The aim of this paper is to detect and assess some parasitic aspects that characterize John Duns Scotus’s account of negation, with a major focus on epistemology and theology. The first paragraph introduces the concepts of asymmetricalism or negation parasitism and traces the occurrence of four asymmetricalist theses in the Author’s production. The second paragraph presents and analyzes a first strategy to dismiss negative theology through an elimination scheme, namely a conditional which reduces negative epistemic propositions to positive ones. The third section attempts a generalization of such a scheme to make it suitable for any kind of negative knowledge foreign to the theological context. The fourth and last paragraph presents a different and more problematic eliminative strategy for negative theology and deals with the issues that arise from it.
{"title":"Negatio non cognoscitur nisi per affirmationem: Some Remarks on Negation Parasitism in John Duns Scotus’s Writings","authors":"Matteo Maserati","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-05","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to detect and assess some parasitic aspects that character\u0002ize John Duns Scotus’s account of negation, with a major focus on epistemology and theology. The first paragraph introduces the concepts of asymmetricalism or negation parasitism and traces the occurrence of four asymmetricalist theses in the Author’s production. The second paragraph presents and analyzes a first strategy \u0000to dismiss negative theology through an elimination scheme, namely a conditional which reduces negative epistemic propositions to positive ones. The third section attempts a generalization of such a scheme to make it suitable for any kind of nega\u0002tive knowledge foreign to the theological context. The fourth and last paragraph presents a different and more problematic eliminative strategy for negative theology and deals with the issues that arise from it.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45649207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to offer an edition of three anonymous questions on De anima II.8, contained in MS Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, M. 80, ff. 54vA–55vB and dated 1250–1260. The text offers an original theory of the everyday imposition of words. To present it, I (i) analyze the contemporary question-commentaries on De anima II.8; (ii) I present the theory of everyday imposition by discussing the analogies with, and differences from, Bacon’s contemporary pragmatic theory; and (iii) I discuss the hypothesis of the attribution of the text to Roger Bacon.
{"title":"A Pragmatic Theory of Everyday Imposition of Words in an Anonymous Thirteenth-Century Commentary on De anima (MS Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, M. 80, ff. 54vA–55rB)","authors":"Claudia Appolloni","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-01","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to offer an edition of three anonymous questions on De anima II.8, contained in MS Prague, Metropolitan Chapter, M. 80, ff. 54vA–55vB and dated 1250–1260. The text offers an original theory of the everyday imposi\u0002tion of words. To present it, I (i) analyze the contemporary question-commentaries on De anima II.8; (ii) I present the theory of everyday imposition by discussing the analogies with, and differences from, Bacon’s contemporary pragmatic theory; and (iii) I discuss the hypothesis of the attribution of the text to Roger Bacon.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44523723","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper comprises two parts. The first part is an introduction to Auriol’s moderate conceptualism, as it is presented in his Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, distinction 9, question 2, article 1. The second part is an edition of the text. In the introduction, I focus on Auriol’s use of the noetic tool of connotation. My thesis, in particular, is that connotation is a necessary prerequisite to his moderate conceptualism. To this purpose, the first part of this introduction will be devoted to a brief presentation of Auriol’s conceptualism. In the second part, Auriol’s theory of essential predication will be presented. In the third part, I will present my claim that Auriol’s theory of essential predication can only be made sense of when read against the background of his theory of connotation as applied to intellectual cognition. Finally, I will offer a collation of Auriol’s Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, distinction 9, question 2, article 1, obtained by collating eight manuscripts, which hand down Auriol’s text, that is, Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. Conv. Soppr. B.6.121, Firenze, ms. Conv. Soppr. A. 3.120, Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale, ms. VII.C.3, Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. 161, scaff. ix, Paris, Bibliotheque nationale de France, ms. latin 15867; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium duchownego, ms. 46/85, Vaticano (Citta del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Borgiano 404, Vaticano (Citta del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Vat. lat. 942.
本文由两部分组成。第一部分是对奥里奥温和概念主义的介绍，这是在他对《句子》第二卷的评论中提出的，区别9，问题2，第一条。第二部分是文本的一个版本。在引言部分，我着重讨论了奥里奥对内涵这一思维工具的运用。我的论点是，内涵是他的温和概念主义的必要前提。为此目的，本导论的第一部分将致力于简要介绍奥里奥的概念主义。第二部分将介绍奥里奥的本质预测理论。在第三部分，我将提出我的主张，即奥里奥的本质预测理论只有在他的内涵理论应用于智力认知的背景下才能理解。最后，我将提供一份奥里奥的《对《句子》第二卷的评论》的校勘，参见章节9，问题2，第一条，通过校勘八份手稿获得，这些手稿流传着奥里奥的文本，也就是佛罗伦萨，国立中央图书馆，Conv. Soppr女士。B.6.121，佛罗伦萨，Conv. Soppr女士。A. 3.120，那不勒斯，国家图书馆，VII.C.女士。3、帕多瓦，安东尼安娜图书馆，161女士，scaff。9，巴黎，法国国家图书馆，ms. latin 15867;佩尔普林，神学院图书馆，46/85女士，梵蒂冈(圣城)，使徒图书馆，博尔吉亚诺女士，梵蒂冈(圣城)，使徒图书馆，瓦特女士。纬度。942.
{"title":"Conception, Connotation, and Essential Predication: Peter Auriol’s Conceptualism to the Test in II Sententiarum, d. 9, q. 2, art. 1","authors":"G. Fornasieri","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-03","url":null,"abstract":"This paper comprises two parts. The first part is an introduction to Auriol’s moderate conceptualism, as it is presented in his Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, distinction 9, question 2, article 1. The second part is an edition of the text. In the introduction, I focus on Auriol’s use of the noetic tool of connotation. My thesis, in particular, is that connotation is a necessary prerequisite to his moderate conceptu\u0002alism. To this purpose, the first part of this introduction will be devoted to a brief presentation of Auriol’s conceptualism. In the second part, Auriol’s theory of essential predication will be presented. In the third part, I will present my claim that Auriol’s theory of essential predication can only be made sense of when read against the background of his theory of connotation as applied to intellectual cognition. Finally, I will offer a collation of Auriol’s Commentary on Book II of the Sentences, dis\u0002tinction 9, question 2, article 1, obtained by collating eight manuscripts, which \u0000hand down Auriol’s text, that is, Firenze, Biblioteca nazionale centrale, ms. Conv. Soppr. B.6.121, Firenze, ms. Conv. Soppr. A. 3.120, Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale, ms. VII.C.3, Padova, Biblioteca Antoniana, ms. 161, scaff. ix, Paris, Bibliotheque nationale de France, ms. latin 15867; Pelplin, Biblioteka Seminarium duchownego, ms. 46/85, Vaticano (Citta del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Borgiano 404, Vaticano (Citta del), Biblioteca Apostolica, ms. Vat. lat. 942.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47178951","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William of Ockham’s theories about the cognitive nature of prophetic statements, a topic in the theological debate of the early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations of Chatton and Ockham’s cognitive theory in terms of the distinction between externalism and internalism, and from a reading of some sources where the topic of prophecy is crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, the less investigated d. 41 and Quodlibeta, qq. 26-29; for Ockham: Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, q.1 and Quodlibeta, q. 4) we apply the externalism/internalism distinction to the case study of prophetic statements. Starting from epistemological questions about prophecies, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, we’ll show the outcomes as pragmatic rules of this kind of statements in both conceptual frameworks analyzed.
本文的主题是沃尔特·查顿和奥卡姆的威廉关于预言的认知本质的理论之间的交织，这是14世纪初神学辩论中的一个主题。从查顿和奥卡姆认知理论的外在主义与内在主义的区别入手，通过阅读一些关于预言主题至关重要的来源（对于查顿：Reportatio Super Sententias，I，dd.38-39，较少调查的d.41和Quodlibeta，qq.29-29；对于奥卡姆：Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium，q.1和Quoldibeta，q.4），我们将外在主义/内在主义的区别应用于预言的案例研究声明。从关于预言、未来特遣队和神圣预知的认识论问题开始，我们将在分析的两个概念框架中，将结果显示为这类陈述的语用规则。
{"title":"Assensum in mente prophetae: William of Ockham and Walter Chatton on Prophecies","authors":"Roberto Limonta, Riccardo Fedriga","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-02","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this article is the intertwining between Walter Chatton and William of Ockham’s theories about the cognitive nature of prophetic statements, a topic in the theological debate of the early 14th century. Starting from recent interpretations of Chatton and Ockham’s cognitive theory in terms of the distinction between externalism and internalism, and from a reading of some sources where the topic of prophecy is crucial (for Chatton: Reportatio Super Sententias, I, dd. 38-39, the less investigated d. 41 and Quodlibeta, qq. 26-29; for Ockham: Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, q.1 and Quodlibeta, q. 4) we apply the externalism/internalism distinction to the case study of prophetic statements. Starting from epistemological questions about prophecies, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, we’ll show the outcomes as pragmatic rules of this kind of statements in both conceptual frameworks analyzed.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44961979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The intersections between philology and philosophy are visible in the interpretations of passages of Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato devoted to the so-called middle color (color medius) by several philosophers active in Oxford in the middle of the thirteenth century, such as Adam of Buckfield, Adam of Whitby and Geoffrey of Aspall. In their work, they had to struggle not only with problems originating from De sensu et sensato itself, but also with others caused by the poor quality of its only translation available at that time. They also discussed a new philosophical problem emerging from Aristotle’s text: if there is a sequence of colors stretched between white and black, where middle colors are evenly distributed throughout it according to the ratio of whiteness and blackness in each of them, there must be a color in which the ratio is perfectly even and, therefore, it has to occupy the position in the very middle of the sequence. My paper presents their search for the middle color par excellence and intense discussions on the nature of the middle color.
{"title":"The Middle Color: A History of a Problem in Thirteenth Century Oxford Commentaries on De sensu et sensato","authors":"Monika Mansfeld","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-04","url":null,"abstract":"The intersections between philology and philosophy are visible in the interpre\u0002tations of passages of Aristotle’s De sensu et sensato devoted to the so-called middle color (color medius) by several philosophers active in Oxford in the mid\u0002dle of the thirteenth century, such as Adam of Buckfield, Adam of Whitby and Geof\u0002frey of Aspall. In their work, they had to struggle not only with problems originating from De sensu et sensato itself, but also with others caused by the poor quality of its only translation available at that time. They also discussed a new philosophical problem emerging from Aristotle’s text: if there is a sequence of colors stretched between white and black, where middle colors are evenly distributed throughout it according to the ratio of whiteness and blackness in each of them, there must be a color in which the ratio is perfectly even and, therefore, it has to occupy the position in the very middle of the sequence. My paper presents their search for the middle color par excellence and intense discussions on the nature of the middle color.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42380028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subject of this article is Latin reception of Averroes’s treatise De substantia orbis, with special regard to the commentary practice in the late Middle Ages. Numerous philosophical problems were taken up in these commentaries following Averroes’s lead. The most controver-sial among them were these concerning divine attributes, i.e., infinite power, efficient and final causality, and, consequently, God's ability to create out of nothing. Three different commentaries were therefore chosen to exemplify the key differences be-tween the doctrinal approaches of the commentaries on the De substantia orbis. The first two of them—composed by Fernand of Spain and Maino de’ Maineri—represent the Averroistic approach, adopting and developing Averroes’s ideas; the third commentary—composed by an anonymous author in Erfurt around 1362—represents the non-Averroistic approach referring to the questions raised in the De substantia orbis in order to propose orthodox solutions being far from these adopted in the treaty by Averroes himself. The article aims at scrutinizing the problems of infinite power of God and divine causali-ty as they have been taken up by Latin philosophers from the late XIIIth to the second half of the XIVth century by elucidating the key differences between the two lines of inquiry and highligh-ting the variety of approaches to Averroes’s De substantia orbis.
{"title":"Natural Reason and God’s Infinite Power: Diversity of Approaches in the Late 13th and 14th Century Commentaries on Averroes’s De substantia orbis","authors":"Łukasz Tomanek","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.54-06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.54-06","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this article is Latin reception of Averroes’s treatise De substantia orbis, with special regard to the commentary practice in the late Middle Ages. Numerous philosophical problems were taken up in these commentaries following Averroes’s lead. The most controver-sial among them were these concerning divine attributes, i.e., infinite power, efficient and final causality, and, consequently, God's ability to create out of nothing. \u0000Three different commentaries were therefore chosen to exemplify the key differences be-tween the doctrinal approaches of the commentaries on the De substantia orbis. The first two of them—composed by Fernand of Spain and Maino de’ Maineri—represent the Averroistic approach, adopting and developing Averroes’s ideas; the third commentary—composed by an anonymous author in Erfurt around 1362—represents the non-Averroistic approach referring to the questions raised in the De substantia orbis in order to propose orthodox solutions being far from these adopted in the treaty by Averroes himself. \u0000The article aims at scrutinizing the problems of infinite power of God and divine causali-ty as they have been taken up by Latin philosophers from the late XIIIth to the second half of the XIVth century by elucidating the key differences between the two lines of inquiry and highligh-ting the variety of approaches to Averroes’s De substantia orbis.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49411497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Body memory is a relatively new philosophical notion, entangled in interiorization of the past – paradoxically this entanglement liberates the individual from the dictature of the present flow and enables her/his autonomy. The author intends to show that this apparent ensnarement, with all its difficult genesis, makes us responsible, active agents, influencing our environment. To achieve this objective, she chooses to describe the painful and ambiguous process of training and drilling the body, immersing us in social patterns, and thus in the living past. This path leads us – a paradox again – to the arduous and painstaking rediscovery of the issue of subject. There is still hope that we can recuperate this vanishing notion, reinterpreting the most essential classical themes of philosophy, such as time and transcendentality. But the subject matter remains opaque, and requires further reflection.
{"title":"Difficult birth of the agent. Memory of the body, identity and social competence","authors":"M. Żardecka","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.56-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.56-01","url":null,"abstract":"Body memory is a relatively new philosophical notion, entangled in interiorization of the past – paradoxically this entanglement liberates the individual from the dictature of the present flow and enables her/his autonomy. The author intends to show that this apparent ensnarement, with all its difficult genesis, makes us responsible, active agents, influencing our environment. To achieve this objective, she chooses to describe the painful and ambiguous process of training and drilling the body, immersing us in social patterns, and thus in the living past. This path leads us – a paradox again – to the arduous and painstaking rediscovery of the issue of subject. There is still hope that we can recuperate this vanishing notion, reinterpreting the most essential classical themes of philosophy, such as time and transcendentality. But the subject matter remains opaque, and requires further reflection.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67979937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Calculability and incalculability of distributive justice in the medical and pandemic context","authors":"M. Kowalska","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.53-05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.53-05","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67979055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Theists believe that our world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. If God with such traits creates a world, we would expect that the world to have certain features. Such features should be compatible with God’s traits. We do not expect a God who is omnipotent and omniscient to create a poorly-designed world. If we believe that our world is created by God with the aforementioned traits and yet our world is poorly designed, we would either abandon our belief that our world was created by God or we would preserve our belief. If we wish to preserve our belief we would either revise the traits we attribute to him, or we would find a way to justify the co-existence of God with such traits as the creator and a poorly-designed world. In the history of philosophy one feature of our world has been subject to a great many debates, namely ‘evil’. By evil we have all the pain and sufferings that sentient beings go through. God is said to be omnibenevolent, as a result he would not want us to go through pain and suffering. He is also omniscient and omnipotent and therefore he has the knowledge and power to do so. Yet we are facing pain and suffering in this world. For the theists reconciling the existing evil in this world with God is a great challenge and atheists try to argue from evil and prove the non-existence of God. The debate between theists and atheists surrounding the problem of evil presupposes a certain conception of God. The presupposition is that God is a person who possesses a mind, will power and has a moral character. For Wittgenstein attributing personhood to God is a confusion. As a result, for Wittgenstein there can be no ‘problem of evil’ and the debates between the theists and atheists is not engaging with a real problem but a pseudo-problem. The problem of evil does not need a solution and smart arguments and counter-arguments, rather it needs therapy.
{"title":"Wittgenstein and the Pseudo-Problem of Evil","authors":"Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.55-03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.55-03","url":null,"abstract":"Theists believe that our world was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God. If God with such traits creates a world, we would expect that the world to have certain features. Such features should be compatible with God’s traits. We do not expect a God who is omnipotent and omniscient to create a poorly-designed world. If we believe that our world is created by God with the aforementioned traits and yet our world is poorly designed, we would either abandon our belief that our world was created by God or we would preserve our belief. If we wish to preserve our belief we would either revise the traits we attribute to him, or we would find a way to justify the co-existence of God with such traits as the creator and a poorly-designed world. In the history of philosophy one feature of our world has been subject to a great many debates, namely ‘evil’. By evil we have all the pain and sufferings that sentient beings go through. God is said to be omnibenevolent, as a result he would not want us to go through pain and suffering. He is also omniscient and omnipotent and therefore he has the knowledge and power to do so. Yet we are facing pain and suffering in this world. For the theists reconciling the existing evil in this world with God is a great challenge and atheists try to argue from evil and prove the non-existence of God. The debate between theists and atheists surrounding the problem of evil presupposes a certain conception of God. The presupposition is that God is a person who possesses a mind, will power and has a moral character. For Wittgenstein attributing personhood to God is a confusion. As a result, for Wittgenstein there can be no ‘problem of evil’ and the debates between the theists and atheists is not engaging with a real problem but a pseudo-problem. The problem of evil does not need a solution and smart arguments and counter-arguments, rather it needs therapy.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67979806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper explores the relation between collective memory and social theory, trying in particular to show the key role that the notion of collective memory plays in understanding the dynamics of the social process (structuration, genesis of social structure). It does it by means of a series of reinterpretations of classical authors. Investigating the phenomenon of forgetting as covering up the traces of social change (M. Halbwachs), problematized in the contemporary context (P. Bourdieu), leads us to unraveling the problematic character of social change as such in a vain effort of annulment of memory (A. Touraine), and finally to rediscovering of social memory at a deeper level, as a profound structure of social processes. This discovery points to the necessity of introducing a new, yet undeveloped method of studying the social unconscious (A. Giddens, J. Assmann, and in particular J. Alexander). Jeffrey Alexander overtly postulates such a development, identifying his major project of cultural sociology with a kind of social psychoanalysis. The paper ends with a question – where such a postulate leads us to? Perhaps we need a new kind of art of benevolent interpretation that brings along with new understanding also some kind of soothing the pain of misery, deeply inscribed in social existence.
{"title":"Social structure and collective memory","authors":"M. Żardecka","doi":"10.18276/aie.2021.53-01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.18276/aie.2021.53-01","url":null,"abstract":"The paper explores the relation between collective memory and social theory, trying in particular to show the key role that the notion of collective memory plays in understanding the dynamics of the social process (structuration, genesis of social structure). It does it by means of a series of reinterpretations of classical authors. Investigating the phenomenon of forgetting as covering up the traces of social change (M. Halbwachs), problematized in the contemporary context (P. Bourdieu), leads us to unraveling the problematic character of social change as such in a vain effort of annulment of memory (A. Touraine), and finally to rediscovering of social memory at a deeper level, as a profound structure of social processes. This discovery points to the necessity of introducing a new, yet undeveloped method of studying the social unconscious (A. Giddens, J. Assmann, and in particular J. Alexander). Jeffrey Alexander overtly postulates such a development, identifying his major project of cultural sociology with a kind of social psychoanalysis. The paper ends with a question – where such a postulate leads us to? Perhaps we need a new kind of art of benevolent interpretation that brings along with new understanding also some kind of soothing the pain of misery, deeply inscribed in social existence.","PeriodicalId":37710,"journal":{"name":"Analiza i Egzystencja","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67978927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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