Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727068
Ryan Catterwell
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether the process of contract interpretation (also described as contract construction) can be automated. It approaches the task in two stages. The first part explains contract interpretation as a cognitive process. It demonstrates that interpretation involves: (i) the identification of arguments in favour of each interpretation; and (ii) the weighing and balancing of arguments to arrive at the construction that was probably intended. The second part of the paper explores the extent to which the process can be automated by logical design or through machine learning. It demonstrates that manual programming and data analytics can automate the interpretive process in different ways and to different extents: a machine can be manually programmed to formulate some interpretive arguments; relevant interpretive information can be identified, classified and extracted through machine learning; and data analytics can be applied to recognise argument patterns in interpretive disputes.
{"title":"Automation in contract interpretation*","authors":"Ryan Catterwell","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727068","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether the process of contract interpretation (also described as contract construction) can be automated. It approaches the task in two stages. The first part explains contract interpretation as a cognitive process. It demonstrates that interpretation involves: (i) the identification of arguments in favour of each interpretation; and (ii) the weighing and balancing of arguments to arrive at the construction that was probably intended. The second part of the paper explores the extent to which the process can be automated by logical design or through machine learning. It demonstrates that manual programming and data analytics can automate the interpretive process in different ways and to different extents: a machine can be manually programmed to formulate some interpretive arguments; relevant interpretive information can be identified, classified and extracted through machine learning; and data analytics can be applied to recognise argument patterns in interpretive disputes.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"112 - 81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727068","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47419708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727054
P. Li, A. Faulkner, N. Medcalf
ABSTRACT In this paper we assess both the ex ante and the ex post dimensions of the regulatory landscape of 3D bioprinting governance. While the former is mainly concerned with the market approval and safety of 3D bioprinting, the latter is concerned with the matter of liability once bioprinting has been licensed or authorised for use. In this 2D landscape, we highlight three sets of choices: whether regulation should focus on the process, the product or both; whether to rely on existing regimes or create a new bespoke and distinct regulatory framework; and whether to employ top down, bottom up, or co-regulation. We identify a series of interpretative uncertainties as well as gaps in the current legal regimes. We consider an initial provisional ‘process-based’ approach and a co-regulation model for bioprinting governance. We anticipate that the study of the regulatory landscape will offer key insights in relation to other types of biofabrication.
{"title":"3D bioprinting in a 2D regulatory landscape: gaps, uncertainties, and problems","authors":"P. Li, A. Faulkner, N. Medcalf","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727054","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727054","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this paper we assess both the ex ante and the ex post dimensions of the regulatory landscape of 3D bioprinting governance. While the former is mainly concerned with the market approval and safety of 3D bioprinting, the latter is concerned with the matter of liability once bioprinting has been licensed or authorised for use. In this 2D landscape, we highlight three sets of choices: whether regulation should focus on the process, the product or both; whether to rely on existing regimes or create a new bespoke and distinct regulatory framework; and whether to employ top down, bottom up, or co-regulation. We identify a series of interpretative uncertainties as well as gaps in the current legal regimes. We consider an initial provisional ‘process-based’ approach and a co-regulation model for bioprinting governance. We anticipate that the study of the regulatory landscape will offer key insights in relation to other types of biofabrication.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"1 - 29"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727054","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41614892","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727097
R. Sparrow, Lauren Karas
ABSTRACT It is now possible to buy sex toys that connect to the user’s phone or computer via Bluetooth and can be controlled remotely. The use of such Internet-enabled haptic sex toys involves an ineliminable risk of being deceived about particular features of one’s sexual partner and/or about which person one was having ‘sex’ with. Where this occurs, it is possible that the user would become the victim of rape-by-deception. We argue that determining whether a person using an Internet-enabled haptic sex toy has been raped or not when they are involved in a sexual encounter with someone – or something – other than that they intended requires us to confront difficult questions about the definition and significance of sexual intercourse and about the nature and harm of rape. Our discussion of these topics suggests that the use of such devices is more ethically fraught than has been appreciated to date.
{"title":"Teledildonics and rape by deception","authors":"R. Sparrow, Lauren Karas","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727097","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is now possible to buy sex toys that connect to the user’s phone or computer via Bluetooth and can be controlled remotely. The use of such Internet-enabled haptic sex toys involves an ineliminable risk of being deceived about particular features of one’s sexual partner and/or about which person one was having ‘sex’ with. Where this occurs, it is possible that the user would become the victim of rape-by-deception. We argue that determining whether a person using an Internet-enabled haptic sex toy has been raped or not when they are involved in a sexual encounter with someone – or something – other than that they intended requires us to confront difficult questions about the definition and significance of sexual intercourse and about the nature and harm of rape. Our discussion of these topics suggests that the use of such devices is more ethically fraught than has been appreciated to date.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"175 - 204"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727097","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44428516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2020.1727087
Yahong Li
ABSTRACT The remix has emerged as a dominant force of creation in the digital and Internet age. The solutions under current copyright law such as fair use as well as voluntary, compulsory and public licencing have failed to adequately protect remix works and remixers, and as a result hampered the creativity of remix artists. New approaches are needed to cope with the challenges. This article proposes to add remix as a protectable subject matter; create a right to remix and grant it to remixers; obligate remixers to attribute source works to copyright holders and remunerate them for remixing; require the same remix rights and obligations to be passed on to future remixers; and impose a statutory levy on social media for using remixes. It is argued that the proposed approach can better protect remix creation and help achieve an optimal balance of interests between copyright holders, social media and users.
{"title":"The age of remix and copyright law reform","authors":"Yahong Li","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2020.1727087","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727087","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The remix has emerged as a dominant force of creation in the digital and Internet age. The solutions under current copyright law such as fair use as well as voluntary, compulsory and public licencing have failed to adequately protect remix works and remixers, and as a result hampered the creativity of remix artists. New approaches are needed to cope with the challenges. This article proposes to add remix as a protectable subject matter; create a right to remix and grant it to remixers; obligate remixers to attribute source works to copyright holders and remunerate them for remixing; require the same remix rights and obligations to be passed on to future remixers; and impose a statutory levy on social media for using remixes. It is argued that the proposed approach can better protect remix creation and help achieve an optimal balance of interests between copyright holders, social media and users.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"113 - 155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2020.1727087","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48842675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-29DOI: 10.20944/preprints201905.0070.v2
Ignacio Mastroleo, F. Holzer
ABSTRACT A significant part of the literature on innovative practice in medicine relates to seizing opportunities and curbing harms for patients in desperate situations. Unfortunately, the term innovation has multiple meanings and a rich rhetorical flourish that adds confusion and misunderstanding to an already difficult debate. This paper aims to enhance the current definition of innovative practice for medicine. First, we replace the term ‘innovation’ with the more literal ‘new non-validated practice’. To identify this meaning, we analyse the traditional research ethics’ distinction between research, validated practice, and innovation in the Belmont Report. Second, we propose the following explicit definition of new non-validated practice: the first or recent use of diagnostic, therapeutic or preventive interventions that introduce a significant change, with an insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare, and with the main aim to benefit individual patients. This definition is a promising conceptual tool to inform empirical research, ethicists, and the harmonisation of regulation and legislation (e.g. right-to-try laws).
{"title":"New non-validated practice: an enhanced definition of innovative practice for medicine","authors":"Ignacio Mastroleo, F. Holzer","doi":"10.20944/preprints201905.0070.v2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201905.0070.v2","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A significant part of the literature on innovative practice in medicine relates to seizing opportunities and curbing harms for patients in desperate situations. Unfortunately, the term innovation has multiple meanings and a rich rhetorical flourish that adds confusion and misunderstanding to an already difficult debate. This paper aims to enhance the current definition of innovative practice for medicine. First, we replace the term ‘innovation’ with the more literal ‘new non-validated practice’. To identify this meaning, we analyse the traditional research ethics’ distinction between research, validated practice, and innovation in the Belmont Report. Second, we propose the following explicit definition of new non-validated practice: the first or recent use of diagnostic, therapeutic or preventive interventions that introduce a significant change, with an insufficient level of evidence of safety or efficacy for regular healthcare, and with the main aim to benefit individual patients. This definition is a promising conceptual tool to inform empirical research, ethicists, and the harmonisation of regulation and legislation (e.g. right-to-try laws).","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"12 1","pages":"318 - 346"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41777994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT The paper argues that the material scope of AI regulations should not rely on the term ‘artificial intelligence (AI)’. The argument is developed by proposing a number of requirements for legal definitions, surveying existing AI definitions, and then discussing the extent to which they meet the proposed requirements. It is shown that existing definitions of AI do not meet the most important requirements for legal definitions. Next, the paper argues that a risk-based approach would be preferable. Rather than using the term AI, policy makers should focus on the specific risks they want to reduce. It is shown that the requirements for legal definitions can be better met by defining the main sources of relevant risks: certain technical approaches (e.g. reinforcement learning), applications (e.g. facial recognition), and capabilities (e.g. the ability to physically interact with the environment). Finally, the paper discusses the extent to which this approach can also be applied to more advanced AI systems.
{"title":"Defining the scope of AI regulations","authors":"Jonas Schuett","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3453632","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3453632","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 The paper argues that the material scope of AI regulations should not rely on the term ‘artificial intelligence (AI)’. The argument is developed by proposing a number of requirements for legal definitions, surveying existing AI definitions, and then discussing the extent to which they meet the proposed requirements. It is shown that existing definitions of AI do not meet the most important requirements for legal definitions. Next, the paper argues that a risk-based approach would be preferable. Rather than using the term AI, policy makers should focus on the specific risks they want to reduce. It is shown that the requirements for legal definitions can be better met by defining the main sources of relevant risks: certain technical approaches (e.g. reinforcement learning), applications (e.g. facial recognition), and capabilities (e.g. the ability to physically interact with the environment). Finally, the paper discusses the extent to which this approach can also be applied to more advanced AI systems.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"1 1","pages":"60 - 82"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88231773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2019.1665794
R. Mampuys, L. Poort
ABSTRACT The cultivation of GM crops in Europe has a long history of disagreement. While the legal framework is based on a safety assessment, the disagreement goes beyond such risks and is rooted in political, social and cultural grounds. In 2015, with the discussion having become deadlocked—neither Member States (MS) who wanted to cultivate GM crops nor those who did not could have their way—Directive (EU) 2015/412 was adopted. This Directive which, in addition to the safety assessment, enables MS to prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory based on non-safety considerations, was supposed to remove the deadlock and give MS autonomy to restrict cultivation. However, as of 2018, it seems that this approach has been only partially successful. In this article, we identify factors limiting the effective use of the new Directive; and, then using Poort’s model of interactive legislation combined with an ethos of controversies, we analyse the potential of the Directive.
{"title":"Controversy first: factors limiting the success of Directive (EU) 2015/412 for national decision-making on the cultivation of GM crops","authors":"R. Mampuys, L. Poort","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2019.1665794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2019.1665794","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The cultivation of GM crops in Europe has a long history of disagreement. While the legal framework is based on a safety assessment, the disagreement goes beyond such risks and is rooted in political, social and cultural grounds. In 2015, with the discussion having become deadlocked—neither Member States (MS) who wanted to cultivate GM crops nor those who did not could have their way—Directive (EU) 2015/412 was adopted. This Directive which, in addition to the safety assessment, enables MS to prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their territory based on non-safety considerations, was supposed to remove the deadlock and give MS autonomy to restrict cultivation. However, as of 2018, it seems that this approach has been only partially successful. In this article, we identify factors limiting the effective use of the new Directive; and, then using Poort’s model of interactive legislation combined with an ethos of controversies, we analyse the potential of the Directive.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"11 1","pages":"175 - 202"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2019.1665794","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49135628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2019.1665800
Michael A. Katell, F. Dechesne, B. Koops, Paulus N. Meessen
ABSTRACT Augmented Reality (AR) will have important effects on the ways in which spaces and places take meaning for both users and non-users of AR. As the market penetration of AR increases, new claims will be made on certain spaces, superimposing AR contexts on the meanings and functions traditionally associated with these spaces, not only by AR users but also by AR designers and service providers, raising important and complex questions about regulatory approaches to mitigating information and power asymmetries. A regulatory strategy that promotes civil society and individual privacy requires that we thoroughly consider the implications of AR on the construction of public and private space. We employ a mix of real and fictional AR scenarios to interrogate the potential effects of AR use and design on the construction of spatial meaning, the orientation of social relations, and distributions of social power, and we make initial recommendations for regulation to address AR’s possible negative effects.
{"title":"Seeing the whole picture: visualising socio-spatial power through augmented reality","authors":"Michael A. Katell, F. Dechesne, B. Koops, Paulus N. Meessen","doi":"10.1080/17579961.2019.1665800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/17579961.2019.1665800","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Augmented Reality (AR) will have important effects on the ways in which spaces and places take meaning for both users and non-users of AR. As the market penetration of AR increases, new claims will be made on certain spaces, superimposing AR contexts on the meanings and functions traditionally associated with these spaces, not only by AR users but also by AR designers and service providers, raising important and complex questions about regulatory approaches to mitigating information and power asymmetries. A regulatory strategy that promotes civil society and individual privacy requires that we thoroughly consider the implications of AR on the construction of public and private space. We employ a mix of real and fictional AR scenarios to interrogate the potential effects of AR use and design on the construction of spatial meaning, the orientation of social relations, and distributions of social power, and we make initial recommendations for regulation to address AR’s possible negative effects.","PeriodicalId":37639,"journal":{"name":"Law, Innovation and Technology","volume":"11 1","pages":"279 - 310"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/17579961.2019.1665800","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46621330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-07-03DOI: 10.1080/17579961.2019.1665792
Michael Guihot
ABSTRACT Technology law is emerging as a distinct field of law among the canon of more established law subjects. This paper examines the requirements for coherence in law subjects and begins the process of classifying the field of technology law. It examines historical struggles for coherence in health law and environmental law in order to distil a methodology that will guide the analysis. The paper sets out a menu approach that refines some of the unifying principles of technology law that mark it out as a distinct field. The methodology is then tested against the ostensibly disparate papers that can all be said to be on ‘technology law’ in the Oxford Handbook on Law, Regulation and Technology. The paper concludes by directing further work to more fully classify this emerging field.
技术法作为一个独特的法律领域，在众多成熟的法律学科中崭露头角。本文考察了法律学科对连贯性的要求，并开始对技术法领域进行分类。它审查了卫生法和环境法一致性的历史斗争，以便提炼出一种指导分析的方法。这篇论文提出了一种菜单式的方法，提炼了一些技术法的统一原则，这些原则将其标记为一个独特的领域。然后，将这种方法与《牛津法律、法规和技术手册》(Oxford Handbook on law, Regulation and technology)中看似完全不同的论文进行对比，这些论文都可以说是关于“技术法”的。论文的结论是指导进一步的工作，以更全面地分类这一新兴领域。
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