Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005888
J. Bronk, Jack Watling
Humans are naturally drawn to stories, since we use narratives to make sense of a complex world, to order information into chains of causality, and to communicate and respond to ideas. Confronted with novel technologies or tactics, we are often drawn to narrative vignettes of how these capabilities could be employed in order to visualise their effects. However, narratives are not merely descriptive; they implicitly promote frameworks that prompt behaviour and judgement. It has long been recognised in economics that narratives shape expectations, stimulate imagination and guide investment decisions in ways that empirical analysis often struggles to match. Within Defence, the shaping influence of uncritically accepted narratives can have problematic consequences. In many areas of defence policy, such as cyber warfare, space or novel weapons systems, deep subject matter expertise is required to understand the potential benefits and limitations. The same is true of attempts to assess the policies and actions of strategic competitors with very different cultural and geopolitical viewpoints. Crucial nuances and practical constraints are almost unavoidably lost in translation as senior decision-makers shape policy and generalists rewrite doctrine and strategy documents based on their own understanding of briefings given by specialist practitioners and subject matter experts. This tendency is exacerbated by a natural inclination to over-hype the potential for novel technologies or strategies to provide transformative effects. Incompatible
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"J. Bronk, Jack Watling","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005888","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005888","url":null,"abstract":"Humans are naturally drawn to stories, since we use narratives to make sense of a complex world, to order information into chains of causality, and to communicate and respond to ideas. Confronted with novel technologies or tactics, we are often drawn to narrative vignettes of how these capabilities could be employed in order to visualise their effects. However, narratives are not merely descriptive; they implicitly promote frameworks that prompt behaviour and judgement. It has long been recognised in economics that narratives shape expectations, stimulate imagination and guide investment decisions in ways that empirical analysis often struggles to match. Within Defence, the shaping influence of uncritically accepted narratives can have problematic consequences. In many areas of defence policy, such as cyber warfare, space or novel weapons systems, deep subject matter expertise is required to understand the potential benefits and limitations. The same is true of attempts to assess the policies and actions of strategic competitors with very different cultural and geopolitical viewpoints. Crucial nuances and practical constraints are almost unavoidably lost in translation as senior decision-makers shape policy and generalists rewrite doctrine and strategy documents based on their own understanding of briefings given by specialist practitioners and subject matter experts. This tendency is exacerbated by a natural inclination to over-hype the potential for novel technologies or strategies to provide transformative effects. Incompatible","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"1 - 10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48855754","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005901
Jack Watling
The US Air Force likes to describe the future of command and control in warfare as analogous to Uber. Such a system promises a drastic improvement in efficiency and cooperation across the force. Suppose, for example, that an infantry platoon needed assistance in engaging enemy armour advancing on their position. They could make the request by reporting the target’s position, and this could be made available to all potential shooters in the area. These might comprise an artillery battery, an aircraft en route to a target and an aircraft returning from a strike. One could envisage the artillery battery declining the request because they were tasked with counterbattery duties and did not want to unmask their guns. The first aircraft might also decline because they were already tasked with an important strike mission and needed their munitions for that. The returning aircraft, finding that it had munitions left over from the strike, might accept, and the request would no longer be pushed to other units. Alternatively, if the second aircraft is removed from the equation, a higher commander might be envisaged, with access to the options, determining the trade-off between unmasking the guns, or abandoning the strike mission, based on their broader intent. Without such a system, the infantry platoon would have to call for artillery and air support on separate systems. Since the artillery and aircraft would not coordinate with each other, the infantry may receive no support, or support from both.
{"title":"VII. More Sensors Than Sense","authors":"Jack Watling","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005901","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005901","url":null,"abstract":"The US Air Force likes to describe the future of command and control in warfare as analogous to Uber. Such a system promises a drastic improvement in efficiency and cooperation across the force. Suppose, for example, that an infantry platoon needed assistance in engaging enemy armour advancing on their position. They could make the request by reporting the target’s position, and this could be made available to all potential shooters in the area. These might comprise an artillery battery, an aircraft en route to a target and an aircraft returning from a strike. One could envisage the artillery battery declining the request because they were tasked with counterbattery duties and did not want to unmask their guns. The first aircraft might also decline because they were already tasked with an important strike mission and needed their munitions for that. The returning aircraft, finding that it had munitions left over from the strike, might accept, and the request would no longer be pushed to other units. Alternatively, if the second aircraft is removed from the equation, a higher commander might be envisaged, with access to the options, determining the trade-off between unmasking the guns, or abandoning the strike mission, based on their broader intent. Without such a system, the infantry platoon would have to call for artillery and air support on separate systems. Since the artillery and aircraft would not coordinate with each other, the infantry may receive no support, or support from both.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"87 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47981166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005894
N. Reynolds
It is a long-established point of pride for smaller, lighter professional military forces that they can match larger, heavier forces. The US Marine Corps (USMC) has often considered itself as ‘doing more with less’ when compared to the US Army, equivalent to the UK defence cliché of ‘punching above our weight’. Since the end of the Cold War, successive events have pushed most Western militaries to become smaller. The idea of a peace dividend was followed by attempts to make defence more efficient, and despite a brief trend of modest expansion during the War on Terror, this has been followed by further contraction. The official rationale usually involves efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Recently, an additional element of the debate has been brought to the fore: whether older, heavier platforms are survivable in the face of the increasing range, precision and lethality of offensive weapons and technology. The UK’s Integrated Review in 2021 required government policy to directly address these questions, and the result for the most part favoured smaller and lighter land forces. It framed the shrinkage of the British Army as a positive step, stating that ‘the Army of the future will be leaner, more lethal, nimbler, and more effectively matched to current and future threats’ while proposing personnel cuts ‘from the current Full Time Trade Trained strength of 76,000 to 72,500 by 2025’. The necessity of rectifying prior funding discrepancies by difficult prioritisation decisions was
{"title":"III. Doing Less with Less in the Land Domain","authors":"N. Reynolds","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005894","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005894","url":null,"abstract":"It is a long-established point of pride for smaller, lighter professional military forces that they can match larger, heavier forces. The US Marine Corps (USMC) has often considered itself as ‘doing more with less’ when compared to the US Army, equivalent to the UK defence cliché of ‘punching above our weight’. Since the end of the Cold War, successive events have pushed most Western militaries to become smaller. The idea of a peace dividend was followed by attempts to make defence more efficient, and despite a brief trend of modest expansion during the War on Terror, this has been followed by further contraction. The official rationale usually involves efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Recently, an additional element of the debate has been brought to the fore: whether older, heavier platforms are survivable in the face of the increasing range, precision and lethality of offensive weapons and technology. The UK’s Integrated Review in 2021 required government policy to directly address these questions, and the result for the most part favoured smaller and lighter land forces. It framed the shrinkage of the British Army as a positive step, stating that ‘the Army of the future will be leaner, more lethal, nimbler, and more effectively matched to current and future threats’ while proposing personnel cuts ‘from the current Full Time Trade Trained strength of 76,000 to 72,500 by 2025’. The necessity of rectifying prior funding discrepancies by difficult prioritisation decisions was","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"34 - 48"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46203499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005900
A. Stickings
In 2019, the establishment of the US Space Force as an independent military service reignited various long-running debates on the nature of future conflict in space. While specialists in military space policy understood the formation of Space Force as a reorganisation of existing capabilities and missions, other narratives soon emerged in the broader security and defence sphere. Most centred on fears of direct kinetic conflict and increasing weaponisation of assets in orbit; high-powered space lasers which could target enemy satellites, military bases on the Moon, and the spectre of ‘space marines’ in the shape of armed service personnel routinely being deployed in orbit. Beyond providing a target for political commentators and late-night comedy show hosts, these narratives distract attention from the real and important issues raised by likely confrontation in the space domain during future conflicts. Specifically, it is necessary to counter the idea that kinetic warfare in space will be a central and early feature of future state-on-state wars. The idea of kinetic conflict in space is not new. It became apparent during the late 1950s that satellites could provide enabling capabilities for terrestrial military operations. Consequently, both the US and the Soviet
{"title":"VI. In Space, No One Will See You Fight","authors":"A. Stickings","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005900","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005900","url":null,"abstract":"In 2019, the establishment of the US Space Force as an independent military service reignited various long-running debates on the nature of future conflict in space. While specialists in military space policy understood the formation of Space Force as a reorganisation of existing capabilities and missions, other narratives soon emerged in the broader security and defence sphere. Most centred on fears of direct kinetic conflict and increasing weaponisation of assets in orbit; high-powered space lasers which could target enemy satellites, military bases on the Moon, and the spectre of ‘space marines’ in the shape of armed service personnel routinely being deployed in orbit. Beyond providing a target for political commentators and late-night comedy show hosts, these narratives distract attention from the real and important issues raised by likely confrontation in the space domain during future conflicts. Specifically, it is necessary to counter the idea that kinetic warfare in space will be a central and early feature of future state-on-state wars. The idea of kinetic conflict in space is not new. It became apparent during the late 1950s that satellites could provide enabling capabilities for terrestrial military operations. Consequently, both the US and the Soviet","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"76 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47265626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005899
P. Roberts
The likelihood of success in achieving national foreign policy goals against a competitor may be drawn from a set of characteristics determined by a view on the threat being posed. In military circles, this has historically been equated to the idea that a threat is equal to the military capability of a state plus their intent to carry out activities against you. This methodology was rapidly adopted by business seeking ‘competitive advantage’ and became lingua franca across the public, private, commercial and military domains before 2005. In military education, where future senior officers and their civil service counterparts are groomed for high office, such basic calculations have become key indicators of military prowess – applied as much as an assessment of one’s own ability to enact foreign policies as it has to other belligerents. In national security terms, and increasingly since 1945, this same calculation has gradually been refined by various states to one that places equal emphasis on military capability and will to fight. Indeed, given the history of Western states, the idea of a will to fight (the intent part of the calculation) has become fixed – first by the ideological position of the Soviet Union as a long-term adversary, later by the idea of terrorism as a singular amorphous entity, and most recently by various insurgent groups
{"title":"V. The Lights May Go Out, But the Band Plays On","authors":"P. Roberts","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005899","url":null,"abstract":"The likelihood of success in achieving national foreign policy goals against a competitor may be drawn from a set of characteristics determined by a view on the threat being posed. In military circles, this has historically been equated to the idea that a threat is equal to the military capability of a state plus their intent to carry out activities against you. This methodology was rapidly adopted by business seeking ‘competitive advantage’ and became lingua franca across the public, private, commercial and military domains before 2005. In military education, where future senior officers and their civil service counterparts are groomed for high office, such basic calculations have become key indicators of military prowess – applied as much as an assessment of one’s own ability to enact foreign policies as it has to other belligerents. In national security terms, and increasingly since 1945, this same calculation has gradually been refined by various states to one that places equal emphasis on military capability and will to fight. Indeed, given the history of Western states, the idea of a will to fight (the intent part of the calculation) has become fixed – first by the ideological position of the Soviet Union as a long-term adversary, later by the idea of terrorism as a singular amorphous entity, and most recently by various insurgent groups","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"61 - 75"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48738299","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005898
J. Bronk
Swarming munitions and cheap ‘attritable’ UAVs are two of the most common features of PowerPoint slides and forecasting documents dealing with the future battlefield. Alongside the ubiquitous lightning bolts representing seamless connectivity, these highly automated assets are pictured sweeping across future skies in large numbers, rolling back the fog of war, conducting stand-in jamming and striking key targets with pinpoint accuracy. It is small wonder that this vision is extremely attractive to many policymakers. In the UK, both the Chief of the Air Staff and Chief of the Defence Staff recently outlined a vision where such capabilities might provide up to 80% of the RAF’s combat air mass by the 2030s. Swarming munitions are designed to be used in large numbers simultaneously, and to coordinate their actions as a group to improve overall efficiency. Attritable, reusable UAVs are an emerging class of UAV designed for a limited operational lifespan, able to carry modular sensor
{"title":"IV. Swarming Munitions, UAVs and the Myth of Cheap Mass","authors":"J. Bronk","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005898","url":null,"abstract":"Swarming munitions and cheap ‘attritable’ UAVs are two of the most common features of PowerPoint slides and forecasting documents dealing with the future battlefield. Alongside the ubiquitous lightning bolts representing seamless connectivity, these highly automated assets are pictured sweeping across future skies in large numbers, rolling back the fog of war, conducting stand-in jamming and striking key targets with pinpoint accuracy. It is small wonder that this vision is extremely attractive to many policymakers. In the UK, both the Chief of the Air Staff and Chief of the Defence Staff recently outlined a vision where such capabilities might provide up to 80% of the RAF’s combat air mass by the 2030s. Swarming munitions are designed to be used in large numbers simultaneously, and to coordinate their actions as a group to improve overall efficiency. Attritable, reusable UAVs are an emerging class of UAV designed for a limited operational lifespan, able to carry modular sensor","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"49 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47996533","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005903
J. Bronk, Jack Watling
In March 2021, the UK published its most far-reaching reassessment of its foreign and defence policy since 1997. The Integrated Review articulated a vision of the UK as an independent global player, using widespread access to develop economic and political influence, embedded in a strong Western alliance, and at the leading edge of emerging technologies. It stated that Russia was a threat that must be deterred, and that China was a strategic competitor. Whether one agrees or disagrees with its prognosis, the Integrated Review provides a clear articulation of what UK foreign policy aspires to achieve. The subsequent Defence Command Paper (DCP) was supposed to set out how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would structure the armed forces to meet the policy demands in the Integrated Review. It failed to do so coherently. This was partly because the forces which can be fielded within the budget available fall far short of what would be required to meet the policy ambition described. However, beyond a lack of fiscal realism, the DCP also demonstrated various conceptual failures which are likely to hamper the ability of Defence to deliver relevant policy options. One example from the DCP which illustrates some of the real-world consequences of the distortionary narratives highlighted in this Whitehall Paper is the establishment of the British Army’s new Ranger Regiment.
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"J. Bronk, Jack Watling","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2021.2005903","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2021.2005903","url":null,"abstract":"In March 2021, the UK published its most far-reaching reassessment of its foreign and defence policy since 1997. The Integrated Review articulated a vision of the UK as an independent global player, using widespread access to develop economic and political influence, embedded in a strong Western alliance, and at the leading edge of emerging technologies. It stated that Russia was a threat that must be deterred, and that China was a strategic competitor. Whether one agrees or disagrees with its prognosis, the Integrated Review provides a clear articulation of what UK foreign policy aspires to achieve. The subsequent Defence Command Paper (DCP) was supposed to set out how the Ministry of Defence (MoD) would structure the armed forces to meet the policy demands in the Integrated Review. It failed to do so coherently. This was partly because the forces which can be fielded within the budget available fall far short of what would be required to meet the policy ambition described. However, beyond a lack of fiscal realism, the DCP also demonstrated various conceptual failures which are likely to hamper the ability of Defence to deliver relevant policy options. One example from the DCP which illustrates some of the real-world consequences of the distortionary narratives highlighted in this Whitehall Paper is the establishment of the British Army’s new Ranger Regiment.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"99 1","pages":"99 - 104"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45882710","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005891
J. Bronk, Jack Watling
Sally Walker, former Director of Cyber at GCHQ, has stated that cyber attacks ‘can have impact in the real world and you can do it at scale’. Because cyber attacks can target everything from financial systems and critical national infrastructure to political leaders and legal institutions – undermining trust and the rule of law – they can have an ‘attritional’ effect on the cohesion of states to which open societies ‘are uniquely vulnerable’. Such warnings over the years, combined with high-profile incidents like the WannaCry ransomware attack against the NHS, have meant that military leaders have recognised the importance of the ‘cyber domain’. When new forms of conflict first emerge, however, there is almost always a period of inflated expectation. For the small community within Defence who have worked in the margins to explore the novel capability, there is a tendency to hype its effects and downplay its limitations in order to gain the attention of the wider defence and security community and secure resources within the bureaucracy. For that wider community – lacking an understanding of the capability – it is often much easier to visualise the potential threats posed by novel weapons than the challenges involved in employing them effectively. Cyber warfare today is arguably at the peak of this inflated discourse,
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Pub Date : 2020-01-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1836756
de Menezes, Yinan Zhang, T. Henshaw, J. Vorman, Jane F. Kirby-Zaki, Christoph Pusch, Arati Belle, Haris Khan, Atishay Abbhi, Poonam Pillai Gpurl, Nazmus Khan, Manuela Francisco Mti, Adnan Ashraf Ghumman, Charl Jooste, G. Schwerhoff
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