Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234319
Robert Roreitner
The article reconstructs a late ancient debate concerning a dilemma raised by Aristotle’s De anima: How can an impassive soul account for perceiving qua being affected by perceptual objects? It is argued that Alexander and Themistius developed radically different approaches which can be better understood within a larger context of the dialogue between Aristotelianism and Platonism. The debate is shown to be instructive in underlining difficulties inherent in Aristotle’s account.
{"title":"The Perceptive Soul’s Impassivity in Late Ancient Reception of Aristotle’s De anima","authors":"Robert Roreitner","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234319","url":null,"abstract":"The article reconstructs a late ancient debate concerning a dilemma raised by Aristotle’s De anima: How can an impassive soul account for perceiving qua being affected by perceptual objects? It is argued that Alexander and Themistius developed radically different approaches which can be better understood within a larger context of the dialogue between Aristotelianism and Platonism. The debate is shown to be instructive in underlining difficulties inherent in Aristotle’s account.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343237
C. Cohoe
{"title":"Mind and World in Aristotle’s ‘De Anima’. By Sean Kelsey","authors":"C. Cohoe","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343237","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343218
Marco Montagnino
I walk a well-trodden but still only partially explored path, along which we shall attempt to establish a basis for the study of the Parmenides poem’s unity by way of a comparison with twentieth-century physics. I investigate the hypothesis that Parmenides’ sphere-shaped τὸ ἐόν, as described in B8.42-49, could be understood as a hyperspherical unlimited whole cosmologically bounded by the διάκοσμος described by the complex sphere system in fragment B12.
我走的是一条被人熟知但仍只是部分探索过的道路，沿着这条道路，我们将试图通过与二十世纪物理学的比较，为巴门尼德诗歌的统一性研究建立一个基础。我研究了在B8.42-49中描述的巴门尼德的球形τ ο ν可以被理解为一个在宇宙上由片段B12中复杂球体系统描述的δι κοσμος所限定的超球体的无限整体的假设。
{"title":"How Can Parmenides’ τὸ ἐόν Be Unending but Non-endless?","authors":"Marco Montagnino","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343218","url":null,"abstract":"I walk a well-trodden but still only partially explored path, along which we shall attempt to establish a basis for the study of the Parmenides poem’s unity by way of a comparison with twentieth-century physics. I investigate the hypothesis that Parmenides’ sphere-shaped τὸ ἐόν, as described in B8.42-49, could be understood as a hyperspherical unlimited whole cosmologically bounded by the διάκοσμος described by the complex sphere system in fragment B12.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343223
Ryan M. Brown
In this essay, I discuss the philosophical significance of three features of the Phaedrus’s dramatic scenery: the myth of Boreas, the two trees Socrates singles out upon arriving at the grove, and the grove itself. I argue that attention to these three features of the dramatic scenery helps us better understand the Phaedrus’s account of erōs.
{"title":"The Thematic Significance of the Scenery in Plato’s Phaedrus","authors":"Ryan M. Brown","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343223","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343223","url":null,"abstract":"In this essay, I discuss the philosophical significance of three features of the Phaedrus’s dramatic scenery: the myth of Boreas, the two trees Socrates singles out upon arriving at the grove, and the grove itself. I argue that attention to these three features of the dramatic scenery helps us better understand the Phaedrus’s account of erōs.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343229
D. Greenwood
I argue for the authenticity of a fragment found in Eusebius, PE i 2.2-5, and sometimes attributed to Porphyry of Tyre. I argue against the case for non-Porphyrian authorship that has become dominant in recent years, employing evidence that highlights congruity with generally accepted Porphyrian works. This allows me to move on to an initial reconstruction of Porphyry’s religious epistemology, and to assess what that means in his historical context.
{"title":"Porphyry, Eusebius, and Epistemology","authors":"D. Greenwood","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343229","url":null,"abstract":"I argue for the authenticity of a fragment found in Eusebius, PE i 2.2-5, and sometimes attributed to Porphyry of Tyre. I argue against the case for non-Porphyrian authorship that has become dominant in recent years, employing evidence that highlights congruity with generally accepted Porphyrian works. This allows me to move on to an initial reconstruction of Porphyry’s religious epistemology, and to assess what that means in his historical context.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343232
M. Segev
{"title":"Searching for the Divine in Plato and Aristotle: Philosophical Theoria and Traditional Practice. By Julie K. Ward","authors":"M. Segev","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343232","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343233
Peter J. Vernezze
{"title":"Plato Goes to China: The Greek Classics and Chinese Nationalism. By Shadi Bartsch","authors":"Peter J. Vernezze","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343233","url":null,"abstract":"<jats:p />","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil20234318
Sandra L Peterson
This article responds to scholars that claim that Xenophon’s Socrates, unlike Plato’s Socrates, never professes ignorance about moral matters (§1). I cite instances when the behavior of Xenophon’s Socrates implies that he acknowledges ignorance about particular moral matters. Implied acknowledgement of ignorance amounts to implicit profession (§2). I then consider passages that are evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates professed his ignorance about ‘the greatest things’, which include ethical matters much larger than particular (§3).
{"title":"The Ignorance of Xenophon’s Socrates","authors":"Sandra L Peterson","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil20234318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil20234318","url":null,"abstract":"This article responds to scholars that claim that Xenophon’s Socrates, unlike Plato’s Socrates, never professes ignorance about moral matters (§1). I cite instances when the behavior of Xenophon’s Socrates implies that he acknowledges ignorance about particular moral matters. Implied acknowledgement of ignorance amounts to implicit profession (§2). I then consider passages that are evidence that Xenophon’s Socrates professed his ignorance about ‘the greatest things’, which include ethical matters much larger than particular (§3).","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71193739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5840/ancientphil202343227
Paul Asman
Aristotle says that conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions that occur εὐθύς, which is normally translated to indicate temporal immediacy. Both aspects of this—that the conclusions are actions, and that they occur immediately—seem wrong. Interpreting εὐθύς as atemporal, specifically as indicating that nothing more is needed to explain the action, makes better sense of practical syllogisms and solves the problems raised by calling their conclusions actions.
{"title":"Εὐθύς and Action in Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism","authors":"Paul Asman","doi":"10.5840/ancientphil202343227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/ancientphil202343227","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle says that conclusions of practical syllogisms are actions that occur εὐθύς, which is normally translated to indicate temporal immediacy. Both aspects of this—that the conclusions are actions, and that they occur immediately—seem wrong. Interpreting εὐθύς as atemporal, specifically as indicating that nothing more is needed to explain the action, makes better sense of practical syllogisms and solves the problems raised by calling their conclusions actions.","PeriodicalId":38413,"journal":{"name":"Ancient Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135828959","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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