What are the macroeconomic implications of re-allocating taxing rights away from source countries (where goods are produced) to market countries (where goods are consumed) and introducing minimum rates in international profit taxation? We assess this question in a dynamic macroeconomic model that gives a meaningful role to profit taxation. We find that, in low tax economies, the average profit tax rate will rise. On the one hand, this reduces price competitiveness of firms located in these regions and, thereby, output. On the other hand, higher profit tax revenues help to reduce other taxes. Moreover, lower expected future output requires less capital in production in the long run. Firms hence invest less and (temporarily) augment dividend payments. This raises disposable income of households, who (at least temporarily) increase consumption. The opposite holds for high tax economies. When taxing rights are re-allocated, wealth transfers between regions mitigate these effects. In terms of welfare, low tax economies can benefit from an increase in profit taxation.
{"title":"Re-Allocating Taxing Rights and Minimum Tax Rates in International Profit Taxation","authors":"G. Kempkes, Nikolai Stähler","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3797373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3797373","url":null,"abstract":"What are the macroeconomic implications of re-allocating taxing rights away from source countries (where goods are produced) to market countries (where goods are consumed) and introducing minimum rates in international profit taxation? We assess this question in a dynamic macroeconomic model that gives a meaningful role to profit taxation. We find that, in low tax economies, the average profit tax rate will rise. On the one hand, this reduces price competitiveness of firms located in these regions and, thereby, output. On the other hand, higher profit tax revenues help to reduce other taxes. Moreover, lower expected future output requires less capital in production in the long run. Firms hence invest less and (temporarily) augment dividend payments. This raises disposable income of households, who (at least temporarily) increase consumption. The opposite holds for high tax economies. When taxing rights are re-allocated, wealth transfers between regions mitigate these effects. In terms of welfare, low tax economies can benefit from an increase in profit taxation.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130065323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We document that larger firms pay substantially lower cash effective tax rates (cash ETRs) in the long-term than do smaller firms. This pattern in long-term cash ETRs is robust to various specifications, but vanishes when cash ETRs are measured over a single year. Over a ten-year period, firms in the largest decile pay 10.8 p.p. (26 percent) lower taxes than those in the smallest decile, while this gap balloons to 14.4 p.p. (35 percent) for the largest 1 percent of firms. The relation between firm size and taxes over the long run cannot be explained by foreign operations, asset tangibility, R&D spending, capital structure, net operating loss carryforwards, or releases in the valuation allowance. While profitability explains near a quarter of this effect, about 80 percent of the association between size and taxes can be explained by the magnitude of losses within the horizon period. Overall, our results suggest large firms pay fewer taxes over the long run primarily by avoiding losses, potentially mitigating the negative consequences of tax convexity.
{"title":"A Re-examination of Firm Size and Taxes","authors":"Fabio B. Gaertner, Brent Glover, Oliver Levine","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3928145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3928145","url":null,"abstract":"We document that larger firms pay substantially lower cash effective tax rates (cash ETRs) in the long-term than do smaller firms. This pattern in long-term cash ETRs is robust to various specifications, but vanishes when cash ETRs are measured over a single year. Over a ten-year period, firms in the largest decile pay 10.8 p.p. (26 percent) lower taxes than those in the smallest decile, while this gap balloons to 14.4 p.p. (35 percent) for the largest 1 percent of firms. The relation between firm size and taxes over the long run cannot be explained by foreign operations, asset tangibility, R&D spending, capital structure, net operating loss carryforwards, or releases in the valuation allowance. While profitability explains near a quarter of this effect, about 80 percent of the association between size and taxes can be explained by the magnitude of losses within the horizon period. Overall, our results suggest large firms pay fewer taxes over the long run primarily by avoiding losses, potentially mitigating the negative consequences of tax convexity.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130893049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper examines the short- and long-run effects of U.S. federal personal income and corporate income tax cuts on a wide array of economic policy variables in a data-rich environment. Using a panel of U.S. macroeconomic data set, made up of 132 quarterly macroeconomic series for 1959-2018, the study estimates factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVARs) models where an extended narrative tax changes dataset combined with unobserved factors. The narrative approach classifies if tax changes are exogenous or endogenous. This paper identifies narrative tax shocks in the vector autoregression model using the sign restrictions with Uhlig's (2005) penalty function. Empirical findings show a significant expansionary effect of tax cuts on the macroeconomic variables. Cuts in personal and corporate income taxes cause a rise in output, investment, employment, and consumption; however, cuts in personal taxes appear to be a more effective fiscal policy tool than the cut in corporate income taxes. Real GDP, employment, investment, and industrial production increase significantly and reach their maximum response values two years after personal income tax cuts. The effects of corporate tax cuts have relatively smaller effects on output and consumption but show immediate and higher effects on fixed investment and price levels.
{"title":"Output, Employment, and Price Effects of U.S. Narrative Tax Changes: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregression Approach","authors":"Masudul Alam","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3870896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3870896","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the short- and long-run effects of U.S. federal personal income and corporate income tax cuts on a wide array of economic policy variables in a data-rich environment. Using a panel of U.S. macroeconomic data set, made up of 132 quarterly macroeconomic series for 1959-2018, the study estimates factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVARs) models where an extended narrative tax changes dataset combined with unobserved factors. The narrative approach classifies if tax changes are exogenous or endogenous. This paper identifies narrative tax shocks in the vector autoregression model using the sign restrictions with Uhlig's (2005) penalty function. Empirical findings show a significant expansionary effect of tax cuts on the macroeconomic variables. Cuts in personal and corporate income taxes cause a rise in output, investment, employment, and consumption; however, cuts in personal taxes appear to be a more effective fiscal policy tool than the cut in corporate income taxes. Real GDP, employment, investment, and industrial production increase significantly and reach their maximum response values two years after personal income tax cuts. The effects of corporate tax cuts have relatively smaller effects on output and consumption but show immediate and higher effects on fixed investment and price levels.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128546641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
John Gallemore, Stephan Hollander, M. Jacob, Xiang Zheng
We examine how beliefs about tax policy affect firms’ investment decisions. Exploiting the periods around the surprise election of Donald Trump, who campaigned heavily on tax reform, and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), we find that expectations regarding tax policy have both first-moment (sentiment) and second-moment (uncertainty) effects on investment, which vary heterogeneously across events and firms. In particular, we document that tax policy sentiment (uncertainty) enhances (dampens) the change in investment around the passage of the TCJA, suggesting that these beliefs affect the ability of tax reforms to spur economic growth.
{"title":"Tax Policy Expectations and Firm Behavior: Evidence from the 2016 U.S. Election and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act","authors":"John Gallemore, Stephan Hollander, M. Jacob, Xiang Zheng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3775710","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3775710","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how beliefs about tax policy affect firms’ investment decisions. Exploiting the periods around the surprise election of Donald Trump, who campaigned heavily on tax reform, and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), we find that expectations regarding tax policy have both first-moment (sentiment) and second-moment (uncertainty) effects on investment, which vary heterogeneously across events and firms. In particular, we document that tax policy sentiment (uncertainty) enhances (dampens) the change in investment around the passage of the TCJA, suggesting that these beliefs affect the ability of tax reforms to spur economic growth.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124559961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tax avoidance harms public budgets as is estimated that at least 20 per cent of corporate income tax revenues are lost due to such corporate behaviour. Furthermore, the business models used by multinational enterprises to reduce tax payments (such as letterbox-type practices) have a detrimental impact on productive investment, on workers’ involvement in management’s decisions and on collective bargaining for a fair share of the wealth. Indeed, current international tax rules do not take into account the complex business and tax strategies in which multinationals are engaged at global level. First, a move towards a unitary taxation principle is required, which means that the profits of a multinational should be determined globally and shared out between countries in proportion to the real level of economic activity. Second, a global minimum tax rate should limit tax competition between countries and raise corporate tax revenues. And finally, greater transparency about tax practices, including a breakdown of revenues and profits by country (country-by-country reporting), is needed to enable workers’ representatives to understand the tax practices of their companies.
{"title":"Fair Corporate Taxation: Why and How International Tax Rules Need to Be Changed","authors":"Séverine Picard","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3729352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729352","url":null,"abstract":"Tax avoidance harms public budgets as is estimated that at least 20 per cent of corporate income tax revenues are lost due to such corporate behaviour. Furthermore, the business models used by multinational enterprises to reduce tax payments (such as letterbox-type practices) have a detrimental impact on productive investment, on workers’ involvement in management’s decisions and on collective bargaining for a fair share of the wealth. Indeed, current international tax rules do not take into account the complex business and tax strategies in which multinationals are engaged at global level. First, a move towards a unitary taxation principle is required, which means that the profits of a multinational should be determined globally and shared out between countries in proportion to the real level of economic activity. Second, a global minimum tax rate should limit tax competition between countries and raise corporate tax revenues. And finally, greater transparency about tax practices, including a breakdown of revenues and profits by country (country-by-country reporting), is needed to enable workers’ representatives to understand the tax practices of their companies.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117137538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper provides an assessment of the evolution of the Italian corporate tax system over the last decade through the computations of new and updated effective tax rates. The analysis takes into account the specificities of Italy’s Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and looks at the evolution of market interest rates to evaluate the effects. It relies on a new method to measure the effect of the limits to the deductibility of the cost of debt. Over the period 2010-2020, the legislative changes led to effective taxation becoming highly volatile. This dynamic was mostly driven by the evolution of the ACE regime. Since 2016, the temporary tax incentives for purchasing machinery greatly reduced the cost of capital. However, since 2019 the provision that phased out the incentives at higher-levels of investment may have lowered their effectiveness for larger firms. The analysis also shows that ACE has better economic properties than the Mini-Ires regime that replaced it temporarily in 2019, in terms of incentive to invest and to increase equity funding.
{"title":"An Economic Assessment of the Evolution of the Corporate Tax System in Italy","authors":"Ernesto Zangari","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3710103","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710103","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides an assessment of the evolution of the Italian corporate tax system over the last decade through the computations of new and updated effective tax rates. The analysis takes into account the specificities of Italy’s Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) and looks at the evolution of market interest rates to evaluate the effects. It relies on a new method to measure the effect of the limits to the deductibility of the cost of debt. Over the period 2010-2020, the legislative changes led to effective taxation becoming highly volatile. This dynamic was mostly driven by the evolution of the ACE regime. Since 2016, the temporary tax incentives for purchasing machinery greatly reduced the cost of capital. However, since 2019 the provision that phased out the incentives at higher-levels of investment may have lowered their effectiveness for larger firms. The analysis also shows that ACE has better economic properties than the Mini-Ires regime that replaced it temporarily in 2019, in terms of incentive to invest and to increase equity funding.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129782023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Travis Chow, Sterling Huang, K. Klassen, Jeffrey Ng
This study examines the effects of jurisdictions’ corporate taxes and other policies on firms’ headquarters (HQ) location decisions. Using changes in state corporate income tax rates across time and states as the setting, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the HQ state corporate income tax rate increases the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ out of the state by 16.8%, and an equivalent decrease in the HQ state rate decreases the likelihood of HQ relocations by 9.1%. Exploiting the unique tax policy features within the state apportionment system lends strong support to the interpretation that taxation drives this effect. Our analyses also demonstrate that state income tax features affect the destination of the HQ move. We contribute to the literature on corporate decision making by showing how state income taxation affects a real corporate decision that has significant economic consequences for the company and the state. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
{"title":"The Influence of Corporate Income Taxes on Investment Location: Evidence from Corporate Headquarters Relocations","authors":"Travis Chow, Sterling Huang, K. Klassen, Jeffrey Ng","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2867298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2867298","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines the effects of jurisdictions’ corporate taxes and other policies on firms’ headquarters (HQ) location decisions. Using changes in state corporate income tax rates across time and states as the setting, we find that a one-percentage-point increase in the HQ state corporate income tax rate increases the likelihood of firms relocating their HQ out of the state by 16.8%, and an equivalent decrease in the HQ state rate decreases the likelihood of HQ relocations by 9.1%. Exploiting the unique tax policy features within the state apportionment system lends strong support to the interpretation that taxation drives this effect. Our analyses also demonstrate that state income tax features affect the destination of the HQ move. We contribute to the literature on corporate decision making by showing how state income taxation affects a real corporate decision that has significant economic consequences for the company and the state. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130248956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-09-01DOI: 10.5089/9781513556376.001.A001
Shafik Hebous
How did the rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) put pressure on the prevailing international corporate tax framework? MNEs, and firms with market power, are not new phenomena, nor is the corporate income tax, which dates to the early 20th century. This prompts the question, what is distinctly new (about multinational enterprises)—if anything—that has triggered unprecedented recent concerns about vulnerabilities in international tax arrangements and the taxation of MNEs? This paper presents a set of empirical observations and a synthesis of strands of the literature to answer this question. A key message is that MNEs of the 21st century operate differently from prior periods and have evolved to become global firms—with important tax ramifications. The fragility of international tax arrangements was present at the outset of designing international tax rules, but the challenges have drastically intensified with the global integration of business, the increased trade in hard-to-price services and intangibles, and the rapid growth of the digital economy.
{"title":"Global Firms, National Corporate Taxes: An Evolution of Incompatibility","authors":"Shafik Hebous","doi":"10.5089/9781513556376.001.A001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513556376.001.A001","url":null,"abstract":"How did the rise of multinational enterprises (MNEs) put pressure on the prevailing international corporate tax framework? MNEs, and firms with market power, are not new phenomena, nor is the corporate income tax, which dates to the early 20th century. This prompts the question, what is distinctly new (about multinational enterprises)—if anything—that has triggered unprecedented recent concerns about vulnerabilities in international tax arrangements and the taxation of MNEs? This paper presents a set of empirical observations and a synthesis of strands of the literature to answer this question. A key message is that MNEs of the 21st century operate differently from prior periods and have evolved to become global firms—with important tax ramifications. The fragility of international tax arrangements was present at the outset of designing international tax rules, but the challenges have drastically intensified with the global integration of business, the increased trade in hard-to-price services and intangibles, and the rapid growth of the digital economy.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122010694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the effects of tax avoidance and tax risk on stock return volatilities of U.S. firms. We find that firms with very low and very high levels of tax avoidance and firms with high levels of tax risk have more volatile stock returns. We observe that tax avoidance primarily affects stock return volatility through changes in investors’ cash flow expectations; in contrast, tax risk seems to affect stock returns through cash flow and discount rate channels. Furthermore, we find that changes in expected cash flows and discount rates are less offsetting for firms with extreme levels of tax avoidance and high levels of tax risk.
{"title":"Tax Avoidance, Tax Risk, and the Volatility of Stock Returns","authors":"Alain A. Krapl, R. Salyer, Reilly White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613038","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the effects of tax avoidance and tax risk on stock return volatilities of U.S. firms. We find that firms with very low and very high levels of tax avoidance and firms with high levels of tax risk have more volatile stock returns. We observe that tax avoidance primarily affects stock return volatility through changes in investors’ cash flow expectations; in contrast, tax risk seems to affect stock returns through cash flow and discount rate channels. Furthermore, we find that changes in expected cash flows and discount rates are less offsetting for firms with extreme levels of tax avoidance and high levels of tax risk.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121994337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study explores the relationship between tax aggressiveness and foreign capital participation in Brazilian companies listed on the BM&F BOVESPA from 2010 to 2015, using the concept of tax aggressiveness as a reduction of taxable income through tax management and planning (Chen et al., 2010). Observing that previous studies show a significant relationship between tax aggressiveness and ownership structures, this research seeks to understand whether this relationship is significant if there is foreign capital participation in the company. The sample was composed of Brazilian companies listed on the BM&F BOVESPA. Two metrics of tax aggressiveness were used to investigate this relationship: effective tax rate (ETR) and book-tax difference (BTD). The use of these metrics was inspired in a review on tax research by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), who concluded that ETR and BTD could capture the reduction of taxable income through tax planning. The results showed no significant relationship between foreign capital participation and tax aggressiveness, demonstrating that the origin of equity capital is not a factor of tax aggressiveness.
本研究探讨了2010年至2015年巴西BM&F BOVESPA上市公司的税收侵略性与外资参与之间的关系，使用税收侵略性的概念作为通过税收管理和规划减少应税收入(Chen et al.， 2010)。观察到先前的研究表明税收侵略性和所有权结构之间存在显著关系，本研究试图了解如果公司有外资参与，这种关系是否显著。样本由在巴西工商期货交易所上市的巴西公司组成。税收侵略性的两个指标被用来调查这种关系:有效税率(ETR)和账面税收差异(BTD)。使用这些指标的灵感来自于Hanlon和Heitzman(2010)对税收研究的回顾，他们得出结论，ETR和BTD可以通过税收规划捕捉到应税收入的减少。结果显示，外资参与与税收侵略性之间没有显著关系，这表明权益资本的来源不是税收侵略性的一个因素。
{"title":"Tax Aggressiveness in Brazilian Companies with Foreign Capital Participation","authors":"Antonio Lopo Martinez, Clébio Bis","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3589280","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589280","url":null,"abstract":"This study explores the relationship between tax aggressiveness and foreign capital participation in Brazilian companies listed on the BM&F BOVESPA from 2010 to 2015, using the concept of tax aggressiveness as a reduction of taxable income through tax management and planning (Chen et al., 2010). Observing that previous studies show a significant relationship between tax aggressiveness and ownership structures, this research seeks to understand whether this relationship is significant if there is foreign capital participation in the company. The sample was composed of Brazilian companies listed on the BM&F BOVESPA. Two metrics of tax aggressiveness were used to investigate this relationship: effective tax rate (ETR) and book-tax difference (BTD). The use of these metrics was inspired in a review on tax research by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), who concluded that ETR and BTD could capture the reduction of taxable income through tax planning. The results showed no significant relationship between foreign capital participation and tax aggressiveness, demonstrating that the origin of equity capital is not a factor of tax aggressiveness.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130166218","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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