Abstract This paper explores key lessons from the 1990 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Drug Abuse (UNGASS 1990) and the 1998 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 1998), and tracks subsequent policy events and trends. It discusses the wide array of increasing tensions and cracks in the “Vienna consensus,” as well as systemic challenges and recent treaty breaches. Various options for treaty reform are explored and the following questions are considered: Given policy developments around the world this past decade, what outcomes can the 2016 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016) have in terms of a new political compromise? How can UNGASS 2016 contribute to more system-wide coherence where previous attempts failed? Can UNGASS 2016 realistically initiate a process of modernizing the global drug control system and breathe oxygen into a system risking asphyxiation? Finally, is there a chance that treaty reform options will be discussed at all, or do today’s political realities still block possible future regime changes?
{"title":"UNGASS 2016: Prospects for Treaty Reform and UN System-Wide Coherence on Drug Policy","authors":"M. Jelsma","doi":"10.1515/JDPA-2015-0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JDPA-2015-0021","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores key lessons from the 1990 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Drug Abuse (UNGASS 1990) and the 1998 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 1998), and tracks subsequent policy events and trends. It discusses the wide array of increasing tensions and cracks in the “Vienna consensus,” as well as systemic challenges and recent treaty breaches. Various options for treaty reform are explored and the following questions are considered: Given policy developments around the world this past decade, what outcomes can the 2016 Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016) have in terms of a new political compromise? How can UNGASS 2016 contribute to more system-wide coherence where previous attempts failed? Can UNGASS 2016 realistically initiate a process of modernizing the global drug control system and breathe oxygen into a system risking asphyxiation? Finally, is there a chance that treaty reform options will be discussed at all, or do today’s political realities still block possible future regime changes?","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JDPA-2015-0021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46402564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sahba Jalali, Dixon Thomas, Padma Shetty, Jason C. Cooper
Abstract Tramadol abuse potential is not well studied. While some studies claim low abuse potential, others signal significant public health risks associated with tramadol abuse. This is a review on the abuse and dependence potential of tramadol. Tramadol was originally approved as non-controlled drug, but there is a trend to recognize tramadol as a controlled substance by regulators in many countries. Several factors contribute to abuse of tramadol. The leading reasons include history of drug abuse, geographical variation, and lessened regulatory controls. Tramadol abuse can cause increases in seizures and suicidal ideations. Abusers experience withdrawal symptoms and worsening of depression. Higher regulatory control of tramadol is warranted to avoid its misuse.
{"title":"Higher Regulatory Control of Tramadol to Prevent its Abuse and Dependence","authors":"Sahba Jalali, Dixon Thomas, Padma Shetty, Jason C. Cooper","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2016-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2016-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Tramadol abuse potential is not well studied. While some studies claim low abuse potential, others signal significant public health risks associated with tramadol abuse. This is a review on the abuse and dependence potential of tramadol. Tramadol was originally approved as non-controlled drug, but there is a trend to recognize tramadol as a controlled substance by regulators in many countries. Several factors contribute to abuse of tramadol. The leading reasons include history of drug abuse, geographical variation, and lessened regulatory controls. Tramadol abuse can cause increases in seizures and suicidal ideations. Abusers experience withdrawal symptoms and worsening of depression. Higher regulatory control of tramadol is warranted to avoid its misuse.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2016-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47879638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The suppression of drug consumption and trade is high on the Government of Vietnam’s agenda. To accomplish this goal, Vietnam employs repressive policies that often contravene international human rights law. Among the most detrimental and problematic policies are the incarceration of drug users in compulsory treatment centers, and the stigmatization and abuse of consumers by the police. Vietnamese drug policy is, however, slowly changing in the face of one of Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics. While the Communist Government of the early-1990s designated illicit drugs as a “social evil” to be eradicated through punitive and often repressive means, the recent implementation of harm reduction approaches have reduced the level of needle sharing, and thus HIV transmission. This briefing will explore the current trends in drug consumption, production, and trafficking before looking at the key harms and threats associated with drugs in Vietnam. This will be followed by a summary of Vietnam’s drug policies, including the country’s approach to drug treatment, harm reduction, and illicit opium suppression: Vietnam is one of a small number of states to have suppressed illicit opium production, an intervention that centred upon coercive negotiations with limited alternative development. The briefing will conclude with some tentative recommendations for reform and thoughts on what could be expected from Vietnam during the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016).
{"title":"A Slow March from Social Evil to Harm Reduction: Drugs and Drug Policy in Vietnam","authors":"J. Windle","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2015-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The suppression of drug consumption and trade is high on the Government of Vietnam’s agenda. To accomplish this goal, Vietnam employs repressive policies that often contravene international human rights law. Among the most detrimental and problematic policies are the incarceration of drug users in compulsory treatment centers, and the stigmatization and abuse of consumers by the police. Vietnamese drug policy is, however, slowly changing in the face of one of Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics. While the Communist Government of the early-1990s designated illicit drugs as a “social evil” to be eradicated through punitive and often repressive means, the recent implementation of harm reduction approaches have reduced the level of needle sharing, and thus HIV transmission. This briefing will explore the current trends in drug consumption, production, and trafficking before looking at the key harms and threats associated with drugs in Vietnam. This will be followed by a summary of Vietnam’s drug policies, including the country’s approach to drug treatment, harm reduction, and illicit opium suppression: Vietnam is one of a small number of states to have suppressed illicit opium production, an intervention that centred upon coercive negotiations with limited alternative development. The briefing will conclude with some tentative recommendations for reform and thoughts on what could be expected from Vietnam during the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016).","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46076677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract International prohibitions create asymmetries; production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal trade. These externalities fuel calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the framework. Analyses of the pros and cons of legalization usually adopt the perspective of a single nation acting in isolation. However, one nation’s legalization alters incentives for others to act, and not always in obvious ways. So the proper perspective is that of a dynamic game. The primary contribution of this paper is to make the case for analyzing legalization as a strategic game, but it also offers preliminary analysis for the case of cocaine. Tentative conclusions include: – While decriminalizing possession of amounts of marijuana suitable for personal use has minimal repercussions beyond a nation’s borders, even one country’s legalization of a commercial cocaine or heroin industry could affect countries around the world. – Legalization of production in one country would draw production away from other producers who retain their prohibitions. This incentivizes current producers to encourage other such countries to legalize first, thereby addressing the first producer’s black market externalities without incurring opprobrium from final market countries. – Legalization in one transshipment country would likewise attract transportation activities from existing jurisdictions where drugs remain illegal. – The impact of a transshipment country legalizing cocaine varies by region. It might have minimal effect on the United States or Mexico if the “final mile” continues to be smuggling across the Mexico-United States border. By contrast, if an Eastern European country with large porous land borders were to legalize, that could dramatically alter supply conditions in Europe and Russia by producing covert smuggling networks similar to those currently existing on the U.S.-Mexico border.
{"title":"After the Grand Fracture: Scenarios for the Collapse of the International Drug Control Regime","authors":"J. Caulkins","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2015-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract International prohibitions create asymmetries; production and transshipment concentrate in relatively few places that bear the bulk of the negative externalities created by the illegal trade. These externalities fuel calls for altering the United Nations treaty framework and for individual nations to legalize outside of the framework. Analyses of the pros and cons of legalization usually adopt the perspective of a single nation acting in isolation. However, one nation’s legalization alters incentives for others to act, and not always in obvious ways. So the proper perspective is that of a dynamic game. The primary contribution of this paper is to make the case for analyzing legalization as a strategic game, but it also offers preliminary analysis for the case of cocaine. Tentative conclusions include: – While decriminalizing possession of amounts of marijuana suitable for personal use has minimal repercussions beyond a nation’s borders, even one country’s legalization of a commercial cocaine or heroin industry could affect countries around the world. – Legalization of production in one country would draw production away from other producers who retain their prohibitions. This incentivizes current producers to encourage other such countries to legalize first, thereby addressing the first producer’s black market externalities without incurring opprobrium from final market countries. – Legalization in one transshipment country would likewise attract transportation activities from existing jurisdictions where drugs remain illegal. – The impact of a transshipment country legalizing cocaine varies by region. It might have minimal effect on the United States or Mexico if the “final mile” continues to be smuggling across the Mexico-United States border. By contrast, if an Eastern European country with large porous land borders were to legalize, that could dramatically alter supply conditions in Europe and Russia by producing covert smuggling networks similar to those currently existing on the U.S.-Mexico border.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49284284","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
D. Bergen-Cico, D. Otiashvili, I. Kirtadze, T. Zábranský, Vano Tsertsvadze
Abstract Background In 2006 the country of Georgia implemented Article 45 of the Administrative code and Article 273 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, a public policy that enable police to detain any individual, anywhere, at any time on grounds of suspicion of drug use; and require them to submit to urine screening to test for the presence of illegal drugs and their metabolites. This policy is referred to as the street drug testing policy. Positive drug screening results in fines and potential jail time. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a cost analysis of this policy and assess the execution of the policy and the extent to which the policy meets its stated aims. Methods This study employed cost analysis methodology to calculate annual direct material and labor costs associated with carrying out Georgia’s street level drug testing policy. These costs encompassed law enforcement, drug testing, associated judicial processes, imprisonment and income offset through fines collected during the two years covered in this study (2008 and 2014). In addition, we measured: fidelity of the execution of the policy measured by the accuracy of the percentage of people detained who were found to actually have used drugs; and the policy’s effectiveness in deterring drug use among those who tested positive. Impact on drug use behavior was measured through impact analysis interviews conducted with a national sample of 500 detainees who tested positive for drugs under Article 45 and Article 273. Results Using conservative financial estimates the cost of carrying out the policy offset by fine revenues broke even in 2008 (−111,889 GEL); however, by 2014 the costs increased 20 % in conjunction with an 18 % increase in the number of people detained for testing. However, the percentage of people who tested positive for drugs declined 39 % indicating decreased fidelity in the execution of the policy; accompanied by a financial imbalance of −10,277,909 GEL. Moreover, effectiveness analysis revealed that within one month of being detained and having tested positive for drug use, over 90 % of individuals had returned to pre-detention drug use levels, and within 12 months 100 % of detainees had resumed prior drug use behaviors. Conclusion The financial costs associated with Georgia’s street level drug screening policy has rapidly increased while becoming decreasingly accurate and efficient in its execution. Moreover, data indicates that the policy is not effective in reducing or stopping drug use among those who tested positive. In conclusion, it is fiscally unsustainable to continue the policy as it is being executed and the policy is ineffective in changing drug use behavior among people who use illegal substances.
{"title":"Cost Analysis of the Country of Georgia’s Street Level Drug Testing Policy","authors":"D. Bergen-Cico, D. Otiashvili, I. Kirtadze, T. Zábranský, Vano Tsertsvadze","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2017-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2017-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Background In 2006 the country of Georgia implemented Article 45 of the Administrative code and Article 273 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, a public policy that enable police to detain any individual, anywhere, at any time on grounds of suspicion of drug use; and require them to submit to urine screening to test for the presence of illegal drugs and their metabolites. This policy is referred to as the street drug testing policy. Positive drug screening results in fines and potential jail time. The purpose of this paper is to conduct a cost analysis of this policy and assess the execution of the policy and the extent to which the policy meets its stated aims. Methods This study employed cost analysis methodology to calculate annual direct material and labor costs associated with carrying out Georgia’s street level drug testing policy. These costs encompassed law enforcement, drug testing, associated judicial processes, imprisonment and income offset through fines collected during the two years covered in this study (2008 and 2014). In addition, we measured: fidelity of the execution of the policy measured by the accuracy of the percentage of people detained who were found to actually have used drugs; and the policy’s effectiveness in deterring drug use among those who tested positive. Impact on drug use behavior was measured through impact analysis interviews conducted with a national sample of 500 detainees who tested positive for drugs under Article 45 and Article 273. Results Using conservative financial estimates the cost of carrying out the policy offset by fine revenues broke even in 2008 (−111,889 GEL); however, by 2014 the costs increased 20 % in conjunction with an 18 % increase in the number of people detained for testing. However, the percentage of people who tested positive for drugs declined 39 % indicating decreased fidelity in the execution of the policy; accompanied by a financial imbalance of −10,277,909 GEL. Moreover, effectiveness analysis revealed that within one month of being detained and having tested positive for drug use, over 90 % of individuals had returned to pre-detention drug use levels, and within 12 months 100 % of detainees had resumed prior drug use behaviors. Conclusion The financial costs associated with Georgia’s street level drug screening policy has rapidly increased while becoming decreasingly accurate and efficient in its execution. Moreover, data indicates that the policy is not effective in reducing or stopping drug use among those who tested positive. In conclusion, it is fiscally unsustainable to continue the policy as it is being executed and the policy is ineffective in changing drug use behavior among people who use illegal substances.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2017-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66931408","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act [P.L. 111–31] gives the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products, including placing restrictions on product composition, sale, and distribution. A complete accounting of the costs and benefits of any tobacco regulation includes harms from possible illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP): costs of enforcement, violence, incarceration, etc. Indeed, the law instructs the FDA to take into account the “countervailing effects” of regulation on public health, “such as the creation of a significant demand for contraband or other tobacco products that do not meet the requirements.” While the law’s narrow focus on public health may limit the scope of an inquiry by the FDA compared to a full benefit-cost analysis, aspects of ITTP such as violence and incarceration have substantial health impacts. Illicit markets in drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, not to mention the grand experiment of alcohol Prohibition in the early twentieth century, illustrate the substantial risks of unwanted side effects of drug prohibition. But taxes, product limitations, access restrictions, and narrowly defined product bans constitute “lesser prohibitions,” and are subject to the same kind (if not degree) of risks. All tobacco policy-making should therefore consider ITTP. This article sets forth a research agenda for the FDA to consider in order to estimate the effects of contemplated tobacco-product regulation and ITTP. To carry out fully its legislative mandate, the FDA would have to determine the current size and impacts of ITTP, analyze how these may be expected to change under new regulations, and look for interdependencies among tobacco-product markets that may complicate single-product regulation. A more challenging element of the research agenda would be to develop a better theoretical groundwork for the prediction of the emergence, size, and side effects of illicit markets. We close with discussion of how the proposed research agenda may lead to insights into other policy areas as well.
{"title":"Illicit Trade as a Countervailing Effect: What the FDA Would Have to Know to Evaluate Tobacco Regulations","authors":"M. Kleiman, J. Prieger, Jonathan Kulick","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2015-0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0016","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act [P.L. 111–31] gives the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) the authority to regulate tobacco products, including placing restrictions on product composition, sale, and distribution. A complete accounting of the costs and benefits of any tobacco regulation includes harms from possible illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP): costs of enforcement, violence, incarceration, etc. Indeed, the law instructs the FDA to take into account the “countervailing effects” of regulation on public health, “such as the creation of a significant demand for contraband or other tobacco products that do not meet the requirements.” While the law’s narrow focus on public health may limit the scope of an inquiry by the FDA compared to a full benefit-cost analysis, aspects of ITTP such as violence and incarceration have substantial health impacts. Illicit markets in drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, not to mention the grand experiment of alcohol Prohibition in the early twentieth century, illustrate the substantial risks of unwanted side effects of drug prohibition. But taxes, product limitations, access restrictions, and narrowly defined product bans constitute “lesser prohibitions,” and are subject to the same kind (if not degree) of risks. All tobacco policy-making should therefore consider ITTP. This article sets forth a research agenda for the FDA to consider in order to estimate the effects of contemplated tobacco-product regulation and ITTP. To carry out fully its legislative mandate, the FDA would have to determine the current size and impacts of ITTP, analyze how these may be expected to change under new regulations, and look for interdependencies among tobacco-product markets that may complicate single-product regulation. A more challenging element of the research agenda would be to develop a better theoretical groundwork for the prediction of the emergence, size, and side effects of illicit markets. We close with discussion of how the proposed research agenda may lead to insights into other policy areas as well.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 30"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0016","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66931346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Reducing illicit methamphetamine (meth) labs poses many unique challenges. For more than 30 years, the government’s strategy has relied on controlling certain chemicals and precursors used by amateur chemists (called “cooks”) to make meth. Some states have pursued additional controls, including, for example, requiring prescriptions for popular drug products that can be used as meth precursors. In this paper we review the government’s anti-meth strategies and assess their effectiveness. Our findings suggest that, historically, precursor controls have caused only limited and temporary disruptions in meth production because cooks are quick to adapt and use alternate methods for making meth. Our data review uncovered limitations in a national database that has been used for more than a decade by federal and state agencies to track meth production and formulate anti-meth strategies. The continued use of these data, we conclude, has contributed to wasteful federal spending that, in turn, has distorted the scope and nature of the domestic meth lab problem.
{"title":"Reducing Illicit Methamphetamine Labs: Is Precursor Control the Answer?","authors":"John J. Coleman","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2015-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Reducing illicit methamphetamine (meth) labs poses many unique challenges. For more than 30 years, the government’s strategy has relied on controlling certain chemicals and precursors used by amateur chemists (called “cooks”) to make meth. Some states have pursued additional controls, including, for example, requiring prescriptions for popular drug products that can be used as meth precursors. In this paper we review the government’s anti-meth strategies and assess their effectiveness. Our findings suggest that, historically, precursor controls have caused only limited and temporary disruptions in meth production because cooks are quick to adapt and use alternate methods for making meth. Our data review uncovered limitations in a national database that has been used for more than a decade by federal and state agencies to track meth production and formulate anti-meth strategies. The continued use of these data, we conclude, has contributed to wasteful federal spending that, in turn, has distorted the scope and nature of the domestic meth lab problem.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":"9 1","pages":"31 - 54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66931290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Uruguay, the first country to enact legislation to legalize and regulate every level of the market for cannabis, will be an important example globally for jurisdictions contemplating whether and how to liberalize drug policies. A combination of political leadership by former President José “Pepe” Mujica and public unease over rising criminality led Uruguay to pursue reforms to place the cannabis market under legal authority of the state, rather than in the hands of illegal groups. The new law, approved in December 2013, encompasses medical as well as adult use, or “recreational cannabis” for which it creates three distinct sources of legal access: home growing, social clubs, and commercial sales through pharmacies. While most Uruguayans remain skeptical of the new cannabis law, the “Broad Front” coalition responsible for passing the law in 2013 renewed its congressional majorities and retained the presidency in the country’s 2014 elections. The current government of President Tabaré Vazquez has stated its commitment to fully implementing the law, but is moving ahead cautiously, mindful of ongoing domestic and international criticisms. While the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has castigated Uruguay for violating its international drug treaty obligations, Uruguay has argued that the country’s human rights obligations under international law take priority over drug control treaty requirements. Given the unprecedented nature of Uruguay’s new cannabis regime, successful implementation will require rigorous monitoring and evaluation and the flexibility to make revisions as problems emerge. Rigorous evaluation of Uruguay’s pioneering reforms can also provide important insights and knowledge for other jurisdictions that may wish to consider comparable regulatory approaches.
{"title":"Cannabis Regulation in Uruguay: An Innovative Law Facing Major Challenges","authors":"J. Walsh, Geoff Ramsey","doi":"10.1515/JDPA-2015-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JDPA-2015-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Uruguay, the first country to enact legislation to legalize and regulate every level of the market for cannabis, will be an important example globally for jurisdictions contemplating whether and how to liberalize drug policies. A combination of political leadership by former President José “Pepe” Mujica and public unease over rising criminality led Uruguay to pursue reforms to place the cannabis market under legal authority of the state, rather than in the hands of illegal groups. The new law, approved in December 2013, encompasses medical as well as adult use, or “recreational cannabis” for which it creates three distinct sources of legal access: home growing, social clubs, and commercial sales through pharmacies. While most Uruguayans remain skeptical of the new cannabis law, the “Broad Front” coalition responsible for passing the law in 2013 renewed its congressional majorities and retained the presidency in the country’s 2014 elections. The current government of President Tabaré Vazquez has stated its commitment to fully implementing the law, but is moving ahead cautiously, mindful of ongoing domestic and international criticisms. While the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has castigated Uruguay for violating its international drug treaty obligations, Uruguay has argued that the country’s human rights obligations under international law take priority over drug control treaty requirements. Given the unprecedented nature of Uruguay’s new cannabis regime, successful implementation will require rigorous monitoring and evaluation and the flexibility to make revisions as problems emerge. Rigorous evaluation of Uruguay’s pioneering reforms can also provide important insights and knowledge for other jurisdictions that may wish to consider comparable regulatory approaches.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JDPA-2015-0007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66931301","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article examines the variety of drug policy in operation within Europe by focusing on Sweden (relatively restrictive) and the Netherlands (relatively liberal) as case studies. It analyses European data to produce an in-depth overview of the nature of the illegal drugs situation in both countries, focusing on both successes and areas that could be improved. Finally it appraises the appetite for drug policy reform in terms of (i) cannabis regulation and (ii) treaty reform in each country. The main conclusions suggest that there are no common indicators of success by which drug policies in general can be judged, and there is little agreement within Europe about whether or not we are in need of drug policy reform. It suggests that a successful global drug policy should celebrate diversity and should also seek to provide an international framework within which different global drug strategies can be evaluated.
{"title":"Mixed Messages from Europe on Drug Policy Reform: The Cases of Sweden and the Netherlands","authors":"Caroline Chatwin","doi":"10.1515/jdpa-2015-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article examines the variety of drug policy in operation within Europe by focusing on Sweden (relatively restrictive) and the Netherlands (relatively liberal) as case studies. It analyses European data to produce an in-depth overview of the nature of the illegal drugs situation in both countries, focusing on both successes and areas that could be improved. Finally it appraises the appetite for drug policy reform in terms of (i) cannabis regulation and (ii) treaty reform in each country. The main conclusions suggest that there are no common indicators of success by which drug policies in general can be judged, and there is little agreement within Europe about whether or not we are in need of drug policy reform. It suggests that a successful global drug policy should celebrate diversity and should also seek to provide an international framework within which different global drug strategies can be evaluated.","PeriodicalId":38436,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Drug Policy Analysis","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jdpa-2015-0009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66931310","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
S. Rozo, Verónica González, Carlos Morales, Yuri Soares
Abstract This paper presents the impact evaluation of a pilot program that treated 57 small organizations of agricultural producers with high risk of getting involved in illegal drug production in Colombia. The program supported producers mainly by facilitating the commercialization of their new licit alternative sources of income. We combine propensity score matching, regression discontinuity, and Bayesian decision theory, with unique and rich panel data to assess the economic impact of the program. Our results suggest that the program was successful on increasing total sales and improving the product’s quality for the treated producers. The intervention was more successful when combined with other programs that gave producers incentives to abandon illegal drug production definitely.
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