Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112210
Christopher T. Buford
Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.
{"title":"Stranded Runners","authors":"Christopher T. Buford","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112210","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112210","url":null,"abstract":"Those who endorse a knowledge-first program in epistemology claim that rather than attempting to understand knowledge in terms of more fundamental notions or relations such as belief and justification, we should instead understand knowledge as being in some sense prior to such concepts and/or relations. If we suppose that this is the correct approach to theorizing about knowledge, we are left with a residual question about the nature of those concepts or relations, such as justification, that were thought to be first but are now second. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has recently proposed that we understand justification in terms of potential knowledge. Ichikawa combines his view of knowledge and justification with what initially seems to be a natural complement, epistemological disjunctivism. While Ichikawa focuses on hallucination, I shift the focus to illusion. I argue that the combination of justification as potential knowledge and epistemological disjunctivism entails that perceptual beliefs that arise from illusions are not justified.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91364705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211212
E. Gilbertson
One defense of the “steadfast” position in cases of peer disagreement appeals to the idea that it's rational for you to remain deeply agnostic about relevant propositions concerning your peer's judgment, that is, to assign no credence value at all to such propositions. Thus, according to this view, since you need not assign any value to the proposition that your peer's judgment is likely to be correct, you need not conciliate, since you can remain deeply agnostic on the question of how the likelihood of your peer's judgment bears on the likelihood of your own. This paper argues that the case for deep agnosticism as a response to peer disagreement fails. Deep agnosticism (as a general thesis) implies that it is sometimes permissible to withhold judgment about whether there is a non-zero chance of a proposition's being true. However, in cases of disagreement where deep agnosticism is supposed to support the steadfast position, such withholding isn't rational. This is because of constraints placed on rational credence by objective probability or chance, which ensure that rational credence adequately reflects strength of evidence.
{"title":"Disagreement and Deep Agnosticism","authors":"E. Gilbertson","doi":"10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211212","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/LOGOS-EPISTEME20211212","url":null,"abstract":"One defense of the “steadfast” position in cases of peer disagreement appeals to the idea that it's rational for you to remain deeply agnostic about relevant propositions concerning your peer's judgment, that is, to assign no credence value at all to such propositions. Thus, according to this view, since you need not assign any value to the proposition that your peer's judgment is likely to be correct, you need not conciliate, since you can remain deeply agnostic on the question of how the likelihood of your peer's judgment bears on the likelihood of your own. This paper argues that the case for deep agnosticism as a response to peer disagreement fails. Deep agnosticism (as a general thesis) implies that it is sometimes permissible to withhold judgment about whether there is a non-zero chance of a proposition's being true. However, in cases of disagreement where deep agnosticism is supposed to support the steadfast position, such withholding isn't rational. This is because of constraints placed on rational credence by objective probability or chance, which ensure that rational credence adequately reflects strength of evidence.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75058847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112436
H. Sankey
For Kuhn, there are a number of values which provide scientists with a shared basis for theory-choice. These values include accuracy, breadth, consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness. Each of these values may be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, there may be conflict between the values in application to specific theories. In this short paper, Kuhn's idea of scientific values is extended to the value of academic freedom. The value of academic freedom may be interpreted in a number of different ways. Moreover, there are other values which play a role in the functioning of our academic institutions. As with the possible conflict between scientific values, there may be conflict among the academic values.
{"title":"Kuhn, Values and Academic Freedom","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112436","url":null,"abstract":"For Kuhn, there are a number of values which provide scientists with a shared basis for theory-choice. These values include accuracy, breadth, consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness. Each of these values may be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, there may be conflict between the values in application to specific theories. In this short paper, Kuhn's idea of scientific values is extended to the value of academic freedom. The value of academic freedom may be interpreted in a number of different ways. Moreover, there are other values which play a role in the functioning of our academic institutions. As with the possible conflict between scientific values, there may be conflict among the academic values.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80521770","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112211
Filip Čukljević
The aim of this paper is to reexamine the importance of Rip van Winkle’s case for the problem of cognitive dynamics. First I shall present the main problem of cognitive dynamics. Then I shall explain the relevance of Rip’s case to this problem. After that I shall provide a short presentation of the main solutions to this problem. I shall explicate the problem concerning the manner in which philosophers who propose those solutions defend their response to the question of Rip’s case. My argument shall be that they defend their response either in overly dogmatic or in circular way. Finally, I shall suggest a way out of that problem.
{"title":"Why Rip Matters?","authors":"Filip Čukljević","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112211","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112211","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to reexamine the importance of Rip van Winkle’s case for the problem of cognitive dynamics. First I shall present the main problem of cognitive dynamics. Then I shall explain the relevance of Rip’s case to this problem. After that I shall provide a short presentation of the main solutions to this problem. I shall explicate the problem concerning the manner in which philosophers who propose those solutions defend their response to the question of Rip’s case. My argument shall be that they defend their response either in overly dogmatic or in circular way. Finally, I shall suggest a way out of that problem.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87023235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-01-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202112431
Erhan Demircioglu
My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.
{"title":"On the Very Idea of Undercutting Defeat","authors":"Erhan Demircioglu","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202112431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112431","url":null,"abstract":"My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85409131","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-15DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011439
M. Lewiński
In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social ontology and social epistemology.
{"title":"Social Situations and Which Descriptions","authors":"M. Lewiński","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011439","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social ontology and social epistemology.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82094049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011440
Nuno Venturinha
This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018) written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin Lewiński.
{"title":"Replies to Critics","authors":"Nuno Venturinha","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011440","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011440","url":null,"abstract":"This text brings together replies to three commentaries on my Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology (Springer, 2018) written by Modesto Gómez-Alonso, Anna Boncompagni and Marcin Lewiński.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81520856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-11-01DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011438
Anna Boncompagni
In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.
在这篇对Nuno Venturinha的《情境描述》的评论中，在强调了在我看来他的作品中最重要和最具创新性的特征之后，我将重点放在Venturinha的无谬误的知识方法上。这个话题允许对后期维特根斯坦哲学的实用主义方面进行更广泛的讨论。我分三步讨论这个问题:首先，描述维特根斯坦和实用主义者在强调语境方面的一般相似性;第二，关注实用主义者认可的可错论及其与查尔斯·s·皮尔斯(Charles S. Peirce)的“不容置疑”概念的兼容性，我认为这是维特根斯坦铰链概念的先驱;最后，他提出了一个假设，即在后来的维特根斯坦身上也有可能找到一种形式的可错性，尽管他坚持认为错误是不可能的。我的结论是，虽然文图里尼亚的语境主义在后来的维特根斯坦的著作中得到了支持，但他的无谬论却没有得到支持。
{"title":"On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes","authors":"Anna Boncompagni","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011438","url":null,"abstract":"In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79466126","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-06-30DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme202011217
Jeffrey R. Hoops
In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections.
{"title":"Knowledge, Certainty, and Factivity","authors":"Jeffrey R. Hoops","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011217","url":null,"abstract":"In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between Mizrahi’s proposal and Sankey’s objections.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91010993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-04-03DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme20201115
Timothy Perrine
Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, would establish Epistemic Value Pluralism is true and Epistemic Value Monism is false. This paper critically examines those arguments, finding them wanting. However, I develop an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds which turns on general reflection on the nature of value. On a widely held view, true beliefs are of final epistemic value. An interesting question is whether, and why, anything else is. Some authors hold that truth is the most basic thing of final epistemic value, embracing a version of “Epistemic Value Monism” that is sometimes called “Vertisim” or “Truth Value Monism.” Other authors demur, maintaining that the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of everything. Such authors embrace a kind of “Epistemic Value Pluralism.” The debate between Epistemic Value Monists and Pluralists is an important one. For instance, some philosophers might be inclined to understand other epistemic categories—e.g., epistemic obligations or epistemic virtues and vices—in terms of their relation to epistemic value. Clearly settling what is of epistemic value would be important for such projects. Various arguments have been given against Truth Value Monism and in favor of Epistemic Value Pluralism. We can separate those arguments into two categories. Knowledge based Arguments argue that because the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of knowledge we must embrace Epistemic Value Pluralism to explain the epistemic value of knowledge. Non-Knowledge based Arguments argue that the epistemic value of truth cannot explain the epistemic value of things besides knowledge. In other work, I have discussed Knowledge based Arguments and will not discuss them here. Rather, the aim of this paper is to examine Non-Knowledge based Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism. I will argue several such arguments fail—they are implausible, obscure, actually consistent with Truth Value Monism, or neglect the relevant distinction between basic and non-basic final value (see below). Nonetheless, I will claim that there is one Non-Knowledge based Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism that succeeds. That argument turns on plausible general claims about final value. After setting the stage in section I, I examine an argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism due to Jonathan Kvanvig in section II. I show how his argument is too obscure to carry force. In section III, I focus on a more straightforward argument from Kvanvig on the nature of understanding. But I argue Kvanvig’s view is ac
认识价值一元论认为只有一种事物具有基本的、最终的认识价值。也许认识价值一元论最可信的版本是真理价值一元论，它认为只有真实的信仰才具有基本的、最终的认识价值。一些作家——尤其是乔纳森·科万维格和迈克尔·德保罗——通过诉诸知识以外的事物的认知价值来批评真理价值一元论。这样的论证，如果成功，将确立认识价值多元论是正确的，认识价值一元论是错误的。本文批判性地审视了这些论点，发现它们存在不足。然而，我提出了一个关于认知价值多元主义的论点，它成功地开启了对价值本质的一般反思。在一个广泛持有的观点中，真正的信念具有最终的认知价值。一个有趣的问题是，其他事物是否如此，以及为什么如此。一些作者认为，真理是最终认识价值的最基本的东西，拥抱一种“认识价值一元论”，有时被称为“眩晕论”或“真理价值一元论”。其他作者则提出异议，认为真理的认识价值不能解释一切事物的认识价值。这些作者信奉一种“认知价值多元论”。认识价值一元论者与认识价值多元论者的争论是一个重要的争论。例如，一些哲学家可能倾向于理解其他认知范畴——例如:认识义务或认识的美德和罪恶——就它们与认识价值的关系而言。对于这类项目来说，清楚地确定什么具有认知价值是很重要的。反对真理价值一元论和支持认识价值多元主义的各种论点已经提出。我们可以把这些论点分为两类。基于知识的观点认为，由于真理的认识价值不能解释知识的认识价值，我们必须采用认识价值多元主义来解释知识的认识价值。非知识论认为，真理的认识价值不能解释知识以外事物的认识价值。在其他工作中，我已经讨论过基于知识的论证，这里不再讨论它们。相反，本文的目的是检查非知识为基础的论点认识价值多元主义。我认为有几个这样的论点是失败的——它们难以置信，模糊不清，实际上与真理价值一元论一致，或者忽视了基本和非基本最终价值之间的相关区别(见下文)。尽管如此，我还是要说，对于认知价值多元主义，有一种非基于知识的论证是成功的。这个论点围绕着关于最终价值的貌似合理的一般主张。在第一节奠定了基础之后，我在第二节中考察了乔纳森·科万维格(Jonathan Kvanvig)提出的关于认知价值多元主义的论点。我指出他的论点太模糊而没有说服力。在第三部分，我将重点讨论Kvanvig关于理解本质的一个更直接的论点。但我认为Kvanvig的观点实际上与真理价值一元论是一致的。对于有用的反馈，我要感谢Dan Buckley, Jordi Cat, Dave Fisher, Adam Leite, Dan Linsenbardt, Mark Kaplan, Tim O'Connor, Andrew Smith和Harrison Waldo。
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