (iii) should robots be granted rights? On the question of whether we can recognise robot rights we examine how the law has treated different categories of legal persons and non-persons historically, finding that the concept of legal personhood is fluid and so arguably could be extended to include robots. However, as can be seen from the current debate in Intellectual Property (IP) law, AI and robots have not been recognised as the bearers of IP rights despite their ability to create and innovate, suggesting that the answer to the question of whether we will grant rights to robots is less certain. Finally, whether we should recognise rights for robots will depend on the intended purpose of regulatory reform.
{"title":"Recognising rights for robots: Can we? Will we? Should we?","authors":"B. Bennett, A. Daly","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727063","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article considers the law’s response to the emergence of robots and artificial intelligence (AI), and whether they should be considered as legal persons and accordingly the bearers of legal rights. We analyse the regulatory issues raised by robot rights through three questions: (i) could robots be granted rights? (ii) will robots be granted rights? and (iii) should robots be granted rights? On the question of whether we can recognise robot rights we examine how the law has treated different categories of legal persons and non-persons historically, finding that the concept of legal personhood is fluid and so arguably could be extended to include robots. However, as can be seen from the current debate in Intellectual Property (IP) law, AI and robots have not been recognised as the bearers of IP rights despite their ability to create and innovate, suggesting that the answer to the question of whether we will grant rights to robots is less certain. Finally, whether we should recognise rights for robots will depend on the intended purpose of regulatory reform.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"60 - 80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727063","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48315502","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727094
Robert Herian
ABSTRACT Like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the broader, mainstream emergence of blockchain technology in the present moment of, what I call, data dysphoria is no accident. It is in part reaction to data dysphoria, and in part exploitation of it, a duality underpinned by the tantalising promise of the prosumer ‘taking control’ of their data and establishing sovereignty over it. Blockchain and GDPR alike aim to resolve ‘problem’/’solution’ matrices with deep roots in a wide variety of global economic, political, social, legal and cultural contexts. This article explores the problem of achieving resolution based on innovation and technology by offering an account of the rise of blockchain and implementation of GDPR within a psycho-political framework, one in which fantasies of taking control are predominant yet highly contestable actualities in the lives of technology users.
{"title":"Blockchain, GDPR, and fantasies of data sovereignty","authors":"Robert Herian","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727094","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Like the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the broader, mainstream emergence of blockchain technology in the present moment of, what I call, data dysphoria is no accident. It is in part reaction to data dysphoria, and in part exploitation of it, a duality underpinned by the tantalising promise of the prosumer ‘taking control’ of their data and establishing sovereignty over it. Blockchain and GDPR alike aim to resolve ‘problem’/’solution’ matrices with deep roots in a wide variety of global economic, political, social, legal and cultural contexts. This article explores the problem of achieving resolution based on innovation and technology by offering an account of the rise of blockchain and implementation of GDPR within a psycho-political framework, one in which fantasies of taking control are predominant yet highly contestable actualities in the lives of technology users.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"156 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727094","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49327123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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