Pub Date : 2022-04-12DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2022.2030967
The balance of power on the ocean surface in the Arctic will have a crucial role in determining the relative capacity of NATO and Russia to exert influence in the region and the High North in both peacetime and war. This balance will be impacted by related factors such as the balance of power in the air and subsurface domain. When discussing Russia’s surface capabilities in the Arctic, the scope needs to extend beyond naval platforms. This stems from the symbiotic relationship between Russia’s naval forces in the Arctic, its coast guard, and commercial assets such as its nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. Indeed, the relationship between the security services and functions such as border security has always been relatively tight – the FSB, for example, is in charge of border security. The assets held by the Russian border
{"title":"Chapter III: Russian and NATO Surface Capabilities in the High North","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2022.2030967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2022.2030967","url":null,"abstract":"The balance of power on the ocean surface in the Arctic will have a crucial role in determining the relative capacity of NATO and Russia to exert influence in the region and the High North in both peacetime and war. This balance will be impacted by related factors such as the balance of power in the air and subsurface domain. When discussing Russia’s surface capabilities in the Arctic, the scope needs to extend beyond naval platforms. This stems from the symbiotic relationship between Russia’s naval forces in the Arctic, its coast guard, and commercial assets such as its nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. Indeed, the relationship between the security services and functions such as border security has always been relatively tight – the FSB, for example, is in charge of border security. The assets held by the Russian border","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"100 1","pages":"42 - 67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42971936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932361
With Sino–American geopolitical rivalry escalating, PRC overseas political activities are presenting US-aligned liberal democracies with an array of complex, unavoidable policy issues. Alongside thorny technical questions of economic dependence, defence technology exports and PRC investment in strategic infrastructure, liberal democracies need to wrestle with how to properly manage the array of distinct political challenges presented by the CCP and its supporters’ overseas activities. Chapter I showed how faulty terminology has made the challenges difficult to define. Chapter II disaggregated their varying nature, causes, actors and relationship to liberal-democratic principles. Chapter III showed how the need to respond itself generates a further series of risks to social cohesion, civil liberties and national security. This chapter offers a set of policy suggestions based on a riskmanagement framework that takes the preservation and strengthening of three core liberal-democratic institutions – integrity of the political system, protection of civil rights of individuals and groups, and academic freedom in research and education – as the immediate and overriding goal of policy measures. As discussed in the Introduction, this contrasts with aggregative approaches that apply a singular national security lens to a wide array of problems, and often take suppressing PRC political activity, or the conduct of ‘political warfare’, as overriding goals. The disaggregation-based risk-management approach advocated here implies neither permissiveness towards PRC interference, nor neutrality in the incipient systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism. It reflects instead an underlying assumption that the prospects for liberal democracy in the current global context depend on the strength of liberal-democratic institutions and consistency between liberaldemocratic principles and governments’ policies and practices. Common organisational risk-management practice involves a hierarchy of hazard control measures. If it is possible to eliminate a risk entirely, this is the preferred course of action. The next-best alternative is substitution, meaning replacement of the source with a less risky alternative. The third choice is control measures to maximise distance
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Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932351
B. Garth
The emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a global power has reanimated a central challenge for liberal democracies: how to protect both national security and political liberties when adversaries are willing and able to use one against the other. In President Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ of PRC power, politicians, pundits and the media in the UK, the US and Australia are paying increasing attention to the overseas political activities of Beijing and its supporters. Many such concerns are well founded. Covert and overt political activities are in the Leninist DNA of China’s ruling party, and communications technology has created new opportunities for authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent beyond their borders. On top of this, pro-Beijing patriots and wealthy lobbyists are advancing their views with increased confidence, and many influential economic actors involved in trade relations with China share significant overlapping interests with its party-state. Yet the need for policy responses to these developments also raises a further set of risks from within liberal democracies. These range from the polarisation of public discourse and the rise of alarmist rhetoric that fans xenophobia and harms social cohesion through to legislative encroachments on civil liberties and growing powers of national security agencies that operate with limited public oversight. Such dilemmas are not new. The onset of the Cold War in the mid20 century prompted painful choices and numerous missteps in liberal democracies. In the US, claims of widespread communist infiltration and subversion led to ‘McCarthyist’ political inquisitions and purges, along with legislation later deemed unconstitutional. The UK and Australia both saw a major expansion in the largely unaccountable powers of security agencies that historians have argued generated little useful
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Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932354
This chapter unpacks the array of issues the party-state and its supporters’ political activities have presented to liberal democracies in Xi’s ‘New Era’ of PRC power, highlighting significant variation in their causes, the actors involved, comparative context, and their relationship with local laws and institutions. The most basic distinctions concern three different objects of risk or threat: national security; civil liberties; and academic freedom. Some of the activities under discussion present security risks by potentially impacting the integrity of democratic systems of representation and government. However, the most directly impactful activities threaten the political rights and freedoms of particular individuals and groups, especially dissident individuals and émigré ethnic and religious groups. The third set of risks relate to the special responsibility of higher education institutions to ensure freedom of speech and intellectual enquiry for their staff, students and visitors. Various PRC overseas political activities, meanwhile, constitute normal exercises of democratic rights. The comparative context, causes and effects of different PRC overseas political activities are also varied. In some cases, other foreign states or domestic actors conduct comparable activities, while in others the PRC’s stand out as either quantitatively or qualitatively different. Significant diversity is also apparent in the causes of the risks identified. Some are straightforwardly the result of repressive policies formulated and coordinated in Beijing. Others, however, have arisen primarily from technological developments, the growth of China’s economic heft, and the increasing mobility, financial means and self-confidence of PRC citizens and consumers. Finally, many of these risks are a result of shortcomings in local institutions. This is crucial for policy purposes, as it implies that the challenges raised by the PRC’s overseas political activities may also represent opportunities to strengthen liberal-democratic institutions, a theme to which Chapter IV will return.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932358
Chapter II illustrated the varied risks that overseas political activities of the CCP and its supporters have presented to liberal democracies, particularly those with multicultural societies. These can be understood as the risks of inaction. But the risks of responding to these challenges also demand careful consideration. Australia offers an example of public policy responses based on the aggregation approach that addresses this array of issues primarily as a matter of national security. This may have helped to mobilise rapid legislative action and rally other liberal democracies to action. However, as this chapter argues, Australia’s experience also illustrates major drawbacks to the aggregation-based approach. Canberra’s efforts to counter PRC political activities have been hailed – and promoted – internationally as a pioneering model to follow. In February 2018, then US Assistant Secretary of Defense Randy Schriver said Australia had ‘done us a great service by publicising much of this activity and then taking action’. National Endowment for Democracy Vice President Christopher Walker testified to a US Congressional hearing that European states should ‘learn from countries, such as Australia, that
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Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932352
Accurate definition of problems is crucial to the development of effective policy responses. In his 1946 essay ‘Politics and the English Language’, George Orwell made an impassioned plea for precision in political discourse against a proliferation of vague and malleable set phrases. In national security policy, amorphous concepts such as the ‘communist threat’ during the Cold War and ‘terrorism’ after 9/11 have hindered rational assessment of the nature and magnitude of threats. Choice of language influences how the qualitative nature of a problem is understood, along with the causes that give rise to it, the broader associations that audiences will draw and the design of public policy solutions. Unfortunately, the basic terms in which the CCP and its supporters’ political activities have been discussed in English have been frequently vague and potentially misleading. As Chapter III will argue, such imprecision has contributed to unwarranted and often unintended associations between state conduct and ethnicity, misidentification of priorities for policy responses, and missed opportunities to strengthen liberal-democratic institutions.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-28DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2020.1932362
A. Chubb
In his 1937 essay, ‘On Contradiction’, Mao Zedong wrote of two opposing ‘world outlooks’. One was the correct ‘materialist dialectical’ view that takes all phenomena in the natural and social worlds to be the outcome of contradictions. The other was the incorrect ‘metaphysical’ view affirming the existence of transcendent properties such as truth and natural rights. Developed by CCP ideologists over subsequent decades, the idea that all political developments result from clashes between two opposing forces continues to suffuse CCP theory and policy. It is a view of politics that leaves no room for individual human agency, principled middle ground or actions taken in good faith. It renders human intentions irrelevant in the understanding of political actions, whose character is instead defined by which ‘force’ they form part of – that is, which side of the ‘contradiction’ they are on – at the particular time they occur. A 2013 film produced by a PLA propaganda unit and leaked online reminded observers of the ongoing dominance of the materialistdialectical world outlook in Beijing in Xi’s ‘New Era’. Titled Silent Contest (较量无声), the film depicted a vast conspiracy among Western governments, civil society and citizens coordinating consciously or
{"title":"Conclusion: Two ‘World Outlooks’","authors":"A. Chubb","doi":"10.1080/02681307.2020.1932362","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02681307.2020.1932362","url":null,"abstract":"In his 1937 essay, ‘On Contradiction’, Mao Zedong wrote of two opposing ‘world outlooks’. One was the correct ‘materialist dialectical’ view that takes all phenomena in the natural and social worlds to be the outcome of contradictions. The other was the incorrect ‘metaphysical’ view affirming the existence of transcendent properties such as truth and natural rights. Developed by CCP ideologists over subsequent decades, the idea that all political developments result from clashes between two opposing forces continues to suffuse CCP theory and policy. It is a view of politics that leaves no room for individual human agency, principled middle ground or actions taken in good faith. It renders human intentions irrelevant in the understanding of political actions, whose character is instead defined by which ‘force’ they form part of – that is, which side of the ‘contradiction’ they are on – at the particular time they occur. A 2013 film produced by a PLA propaganda unit and leaked online reminded observers of the ongoing dominance of the materialistdialectical world outlook in Beijing in Xi’s ‘New Era’. Titled Silent Contest (较量无声), the film depicted a vast conspiracy among Western governments, civil society and citizens coordinating consciously or","PeriodicalId":37791,"journal":{"name":"Whitehall Papers","volume":"98 1","pages":"95 - 97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/02681307.2020.1932362","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44889720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-02DOI: 10.1080/02681307.2021.2005892
Sidharth Kaushal
Over the course of recent years, it has become common to hear the term ‘grey-zone strategy’ invoked to conceptualise the ways in which a range of state competitors are pursuing revisionist goals. Per this understanding, Western adversaries such as Russia, China and Iran have become adept at using a range of tools short of open warfare to challenge the status quo, leaving Western policymakers scrambling to come up with appropriate and proportionate responses. Similarly, the US and its allies have their own grey-zone tools, including support for colour revolutions, financial sanctions and cyber attacks. Thus, for example, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff envision an operating environment defined by sub-threshold activity and attendant ambiguity. Nor is this an exclusively American view: the UK’s Integrated Operating Concept notes that ‘our adversaries use an array of capabilities including their militaries below the threshold of war and in ways that challenge our political and legal norms’. Similarly, France’s 2017 national security strategy notes the challenge posed by legally ambiguous forms of aggression in the information space: ‘Ambiguous postures and covert aggression are also becoming more common, with certain states making an increasing use of a wide variety of proxies.’
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