{"title":"Life, happiness, flourishing. On the concept of human being’s ultimate goal in Ayn Rand’s objectivist philosophy","authors":"Ziemowit Gowin","doi":"10.18276/AIE.2020.52-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/AIE.2020.52-05","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"52 1","pages":"75-92"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67978919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Heidegger’s ontology can still be a resource for new trends in environmental ethics (e.g. postnatural environmentalism), if we draw upon his less frequently discussed concepts such as kinship of the physis and techne , or ‘proper use,’ which enables entities to manifest their identity. The Anthropocene condition prompts us, however, to reexamine the relationship between the act of using properly and that of using up, as laid out in Heidegger’s ontology. This will help to address the wider problem of whether beings in Heidegger can affect each other, mutually shaping each other’s identity, or peculiarity. I shall argue that Heidegger’s concept of being lacks the dimensions of shaping and being shaped by others. However, it is possible to revise his concepts of fundamental structures of being, such as temporality and worldliness, thereby creating the structure of shapeability of being, which would not be limited to human beings. This, in turn, can help elucidate one of the key dilemmas of the Anthropocene related to setting the boundary between footprint and harm.
{"title":"Shapeability. Revisiting Heidegger’s Concept of Being in the Anthropocene","authors":"Magdalena Hoły-Łuczaj","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.48-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.48-04","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger’s ontology can still be a resource for new trends in environmental ethics (e.g. postnatural environmentalism), if we draw upon his less frequently discussed concepts such as kinship of the physis and techne , or ‘proper use,’ which enables entities to manifest their identity. The Anthropocene condition prompts us, however, to reexamine the relationship between the act of using properly and that of using up, as laid out in Heidegger’s ontology. This will help to address the wider problem of whether beings in Heidegger can affect each other, mutually shaping each other’s identity, or peculiarity. I shall argue that Heidegger’s concept of being lacks the dimensions of shaping and being shaped by others. However, it is possible to revise his concepts of fundamental structures of being, such as temporality and worldliness, thereby creating the structure of shapeability of being, which would not be limited to human beings. This, in turn, can help elucidate one of the key dilemmas of the Anthropocene related to setting the boundary between footprint and harm.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47645160","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The meaning of narrative identity concept in the light of Jurgen Habermas' thesis about the colonization of the world of life by the system","authors":"Wojciech Torzewski","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.46-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.46-03","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67973867","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hurting and allowing harm. Part II: A right to self defense","authors":"Mirosław Rutkowski","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.45-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.45-03","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67972596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Intentionality of a Work of Art in Joseph Margolis’ Metaphysics of Culture and Roman Ingarden’s Phenomenological Aesthetics","authors":"Aleksandra Łukaszewicz Alcaraz","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.48-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.48-05","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67975672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Institutional Function Consequentialism","authors":"K. Saja","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.48-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.48-01","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67974765","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Wokol sekularyzacji toczy sie obecnie ozywiona dyskusja. Problem ten jest jednak o wiele bardziej zlozony niz mogloby sie wydawac. Sekularyzacja bowiem to nie tylko rozdzial panstwa od religii, lecz rowniez szereg innych postulatow i zalozen, o ktorych czesto sie zapomina. Charles Taylor przedstawia swoją koncepcje sekularyzacji w dziele Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, gdzie wyroznia dwie grupy postulatow sekularyzmu. W tym artykule skupie sie na omowieniu sześciu kwestii związanych z postulatem neutralności panstwa wobec religii, ktore pojawiają sie na gruncie filozofii Taylora, lecz zarazem wykraczają poza nią. Rozwazania nad neutralnością panstwa wobec religii stanowią rowniez podstawe do postawienia pytania o sensownośc sekularyzacji i jej realne zastosowanie w zyciu publicznym.
{"title":"Neutralność państwa wobec religii w świetle Charlesa Taylora koncepcji sekularyzacji (State’s Neutrality towards Religion in the Light of Charles Taylor’s Secularization Concept)","authors":"A. Torzewski","doi":"10.18276/AIE.2019.46-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/AIE.2019.46-04","url":null,"abstract":"Wokol sekularyzacji toczy sie obecnie ozywiona dyskusja. Problem ten jest jednak o wiele bardziej zlozony niz mogloby sie wydawac. Sekularyzacja bowiem to nie tylko rozdzial panstwa od religii, lecz rowniez szereg innych postulatow i zalozen, o ktorych czesto sie zapomina. Charles Taylor przedstawia swoją koncepcje sekularyzacji w dziele Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, gdzie wyroznia dwie grupy postulatow sekularyzmu. W tym artykule skupie sie na omowieniu sześciu kwestii związanych z postulatem neutralności panstwa wobec religii, ktore pojawiają sie na gruncie filozofii Taylora, lecz zarazem wykraczają poza nią. Rozwazania nad neutralnością panstwa wobec religii stanowią rowniez podstawe do postawienia pytania o sensownośc sekularyzacji i jej realne zastosowanie w zyciu publicznym.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"46 1","pages":"57-74"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67973517","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article presents the principles on which the ethics of Kant and Scheler are built. Kant formulates declarative ethics, which is based on the ontology of reason. This level is unattainable formal and is the unattainable standard of our actions. On the other hand, Scheler formulates an ethics of values which can be realized by each of us. The paper examines two different ethical standpoints that can never be brought to each other.
{"title":"Immanuel Kant’s Ethics versus Max Scheler’s Ethics","authors":"Marcin Furman","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.48-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.48-03","url":null,"abstract":"The article presents the principles on which the ethics of Kant and Scheler are built. Kant formulates declarative ethics, which is based on the ontology of reason. This level is unattainable formal and is the unattainable standard of our actions. On the other hand, Scheler formulates an ethics of values which can be realized by each of us. The paper examines two different ethical standpoints that can never be brought to each other.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67975789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.
{"title":"Philosophy without Psychology: a case of wishful thinking?","authors":"H. Glock","doi":"10.18276/aie.2019.47-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2019.47-01","url":null,"abstract":"The topic of this lecture is the relation between Wittgenstein’s thought and Wittgensteinian philosophy on the one hand, psychology and psychologism on the other. It will start by clarifying how the label ‘psychologism’ should be understood in this context, opting for a neutral rather than derogatory conception. Next it discusses the relation between Frege’s anti-psychologism and that of the early Wittgenstein. The main focus will be on Wittgenstein’s denial that assertion and judgement are of logical relevance. The final sections turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. Can it avoid the intrusion of psychology concerning the following areas: – meaning – philosophical psychology – philosophical method? Giving short shrift to psychological notions like understanding, perception, judgement and belief is impossible even in philosophy of language and epistemology, given their connections to notions like meaning and knowledge. If Wittgensteinian philosophizing were a kind of psychotherapy, it would also be wholly irresponsible to ignore psychological theories. Fortunately it isn’t. Nevertheless it is neither feasible nor desirable to insulate the clarification of philosophical problems and contested concepts against empirical considerations. I shall substantiate this claim by looking at the problem of animal minds and the role that abilities play for mental and epistemic phenomena. If conceptual analysis is to serve as an instrument of critical thinking, it had better be impure.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67974739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}