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Contesting the place of protest in migrant caravans 在移民大篷车中争夺抗议地点
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1837648
Margaret Franz
ABSTRACT Restrictions on assembly, all of which disproportionately target Black, Indigenous, and People of Color, demonstrate that the freedom to assemble depends on state-defined temporal, behavioral, and spatial boundaries of political practice. This essay analyzes how the migrant caravans organized by Pueblo Sin Fronteras (PSF) push against the state-derived boundaries on assembly. Specifically, it focuses on two tactics deployed by the caravans: (1) using the term caravan and caravana to describe border crossing, and (2) media practices that turned undocumented border crossing into border refusal. These tactics contested the nation-state sovereignty required to mark its jurisdiction, and thus, to decide on the correct place and form of politics. In the end, the essay argues that the caravan expanded what it means to freely assemble by turning undocumented migration into protest. Communication scholars should pay attention to this expansion because it illuminates alternate ways of being political that push against the legacy of nation-state sovereignty and colonization.
摘要对集会的限制,所有这些都不成比例地针对黑人、原住民和有色人种,表明集会自由取决于国家定义的政治实践的时间、行为和空间边界。本文分析了Pueblo Sin Fronteras(PSF)组织的移民商队是如何在集会上突破国家边界的。具体而言,它侧重于大篷车部署的两种策略:(1)使用大篷车和大篷车一词来描述越境,以及(2)将无证越境变成拒绝越境的媒体做法。这些策略对民族国家主权提出了质疑,民族国家主权是标记其管辖权所必需的,从而决定了正确的政治位置和形式。最后,文章认为,商队通过将无证移民转变为抗议,扩大了自由集会的意义。传播学学者应该关注这一扩展,因为它阐明了反对民族国家主权和殖民化遗产的政治方式。
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引用次数: 1
Locating freedom of speech in an era of global white nationalism 在全球白人民族主义时代定位言论自由
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1838843
A. Vats, M. Dutta
The chief spokespersons for this more refined sentiment against persons and voices that are new and unfamiliar to the campus and intellectual discourse are not the purveyors of gutter hate speech. They are polite and polished colleagues. The code words of this backlash are words like merit, rigor, standards, qualifications, and excellence. Increasingly we hear those who are resisting change appropriating the language of freedom struggles. Words like intolerant, silencing, McCarthyism, censors, and orthodoxy are used to portray women and people of color as oppressors and to pretend the powerful have become powerless.
这种针对校园和知识话语中陌生的人和声音的更精致的情绪的首席发言人并不是低俗仇恨言论的提供者。他们是彬彬有礼的同事。这种反弹的暗语是功绩、严谨、标准、资格和卓越。我们越来越多地听到那些抵制变革的人盗用自由斗争的语言。不宽容、沉默、麦卡锡主义、审查者和正统派等词被用来将女性和有色人种描绘成压迫者,并假装权贵变得无能为力。
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引用次数: 3
Hindu nationalism and media violence in news discourses in India 印度教民族主义与印度新闻话语中的媒体暴力
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-07-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1838846
Ashwini Falnikar
ABSTRACT The mainstream media and communication discourses in India in the present times engender ‘media violence’ embedded in the dominant productions of ‘Hinduism’ together with aspirations for neoliberal development. The media violence engenders indigenous forms of racism and colonialism. This article attempts to examine the nature of these productions through critical theories of postcoloniality and decolonial approaches put into conversation with theories of journalism. Through the examination of the instances of selective silencing of journalistic voices, and erasures embedded within the journalistic practices, this article argues for critical theories of press freedom. The productions of racial superiority and internal colonialism in India only begin to make sense when read together with the interplays of religion, class, caste, and global reach of the privileged sections of Indian society, namely the civil society. Against the backdrop of the historical role of the press in India in freedom struggle against colonial rule, the history of press censorship after independence, the civil society voices that are amplified in the neoliberal restructuring of news media, and the Dalit movements that expose the Brahminical dominance in the imaginary of the ‘Indian culture’, the meanings of race and coloniality in India unfold.
当今时代印度的主流媒体和传播话语产生了嵌入在“印度教”主导产品中的“媒体暴力”,以及对新自由主义发展的渴望。媒体暴力造成土著形式的种族主义和殖民主义。本文试图通过后殖民主义批判理论和非殖民主义方法与新闻学理论的对话来审视这些作品的本质。通过对选择性压制新闻声音和新闻实践中存在的抹除现象的考察,本文论证了新闻自由的批判理论。印度的种族优越感和内部殖民主义的产物只有在与宗教、阶级、种姓和印度社会特权阶层(即公民社会)的全球影响力的相互作用一起阅读时才开始有意义。在印度新闻界在反对殖民统治的自由斗争中的历史作用、独立后新闻审查的历史、在新闻媒体的新自由主义重组中被放大的公民社会声音、以及揭露婆罗门教在“印度文化”想象中的主导地位的达利特运动的背景下,印度种族和殖民主义的意义展开了。
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引用次数: 0
Using think-alouds to understand how students balance free speech and inclusion 通过大声思考来理解学生如何平衡言论自由和包容
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-02-06 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2021.1884113
J. Bernstein, Cameron W. Armstrong
ABSTRACT We explore student attitudes toward freedom of speech on campus using a think-aloud method, in which students are exposed to source material on a subject and “think aloud” as they work through the controversies. We gain an in-depth picture of how students understand and make judgments about who should and should not be allowed to speak on campus. Utilizing the think-aloud method to examine various cases of invited speakers on campus, we learn that students have difficult times differentiating legal and political reasons for preventing certain campus speakers. We also find that students tend to be more restrictive than a civil libertarian might like, albeit in (usually) internally consistent and sympathetic ways. We conclude by suggesting interventions that could help students better understand the way First Amendment rights are typically adjudicated and balanced against other lofty goals.
摘要:我们使用出声思考的方法来探讨学生对校园言论自由的态度,在这种方法中,学生接触到一个主题的原始材料,并在他们解决争议的过程中“大声思考”。我们深入了解了学生是如何理解和判断谁应该和不应该在校园里发言的。利用大声思考的方法来检查校园邀请演讲者的各种案例,我们了解到学生很难区分阻止某些校园演讲者的法律和政治原因。我们还发现,学生往往比公民自由主义者可能喜欢的更严格,尽管(通常)在内部一致和同情的方式。最后,我们提出了一些干预措施,可以帮助学生更好地理解第一修正案权利的典型裁决方式,以及如何与其他崇高目标相平衡。
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引用次数: 0
Circumventing the “true threat” and “viewpoint” protection tests to deal with persistent campus hate speech 规避“真实威胁”和“观点”保护测试,应对持续存在的校园仇恨言论
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742759
C. Smith
ABSTRACT This essay suggests using harassment law as a mechanism for remedying defects in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” language which places an undue burden of proof on those trying to quell hate speech on campuses. The essay reviews noted failures and their causes in “true threat” and “viewpoint protection” rulings. Currently, the First Amendment of the Constitution protects freedom of expression unless it presents “a clear and present danger,” is treasonous, obscene, libelous or slanderous. The initial “clear and present danger” standard laid out by Justice Holmes in the Schenck decision has been refined in several cases to create an even heavier burden of proof. Currently, based particularly on the Brandenburg v. Ohio and Virginia v. Black rulings, to be prosecutable, speech must be a “true threat,” which means person-specific, imminent, and possible. However, the Supreme Court has also protected hate speech by defining it as “viewpoint” in such case as Indiana v. Hess, Snyder v. Phelps, and Matal v. Tam. This essay concludes by exploring ways to circumvent the “true threat” and “viewpoint” standards by relying on harassment rulings and extending these precedents from the workplace to campus learning environments.
摘要本文建议使用骚扰法作为一种机制来弥补“真实威胁”和“观点保护”语言中的缺陷,这些缺陷使那些试图平息校园仇恨言论的人承担了不当的举证责任。这篇文章回顾了在“真正威胁”和“观点保护”裁决中注意到的失败及其原因。目前,宪法第一修正案保护言论自由,除非它呈现出“明确而现实的危险”,是叛国、淫秽、诽谤或诽谤。霍姆斯大法官在申克案判决中提出的最初的“明确而现实的危险”标准,在几起案件中得到了改进,从而产生了更重的举证责任。目前,特别是根据勃兰登堡诉俄亥俄州案和弗吉尼亚诉布莱克案的裁决,言论必须是“真正的威胁”,这意味着针对个人的、迫在眉睫的和可能的。然而,在印第安纳诉赫斯案、斯奈德诉菲尔普斯案和马塔尔诉塔姆案等案件中,最高法院也通过将仇恨言论定义为“观点”来保护仇恨言论。本文最后探讨了通过依赖骚扰裁决和将这些先例从工作场所扩展到校园学习环境来规避“真正威胁”和“观点”标准的方法。
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引用次数: 4
Perspective by incongruity: Law and rhetoric in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 不协调视角:杰作蛋糕店诉科罗拉多州民权委员会案中的法律与修辞
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1728357
M. Eisenstadt
ABSTRACT The Supreme Court’s ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was decided on the narrow ground that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause because of hostility toward the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop. This decision failed to answer a cardinal question of constitutional law, whether or not the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause could undermine nondiscrimination law. In Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion, he seized on one particular comment made by a Commissioner about religious freedom that justified ruling against the Commission for its use of discriminatory rhetoric. According to Justice Kennedy, the Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause by describing religious expression as despicable and as merely rhetorical. In this report, I argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion demands heightened attention for two reasons. First, to describe religious freedom as a justification for prejudice as merely rhetorical is a gross underestimation of the power of rhetoric and provides moral encouragement to anti-LGBTQ+ activists using the legal system to advance a heteronormative agenda. Second, Justice Kennedy’s claim that rhetoric is insubstantial and insincere calls into question the role of the Court, the meaning of the law, and the relationship between the law and rhetoric.
摘要最高法院在Masterpiece Cakeshop诉科罗拉多州民权委员会一案中的裁决是基于狭隘的理由作出的,即科罗拉多州民权委员会因对MasterpieceCakeshoP所有者的敌意而违反了第一修正案的自由行使条款。这一决定未能回答宪法的一个基本问题,即第一修正案的言论自由条款是否会破坏非歧视法。在大法官安东尼·肯尼迪的多数意见中,他抓住了一位专员关于宗教自由的特别评论,该评论为反对委员会使用歧视性言论的裁决提供了理由。根据肯尼迪大法官的说法,委员会违反了自由行使条款,将宗教言论描述为卑鄙和仅仅是修辞。在这份报告中,我认为肯尼迪大法官的意见需要得到高度关注,原因有两个。首先,将宗教自由描述为偏见的正当理由,仅仅是修辞,这严重低估了修辞的力量,并为反LGBTQ+活动家利用法律制度推进非规范议程提供了道德鼓励。其次,肯尼迪大法官声称修辞是空洞和不真诚的,这让人对法院的作用、法律的意义以及法律与修辞之间的关系产生了疑问。
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引用次数: 1
Sovereignty and First Amendment rights of higher education institutions: An affirmative and institutional approach 高等教育机构的主权和第一修正案权利:一种肯定和制度的方法
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1743197
M. Park
ABSTRACT This article offers an analysis of how, and to what extent, public institutions of higher learning, as agents of one sovereign, could assert free speech rights against the federal government, another sovereign. This work expands the First Amendment and government speech discourse by contributing a novel examination of Supreme Court precedent and the Court’s language addressing the expressive activities of universities under academic freedom. This work also situates itself theoretically in the Madisonian conception of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, and makes the case that public universities should be recognized as institutions that occupy a special constitutional status within the doctrine. The article’s significance is underscored by the fact that the current political climate raises the specter of increased regulation and policing of the expressive activities of universities.
摘要本文分析了公共高等教育机构作为一个主权国家的代理人,如何以及在多大程度上维护对另一个主权国联邦政府的言论自由权。这项工作扩展了第一修正案和政府言论话语,对最高法院的先例和法院在学术自由下处理大学表达活动的语言进行了新颖的审查。这项工作在理论上也将自己置于第一修正案言论自由条款的麦迪逊概念中,并提出公立大学应被承认为在该原则中具有特殊宪法地位的机构。当前的政治气候引发了对大学表达活动加强监管的担忧,这一事实突显了这篇文章的重要性。
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引用次数: 2
is (not) a whistleblower: Ideographs, whistleblower protections, and restrictions of speech 是(不是)告密者:象形文字、告密者保护和言论限制
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742761
Joshua Guitar
ABSTRACT Edward Snowden’s revelations ignited public discourse on whistleblowing and whistleblower protection legislation. Given the polemics over whistleblower distinctions throughout mediated exchanges between US officials and the press, this manuscript constitutes a synchronic ideographic analysis of pertinent, recognized ideographs as they were operationalized in relation to whistleblowing within the Snowden discourse. While news media and the public agreed that Snowden operated as a whistleblower, the US government adamantly denied this classification. Instead, US officials manufactured a media trial, and in three distinct phases, purged whistleblowing from the public forum, rhetorically criminalized Snowden as a threat to national , and utilized whistleblowing as a means to propagate the war on and defend covert surveillance. These processes afforded US officials the ability to funnel whistleblowers through private channels, effectively neutralizing the public power of whistleblowers. It is argued that removing whistleblowers from the public forum, while packaged as a protective measure for whistleblowers, operates as a defensive measure for state officials and authoritarianism writ large as it disarms a democratic populace of a foundational tool of free speech and dissent.
摘要爱德华·斯诺登的爆料引发了公众对举报和保护举报人立法的讨论。考虑到在美国官员和媒体之间的调解交流中,关于告密者区别的争论,这份手稿构成了对相关的、公认的表意文字的同步表意分析,因为它们在斯诺登话语中与告密有关。尽管新闻媒体和公众一致认为斯诺登是告密者,但美国政府坚决否认这一说法。相反,美国官员制造了一场媒体审判,分三个不同阶段,从公共论坛上清除告密行为,口头上将斯诺登定为对国家的威胁,并利用告密作为宣传战争和捍卫秘密监视的手段。这些程序使美国官员有能力通过私人渠道引导举报人,有效地削弱了举报人的公共权力。有人认为,将举报人从公共论坛上除名,虽然被包装成对举报人的保护措施,但对国家官员来说,这是一种防御措施,威权主义在很大程度上削弱了民主民众的言论自由和异议的基本工具。
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引用次数: 1
Is it too heavy of a constitutional cross to bear? Making sense of the decision in American Legion v. American Humanist Association 宪法十字架是不是太重了?理解美国退伍军人协会诉美国人文主义协会案的判决
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742762
Adrienne E. Hacker-Daniels
ABSTRACT This essay examines the case American Legion v. American Humanist Association in which the Supreme Court decided (in a 7–2 decision) that a monument in Bladensburg, Maryland, known as the Peace Cross, does not represent governmental promotion of religion, and therefore is not in violation of the Establishment Clause. The origins of the First Amendment are discussed followed by a discussion of significant Supreme Court precedents, providing a meaningful framework for an understanding of the First Amendment issues at stake in this case. With that background, the major tenets of the Peace Cross case are examined, including majority/concurring and dissenting opinions. Finally, a perspective of this case is situated as contradistinctive to another current artifact, in which the latter engenders an untenable, harmful and violative relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
摘要本文考察了美国退伍军人协会诉美国人文主义协会一案,在该案中,最高法院(以7–2的判决)裁定,马里兰州布莱登斯堡的一座名为和平十字的纪念碑不代表政府对宗教的宣传,因此不违反设立条款。首先讨论了第一修正案的起源,然后讨论了最高法院的重要判例,为理解本案中涉及的第一修正案问题提供了一个有意义的框架。在这种背景下,审查了和平十字会案件的主要原则,包括多数/赞同和反对意见。最后,本案的观点与另一个当前的人工制品相反,后者在设立条款和自由行使条款之间产生了一种站不住脚的、有害的和违法的关系。
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引用次数: 1
The First Amendment v. reproductive rights: Crisis pregnancy centers, commercial speech, and marketplaces of misinformation 第一修正案诉生殖权利:危机怀孕中心、商业言论和错误信息市场
Q2 Social Sciences Pub Date : 2020-01-02 DOI: 10.1080/21689725.2020.1742763
Bradley Queen
ABSTRACT This essay responds to the holding in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra (2018), arguing that the signal contribution of the majority opinion is its attempt to move commercial speech further into the absolute realm of protected public discourse. In finding the California FACT Act to be unconstitutional, the 5–4 majority uses a fractured commercial speech standard to define NIFLA’s marketplace communications as protected ideological speech. In so doing, Justice Thomas, author of the majority opinion, considers only the state’s speech – its compelled disclosures – and does not assess the rhetorical properties of NIFLA’s commercial communications. But the majority concludes nevertheless that NIFLA’s speech is impervious to publicly interested legislation, despite well-documented evidence of misleading and harmful advertising. Ultimately, it is argued that the question of whether NIFLA’s right to free speech has been violated cannot be squarely addressed if the speech with which the state’s disclosures dialogue remains nebulous. NIFLA seems to undermine the longstanding conception of commercial speech as a form that legitimates both the interests of speakers and the informational interests of publics, with the latter sustained when necessary by governmental initiatives that enable informed choice-making by regulating deceptive information in commercial marketplaces.
摘要本文回应了美国国家家庭与生活倡导者协会(NIFLA)诉Becerra(2018)一案的判决,认为多数意见的标志性贡献是它试图将商业言论进一步带入受保护的公共话语的绝对领域。在认定《加州事实真相法案》违宪的过程中,5–4的多数人使用了一个支离破碎的商业言论标准,将NIFLA的市场传播定义为受保护的意识形态言论。在这样做的时候,多数意见书的作者托马斯大法官只考虑了该州的言论——其强制披露——而没有评估NIFLA商业通信的修辞性质。但大多数人得出的结论是,尽管有充分的证据表明存在误导和有害的广告,但NIFLA的言论不受公众关注的立法的影响。最终,有人认为,如果国家披露对话所用的言论仍然模糊不清,那么NIFLA的言论自由权是否受到侵犯的问题就无法得到正视。NIFLA似乎破坏了商业言论的长期概念,商业言论是一种使演讲者的利益和公众的信息利益合法化的形式,后者在必要时通过政府举措得以维持,通过监管商业市场中的欺骗性信息来实现知情选择。
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引用次数: 0
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First Amendment Studies
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