This article explores escalation as a tool which is being used in Russian military strategy in the twenty-first century. This method of operation has been transformed from a purely defensive deterrence asset which was valid at the beginning of the 2000s into an element of aggressive deterrence, one which bases itself on Russia presenting Crimea’s annexation as a fait accompli. The authors conclude that the strategic value for Moscow of the Black Sea region has grown with the annexation of Crimea, so that it now surpasses the value of the Baltic region. This can be inferred by comparing the Russian military potential which is present in both regions, as well as through related doctrines and corresponding decisions. To a major extent, the Russian stance in the Baltic plays a coercive role in its strategy: it aims to boost deterrence on the Black Sea, where Moscow sees itself as being more vulnerable.
{"title":"Russian roulette: the Kremlin’s escalation strategy from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea","authors":"P. Sinovets, I. Maksymenko, M. Skrypnyk","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.1","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores escalation as a tool which is being used in Russian military strategy in the twenty-first century. This method of operation has been transformed from a purely defensive deterrence asset which was valid at the beginning of the 2000s into an element of aggressive deterrence, one which bases itself on Russia presenting Crimea’s annexation as a fait accompli. The authors conclude that the strategic value for Moscow of the Black Sea region has grown with the annexation of Crimea, so that it now surpasses the value of the Baltic region. This can be inferred by comparing the Russian military potential which is present in both regions, as well as through related doctrines and corresponding decisions. To a major extent, the Russian stance in the Baltic plays a coercive role in its strategy: it aims to boost deterrence on the Black Sea, where Moscow sees itself as being more vulnerable.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46175166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the energy dimension of relationships which have been developed between the ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) partner countries within the context of European security. The essence of the EaP and the main priorities of the initiative’s energy platform will be determined. The peculiarities of their relations with the European Union and the Russian federation will be analysed. One discovery which has been made is the fact that the involvement of the addressee countries within the EaP grants them significant advantages in the implementation of the overall energy policy, and the EU is understood by them as being a guarantor of energy security. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Russia seeks to establish the fullest possible levels of control over energy supplies which are sent to Europe, and to the EU, and indeed even to reduce the dependence of the EaP partner countries on energy imports from Russia. Something which became obvious was the fact that while Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine were forming closer ties with the EU, Azerbaijan and Belarus on the contrary continued (and continue) to adhere to the authoritarian status quo. From this it can be concluded that the EaP partner countries face new challenges and threats, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy, which will determine the transformation of energy relations, in particular within the dimension of security.
{"title":"The energy dimension of the EU Eastern Partnership initiative in restructuring Europe’s security architecture","authors":"Yaryna Turchyn, O. Ivasechko, O. Tsebenko","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2021.19.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2021.19.5","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the energy dimension of relationships which have been developed between the ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) partner countries within the context of European security. The essence of the EaP and the main priorities of the initiative’s energy platform will be determined. The peculiarities of their relations with the European Union and the Russian federation will be analysed. One discovery which has been made is the fact that the involvement of the addressee countries within the EaP grants them significant advantages in the implementation of the overall energy policy, and the EU is understood by them as being a guarantor of energy security. Emphasis is placed on the fact that Russia seeks to establish the fullest possible levels of control over energy supplies which are sent to Europe, and to the EU, and indeed even to reduce the dependence of the EaP partner countries on energy imports from Russia. Something which became obvious was the fact that while Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine were forming closer ties with the EU, Azerbaijan and Belarus on the contrary continued (and continue) to adhere to the authoritarian status quo. From this it can be concluded that the EaP partner countries face new challenges and threats, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy, which will determine the transformation of energy relations, in particular within the dimension of security.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43696449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper presents theoretical considerations regarding the understanding of strategic autonomy in the field of security and defence. It starts with the theoretical understanding of the term “autonomy” and dilemmas concerning autonomy in the EU. Then it identifies and describes the key initiatives in the field of security and defence conditioning the EU’s achievement of strategic autonomy in this area and the main problems of their implementation. The presented conclusions are based on the qualitative analysis of the source material, mainly, the EU normative documents. They lead to the following observations. First, there is no clear definition and interpretation of “strategic autonomy” in the EU normative documents. This can lead to confusion and over-interpretation by individual Member States which may understand strategic autonomy differently, especially in the area of security and defence. Secondly, the majority of the Member States recognise security and defence as an area enabling the achievement of strategic autonomy. However, there are differences between countries in terms of understanding strategic autonomy. Two approaches are visible amongst the EU members: full sovereignty and flexible autonomy in the field of security and defence. Thirdly, the security and defence initiatives adopted by the EU over the past few years can provide the basis for achieving strategic autonomy in this area.
{"title":"Strategic Autonomy of the European Union in Security and Defence","authors":"T. Zieliński","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2020.18.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.1","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents theoretical considerations regarding the understanding of strategic autonomy in the field of security and defence. It starts with the theoretical understanding of the term “autonomy” and dilemmas concerning autonomy in the EU. Then it identifies and describes the key initiatives in the field of security and defence conditioning the EU’s achievement of strategic autonomy in this area and the main problems of their implementation. The presented conclusions are based on the qualitative analysis of the source material, mainly, the EU normative documents. They lead to the following observations. First, there is no clear definition and interpretation of “strategic autonomy” in the EU normative documents. This can lead to confusion and over-interpretation by individual Member States which may understand strategic autonomy differently, especially in the area of security and defence. Secondly, the majority of the Member States recognise security and defence as an area enabling the achievement of strategic autonomy. However, there are differences between countries in terms of understanding strategic autonomy. Two approaches are visible amongst the EU members: full sovereignty and flexible autonomy in the field of security and defence. Thirdly, the security and defence initiatives adopted by the EU over the past few years can provide the basis for achieving strategic autonomy in this area.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"5-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42720609","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
* Prof. Magdalena Tomala is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Politics, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. Address for correspondence: ul. Uniwersytecka 15, 25-406 Kielce, Poland; tel. +48 41 349 6508, e-mail: magdalena.tomala@ujk.edu.pl ** Dr. Maryana Prokop is an assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Politics, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. Address for correspondence: ul. Uniwersytecka 15, 25-406 Kielce, Poland; tel. +48 41 349 6508, e-mail: maryana.prokop@ujk.edu.pl
{"title":"Sweden’s Development Cooperation in the Light of the Principles of the English School of International Relations","authors":"Magdalena Tomala, M. Prokop","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2020.18.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.3","url":null,"abstract":"* Prof. Magdalena Tomala is an associate professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Politics, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. Address for correspondence: ul. Uniwersytecka 15, 25-406 Kielce, Poland; tel. +48 41 349 6508, e-mail: magdalena.tomala@ujk.edu.pl ** Dr. Maryana Prokop is an assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations and Public Politics, Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. Address for correspondence: ul. Uniwersytecka 15, 25-406 Kielce, Poland; tel. +48 41 349 6508, e-mail: maryana.prokop@ujk.edu.pl","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"45-65"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47527453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-01DOI: 10.47459/LASR.2020.18.10
M. Kamionka
After the Euromaidan1 (2013) and the war in the East of Ukraine (2014) youth in this country experienced a new situation, i.e., life during the “Hybrid War”. The article analyses the situation of the young generation in Ukraine in the frameworks of this new war. In addition to this, the author attempts to answer the question of whether there is a sense of patriotism among the young people related to the defence of the motherland during the Hybrid War. The results show the first experiences of the young people towards the unusual situation in which they find themselves. The new reality requires them to have a thorough understanding of patriotism. Patriotism is based on primary motives related to a sense of duty to their country and striving for unity of sometimes totally different parts of the country. This article shows that Patriotism not only still exists in the young generation, but it is fundamental for the myth that will influence next generations.
{"title":"Patriotism of the Young Generation in Ukraine in the Era of Hybrid War","authors":"M. Kamionka","doi":"10.47459/LASR.2020.18.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/LASR.2020.18.10","url":null,"abstract":"After the Euromaidan1 (2013) and the war in the East of Ukraine (2014) youth in this country experienced a new situation, i.e., life during the “Hybrid War”. The article analyses the situation of the young generation in Ukraine in the frameworks of this new war. In addition to this, the author attempts to answer the question of whether there is a sense of patriotism among the young people related to the defence of the motherland during the Hybrid War. The results show the first experiences of the young people towards the unusual situation in which they find themselves. The new reality requires them to have a thorough understanding of patriotism. Patriotism is based on primary motives related to a sense of duty to their country and striving for unity of sometimes totally different parts of the country. This article shows that Patriotism not only still exists in the young generation, but it is fundamental for the myth that will influence next generations.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"221-239"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47633488","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Private Military Companies in the Foreign and Security Policy of the Russian Federation in 2014–2019","authors":"Aivaras Giedraitis","doi":"10.47459/LASR.2020.18.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/LASR.2020.18.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"123-162"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48765648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In 2018 Russia initiated attempts to substantially revitalize the slow process of the Russian – Belarusian integration by implementing the fundamental obligations set out in the Union Treaty not only in the fields of economy or the military, but by also resolving the essential political and financial issues, thus building a strong foundation for further creation of the union state and a certain breakthrough. This article discusses the new phase in the creation of the Union State in order to identify the reasons behind the new initiative and the key factors having led to the slow-pace integration of the Union State and different rates in individual fields. It is argued that the creation process of the Union State does not gain the required momentum due to different interests of the states: Russia’s aspirations for full control over Belarus and the efforts made by the President of Belarus seeking to maintain an integration format enabling unobstructed existence of the model of the political system established by him and allowing him to stay in power. This process could be described as a certain strategic partnership enabling flexible and non-binding actions (postponement of agreements for economic, security, and personal gain). The 2020 crisis in Belarus when President A. Lukashenko lost the legitimacy of his constituents and the Western States did not recognise the presidential election as democratic, the Union State project was “frozen” temporarily until the political situation in the country stabilizes. Under these conditions Russia’s ambition to keep Belarus has remained unchanged and it is likely that cautious tactics would be implemented to achieve this goal at the same time to avoid stirring up opposition sentiment, to maintain sentiments of the Belarusian public favourable to the great power in their neighbourhood, and to activate economic actions directed at strengthening the positions of Russian capital in the neighbouring space.
{"title":"The Russian – Belarusian Integration: Political Puzzles of “31 Roadmaps”","authors":"Virgilijus Pugačiauskas","doi":"10.47459/LASR.2020.18.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/LASR.2020.18.8","url":null,"abstract":"In 2018 Russia initiated attempts to substantially revitalize the slow process of the Russian – Belarusian integration by implementing the fundamental obligations set out in the Union Treaty not only in the fields of economy or the military, but by also resolving the essential political and financial issues, thus building a strong foundation for further creation of the union state and a certain breakthrough. This article discusses the new phase in the creation of the Union State in order to identify the reasons behind the new initiative and the key factors having led to the slow-pace integration of the Union State and different rates in individual fields. It is argued that the creation process of the Union State does not gain the required momentum due to different interests of the states: Russia’s aspirations for full control over Belarus and the efforts made by the President of Belarus seeking to maintain an integration format enabling unobstructed existence of the model of the political system established by him and allowing him to stay in power. This process could be described as a certain strategic partnership enabling flexible and non-binding actions (postponement of agreements for economic, security, and personal gain). The 2020 crisis in Belarus when President A. Lukashenko lost the legitimacy of his constituents and the Western States did not recognise the presidential election as democratic, the Union State project was “frozen” temporarily until the political situation in the country stabilizes. Under these conditions Russia’s ambition to keep Belarus has remained unchanged and it is likely that cautious tactics would be implemented to achieve this goal at the same time to avoid stirring up opposition sentiment, to maintain sentiments of the Belarusian public favourable to the great power in their neighbourhood, and to activate economic actions directed at strengthening the positions of Russian capital in the neighbouring space.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"177-193"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43058544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
* Dr Māris Andžāns is an assistant professor at Rīga Stradiņš University, Faculty of European Studies. Address for correspondence: 16 Dzirciema Street, LV-1007 Rīga, Latvia; phone: +371 67409261; e-mail: maris.andzans@rsu.lv ** Dr Andris Sprūds is a professor at Rīga Stradiņš University, Faculty of European Studies. Address for correspondence: 16 Dzirciema Street, LV-1007 Rīga, Latvia; phone: +371 67409261; e-mail: andris.spruds@rsu.lv
{"title":"Three-Decade Evolution of the Willingness to Defend One’s Own Country: the Case of the Baltic States","authors":"Māris Andžāns, Andris Sprūds","doi":"10.47459/LASR.2020.18.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/LASR.2020.18.9","url":null,"abstract":"* Dr Māris Andžāns is an assistant professor at Rīga Stradiņš University, Faculty of European Studies. Address for correspondence: 16 Dzirciema Street, LV-1007 Rīga, Latvia; phone: +371 67409261; e-mail: maris.andzans@rsu.lv ** Dr Andris Sprūds is a professor at Rīga Stradiņš University, Faculty of European Studies. Address for correspondence: 16 Dzirciema Street, LV-1007 Rīga, Latvia; phone: +371 67409261; e-mail: andris.spruds@rsu.lv","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"195-220"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42508619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Will Russia Comply with the Western Norms and Values ? Russia’s Understanding on Credible Deterrence, Normative Power and Sanctions","authors":"Viljar Veebel, Liia Vihmand, I. Ploom","doi":"10.47459/LASR.2020.18.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/LASR.2020.18.5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"99-121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48345421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
France’s status as a conventional power makes Paris an inevitable actor in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Insofar France is considered as a staunch protagonist of the EU/European strategic autonomy and an opponent against the US/NATO dominance in Europe, the most recent CSDP progress may be expected to belong to the merits of French decision-makers. Based on a closer analytical look, however, CSDP is not reducible to a coherent outcome of French interests. At the EU level, the French influence turns out to be limited. A strong ideological attachment of this EU Member State to sovereign politics and a consequential lack of commitment to common issues of defence and security may be viewed as an impediment to the materialisation of a more significant clout of Paris on the communitarian scale. Yet relevant limits are predominantly a structural consequence, which is a pattern enhanced by the current dynamics in global politics. This makes one consider France’s status as a “system-influencing state” more cautiously. In a sense, the paper takes issue with the literature on the recent CSDP progress as an expression of political and policy convergence and re-focuses attention on manners in which inter-European dynamics can shed light on positions of individual members.
{"title":"Common Security and Defence Policy as France’s Winning Strategy ? Evidence from Recent Experience","authors":"R. Kuokštytė","doi":"10.47459/lasr.2020.18.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47459/lasr.2020.18.2","url":null,"abstract":"France’s status as a conventional power makes Paris an inevitable actor in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Insofar France is considered as a staunch protagonist of the EU/European strategic autonomy and an opponent against the US/NATO dominance in Europe, the most recent CSDP progress may be expected to belong to the merits of French decision-makers. Based on a closer analytical look, however, CSDP is not reducible to a coherent outcome of French interests. At the EU level, the French influence turns out to be limited. A strong ideological attachment of this EU Member State to sovereign politics and a consequential lack of commitment to common issues of defence and security may be viewed as an impediment to the materialisation of a more significant clout of Paris on the communitarian scale. Yet relevant limits are predominantly a structural consequence, which is a pattern enhanced by the current dynamics in global politics. This makes one consider France’s status as a “system-influencing state” more cautiously. In a sense, the paper takes issue with the literature on the recent CSDP progress as an expression of political and policy convergence and re-focuses attention on manners in which inter-European dynamics can shed light on positions of individual members.","PeriodicalId":37780,"journal":{"name":"Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review","volume":"18 1","pages":"23-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42695187","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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