The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the problem of China’s ambiguous neutral stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For around a two-month period (i.e., between February and April) since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on February 24th 2022, there has been no clear diplomatic message from Beijing concerning its final choice of position between Ukraine and its quasi-ally Russia. Parallel to this obscurity in China’s foreign policy, there are numerous arguments (this paper lists eight of them) that attempt to speculate Beijing’s next move based on their respective rationales that might prompt China to aid Russia’s military venture or abandon support for its quasi-ally. In this paper, the researcher tries to study China’s neutrality through an offensive realist prism and frame these arguments into two major underlying raison d’état: 1) to immediately rebalance the power equilibrium in the system by aiding Russia and soliciting it into China’s coalition—namely, to change the configuration of the units in the system; 2) to sustain the positive relat`ive gains in long-term until China surpasses the USA by abandoning Russia, thereby buying time as a diplomatic détente with United States—namely, to change the systemic capability distribution among its units. By comparing the weight of the two raison d’états through an examination of the eight major arguments respectively, the researcher concludes that the inextricable uncertainty of gains/losses between the two antinomic grand strategy approaches is exactly the reason that causes Beijing’s obscure attitude of neutrality between the two belligerents.
{"title":"Why China’s Foreign Policy Remains Neutral (?) in Regard to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine? A Grand Strategy Analysis through an Offensive Realist Prism","authors":"Jiabin Song","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.2","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the problem of China’s ambiguous neutral stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For around a two-month period (i.e., between February and April) since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on February 24th 2022, there has been no clear diplomatic message from Beijing concerning its final choice of position between Ukraine and its quasi-ally Russia. Parallel to this obscurity in China’s foreign policy, there are numerous arguments (this paper lists eight of them) that attempt to speculate Beijing’s next move based on their respective rationales that might prompt China to aid Russia’s military venture or abandon support for its quasi-ally. In this paper, the researcher tries to study China’s neutrality through an offensive realist prism and frame these arguments into two major underlying raison d’état: 1) to immediately rebalance the power equilibrium in the system by aiding Russia and soliciting it into China’s coalition—namely, to change the configuration of the units in the system; 2) to sustain the positive relat`ive gains in long-term until China surpasses the USA by abandoning Russia, thereby buying time as a diplomatic détente with United States—namely, to change the systemic capability distribution among its units. By comparing the weight of the two raison d’états through an examination of the eight major arguments respectively, the researcher concludes that the inextricable uncertainty of gains/losses between the two antinomic grand strategy approaches is exactly the reason that causes Beijing’s obscure attitude of neutrality between the two belligerents.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"46 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138588679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The subject of this article is the foreign policy of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The aim of this article is to analyse the foreign policy and its main objectives pursued in 2019–2022 by the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The analysis attempts to answer the question of whether foreign policy is a continuation of previously pursued foreign policy activity or marks a change, and, in the case of the latter, to what extent has the policy changed? The author focuses his research on foreign actions towards the countries of the region (the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine). The research is based on Gustavsson’s model involving the analysis of various stages of foreign policy development.
{"title":"Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda's Central and Eastern European Foreign Policy in 2019–2022: Continuation or Change?","authors":"Martinas Malužinas","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.7","url":null,"abstract":"The subject of this article is the foreign policy of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The aim of this article is to analyse the foreign policy and its main objectives pursued in 2019–2022 by the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The analysis attempts to answer the question of whether foreign policy is a continuation of previously pursued foreign policy activity or marks a change, and, in the case of the latter, to what extent has the policy changed? The author focuses his research on foreign actions towards the countries of the region (the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine). The research is based on Gustavsson’s model involving the analysis of various stages of foreign policy development.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"49 13","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138587115","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of the article is to determine the role of co-financing technologies (crowdfunding, fundraising) under the conditions of war and post-war reconstruction. The basis of the study is the case analysis of international support to Ukraine to counter Russian aggression. The central issue of the article is to clarify the acceptability, effectiveness, as well as problems of applying co-financing technologies to solve the problems caused by the war. The existing global experience of using co-financing technologies during wars was studied, the peculiarities of the Ukrainian case were revealed. The advantages, problems and risks of using crowdfunding and fundraising during a full-scale war are identified. The motivation of the public of other states to co-finance the solution or mitigation of the problems caused by Russia’s aggression on the territory of Ukraine is ascertained. The research is based on the analysis of projects supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians during the days of the Russian aggression on leading crowdfunding platforms, as well as through fundraising. Crowdfunding and fundraising are considered as forms of remote involvement, elements of digital action repertoires, which are used by the democratic public from all over the world (and in the case of Ukraine, also by government institutions) to convey their position on war and mitigate its consequences. It is concluded that modern technologies of cofinancing enable remote involvement of citizens of different states in international conflicts and humanitarian crises caused by these conflicts and wars. The dependence of the use of crowdfunding and fundraising technologies on the type of political regime and the characteristics of political culture of the dominant part of the population is proven.
{"title":"Crowdfunding and Fundraising in the Peacebuilding System: Ukraine’s Case","authors":"Nataliia Khoma","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.3","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of the article is to determine the role of co-financing technologies (crowdfunding, fundraising) under the conditions of war and post-war reconstruction. The basis of the study is the case analysis of international support to Ukraine to counter Russian aggression. The central issue of the article is to clarify the acceptability, effectiveness, as well as problems of applying co-financing technologies to solve the problems caused by the war. The existing global experience of using co-financing technologies during wars was studied, the peculiarities of the Ukrainian case were revealed. The advantages, problems and risks of using crowdfunding and fundraising during a full-scale war are identified. The motivation of the public of other states to co-finance the solution or mitigation of the problems caused by Russia’s aggression on the territory of Ukraine is ascertained. The research is based on the analysis of projects supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians during the days of the Russian aggression on leading crowdfunding platforms, as well as through fundraising. Crowdfunding and fundraising are considered as forms of remote involvement, elements of digital action repertoires, which are used by the democratic public from all over the world (and in the case of Ukraine, also by government institutions) to convey their position on war and mitigate its consequences. It is concluded that modern technologies of cofinancing enable remote involvement of citizens of different states in international conflicts and humanitarian crises caused by these conflicts and wars. The dependence of the use of crowdfunding and fundraising technologies on the type of political regime and the characteristics of political culture of the dominant part of the population is proven.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"49 7","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138587121","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of hybrid threats plays an increasingly important role in the security studies agenda, as it raises awareness about the multidimensional nature of contemporary security. Hybrid threats are considered hostile activities that involve the simultaneous use of two or more types of threats and are controlled or coordinated by a specific actor, whether state or non-state. Some experts may argue that hybrid threats are the most prevalent type of threat in the European security landscape at present. As a result, the focus of research has shifted to an investigation into this phenomenon and the vulnerabilities that make a country weaker in the face of emerging hybrid threats. However, much less attention has been paid to the subjective perception of hybrid threats in particular societal and historical contexts, as well as their impact on security policy-making. This article analyses the perceptions of Latvian society in regard to its vulnerability to hybrid threats, as well as how these perceptions are reflected in the main security policy documents. It is concluded that the Latvian population recognises certain hybrid threats as being current in their security agenda. This is especially true of information and cyber threats. On the other hand, the analysis of the key national security documents reveals the lack of a well-defined agenda for preventing and combating hybrid threats.
{"title":"Subjective Perception of Hybrid Threats in Latvia","authors":"Prof. Žaneta Ozoliņa, Sigita Struberga","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.6","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of hybrid threats plays an increasingly important role in the security studies agenda, as it raises awareness about the multidimensional nature of contemporary security. Hybrid threats are considered hostile activities that involve the simultaneous use of two or more types of threats and are controlled or coordinated by a specific actor, whether state or non-state. Some experts may argue that hybrid threats are the most prevalent type of threat in the European security landscape at present. As a result, the focus of research has shifted to an investigation into this phenomenon and the vulnerabilities that make a country weaker in the face of emerging hybrid threats. However, much less attention has been paid to the subjective perception of hybrid threats in particular societal and historical contexts, as well as their impact on security policy-making. This article analyses the perceptions of Latvian society in regard to its vulnerability to hybrid threats, as well as how these perceptions are reflected in the main security policy documents. It is concluded that the Latvian population recognises certain hybrid threats as being current in their security agenda. This is especially true of information and cyber threats. On the other hand, the analysis of the key national security documents reveals the lack of a well-defined agenda for preventing and combating hybrid threats.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"90 22","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138586408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article follows the perspective of the World-system and aims to reveal the factors determining Russian foreign policy. In response to the neo-realistic interpretation of Russia’s behaviour in the international system, based on the logic of maintaining the balance of powers, an alternative interpretation is formulated: Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by structural geo-economic factors – belonging to the ‘semi-peripheral’ geo-economic zone. It leads to socio-economic tensions and political instability within the state and forces the Russian regime to use various domestic and foreign policy instruments to mobilize the society. One such instrument is military aggression in foreign countries, including Ukraine.
{"title":"The Russo-Ukrainian War: a Worldsystem Theoretical Approach","authors":"Valentinas Beržiūnas","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2023.20.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2023.20.1","url":null,"abstract":"The article follows the perspective of the World-system and aims to reveal the factors determining Russian foreign policy. In response to the neo-realistic interpretation of Russia’s behaviour in the international system, based on the logic of maintaining the balance of powers, an alternative interpretation is formulated: Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by structural geo-economic factors – belonging to the ‘semi-peripheral’ geo-economic zone. It leads to socio-economic tensions and political instability within the state and forces the Russian regime to use various domestic and foreign policy instruments to mobilize the society. One such instrument is military aggression in foreign countries, including Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138587025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article contributes to research which covers individual’s willingness to defend their own country. To achieve this end, a case study is undertaken which looks at the Baltic states, with a special focus on the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the region. The mapping out of historical and present day quantitative data corroborates the finding that there is a gap in terms of willingness to defend one’s own country between Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian-speakers on the one hand and Russian-speakers on the other. At the same time, data from two nationally-representative surveys across the Baltics leads one to the conclusion that there are no fundamental differences in reasoning along ethnic and linguistic lines, i.e. why individuals express willingness (not) to defend their own country. Consistent differences can be observed only in some smaller categories which generally mirror trends in contrasting historical memories and the perceptions of domestic and international issues.
{"title":"Multi-ethnic societies and willingness to defend one’s own country: Russian-speakers in the Baltic states","authors":"Māris Andžāns","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.3","url":null,"abstract":"This article contributes to research which covers individual’s willingness to defend their own country. To achieve this end, a case study is undertaken which looks at the Baltic states, with a special focus on the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the region. The mapping out of historical and present day quantitative data corroborates the finding that there is a gap in terms of willingness to defend one’s own country between Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian-speakers on the one hand and Russian-speakers on the other. At the same time, data from two nationally-representative surveys across the Baltics leads one to the conclusion that there are no fundamental differences in reasoning along ethnic and linguistic lines, i.e. why individuals express willingness (not) to defend their own country. Consistent differences can be observed only in some smaller categories which generally mirror trends in contrasting historical memories and the perceptions of domestic and international issues.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48671706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Based on an inter-disciplinary theoretical approach about built form as a social construct which mirrors power relations, this article examines the role of what is broadly understood as ‘physical infrastructure’ in Crimean political history, with particular emphasis on the late modern period. The analysis reveals that the infrastructural component proved to be crucial in terms of physically ‘attaching’ the peninsula either to the Russian or Ukrainian parts of the mainland, with the latter naturally seen as a much better option due to the existing terrestrial connection at least as long as all of them remained within a single state. The Soviet disintegration therefore immediately made Crimea’s infrastructure both a contested milieu and a medium of this contestation. As a result, the 2014 annexation and subsequent flashpoints cannot really be explained without referring to such issues as transportation gateways, energy security, and even water supply. While long being quintessentially political, physical infrastructure in Crimea is becoming existential.
{"title":"The role of physical infrastructure in the perennial struggle for Crimea","authors":"Konstantinas Andrijauskas","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.2","url":null,"abstract":"Based on an inter-disciplinary theoretical approach about built form as a social construct which mirrors power relations, this article examines the role of what is broadly understood as ‘physical infrastructure’ in Crimean political history, with particular emphasis on the late modern period. The analysis reveals that the infrastructural component proved to be crucial in terms of physically ‘attaching’ the peninsula either to the Russian or Ukrainian parts of the mainland, with the latter naturally seen as a much better option due to the existing terrestrial connection at least as long as all of them remained within a single state. The Soviet disintegration therefore immediately made Crimea’s infrastructure both a contested milieu and a medium of this contestation. As a result, the 2014 annexation and subsequent flashpoints cannot really be explained without referring to such issues as transportation gateways, energy security, and even water supply. While long being quintessentially political, physical infrastructure in Crimea is becoming existential.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47115920","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Europe’s security situation has evolved somewhat over the past few years, causing national defence policies to be reviewed and strengthened. Being members of Nato and the European Union, the Benelux countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have been changing their defence policies to face complex military and non-military threats. The potential threat from Russia is one factor which has been behind their closer military cooperation, supported by the process of rebuilding national military capabilities. Progress has been especially visible after 2014 most especially due to Russian aggression against Ukraine, along with hybrid threats and terrorists attacks. All three countries tend to cooperate with each other while also enjoying ever-closer relations with Nato and other EU members, while the USA has a special place in this arrangement. All of these connections and areas of cooperation will be covered in this article. The author utilises the qualitative research approach which involves one or more case studies, along with institutional and behavioural analysis, deskbound research, analysis, and synthesis methods.
{"title":"Changes in the Benelux defence policy between 2014-2019","authors":"Marcin Lasoń","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.7","url":null,"abstract":"Europe’s security situation has evolved somewhat over the past few years, causing national defence policies to be reviewed and strengthened. Being members of Nato and the European Union, the Benelux countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg have been changing their defence policies to face complex military and non-military threats. The potential threat from Russia is one factor which has been behind their closer military cooperation, supported by the process of rebuilding national military capabilities. Progress has been especially visible after 2014 most especially due to Russian aggression against Ukraine, along with hybrid threats and terrorists attacks. All three countries tend to cooperate with each other while also enjoying ever-closer relations with Nato and other EU members, while the USA has a special place in this arrangement. All of these connections and areas of cooperation will be covered in this article. The author utilises the qualitative research approach which involves one or more case studies, along with institutional and behavioural analysis, deskbound research, analysis, and synthesis methods.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44739159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case study. Through a multidisciplinary approach, based on a case study as a qualitative method, the authors analyse various factors so that they are able to reach concrete conclusions in a comprehensive manner. The analysis covers historical, demographic, political, and special ethical aspects in Montenegro. Our explanation of the most important causes which ensured the absence of ethnic conflict in Montenegro is based on perspectives of what can be referred to as the neo-Weberian and anti-foundationalism approaches which emphasise the behaviour of the state, as well as geopolitical circumstances, as prime examples for the emergence or absence of ethnic-based conflict.
{"title":"Preserving Peace in a Troubled Region: the Case of Montenegro","authors":"S. Knezevic, Marko Savic, B. Vukićević","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.6","url":null,"abstract":"In the wake of the Cold War, Yugoslavia and its successor states were engulfed in a series of conflicts, including armed ones. In all of the republics - the newly independent states of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia’s then-province of Kosovo, but with the exception of Slovenia - these conflicts were primarily ethnically driven. The only former Yugoslav republic to avert armed conflict in the 1990s was Montenegro, which regained its independence peacefully in 2006. In this article, the authors respond to the research question of why, out of all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, was it only in Montenegro in which there was no ethnic conflict during the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation? The authors apply the Randall Collins theory of social conflicts to the case study of Montenegro. This theory combines geopolitical and ethnic factors for the absence or outbreak of conflicts, something which has a strong explanatory potential for this case study. Through a multidisciplinary approach, based on a case study as a qualitative method, the authors analyse various factors so that they are able to reach concrete conclusions in a comprehensive manner. The analysis covers historical, demographic, political, and special ethical aspects in Montenegro. Our explanation of the most important causes which ensured the absence of ethnic conflict in Montenegro is based on perspectives of what can be referred to as the neo-Weberian and anti-foundationalism approaches which emphasise the behaviour of the state, as well as geopolitical circumstances, as prime examples for the emergence or absence of ethnic-based conflict.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42637717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Russian federation uses several tools to allow it to place pressure on the western world in an asymmetric manner, among them being cyber-attacks, economic tools, and information-influence campaigns. These instruments are especially strongly felt in Estonia. This article uses Estonia’s example in order to delve into Russia’s political goals and strategic conduct. Specifically, analysis is provided in regard to the political context, instruments which form part of the ‘information war’, and any effective counter-measures, with all of this being carried out within the theoretical framework of constructivism. As will be argued, the shift from European to Eurasian power and Russia’s carefully crafted management process of not exceeding red lines, as well as its process of exploiting the socio-economic weaknesses of the west all play a relevant role in understanding the political context. As for instruments, Russia has developed tools which can be analysed in terms of strategic conspiracy narratives, while it has likewise used several channels which lie next to the usual media tools, along with policy tools such as Pax Russica and the compatriot policy.
{"title":"Russian information warfare in Estonia, and Estonian countermeasures","authors":"Viljar Veebel, I. Ploom, V. Sazonov","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.4","url":null,"abstract":"The Russian federation uses several tools to allow it to place pressure on the western world in an asymmetric manner, among them being cyber-attacks, economic tools, and information-influence campaigns. These instruments are especially strongly felt in Estonia. This article uses Estonia’s example in order to delve into Russia’s political goals and strategic conduct. Specifically, analysis is provided in regard to the political context, instruments which form part of the ‘information war’, and any effective counter-measures, with all of this being carried out within the theoretical framework of constructivism. As will be argued, the shift from European to Eurasian power and Russia’s carefully crafted management process of not exceeding red lines, as well as its process of exploiting the socio-economic weaknesses of the west all play a relevant role in understanding the political context. As for instruments, Russia has developed tools which can be analysed in terms of strategic conspiracy narratives, while it has likewise used several channels which lie next to the usual media tools, along with policy tools such as Pax Russica and the compatriot policy.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43098440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：