Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1507437
P. Siegel
{"title":"Introduction to special section on safe spaces for core beliefs","authors":"P. Siegel","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1507437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1507437","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1507437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44493858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1507833
Sarah Steimel
ABSTRACT After nearly five years of litigation and public debate, the University of Utah now follows a Content Accommodations policy that outlines how students may ask for university curriculum to be altered based on their sincerely held beliefs. This essay is written about experiences teaching at another public university in Utah (Weber State), which has a similar Core Beliefs policy written in the aftermath of the University of Utah lawsuit. Teaching under a core beliefs policy has resulted in at least three notable influences on my own teaching practices: tensions between planning and spontaneity, vagaries surrounding reasonable accommodation, and pre-curation (or self-censorship) strategies.
{"title":"Core beliefs/content accommodation policies and teaching practice","authors":"Sarah Steimel","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1507833","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1507833","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After nearly five years of litigation and public debate, the University of Utah now follows a Content Accommodations policy that outlines how students may ask for university curriculum to be altered based on their sincerely held beliefs. This essay is written about experiences teaching at another public university in Utah (Weber State), which has a similar Core Beliefs policy written in the aftermath of the University of Utah lawsuit. Teaching under a core beliefs policy has resulted in at least three notable influences on my own teaching practices: tensions between planning and spontaneity, vagaries surrounding reasonable accommodation, and pre-curation (or self-censorship) strategies.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1507833","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44178289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1489297
Kevin A. Johnson, Lucienne Profenius
{"title":"Speech and society in turbulent times: Freedom of expression in comparative perspective","authors":"Kevin A. Johnson, Lucienne Profenius","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1489297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1489297","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1489297","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42054658","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1500929
Susan H. Sarapin, P. Morris
ABSTRACT Freedom of expression, provided by the First Amendment, is a core part of the foundation of our democracy. Yet those who use public places for artistic expression, such as music, are still fighting to benefit from this right, a right vital to their ability to earn a living from musical performances. Historically, both in the United States and elsewhere, buskers, those who perform on the streets for tips, have been subjected to unreasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of their speech, and, at times, outright banishment from constitutionally protected public fora. This article demonstrates why current restrictions on street performers constitute clear violations of free speech through an examination of historical restrictions, case law, and the current rules and regulations of four US cities. Obtaining an ostensibly permanent decision from the Supreme Court is not the solution for ensuring the free-speech rights of street performers. Rather, we present an example of model regulations that, if embraced by individual localities, can ensure proper protection for the First Amendment rights of musicians in public spaces.
{"title":"Entertaining free expression on public sidewalks: Are city ordinances kicking musical muses to the curb?","authors":"Susan H. Sarapin, P. Morris","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1500929","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1500929","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Freedom of expression, provided by the First Amendment, is a core part of the foundation of our democracy. Yet those who use public places for artistic expression, such as music, are still fighting to benefit from this right, a right vital to their ability to earn a living from musical performances. Historically, both in the United States and elsewhere, buskers, those who perform on the streets for tips, have been subjected to unreasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of their speech, and, at times, outright banishment from constitutionally protected public fora. This article demonstrates why current restrictions on street performers constitute clear violations of free speech through an examination of historical restrictions, case law, and the current rules and regulations of four US cities. Obtaining an ostensibly permanent decision from the Supreme Court is not the solution for ensuring the free-speech rights of street performers. Rather, we present an example of model regulations that, if embraced by individual localities, can ensure proper protection for the First Amendment rights of musicians in public spaces.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1500929","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45313137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1495094
Frances L. M. Smith, Crystal Rae Coel
ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that higher education institutions should change their Faculty Codes of Conduct to reflect workplace bullying as a form of unacceptable harassment. The article first provides a definition for workplace bullying; secondly, it offers an analysis of how the First Amendment is not an absolute, especially in the workplace; thirdly, it examines the scant legislative and judicial attention that is given to this issue; and finally, an argument is made to show how colleges and universities are not providing clear enough policies and procedures to address workplace bullying. That argument focuses on results of our thematic analysis of 276 Faculty Codes of Conduct from a variety of universities and colleges across the United States. That analysis revealed two primary themes: the Harassment Hang-up and Employee Engagement. Based on this analysis, we conclude that higher education institutions should change their Faculty Codes of Conduct so bullying is defined as a distinctive form of harassment, provide faculty and staff clear communications regarding how to define bullying, and offer guidance for both targets and bystanders of workplace bullying.
{"title":"Workplace bullying policies, higher education and the First Amendment: Building bridges not walls","authors":"Frances L. M. Smith, Crystal Rae Coel","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1495094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1495094","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that higher education institutions should change their Faculty Codes of Conduct to reflect workplace bullying as a form of unacceptable harassment. The article first provides a definition for workplace bullying; secondly, it offers an analysis of how the First Amendment is not an absolute, especially in the workplace; thirdly, it examines the scant legislative and judicial attention that is given to this issue; and finally, an argument is made to show how colleges and universities are not providing clear enough policies and procedures to address workplace bullying. That argument focuses on results of our thematic analysis of 276 Faculty Codes of Conduct from a variety of universities and colleges across the United States. That analysis revealed two primary themes: the Harassment Hang-up and Employee Engagement. Based on this analysis, we conclude that higher education institutions should change their Faculty Codes of Conduct so bullying is defined as a distinctive form of harassment, provide faculty and staff clear communications regarding how to define bullying, and offer guidance for both targets and bystanders of workplace bullying.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1495094","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44312615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-06-07DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1474122
K. Olson
ABSTRACT Striking the proper balance between private intellectual property interests and the public interest is especially important in the context of news, given its fundamental role in democracy. This article examines the scope of copyright protection for photojournalism, as well as the First Amendment safeguards that may limit that protection. It focuses on current understandings of the fair use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy (and idea/expression merger.) Next it focuses on the federal district court ruling in the Zapruder film case, which was based on one of the fair use doctrine’s key questions, but which also considered and rejected an idea/expression merger defense. An analysis of that case, and also a pair of key law review articles on copyright and images, leads to a proposal for a new “public-interest merger” doctrine for balancing public and rights holders’ interests in cases involving news images. That proposal argues for focus on whether the news images are exclusive (or at least nearly so), and evidentiary.
{"title":"Copyrighting facts? Ownership of news images","authors":"K. Olson","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1474122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1474122","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Striking the proper balance between private intellectual property interests and the public interest is especially important in the context of news, given its fundamental role in democracy. This article examines the scope of copyright protection for photojournalism, as well as the First Amendment safeguards that may limit that protection. It focuses on current understandings of the fair use doctrine and the idea/expression dichotomy (and idea/expression merger.) Next it focuses on the federal district court ruling in the Zapruder film case, which was based on one of the fair use doctrine’s key questions, but which also considered and rejected an idea/expression merger defense. An analysis of that case, and also a pair of key law review articles on copyright and images, leads to a proposal for a new “public-interest merger” doctrine for balancing public and rights holders’ interests in cases involving news images. That proposal argues for focus on whether the news images are exclusive (or at least nearly so), and evidentiary.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1474122","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44593828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-15DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1460215
Jared Schroeder
ABSTRACT The marketplace of ideas metaphor remains one of the Supreme Court’s most enduring tools for communicating understandings regarding freedom of expression. For nearly a century, justices from a variety of judicial philosophies, in several areas of First Amendment law, including commercial speech, defamation, and obscenity, have called upon the metaphor to help them convey what have ultimately become crucial interpretations regarding the Amendment’s protections. Metaphors, however, do not have static meanings. In light of the important considerations of paradigmatic social and technological changes that have substantially altered the very nature of the marketplace of ideas in society, particularly in the era of social media, fake news, and artificially intelligent communicators, this essay examines how the marketplace metaphor can be both reinterpreted and reimagined to account for a substantially different twenty-first-century information environment while remaining faithful to its author’s understandings about the nature of truth. To this end, this essay examines how Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes understood truth, considers differences between Enlightenment and discursive-based understandings regarding the flow of communication in democratic society, and explores how the Supreme Court has traditionally employed the metaphor. Finally, it proposes a revised conceptualization of the marketplace of ideas, ultimately labeled as the “discursive marketplace.”
{"title":"Toward a discursive marketplace of ideas: Reimaging the marketplace metaphor in the era of social media, fake news, and artificial intelligence","authors":"Jared Schroeder","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1460215","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1460215","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The marketplace of ideas metaphor remains one of the Supreme Court’s most enduring tools for communicating understandings regarding freedom of expression. For nearly a century, justices from a variety of judicial philosophies, in several areas of First Amendment law, including commercial speech, defamation, and obscenity, have called upon the metaphor to help them convey what have ultimately become crucial interpretations regarding the Amendment’s protections. Metaphors, however, do not have static meanings. In light of the important considerations of paradigmatic social and technological changes that have substantially altered the very nature of the marketplace of ideas in society, particularly in the era of social media, fake news, and artificially intelligent communicators, this essay examines how the marketplace metaphor can be both reinterpreted and reimagined to account for a substantially different twenty-first-century information environment while remaining faithful to its author’s understandings about the nature of truth. To this end, this essay examines how Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes understood truth, considers differences between Enlightenment and discursive-based understandings regarding the flow of communication in democratic society, and explores how the Supreme Court has traditionally employed the metaphor. Finally, it proposes a revised conceptualization of the marketplace of ideas, ultimately labeled as the “discursive marketplace.”","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1460215","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41712056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-03-14DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2018.1444501
A. McLeod
ABSTRACT This article discusses the US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar and its potential implications for judicial candidate speech and judicial elections. Based in part on a survey of cases involving restrictions on judicial candidate speech decided before and after Williams-Yulee, the article argues that Williams-Yulee effectively overruled the Court’s earlier decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, by weakening the strict scrutiny test that White applied to judicial candidate speech regulations. Specifically, Williams-Yulee weakened White’s version of strict scrutiny by removing the demand that the government demonstrate the effectiveness of its speech-regulating policies in achieving its goals, and by embracing a more permissive form of inclusivity analysis. This weaker version of strict scrutiny could facilitate government interference in the public education process that occurs during judicial elections, which is a process that affects citizens’ propensities to participate in elections, and their ability to make informed judgments about whom they want to put on the bench.
{"title":"Understanding Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar and its implications for freedom of speech in judicial elections","authors":"A. McLeod","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2018.1444501","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2018.1444501","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article discusses the US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar and its potential implications for judicial candidate speech and judicial elections. Based in part on a survey of cases involving restrictions on judicial candidate speech decided before and after Williams-Yulee, the article argues that Williams-Yulee effectively overruled the Court’s earlier decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, by weakening the strict scrutiny test that White applied to judicial candidate speech regulations. Specifically, Williams-Yulee weakened White’s version of strict scrutiny by removing the demand that the government demonstrate the effectiveness of its speech-regulating policies in achieving its goals, and by embracing a more permissive form of inclusivity analysis. This weaker version of strict scrutiny could facilitate government interference in the public education process that occurs during judicial elections, which is a process that affects citizens’ propensities to participate in elections, and their ability to make informed judgments about whom they want to put on the bench.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2018.1444501","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45886066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2017.1349618
H. Hall
Abstract Just before the 2016 Christmas holiday weekend, President Barack Obama quietly signed the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law. Deep within the act is a controversial provision called the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act (CFPDA), which establishes a Global Engagement Center under the State Department and consolidates the power of several federal broadcasting entities under one authority. This center will coordinate efforts to counter foreign propaganda, mainly from Russia and China, that is aimed at undermining the United States’ national security interests. The consolidation of power creates some concerns regarding journalistic independence and credibility for media outlets such as the Voice of America. The new Trump administration’s perceived amicable relationship with Russia also generates uncertainty around the commitment to fight Russian disinformation and propaganda. This essay argues that the US does in fact need some kind of governmental entity devoted to the creation of counter-propaganda, and then concludes there are deficiencies and vulnerabilities with the CFPDA, especially a lack of adequate administrative oversight. Based on this conclusion, as well as on lessons gleaned from how other nations have dealt with Russian disinformation campaigns, the essay offers tentative recommendations as to what an effective governing structure would look like.
就在2016年圣诞假期周末之前，美国总统奥巴马悄悄签署了2017年国防授权法案(NDAA)。该法案的深层内容是一项有争议的条款，名为《打击外国宣传和虚假信息法》(Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation act，简称CFPDA)，该条款在国务院下设立了一个全球参与中心，并将几个联邦广播机构的权力整合到一个机构之下。该中心将协调反击外国宣传的努力，这些宣传主要来自俄罗斯和中国，旨在破坏美国的国家安全利益。权力的巩固给美国之音等媒体的新闻独立性和可信度带来了一些担忧。特朗普新政府与俄罗斯的友好关系也给打击俄罗斯虚假信息和宣传的承诺带来了不确定性。本文认为，美国实际上确实需要某种专门从事反宣传的政府实体，然后得出结论，CFPDA存在缺陷和漏洞，特别是缺乏足够的行政监督。基于这一结论，以及从其他国家如何应对俄罗斯的虚假信息运动中收集到的经验教训，本文就有效的治理结构应该是什么样子提出了初步建议。
{"title":"The new voice of America: Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act","authors":"H. Hall","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2017.1349618","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2017.1349618","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Just before the 2016 Christmas holiday weekend, President Barack Obama quietly signed the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law. Deep within the act is a controversial provision called the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act (CFPDA), which establishes a Global Engagement Center under the State Department and consolidates the power of several federal broadcasting entities under one authority. This center will coordinate efforts to counter foreign propaganda, mainly from Russia and China, that is aimed at undermining the United States’ national security interests. The consolidation of power creates some concerns regarding journalistic independence and credibility for media outlets such as the Voice of America. The new Trump administration’s perceived amicable relationship with Russia also generates uncertainty around the commitment to fight Russian disinformation and propaganda. This essay argues that the US does in fact need some kind of governmental entity devoted to the creation of counter-propaganda, and then concludes there are deficiencies and vulnerabilities with the CFPDA, especially a lack of adequate administrative oversight. Based on this conclusion, as well as on lessons gleaned from how other nations have dealt with Russian disinformation campaigns, the essay offers tentative recommendations as to what an effective governing structure would look like.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2017.1349618","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45640820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2017-07-03DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2017.1388749
Susan H. Sarapin, P. Morris, Ngoc Vo
Abstract As lines between public and private spaces online continue to blur, contracts are moving closer to the day when government actors will be involved in all of them. When 90%+ of online users do not read the terms-of-service (ToS) agreements of social media sites, they are unaware of possible repercussions of blindly assenting to these unread contracts, including potentially relinquishing a number of their constitutional rights. Primary among these is their First Amendment right to petition the government for relief in a court of law. In most ToSs, the online user must agree to mandatory arbitration in the site owner’s venue of choice. Secondary is their sole right to their intellectual property afforded by the Constitution. Through an online survey (N = 235), this article reports data concerning respondents’ attitudes toward reading ToSs, their demographic information, and their likelihood of accepting a forum-selection term from Twitter, contrary to their potential constitutional rights. Two major findings are that: (a) there was no effect of education on the likelihood of rejecting Google’s unfavorable copyright-related terms; and (b) 63.2% of those who state they would not, under any condition, accept the unfavorable Twitter forum-selection term do, indeed, belong to or have belonged to Twitter.
{"title":"The biggest lie on the web: Coming to terms with the failure to read through the lens of the First Amendment","authors":"Susan H. Sarapin, P. Morris, Ngoc Vo","doi":"10.1080/21689725.2017.1388749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21689725.2017.1388749","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As lines between public and private spaces online continue to blur, contracts are moving closer to the day when government actors will be involved in all of them. When 90%+ of online users do not read the terms-of-service (ToS) agreements of social media sites, they are unaware of possible repercussions of blindly assenting to these unread contracts, including potentially relinquishing a number of their constitutional rights. Primary among these is their First Amendment right to petition the government for relief in a court of law. In most ToSs, the online user must agree to mandatory arbitration in the site owner’s venue of choice. Secondary is their sole right to their intellectual property afforded by the Constitution. Through an online survey (N = 235), this article reports data concerning respondents’ attitudes toward reading ToSs, their demographic information, and their likelihood of accepting a forum-selection term from Twitter, contrary to their potential constitutional rights. Two major findings are that: (a) there was no effect of education on the likelihood of rejecting Google’s unfavorable copyright-related terms; and (b) 63.2% of those who state they would not, under any condition, accept the unfavorable Twitter forum-selection term do, indeed, belong to or have belonged to Twitter.","PeriodicalId":37756,"journal":{"name":"First Amendment Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21689725.2017.1388749","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45473400","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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