Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234312
O. Gál
This article traces the limits of the understanding of beauty as unified multiplicity in Plotinus’ Enneads vi 2 and vi 6. These treatises can be read as insisting on the significance of multiplicity for beauty and as implying a distinction between the illuminated and the unilluminated beauty of Intellect. In treatise vi 7, this distinction is made explicit and a deeper understanding of beauty as the manifestation of the Good in Intellect is introduced.
{"title":"Beyond Unified Multiplicity","authors":"O. Gál","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234312","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234312","url":null,"abstract":"This article traces the limits of the understanding of beauty as unified multiplicity in Plotinus’ Enneads vi 2 and vi 6. These treatises can be read as insisting on the significance of multiplicity for beauty and as implying a distinction between the illuminated and the unilluminated beauty of Intellect. In treatise vi 7, this distinction is made explicit and a deeper understanding of beauty as the manifestation of the Good in Intellect is introduced.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234313
Daniel R. Harkin
Phantastic interpreters of the emotions in Aristotle argue that a quasi-perceptual faculty, phantasia, is responsible for grasping the relevant value content. This article argues that phantasia cannot do this work. Rather, it claims, a phantastic account either collapses into the straight-up perceptual account or it fails to offer a cognitive account at all (despite the claims made by some of its adherents). According to the first option the focal value properties, such as slights and danger, are part of perceptual content from the start. It ends by proposing that phantastic interpreters are better off opting for the straight-up perceptual account, a view that has wide-ranging implications for our interpretation of Aristotle.
{"title":"Phantastic Content","authors":"Daniel R. Harkin","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234313","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234313","url":null,"abstract":"Phantastic interpreters of the emotions in Aristotle argue that a quasi-perceptual faculty, phantasia, is responsible for grasping the relevant value content. This article argues that phantasia cannot do this work. Rather, it claims, a phantastic account either collapses into the straight-up perceptual account or it fails to offer a cognitive account at all (despite the claims made by some of its adherents). According to the first option the focal value properties, such as slights and danger, are part of perceptual content from the start. It ends by proposing that phantastic interpreters are better off opting for the straight-up perceptual account, a view that has wide-ranging implications for our interpretation of Aristotle.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234315
Jorge Mittelmann
In commenting on Aristotle’s κοινότατος λόγος of the soul – which portrays it as ‘the first actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality’– Philoponus suggests that seeds and embryos are not potentially alive bodies, despite ‘having become ready to receive life from the soul’ (209.17). To the extent that something’s suitability to be ensouled turns it eo ipso into a potentially alive thing, Philoponus’ remark may betray a contradiction, that can be handled by tinkering with the scope of a closely attached adverb. This paper argues that no such intervention is required, however, and that apparent inconsistencies vanish as soon as Neoplatonic embryology and Philoponus’ lexical background are given their due.
在评论亚里士多德关于灵魂的κοιν ο τατος λ ο γος(将其描述为“具有潜在生命的自然身体的第一个现实”)时，Philoponus认为种子和胚胎不是潜在的活着的身体，尽管“已经准备好接受来自灵魂的生命”(209.17)。从某种程度上说，某物适合被赋予灵魂，使它变成了一个潜在的有生命的东西，菲洛波诺斯的话可能暴露了一个矛盾，这个矛盾可以通过修补一个紧密相连的副词的范围来解决。然而，本文认为不需要这样的干预，只要新柏拉图胚胎学和菲洛波诺斯的词汇背景得到应有的考虑，这种明显的不一致就会消失。
{"title":"Philoponus’ Potentially Ensouled Bodies","authors":"Jorge Mittelmann","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234315","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234315","url":null,"abstract":"In commenting on Aristotle’s κοινότατος λόγος of the soul – which portrays it as ‘the first actuality of a natural body having life in potentiality’– Philoponus suggests that seeds and embryos are not potentially alive bodies, despite ‘having become ready to receive life from the soul’ (209.17). To the extent that something’s suitability to be ensouled turns it eo ipso into a potentially alive thing, Philoponus’ remark may betray a contradiction, that can be handled by tinkering with the scope of a closely attached adverb. This paper argues that no such intervention is required, however, and that apparent inconsistencies vanish as soon as Neoplatonic embryology and Philoponus’ lexical background are given their due.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343219
Radim Kočandrle
Diogenes Laertius ascribes the first concept of spherical Earth to both Pythagoras and Parmenides. Indeed, a major shift in cosmologies—emergence of the spherical conception of the Earth and the surrounding heaven—took place between the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. Given the poor state of preservation of early Pythagorean tradition, it is argued that primacy in formulating the notion of spherical Earth should be ascribed to Parmenides.
{"title":"Origins of the Spherical Earth in Ancient Greek Cosmology","authors":"Radim Kočandrle","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343219","url":null,"abstract":"Diogenes Laertius ascribes the first concept of spherical Earth to both Pythagoras and Parmenides. Indeed, a major shift in cosmologies—emergence of the spherical conception of the Earth and the surrounding heaven—took place between the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. Given the poor state of preservation of early Pythagorean tradition, it is argued that primacy in formulating the notion of spherical Earth should be ascribed to Parmenides.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343225
H. Weidemann
The passage 18a34-b5 of Aristotle’s famous sea-battle chapter has often been misunderstood. My aim is to show, firstly, that Aristotle in this passage attempts to prove that the unrestricted validity of the Principle of Bivalence entails, in the case of singular statements, the validity of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution for the contradictory pairs they are members of. According to the latter principle either the affirmative member of a contradictory pair of statements must be true and the negative false or vice versa. Secondly, I want to show what consequences the correct understanding of the passage in question has for the understanding of the introductory passage of the chapter (18a28-33) and for the dispute over whether Aristotle exempts singular statements about contingent future events from the domain of the Principle of Bivalence. The thesis, advanced by some modern interpreters, that Aristotle refrains from doing so even though he exempts the contradictory pairs such statements are members of from the domain of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution will be rebutted as resulting from a fallacious line of reasoning.
{"title":"Aristotle on Bivalence and Truth-value Distribution","authors":"H. Weidemann","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343225","url":null,"abstract":"The passage 18a34-b5 of Aristotle’s famous sea-battle chapter has often been misunderstood. My aim is to show, firstly, that Aristotle in this passage attempts to prove that the unrestricted validity of the Principle of Bivalence entails, in the case of singular statements, the validity of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution for the contradictory pairs they are members of. According to the latter principle either the affirmative member of a contradictory pair of statements must be true and the negative false or vice versa. Secondly, I want to show what consequences the correct understanding of the passage in question has for the understanding of the introductory passage of the chapter (18a28-33) and for the dispute over whether Aristotle exempts singular statements about contingent future events from the domain of the Principle of Bivalence. The thesis, advanced by some modern interpreters, that Aristotle refrains from doing so even though he exempts the contradictory pairs such statements are members of from the domain of the Principle of Truth-value Distribution will be rebutted as resulting from a fallacious line of reasoning.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234314
Max J. Latona
In the Republic, a popular interpretation holds that Plato conceives knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as a cognitive state that exclusively takes metaphysical intelligibles as its objects, i.e., the Good and the Forms. This interpretation claims further that ἐπιστήμη of perceptibles is impossible, such that the highest cognitive achievement one can attain in the perceptible world is opinion (δόξα). I have two main aims. First, I argue that this interpretation fails to convince us as to why the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen, the non-philosophic citizens, cannot constitute knowledge of a sortal kind. Second, the view seems to undermine Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge, i.e., a kind of knowledge that plausibly involves observation of concrete phenomena, a thorough study of the observed phenomena, and drawing deductive or indicative conclusions in the perceptible world. I explore Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge and propose that, among others, the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen (or most of them) plausibly constitute scientific knowledge, and their cognitive competence should be understood as such.
{"title":"Myths of Self-Transformation in Plato’s Republic","authors":"Max J. Latona","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234314","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234314","url":null,"abstract":"In the Republic, a popular interpretation holds that Plato conceives knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as a cognitive state that exclusively takes metaphysical intelligibles as its objects, i.e., the Good and the Forms. This interpretation claims further that ἐπιστήμη of perceptibles is impossible, such that the highest cognitive achievement one can attain in the perceptible world is opinion (δόξα). I have two main aims. First, I argue that this interpretation fails to convince us as to why the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen, the non-philosophic citizens, cannot constitute knowledge of a sortal kind. Second, the view seems to undermine Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge, i.e., a kind of knowledge that plausibly involves observation of concrete phenomena, a thorough study of the observed phenomena, and drawing deductive or indicative conclusions in the perceptible world. I explore Plato’s possible view on scientific knowledge and propose that, among others, the various ἐπιστήμαι of the craftsmen (or most of them) plausibly constitute scientific knowledge, and their cognitive competence should be understood as such.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343234
J. Dillon
{"title":"Time and Cosmology in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Edited by Daniel Vasquez and Alberto Ross","authors":"J. Dillon","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343234","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343113
Douglas Reed
{"title":"Aristotle on Thought and Feeling. By Paula Gottlieb","authors":"Douglas Reed","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343113","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193230","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343115
R. Seaford
{"title":"Acheloios, Thales, and the Origin of Philosophy. A Response to the neo-Marxians. By Nicholas Molinari","authors":"R. Seaford","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343115","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343115","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343220
Matthew Matherne
What makes Socratic inquiry valuable? A standard response is what I term instrumentalism: Socratic inquiry is merely instrumentally valuable; it is valuable only because it produces valuable results. This paper challenges instrumentalism. First, I present two value puzzles for instrumentalists and argue that these puzzles are best solved by denying instrumentalism. Then, I survey passages in the Apology that point to the source of Socratic inquiry’s non-instrumental value.
{"title":"The Value of Socratic Inquiry in the Apology","authors":"Matthew Matherne","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343220","url":null,"abstract":"What makes Socratic inquiry valuable? A standard response is what I term instrumentalism: Socratic inquiry is merely instrumentally valuable; it is valuable only because it produces valuable results. This paper challenges instrumentalism. First, I present two value puzzles for instrumentalists and argue that these puzzles are best solved by denying instrumentalism. Then, I survey passages in the Apology that point to the source of Socratic inquiry’s non-instrumental value.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193426","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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