Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343110
Thomas Slabon
This article investigates how Plato thinks we secure necessary motivational conditions for inquiry. After presenting a typology of zetetic breakdowns in the dialogues, I identify norms of inquiry Plato believes all successful inquirers must satisfy. Satisfying these norms requires trust that philosophy will not harm but benefit inquirers overall. This trust cannot be secured by protreptic argument. Instead, it requires divine intervention—an extra-rational foundation for rational inquiry.
{"title":"Philosophical Breakdowns and Divine Intervention","authors":"Thomas Slabon","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343110","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates how Plato thinks we secure necessary motivational conditions for inquiry. After presenting a typology of zetetic breakdowns in the dialogues, I identify norms of inquiry Plato believes all successful inquirers must satisfy. Satisfying these norms requires trust that philosophy will not harm but benefit inquirers overall. This trust cannot be secured by protreptic argument. Instead, it requires divine intervention—an extra-rational foundation for rational inquiry.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234316
Freya Möbus
In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.
{"title":"Can Flogging Make Us Less Ignorant?","authors":"Freya Möbus","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234316","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234316","url":null,"abstract":"In the Gorgias, Socrates claims that painful bodily punishment like flogging can improve certain wrongdoers. I argue that we can take Socrates’ endorsement seriously, even on the standard interpretation of Socratic motivational intellectualism, according to which there are no non-rational desires. I propose that flogging can epistemically improve certain wrongdoers by communicating that wrongdoing is bad for oneself. In certain cases, this belief cannot be communicated effectively through philosophical dialogue.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"34 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234317
Fernando Muniz, George Rudebusch
English translates ‘genos’ as kind and ‘eidos’ as form, which differ in meaning as much as ‘herd’ and ‘brand’ do. But there are hard passages where ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ have appeared to be synonyms, usually given the new meaning class. We show that, although ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ are never synonyms and continue to mean kind and form, the word ‘eidos’ can be used figuratively, as a metonym, for a genos.
{"title":"Genos and Eidos in Plato","authors":"Fernando Muniz, George Rudebusch","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234317","url":null,"abstract":"English translates ‘genos’ as kind and ‘eidos’ as form, which differ in meaning as much as ‘herd’ and ‘brand’ do. But there are hard passages where ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ have appeared to be synonyms, usually given the new meaning class. We show that, although ‘genos’ and ‘eidos’ are never synonyms and continue to mean kind and form, the word ‘eidos’ can be used figuratively, as a metonym, for a genos.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193887","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343117
C. Zatta
This essay pursues the question of vegetal respiration in Presocratics’ doctrines in contrast to Aristotle’s categorical circumscription of this vital process to the blooded animals. It finds that epithelial respiration in DK31 B100 is central to Empedocles’ conception of plants’ breathing, linked to their fructification, deciduousness, and overall life preservation. It also discusses plants’ respiration in relation to their body temperature in Menestor, then, concludes by analyzing Democritus’ psychological doctrine, arguing that the intake of fiery atoms pertained to all living beings, plants included.
{"title":"Plants and Vegetal Respiration in Early Greek Philosophy","authors":"C. Zatta","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343117","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343117","url":null,"abstract":"This essay pursues the question of vegetal respiration in Presocratics’ doctrines in contrast to Aristotle’s categorical circumscription of this vital process to the blooded animals. It finds that epithelial respiration in DK31 B100 is central to Empedocles’ conception of plants’ breathing, linked to their fructification, deciduousness, and overall life preservation. It also discusses plants’ respiration in relation to their body temperature in Menestor, then, concludes by analyzing Democritus’ psychological doctrine, arguing that the intake of fiery atoms pertained to all living beings, plants included.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193412","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343235
G. M. Trujillo
{"title":"How to Say No: An Ancient Guide to the Art of Cynicism. Selected, translated, and introduced by M.D. Usher","authors":"G. M. Trujillo","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343235","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343236
D. Ferguson
{"title":"Aristotle’s Empiricism. By Marc Gasser-Wingate","authors":"D. Ferguson","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343236","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"68 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193778","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343112
Freya Möbus
{"title":"Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness. By Nicholas D. Smith","authors":"Freya Möbus","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343112","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"9 32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193186","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343224
Denis Walter
This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue.
{"title":"Definitional Structure and the Same, the Different, and Part-Whole Relations in Plato’s Parmenides","authors":"Denis Walter","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343224","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343224","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that the second part of the Parmenides (137-166) consists not only of the well-known logical structure that has been widely studied but also of a great variety of definitions of forms. My aim is to show how these definitions depend on a specific group of closely connected primary forms (i.e., same, different, part, whole). The definitions that Parmenides provides help Socrates overcome his failure in attempting to define forms in the first part of the dialogue.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343226
A. Carbone
Two of Aristotle’s major legacies, namely, the theory of scientific syllogism and teleology seem to conflict on several planes. Indeed, an array of formal limitations prevents him from formalizing teleological explanations into scientific syllogisms, which are entirely absent from his works. To achieve this, Aristotle resorts to a different tool, the logic of ‘consequence’. This governs both the teleological relation between an end and a means that underlies necessity ‘from a hypothesis’—which is the necessity proper to living things—and a different form of syllogisms, namely, syllogisms ‘from a hypothesis’. His guidelines in the first chapter of his Parts of Animals on the proper form of demonstration to be adopted in biology should be read as laying out the rules of inference for translating teleological explanations into syllogisms ‘from a hypothesis’.
{"title":"The Logic of Consequence in Aristotle’s Biology","authors":"A. Carbone","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343226","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343226","url":null,"abstract":"Two of Aristotle’s major legacies, namely, the theory of scientific syllogism and teleology seem to conflict on several planes. Indeed, an array of formal limitations prevents him from formalizing teleological explanations into scientific syllogisms, which are entirely absent from his works. To achieve this, Aristotle resorts to a different tool, the logic of ‘consequence’. This governs both the teleological relation between an end and a means that underlies necessity ‘from a hypothesis’—which is the necessity proper to living things—and a different form of syllogisms, namely, syllogisms ‘from a hypothesis’. His guidelines in the first chapter of his Parts of Animals on the proper form of demonstration to be adopted in biology should be read as laying out the rules of inference for translating teleological explanations into syllogisms ‘from a hypothesis’.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193586","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343228
Brian Ribeiro
In section 1 I present a case for understanding Cicero as a radical Academic skeptic, based on evidence from the Academica. In section 2 I offer an explanation of the concept of skeptical fideism and present a way to taxonomize various versions of the view. The material in sections 1 and 2 positions us to ask, was Cicero, the Academic augur, a sincere orthopraxic skeptical fideist? In section 3 I attempt to answer that question, beginning with an examination of De divinatione. Reading that work in a skeptical light, as I do, we are led to an impasse on our central question. However, in section 4 I consider two lines of argument that might enable us to determine Cicero’s own views.
{"title":"Skeptic-cum-Augur","authors":"Brian Ribeiro","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343228","url":null,"abstract":"In section 1 I present a case for understanding Cicero as a radical Academic skeptic, based on evidence from the Academica. In section 2 I offer an explanation of the concept of skeptical fideism and present a way to taxonomize various versions of the view. The material in sections 1 and 2 positions us to ask, was Cicero, the Academic augur, a sincere orthopraxic skeptical fideist? In section 3 I attempt to answer that question, beginning with an examination of De divinatione. Reading that work in a skeptical light, as I do, we are led to an impasse on our central question. However, in section 4 I consider two lines of argument that might enable us to determine Cicero’s own views.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193597","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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