Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2019.1731208
Malcolm Chalmers
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Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2019.1731205
J. Olsen
NATO is the most successful political and military alliance in recent history. It remains the single most important contributor to security, stability and peace in Europe and North America. It is v...
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Pub Date : 2019-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2019.1731219
Heinrich Brauss
{"title":"X. The Need for the Alliance to Adapt Further","authors":"Heinrich Brauss","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2019.1731219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2019.1731219","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2019.1731219","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48827639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696576
Aside from the US, NATO’s air forces have suffered a considerable decline in their ability to conduct sustained combat operations against a near-peer or peer state opponent since the end of the Cold War. Badly delayed modernisation plans, inadequate weapons stockpiles, inflexible C2 arrangements, reduced fleet sizes, and pilots highly experienced in dropping munitions on insurgent groups but lacking the intense training required for proficient operations in highly contested airspace are problems that affect all Alliance members. NATO efforts to reverse these trends, such as the so-called ‘Four Thirties’ force generation and readiness plans, still sit largely in the realm of political statements of intent rather than concrete programmes to generate increased military power. Increased readiness levels, while necessary, are also not a solution in and of themselves to the gulf in combat capability and enablers between the US and other member states. While Russia has also seen a significant decline from over 2,650 to around 1,250 modern combat aircraft compared to the Soviet Union, its greater reliance on a mixture of heavy ground forces and modern ground-based air defence systems in large numbers renders it less dependent on large-scale airpower than NATO. Almost three decades of discretionary, limited wars against sub-peer threat states and long counterinsurgency campaigns since 1991 have served to demonstrate many of the inherent strengths of airpower,
{"title":"I. The Context: Home-Grown Problems and Adversary Innovations","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696576","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696576","url":null,"abstract":"Aside from the US, NATO’s air forces have suffered a considerable decline in their ability to conduct sustained combat operations against a near-peer or peer state opponent since the end of the Cold War. Badly delayed modernisation plans, inadequate weapons stockpiles, inflexible C2 arrangements, reduced fleet sizes, and pilots highly experienced in dropping munitions on insurgent groups but lacking the intense training required for proficient operations in highly contested airspace are problems that affect all Alliance members. NATO efforts to reverse these trends, such as the so-called ‘Four Thirties’ force generation and readiness plans, still sit largely in the realm of political statements of intent rather than concrete programmes to generate increased military power. Increased readiness levels, while necessary, are also not a solution in and of themselves to the gulf in combat capability and enablers between the US and other member states. While Russia has also seen a significant decline from over 2,650 to around 1,250 modern combat aircraft compared to the Soviet Union, its greater reliance on a mixture of heavy ground forces and modern ground-based air defence systems in large numbers renders it less dependent on large-scale airpower than NATO. Almost three decades of discretionary, limited wars against sub-peer threat states and long counterinsurgency campaigns since 1991 have served to demonstrate many of the inherent strengths of airpower,","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"18 - 6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696576","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48886321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696578
The 28 non-US NATO members collectively possess well over 1,000 fast jet aircraft and as such represent a potentially highly potent part of the Alliance’s airpower. However, a significant number of smaller member states do not possess combat aircraft, while the majority operate comparatively small fleets of between 40 and 60 aircraft and few enablers. Most of the non-US airpower in the Alliance is fielded by a few large European states, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Spain.
{"title":"III. The Medium Powers: Europe’s Leading Air Forces","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696578","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696578","url":null,"abstract":"The 28 non-US NATO members collectively possess well over 1,000 fast jet aircraft and as such represent a potentially highly potent part of the Alliance’s airpower. However, a significant number of smaller member states do not possess combat aircraft, while the majority operate comparatively small fleets of between 40 and 60 aircraft and few enablers. Most of the non-US airpower in the Alliance is fielded by a few large European states, including the UK, France, Italy, Germany and Spain.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"40 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696578","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43214531","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696580
B. V. Ginkel
In the airpower domain, NATO faces a looming challenge but one which is also a potential opportunity if understood and adequately planned for. Put simply, the US is gearing up to leave the rest of the Alliance behind in capability terms, as it has done in previous generational shifts, but this time with a different primary mission focus from other NATO member states. This is for two main reasons. First, that there is a growing awareness in the US Air Force and in other branches of the US military that even with its unmatched defence budget, the country cannot afford to continue trying to maintain a dominant military position over China and Russia in their own immediate neighbourhoods by pursuing incremental upgrades to existing capabilities. Long-range SAM systems, ever-improving radar and other sensor technologies and long-range anti-enabler missile systems are much cheaper for China in particular to produce than for the US to counter. Decades of airpower overmatch, which has become essential for the way NATO plans for operations, are being steadily eroded by rival powers and in terms of China, the picture will only get worse in the coming decades. China and Russia have studied the US dependence on tankers, big-wing ISR and tactical fighters in its conduct of warfare from the air and have found cost-effective ways to impose unacceptable risks to that family of capabilities. The second, and linked, reason for the US shift in capability is the new focus on China rather than Russia as the US military’s primary long-term peer threat. The demands of the Pacific theatre and the distances to which China as a potential air and maritime challenger can increasingly project (or create) contested and highly contested airspace call for new and different approaches to warfighting than has been the case in relation to Russia in
{"title":"Conclusion: Challenges and Opportunities","authors":"B. V. Ginkel","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696580","url":null,"abstract":"In the airpower domain, NATO faces a looming challenge but one which is also a potential opportunity if understood and adequately planned for. Put simply, the US is gearing up to leave the rest of the Alliance behind in capability terms, as it has done in previous generational shifts, but this time with a different primary mission focus from other NATO member states. This is for two main reasons. First, that there is a growing awareness in the US Air Force and in other branches of the US military that even with its unmatched defence budget, the country cannot afford to continue trying to maintain a dominant military position over China and Russia in their own immediate neighbourhoods by pursuing incremental upgrades to existing capabilities. Long-range SAM systems, ever-improving radar and other sensor technologies and long-range anti-enabler missile systems are much cheaper for China in particular to produce than for the US to counter. Decades of airpower overmatch, which has become essential for the way NATO plans for operations, are being steadily eroded by rival powers and in terms of China, the picture will only get worse in the coming decades. China and Russia have studied the US dependence on tankers, big-wing ISR and tactical fighters in its conduct of warfare from the air and have found cost-effective ways to impose unacceptable risks to that family of capabilities. The second, and linked, reason for the US shift in capability is the new focus on China rather than Russia as the US military’s primary long-term peer threat. The demands of the Pacific theatre and the distances to which China as a potential air and maritime challenger can increasingly project (or create) contested and highly contested airspace call for new and different approaches to warfighting than has been the case in relation to Russia in","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"67 - 73"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696580","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47977588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696555
P. Roberts, Jack Watling, Sidharth Kaushal
I would like to thank the many officers in the Royal Air Force, United States Air Force, Armée de l’Air and Luftwaffe who have been so generous with their time, experiences and patience with my many questions over the last five years. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, especially Peter Roberts, for supporting this project, and Jack Watling and Sidharth Kaushal, for always being willing to talk through and lend their expertise on thorny topics, often at considerable length. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Melanie Thienard for her love and encouragement.
{"title":"Acknowledgements","authors":"P. Roberts, Jack Watling, Sidharth Kaushal","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696555","url":null,"abstract":"I would like to thank the many officers in the Royal Air Force, United States Air Force, Armée de l’Air and Luftwaffe who have been so generous with their time, experiences and patience with my many questions over the last five years. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Military Sciences team at RUSI, especially Peter Roberts, for supporting this project, and Jack Watling and Sidharth Kaushal, for always being willing to talk through and lend their expertise on thorny topics, often at considerable length. Finally, I would like to thank my partner Melanie Thienard for her love and encouragement.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"v - v"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696555","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43521783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}