Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696554
Ivan Idris, Amanda Casari, T. Dyar, Hari Shanker Gupta, Puneet Narula, A. J. Salmoni, Roshni Banerjee, Sarang Chari, Adithi Shetty
Justin Bronk is the Research Fellow for Airpower and Military Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. He is also Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. Justin has written on airpower issues for the RUSI Journal, RUSI Defence Systems, RUSI Newsbrief, the Journal of Strategic Studies and the RAF’s Air Power Journal, as well as contributing regularly to the international media. Justin is a part-time doctoral candidate at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London and holds an MSc in the History of International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a BA (Hons) in History from York University.
{"title":"About the Author","authors":"Ivan Idris, Amanda Casari, T. Dyar, Hari Shanker Gupta, Puneet Narula, A. J. Salmoni, Roshni Banerjee, Sarang Chari, Adithi Shetty","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696554","url":null,"abstract":"Justin Bronk is the Research Fellow for Airpower and Military Technology in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. He is also Editor of the RUSI Defence Systems online journal. Justin has written on airpower issues for the RUSI Journal, RUSI Defence Systems, RUSI Newsbrief, the Journal of Strategic Studies and the RAF’s Air Power Journal, as well as contributing regularly to the international media. Justin is a part-time doctoral candidate at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London and holds an MSc in the History of International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a BA (Hons) in History from York University.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"iv - iv"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696554","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45858758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696556
Faten Khayrat, O. M. Esmat
Background: Home health care services were to help individuals to improve function and live with greater independence, to promote the client’s optimal level of well-being, to assist the patient to remain at home avoiding hospitalization or admission to long-term care. Stents reduce angina (chest pain) and have been shown to improve survivability and decrease adverse events in an acute myocardial infarction. The Aim of the study is to measure the effect of a nursing intervention at home to prevent recurrence of cardiac stent. Research design: A quasi experimental design was utilized. Settings: The study was conducted at outpatient clinics of cardiovascular surgery hospital of Ain Shams University hospitals. Subjects: A purposive randomly selected sample which composed of one hundred and thirty four clients after cardiac stent. Tools of data collection: First: Structured interviewing questionnaire, it was composed of 3 parts, part one: socio-demographic data, part two: Assess client’s knowledge regarding cardiac stent .Part three: client practice related to behavioral habits, nutrition and physical activities. Second tool: Environmental assessment for home condition (ventilation, cleanliness’). Third tool: Client medical record to assess client diagnosis, investigations, and treatments vital signs, and weight and height Results: Revealed a highly statistical significant relation between clients practice and knowledge of clients regarding cardiac stent pre & post nursing intervention. Conclusion: This study concluded that, the nursing intervention program had a highly statistical significant relationship with improved knowledge and practices of clients of cardiac stent and change life style to prevent recurrence of cardiac stent. Recommendations: Building up a national strategy for home care for enhancement knowledge and help in change life style for clientswith cardiac stent to prevent recurrence cardiac stent. Expansion of health insurance services at home to covers the needs of cardiac stent clients by nursing.
{"title":"Introduction","authors":"Faten Khayrat, O. M. Esmat","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696556","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696556","url":null,"abstract":"Background: Home health care services were to help individuals to improve function and live with greater independence, to promote the client’s optimal level of well-being, to assist the patient to remain at home avoiding hospitalization or admission to long-term care. Stents reduce angina (chest pain) and have been shown to improve survivability and decrease adverse events in an acute myocardial infarction. The Aim of the study is to measure the effect of a nursing intervention at home to prevent recurrence of cardiac stent. Research design: A quasi experimental design was utilized. Settings: The study was conducted at outpatient clinics of cardiovascular surgery hospital of Ain Shams University hospitals. Subjects: A purposive randomly selected sample which composed of one hundred and thirty four clients after cardiac stent. Tools of data collection: First: Structured interviewing questionnaire, it was composed of 3 parts, part one: socio-demographic data, part two: Assess client’s knowledge regarding cardiac stent .Part three: client practice related to behavioral habits, nutrition and physical activities. Second tool: Environmental assessment for home condition (ventilation, cleanliness’). Third tool: Client medical record to assess client diagnosis, investigations, and treatments vital signs, and weight and height Results: Revealed a highly statistical significant relation between clients practice and knowledge of clients regarding cardiac stent pre & post nursing intervention. Conclusion: This study concluded that, the nursing intervention program had a highly statistical significant relationship with improved knowledge and practices of clients of cardiac stent and change life style to prevent recurrence of cardiac stent. Recommendations: Building up a national strategy for home care for enhancement knowledge and help in change life style for clientswith cardiac stent to prevent recurrence cardiac stent. Expansion of health insurance services at home to covers the needs of cardiac stent clients by nursing.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"1 - 5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696556","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42164202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696577
H. Wilson
When seeking to understand airpower within the NATO Alliance, the United States must be the starting point for any discussion. The US possesses a greater combat air capability than the rest of NATO put together. The US Air Force is by far the largest within the Alliance, and the US Navy operates what would be the second-largest air force. The discrepancy in capability between the US and other Allies is already far greater than mere platform numbers or budgetary comparisons would suggest. The critical enablers that allow a modern air campaign to be conducted – tankers, strategic and penetrating ISTAR assets, C2 and network infrastructure, munitions stocks and more – are overwhelmingly provided by the US. For example, in 2014, the proportion of AAR tankers provided by the US compared to the remainder of NATO was 9:1. While 17 of 28 (61%) of the NATO member states operated fast jets which draw on AAR, only nine (32%) had a national tanker capability. In this context, the fact that the US Air Force is aiming to increase from its current front line strength of 312 squadrons to 386 squadrons by 2030, in order to fulfil what it sees as the mission sets implied by the latest National Security Strategy, is a powerful reminder of the increasing quantitative gap between the US and other NATO air forces. This significant expansion plan is underpinned by an attempt to change the narrative around how the US government perceives military spending in an era of great power competition. As the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General David L
{"title":"II. The Big Player: The United States","authors":"H. Wilson","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696577","url":null,"abstract":"When seeking to understand airpower within the NATO Alliance, the United States must be the starting point for any discussion. The US possesses a greater combat air capability than the rest of NATO put together. The US Air Force is by far the largest within the Alliance, and the US Navy operates what would be the second-largest air force. The discrepancy in capability between the US and other Allies is already far greater than mere platform numbers or budgetary comparisons would suggest. The critical enablers that allow a modern air campaign to be conducted – tankers, strategic and penetrating ISTAR assets, C2 and network infrastructure, munitions stocks and more – are overwhelmingly provided by the US. For example, in 2014, the proportion of AAR tankers provided by the US compared to the remainder of NATO was 9:1. While 17 of 28 (61%) of the NATO member states operated fast jets which draw on AAR, only nine (32%) had a national tanker capability. In this context, the fact that the US Air Force is aiming to increase from its current front line strength of 312 squadrons to 386 squadrons by 2030, in order to fulfil what it sees as the mission sets implied by the latest National Security Strategy, is a powerful reminder of the increasing quantitative gap between the US and other NATO air forces. This significant expansion plan is underpinned by an attempt to change the narrative around how the US government perceives military spending in an era of great power competition. As the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General David L","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"19 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696577","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48291096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-09-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1696579
The majority of NATO member states operate small air forces, with limited fleets of older thirdor fourth-generation fast jets, alongside rotary-winged assets for search and rescue as well as army-cooperation duties. A few countries such as Poland and Norway, as well as NATO partner states Sweden and Finland, do consider self-defence in a kinetic conflict against Russia as part of their core defence planning assumptions. However, for many smaller NATO states which operate fast jet fleets, it is not always clear what the national requirements for combat air capabilities are beyond quick reaction alert (QRA) scrambles within national airspace. Nonetheless, many of these countries regularly join US-led air campaigns, including those against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, Qadhafi’s forces in Libya and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Baltic states, Luxembourg, Iceland, Montenegro, Albania and Slovenia do not field combat aircraft at all, requiring other NATO members to conduct air policing on their behalf on a rotational basis.
{"title":"IV. The Smaller NATO Air Forces: In Search of a Viable Niche","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1696579","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696579","url":null,"abstract":"The majority of NATO member states operate small air forces, with limited fleets of older thirdor fourth-generation fast jets, alongside rotary-winged assets for search and rescue as well as army-cooperation duties. A few countries such as Poland and Norway, as well as NATO partner states Sweden and Finland, do consider self-defence in a kinetic conflict against Russia as part of their core defence planning assumptions. However, for many smaller NATO states which operate fast jet fleets, it is not always clear what the national requirements for combat air capabilities are beyond quick reaction alert (QRA) scrambles within national airspace. Nonetheless, many of these countries regularly join US-led air campaigns, including those against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, Qadhafi’s forces in Libya and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Baltic states, Luxembourg, Iceland, Montenegro, Albania and Slovenia do not field combat aircraft at all, requiring other NATO members to conduct air policing on their behalf on a rotational basis.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"94 1","pages":"57 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1696579","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48519476","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508967
Alexander R. Vershbow, Magnus Nordenman
The US defence and security relationship with the states of Northern Europe has evolved significantly over time, transitioning from the Cold War view of those countries as the northern flank of NATO into a recognition of these states as a group of small but capable partners in post-Cold War expeditionary operations. Today, however, US engagement in Northern Europe and relationships with its allies and partners are once again changing, as the region has become a key zone of friction with Russia under President Vladimir Putin, intent on altering the European security order in Moscow’s favour. The US has accomplished much since 2014 in terms of strengthening presence and engagement in the region as well as deepening defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and others in Northern Europe. However, the US and Northern Europe must further enhance their defence and security arrangements both bilaterally and multilaterally, including within the context of NATO.
{"title":"VIII. Defence and Security in Northern Europe: A Washington View","authors":"Alexander R. Vershbow, Magnus Nordenman","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508967","url":null,"abstract":"The US defence and security relationship with the states of Northern Europe has evolved significantly over time, transitioning from the Cold War view of those countries as the northern flank of NATO into a recognition of these states as a group of small but capable partners in post-Cold War expeditionary operations. Today, however, US engagement in Northern Europe and relationships with its allies and partners are once again changing, as the region has become a key zone of friction with Russia under President Vladimir Putin, intent on altering the European security order in Moscow’s favour. The US has accomplished much since 2014 in terms of strengthening presence and engagement in the region as well as deepening defence cooperation with Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, and others in Northern Europe. However, the US and Northern Europe must further enhance their defence and security arrangements both bilaterally and multilaterally, including within the context of NATO.","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"93 1","pages":"107 - 98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508967","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41644994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508955
Rolf Tamnes
Russia's military build-up and subversive activities constitute the most important challenge to the defence of Europe. Russia has revitalised its so-called ‘bastion’ concept,1 which includes sea co...
{"title":"I. The High North: A Call for a Competitive Strategy","authors":"Rolf Tamnes","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508955","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508955","url":null,"abstract":"Russia's military build-up and subversive activities constitute the most important challenge to the defence of Europe. Russia has revitalised its so-called ‘bastion’ concept,1 which includes sea co...","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"93 1","pages":"22 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508955","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41824464","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508970
J. G. Foggo, Alarik Fritz
It has been said far too often that ‘the world changed on 9/11’. Since that day, most Americans have seen the challenges of the world revolving around terrorism and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Similarly, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has focused largely on crisis management and counterinsurgency, especially on the southern flank. The instability created by violent-extremist organisations is a clear and present threat, and NATO is helping to address it in a variety of non-kinetic ways. NATO is meeting the problems that come with ungoverned spaces, a declining rule of law, narcotics, and weapons and human trafficking head on. The Alliance recognises these as fundamental challenges that it must and will continue to deal with. However, we also need to recall those challenges that did not change on 9/11: namely, those associated with the security of the North Atlantic. We cannot predict with certainty where the next threat will emerge, or where the next war will take place – but the security of the North Atlantic has always been a focal point for NATO. Today’s Allies operated in this environment through two world wars and the entire Cold War for a very good reason: this is where a single miscalculation could have erupted into a global nuclear conflict. The North Atlantic remains absolutely critical to the West’s collective security. The unavoidable operational reality is that should conflict arise, whoever can exert control over this region can either protect or threaten all of NATO’s northern flank. Defence of the North Atlantic is thus synonymous with Alliance security and sovereignty. In the post-9/11 and post-Cold War era, we need to remember this and ensure
{"title":"X. NATO and the Challenge in the North Atlantic and the Arctic","authors":"J. G. Foggo, Alarik Fritz","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508970","url":null,"abstract":"It has been said far too often that ‘the world changed on 9/11’. Since that day, most Americans have seen the challenges of the world revolving around terrorism and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Similarly, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has focused largely on crisis management and counterinsurgency, especially on the southern flank. The instability created by violent-extremist organisations is a clear and present threat, and NATO is helping to address it in a variety of non-kinetic ways. NATO is meeting the problems that come with ungoverned spaces, a declining rule of law, narcotics, and weapons and human trafficking head on. The Alliance recognises these as fundamental challenges that it must and will continue to deal with. However, we also need to recall those challenges that did not change on 9/11: namely, those associated with the security of the North Atlantic. We cannot predict with certainty where the next threat will emerge, or where the next war will take place – but the security of the North Atlantic has always been a focal point for NATO. Today’s Allies operated in this environment through two world wars and the entire Cold War for a very good reason: this is where a single miscalculation could have erupted into a global nuclear conflict. The North Atlantic remains absolutely critical to the West’s collective security. The unavoidable operational reality is that should conflict arise, whoever can exert control over this region can either protect or threaten all of NATO’s northern flank. Defence of the North Atlantic is thus synonymous with Alliance security and sovereignty. In the post-9/11 and post-Cold War era, we need to remember this and ensure","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"93 1","pages":"121 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508970","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44060356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508959
Tomas Jermalavičius, Eerik Marmei
After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European states understood that they could only ensure their future security and wellbeing by fully integrating with Western institutions. The Baltic States’ accession to NATO and the EU involved a long process that started soon after independence. While their consensus on joining NATO was strong, it was more difficult to secure agreement from existing members. The relatively weak defence capabilities of the Baltic States, Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement, and a lack of vision and political will of some Allies were the main obstacles to Baltic membership. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, integration into NATO turned out to be politically a more arduous journey than joining the EU. Nevertheless, having welcomed Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to its ranks at its 1999 Summit in Washington, DC, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to the enlargement process and presented nine aspirant countries – including the three Baltic States – with Membership Action Plans (MAP). In 2002, at its summit in Prague, NATO decided to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance, which culminated in their membership on 29 March 2004. As a practical manifestation of the benefits of membership and burden-sharing, the Allies immediately launched the Baltic Air Policing (BAP) operation – a peacetime mission to patrol the Baltic States’ airspace. Conducted from an airbase in Lithuania, it remained NATO’s only form of presence in the Baltics for more than a decade. Historical experience and concerns about an uncertain future acted as powerful driving forces for the Baltic States to seek stronger protection against threats to their statehood. A common guiding principle of their foreign and security policies since regaining independence has been ‘never alone again’, which meant that they took a path of full integration
{"title":"II. The Baltic Region","authors":"Tomas Jermalavičius, Eerik Marmei","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508959","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508959","url":null,"abstract":"After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central and Eastern European states understood that they could only ensure their future security and wellbeing by fully integrating with Western institutions. The Baltic States’ accession to NATO and the EU involved a long process that started soon after independence. While their consensus on joining NATO was strong, it was more difficult to secure agreement from existing members. The relatively weak defence capabilities of the Baltic States, Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement, and a lack of vision and political will of some Allies were the main obstacles to Baltic membership. For Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, integration into NATO turned out to be politically a more arduous journey than joining the EU. Nevertheless, having welcomed Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to its ranks at its 1999 Summit in Washington, DC, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to the enlargement process and presented nine aspirant countries – including the three Baltic States – with Membership Action Plans (MAP). In 2002, at its summit in Prague, NATO decided to invite Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to begin accession talks to join the Alliance, which culminated in their membership on 29 March 2004. As a practical manifestation of the benefits of membership and burden-sharing, the Allies immediately launched the Baltic Air Policing (BAP) operation – a peacetime mission to patrol the Baltic States’ airspace. Conducted from an airbase in Lithuania, it remained NATO’s only form of presence in the Baltics for more than a decade. Historical experience and concerns about an uncertain future acted as powerful driving forces for the Baltic States to seek stronger protection against threats to their statehood. A common guiding principle of their foreign and security policies since regaining independence has been ‘never alone again’, which meant that they took a path of full integration","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"93 1","pages":"23 - 36"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508959","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45572635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508965
F. Osinga
Defence Planning in the New Era of Certainty Uncertainty is an overused term these days when it comes to security policy and defence planning in Europe. Of course, international relations and wars are fundamentally non-linear; rapid technological change, geopolitical shifts and societal upheaval are also sources of uncertainty. The current era definitely qualifies as a time of change, with liberalism claimed to be in retreat; the West losing its dominance in international politics as well as its military superiority; waning influence of international institutions such as the EU, the UN and NATO; and Asia increasingly the most important locus of geopolitical developments. But uncertainty can also be over-emphasised. Not all risks are equal; some are closer to home than others and some threaten vital and strategic interests, whereas others may ‘merely’ threaten stability or economic interests. In this respect, life for European defence planners has, regrettably, become relatively straightforward since 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has reduced uncertainty: in addition to preparing for interventions in the ‘arc of instability’, European militaries must now re-learn and re-equip to deter and potentially fight inter-state war on the European continent. Whether that certainty will translate into defence policies that will reduce security risks is still an open question. Indeed, as this chapter argues, the Netherlands is an illustrative case study that suggests this new age of certainty for defence planners offers no grounds for optimism
{"title":"VI. Netherlands Defence and Security Policy: Coping with the ‘New Normal’?","authors":"F. Osinga","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2018.1508965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508965","url":null,"abstract":"Defence Planning in the New Era of Certainty Uncertainty is an overused term these days when it comes to security policy and defence planning in Europe. Of course, international relations and wars are fundamentally non-linear; rapid technological change, geopolitical shifts and societal upheaval are also sources of uncertainty. The current era definitely qualifies as a time of change, with liberalism claimed to be in retreat; the West losing its dominance in international politics as well as its military superiority; waning influence of international institutions such as the EU, the UN and NATO; and Asia increasingly the most important locus of geopolitical developments. But uncertainty can also be over-emphasised. Not all risks are equal; some are closer to home than others and some threaten vital and strategic interests, whereas others may ‘merely’ threaten stability or economic interests. In this respect, life for European defence planners has, regrettably, become relatively straightforward since 2014. Russia’s annexation of Crimea has reduced uncertainty: in addition to preparing for interventions in the ‘arc of instability’, European militaries must now re-learn and re-equip to deter and potentially fight inter-state war on the European continent. Whether that certainty will translate into defence policies that will reduce security risks is still an open question. Indeed, as this chapter argues, the Netherlands is an illustrative case study that suggests this new age of certainty for defence planners offers no grounds for optimism","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"93 1","pages":"75 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2018.1508965","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43756158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-05-04DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2018.1508942
J. Olsen
A state’s prioritisation of defence waxes and wanes according to threat assessments. Currently, defence issues have regained an urgency that Europe has not witnessed for at least three decades. Russia’s aggressive rhetoric and behaviour, significant numbers of forces on high readiness, revitalisation of sea control and sea denial in its northern bastion, reinvestment in forces and dual-use infrastructure along its Arctic coast, and ambitious military modernisation programme with emphasis on long-range precision weapons present a major concern for all of Europe, and for the eastern and northern countries in particular. Heightened submarine activity in the North Atlantic challenges open sea lines of communication between North America and Europe and the ability to provide transatlantic reinforcement in a potential conflict. Russia’s offensive and at times aggressive manoeuvre exercises that include simulated attacks in the Nordic-Baltic countries increase tension still further. Moscow has also engaged in active cyber attacks and has demonstrated innovative hybrid strategies. A recent US study identifies four capability areas of major concern: long-range precision strike; integrated air and missile defence; cyber and electronic warfare; and, not least, nuclear forces. FOCUS 2018 – the Norwegian Intelligence Service’s annual assessment of the current security challenge – concludes that Russia has ‘modernised and trained its armed forces to a standard that expands the Kremlin’s scope for action, including in the High North and
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