I use the passage of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA), which alters the after-tax considerations of foreign internal capital markets, as a quasi-natural experimental setting to test whether a reduction in the tax costs associated with moving foreign capital increased firms’ use of holding companies. In separate tests using Compustat and IRS data, I document that firms increase holding company use after TIPRA. Furthermore, I find that firms with the greatest increases in holding companies also increase their post-TIPRA foreign sales and generate more persistent foreign earnings. I interpret these findings to suggest that TIPRA is associated with increased global competitiveness for firms that actively modify their organizational structures. In additional analysis, I attribute this increased global competitiveness to maintained liquidity and capital investments during a financial crisis, relative to firms that do not respond as strongly to tax incentives to utilize holding companies.
{"title":"How Does the U.S. Taxation of Foreign Earnings Affect Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from TIPRA 2005","authors":"Frank Murphy","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3084075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3084075","url":null,"abstract":"I use the passage of the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 (TIPRA), which alters the after-tax considerations of foreign internal capital markets, as a quasi-natural experimental setting to test whether a reduction in the tax costs associated with moving foreign capital increased firms’ use of holding companies. In separate tests using Compustat and IRS data, I document that firms increase holding company use after TIPRA. Furthermore, I find that firms with the greatest increases in holding companies also increase their post-TIPRA foreign sales and generate more persistent foreign earnings. I interpret these findings to suggest that TIPRA is associated with increased global competitiveness for firms that actively modify their organizational structures. In additional analysis, I attribute this increased global competitiveness to maintained liquidity and capital investments during a financial crisis, relative to firms that do not respond as strongly to tax incentives to utilize holding companies.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116207354","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examines heterogeneity in tax rate elasticities of corporate capital using staggered variation in local business tax rates of German municipalities. The results suggest an average long-run capital decline of 0.97% after a 1% increase in the tax rate. In line with prior literature that suggests higher investment-cash flow sensitivities of firms with financing constraints tax rate elasticities are up to half times larger for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Moreover, capital responses are about half times larger for firms with fewer tax avoidance possibilities. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on tax incidence. I find a weaker relation between taxes and capital for firms that are less likely to bear the economic burden of the tax because they shift the tax incidence to their stakeholders.
{"title":"Heterogeneity in Tax Rate Elasticities of Capital: Evidence from Local Business Tax Reforms","authors":"I. Bethmann","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2940271","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940271","url":null,"abstract":"This study examines heterogeneity in tax rate elasticities of corporate capital using staggered variation in local business tax rates of German municipalities. The results suggest an average long-run capital decline of 0.97% after a 1% increase in the tax rate. In line with prior literature that suggests higher investment-cash flow sensitivities of firms with financing constraints tax rate elasticities are up to half times larger for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Moreover, capital responses are about half times larger for firms with fewer tax avoidance possibilities. Finally, this study contributes to the literature on tax incidence. I find a weaker relation between taxes and capital for firms that are less likely to bear the economic burden of the tax because they shift the tax incidence to their stakeholders.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134225322","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper investigates multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) response to a unique window of opportunity for temporarily unrestricted profit shifting. The window unexpectedly opened because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 that suspended the application of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules within the European Economic Area. It closed with a subsequent piece of anti-shifting legislation on thin capitalization in 2007. We identify causal effects of the suspension of the CFC rules on profit shifting by exploiting random variation in the size of MNEs’ windows that results from variation in the business year starting dates across MNEs. Using detailed balance sheet information on internal debt shifting between foreign low tax subsidiaries and their parents, we find that MNEs’ response to the window of opportunity is remarkably moderate in terms of both the probability and the volume of internal lending. On the one hand, this results from substantial short-term rigidities: internal lending increases with window size. On the other hand, MNEs in general responded with a fair amount of reserve which is indicated by low total levels of internal lending throughout the window. Presumably, this is caused by legal uncertainty about the scope of internal debt shifting that would be accepted by tax offices.
本文研究了跨国企业对暂时不受限制的利润转移的独特机会之窗的反应。2006年，欧洲法院(European Court of Justice)暂停了在欧洲经济区(European Economic Area)实施受控外国公司(CFC)规则的裁决，出人意料地打开了这扇窗口。2007年，它又通过了一项针对资本不足的反转移立法。我们通过利用跨国公司营业年度开始日期变化导致的跨国公司窗口大小的随机变化，确定暂停CFC规则对利润转移的因果影响。利用关于外国低税子公司与其母公司之间内部债务转移的详细资产负债表信息，我们发现跨国公司对机会之窗的反应在内部贷款的概率和数量方面都非常温和。一方面，这是由于大量的短期刚性:内部贷款随着窗口规模的扩大而增加。另一方面，跨国公司一般都有相当数量的储备，这从整个窗口期内的内部贷款总额较低可以看出。据推测，这是由于税务部门可以接受的内部债务转移范围的法律不确定性造成的。
{"title":"Do Multinational Enterprises Exploit a Window of Opportunity? An Empirical Analysis of Profit Shifting in the Absence of Restrictions","authors":"Carolin Holzmann, Christoph Wunder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165968","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165968","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) response to a unique window of opportunity for temporarily unrestricted profit shifting. The window unexpectedly opened because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 that suspended the application of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules within the European Economic Area. It closed with a subsequent piece of anti-shifting legislation on thin capitalization in 2007. We identify causal effects of the suspension of the CFC rules on profit shifting by exploiting random variation in the size of MNEs’ windows that results from variation in the business year starting dates across MNEs. Using detailed balance sheet information on internal debt shifting between foreign low tax subsidiaries and their parents, we find that MNEs’ response to the window of opportunity is remarkably moderate in terms of both the probability and the volume of internal lending. On the one hand, this results from substantial short-term rigidities: internal lending increases with window size. On the other hand, MNEs in general responded with a fair amount of reserve which is indicated by low total levels of internal lending throughout the window. Presumably, this is caused by legal uncertainty about the scope of internal debt shifting that would be accepted by tax offices.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129131737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-12-13DOI: 10.11575/SPPP.V9I0.42611
R. Bird, T. Wilson
Corporate tax reform has long been a contentious issue in Canada. Official commissions, academics and others have often proposed changes in the way we tax corporations. During the last 30 years, perhaps largely owing to concerns about international competitiveness, the corporate tax rate has been substantially reduced. Since revenues did not decline as a result, those concerned by increased inequality who believe that corporate taxes are paid mainly by the rich have suggested that corporate rates should be increased. Others, more persuaded by the increasing evidence that much of the burden of the corporate tax ultimately falls on workers and wages and that even to the extent it falls on capital the economic price paid in terms of reduced output and productivity for each corporate tax dollar collected is high have taken the opposite tack and argued that, if anything, corporate tax reform should be aimed at reducing even further the effective tax rate on corporate capital. Both the technical and the political aspects of corporate taxation are thus at play in the current discussion of possible corporate tax reform. After a brief review of the history, we consider what is now known about the relation between corporate rates and revenue, the surprisingly complex question of who ultimately pays the tax, and the largely undesirable economic effects of corporate income taxes. If all voters were economists and familiar with the evidence, it is unlikely any would favour big increases in corporate taxes. However, even economists who have read all the studies mentioned here (and more) do not agree about the best way to reform the corporate income tax. We sketch three recent major reform proposals Canadian experts have recently put forward (1) replace the existing corporate tax by a tax on ‘rents’ (above-normal returns on capital), (2) replace both it and the current personal income tax by a ‘dual income tax’ with a flat rate on all capital income (corporate and personal), or (3) adopt a more gradual approach to reform that would broadly keep the present system but make it more uniform in its treatment of investment. On the whole, we suggest that, although the ‘rent’ proposal is clearly the favourite in the academic horse race, and we think a much closer look should be taken at the second (dual income tax), the more incremental third proposal – improve what we now have – is perhaps not only the way we should go now but is also likely to be the politically most acceptable of these schemes. Finally, since one reason corporate tax reform is so difficult is because it is closely related to a number of other issues that are often both technically complex and politically sensitive, we consider several such issues. Some, such as small business taxation, could be reformed independently of the sorts of more general reforms just mentioned. We sketch several reforms that would simplify the system, maintain some incentive for small businesses and reduce the extent to whi
{"title":"The Corporate Income Tax in Canada: Does Its Past Foretell Its Future?","authors":"R. Bird, T. Wilson","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V9I0.42611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V9I0.42611","url":null,"abstract":"Corporate tax reform has long been a contentious issue in Canada. Official commissions, academics and others have often proposed changes in the way we tax corporations. During the last 30 years, perhaps largely owing to concerns about international competitiveness, the corporate tax rate has been substantially reduced. Since revenues did not decline as a result, those concerned by increased inequality who believe that corporate taxes are paid mainly by the rich have suggested that corporate rates should be increased. Others, more persuaded by the increasing evidence that much of the burden of the corporate tax ultimately falls on workers and wages and that even to the extent it falls on capital the economic price paid in terms of reduced output and productivity for each corporate tax dollar collected is high have taken the opposite tack and argued that, if anything, corporate tax reform should be aimed at reducing even further the effective tax rate on corporate capital. Both the technical and the political aspects of corporate taxation are thus at play in the current discussion of possible corporate tax reform. After a brief review of the history, we consider what is now known about the relation between corporate rates and revenue, the surprisingly complex question of who ultimately pays the tax, and the largely undesirable economic effects of corporate income taxes. If all voters were economists and familiar with the evidence, it is unlikely any would favour big increases in corporate taxes. However, even economists who have read all the studies mentioned here (and more) do not agree about the best way to reform the corporate income tax. We sketch three recent major reform proposals Canadian experts have recently put forward (1) replace the existing corporate tax by a tax on ‘rents’ (above-normal returns on capital), (2) replace both it and the current personal income tax by a ‘dual income tax’ with a flat rate on all capital income (corporate and personal), or (3) adopt a more gradual approach to reform that would broadly keep the present system but make it more uniform in its treatment of investment. On the whole, we suggest that, although the ‘rent’ proposal is clearly the favourite in the academic horse race, and we think a much closer look should be taken at the second (dual income tax), the more incremental third proposal – improve what we now have – is perhaps not only the way we should go now but is also likely to be the politically most acceptable of these schemes. Finally, since one reason corporate tax reform is so difficult is because it is closely related to a number of other issues that are often both technically complex and politically sensitive, we consider several such issues. Some, such as small business taxation, could be reformed independently of the sorts of more general reforms just mentioned. We sketch several reforms that would simplify the system, maintain some incentive for small businesses and reduce the extent to whi","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123583145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-11-03DOI: 10.21684/2412-2343-2016-3-3-73-102
B. Bogenschneider
Legal indeterminacy comes in a variety of forms identified here as: (i) general legal indeterminacy; (ii) factual indeterminacy; and (iii) Mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy. The concept of general “legal indeterminacy” refers to problems in legal interpretation and has been extensively studied. “Factual indeterminacy” refers to the indeterminacy of facts as a matter of tax law when derived from separately indeterminate fields of law. “Mach/ Feyerabend factual indeterminacy” refers to fact words as derived from legal theory which provide the content for legal interpretation. The “facts” in tax law are not transcendent to law; in addition, the “fact” words of tax law cannot be simply imported from the field of economics. The incremental question of the origins of theory (as discussed by Karl Popper and Albert Einstein) is also analyzed here. The theory of tax law originates with “sympathy with experience” or “intellectual love” (tr. Einfuhlung) of tax law by lawyers as reflected in the special heuristics and practices of the profession. Legal theory accordingly functions in similar fashion to scientific theory where a particular legal theory can be falsified (qua Popper) or understood in pluralistic terms by incorporating auxiliary ideas.
{"title":"Factual Indeterminacy in International Tax Law","authors":"B. Bogenschneider","doi":"10.21684/2412-2343-2016-3-3-73-102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21684/2412-2343-2016-3-3-73-102","url":null,"abstract":"Legal indeterminacy comes in a variety of forms identified here as: (i) general legal indeterminacy; (ii) factual indeterminacy; and (iii) Mach/Feyerabend factual indeterminacy. The concept of general “legal indeterminacy” refers to problems in legal interpretation and has been extensively studied. “Factual indeterminacy” refers to the indeterminacy of facts as a matter of tax law when derived from separately indeterminate fields of law. “Mach/ Feyerabend factual indeterminacy” refers to fact words as derived from legal theory which provide the content for legal interpretation. The “facts” in tax law are not transcendent to law; in addition, the “fact” words of tax law cannot be simply imported from the field of economics. The incremental question of the origins of theory (as discussed by Karl Popper and Albert Einstein) is also analyzed here. The theory of tax law originates with “sympathy with experience” or “intellectual love” (tr. Einfuhlung) of tax law by lawyers as reflected in the special heuristics and practices of the profession. Legal theory accordingly functions in similar fashion to scientific theory where a particular legal theory can be falsified (qua Popper) or understood in pluralistic terms by incorporating auxiliary ideas.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-11-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125310735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Capital taxes, such as property and wealth taxes, are particularly exposed to tax uncertainty. Capital tax uncertainty emerges from expected tax reforms, the unclear outcome of future tax audits, and simplified estimates of capital tax bases in investment models. Uncertain returns on investment as well as stochastic taxation contribute to overall uncertainty and may significantly affect investment decisions. Hitherto, it is unknown how capital tax uncertainty affects investment timing. However, it is well known that both uncertainty and capital tax may be harmful for investment and decelerate investment activities. We are the first to study the investment timing effects of stochastic capital taxes in a real options setting with risky investment opportunities. Our results indicate that even risk neutral investors are sensitive with respect to capital tax risk and may react in a surprising manner to a newly introduced stochastic capital tax. As an apparently paradoxical investment effect, we find that increased capital tax uncertainty can accelerate risky investment if such uncertainty is sufficiently low compared to cash flow uncertainty. In contrast, high capital tax risk delays high-risk innovative investment projects. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain tax policy, tax legislators and tax authorities should avoid high levels of capital tax uncertainty. Broadening the capital tax base or increasing the capital tax rate induces ambiguous timing effects. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. Since investment reactions upon tax reforms are well-known to affect income and wealth distribution, reliable estimations of the impact of taxes on economic decisions are necessary.
{"title":"Does Capital Tax Uncertainty Delay Irreversible Risky Investment?","authors":"Rainer Niemann, Caren Sureth-Sloane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2826022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2826022","url":null,"abstract":"Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Capital taxes, such as property and wealth taxes, are particularly exposed to tax uncertainty. Capital tax uncertainty emerges from expected tax reforms, the unclear outcome of future tax audits, and simplified estimates of capital tax bases in investment models. Uncertain returns on investment as well as stochastic taxation contribute to overall uncertainty and may significantly affect investment decisions. Hitherto, it is unknown how capital tax uncertainty affects investment timing. However, it is well known that both uncertainty and capital tax may be harmful for investment and decelerate investment activities. We are the first to study the investment timing effects of stochastic capital taxes in a real options setting with risky investment opportunities. Our results indicate that even risk neutral investors are sensitive with respect to capital tax risk and may react in a surprising manner to a newly introduced stochastic capital tax. As an apparently paradoxical investment effect, we find that increased capital tax uncertainty can accelerate risky investment if such uncertainty is sufficiently low compared to cash flow uncertainty. In contrast, high capital tax risk delays high-risk innovative investment projects. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain tax policy, tax legislators and tax authorities should avoid high levels of capital tax uncertainty. Broadening the capital tax base or increasing the capital tax rate induces ambiguous timing effects. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. Since investment reactions upon tax reforms are well-known to affect income and wealth distribution, reliable estimations of the impact of taxes on economic decisions are necessary.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130843846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper expands prior IFRS accounting systems’ classifications to a broader set of 27 countries where the IFRS adoption is a widespread practice, plus the United States of America (USA). The results suggest a classification distinguishing between three groups of countries, based on the similarity of their accounting practices: 1) Australia and New Zealand, 2) USA-influenced countries, and 3) South Africa, Oman and European countries. This study contributes to the literature not only by providing evidence of differences in accounting practices to a broader set of countries, but mainly by suggesting an economic explanation to the existence of accounting choices. In particular, the economic proximity to the USA may be an important factor influencing accounting practices in some countries even after the IFRS adoption.
{"title":"International Differences in Accounting Practices under IFRS and the Influence of the USA","authors":"I. Lourenço, R. Sarquis, M. C. Branco, Nuno Magro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2813585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2813585","url":null,"abstract":"This paper expands prior IFRS accounting systems’ classifications to a broader set of 27 countries where the IFRS adoption is a widespread practice, plus the United States of America (USA). The results suggest a classification distinguishing between three groups of countries, based on the similarity of their accounting practices: 1) Australia and New Zealand, 2) USA-influenced countries, and 3) South Africa, Oman and European countries. This study contributes to the literature not only by providing evidence of differences in accounting practices to a broader set of countries, but mainly by suggesting an economic explanation to the existence of accounting choices. In particular, the economic proximity to the USA may be an important factor influencing accounting practices in some countries even after the IFRS adoption.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132803258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The governments of many developing countries seek to attract inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) through the use of tax incentives for multinational corporations (MNCs). The effectiveness of these tax incentives depends crucially on MNCs’ residence country tax regime, especially where the residence country imposes worldwide taxation on foreign income. Tax sparing provisions are included in many bilateral tax treaties to prevent host country tax incentives being nullified by residence country taxation. We analyse the impact of tax sparing provisions using panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 23 OECD countries in 113 developing and transition economies over the period 2002-2012, coding tax sparing provisions in all bilateral tax treaties among these countries. We find that tax sparing agreements are associated with 30 percent to 123 percent higher FDI. The estimated effect is concentrated in the year that tax sparing comes into force and the subsequent years, with no effects in prior years, and is thus consistent with a causal interpretation. Four countries - Norway in 2004, and the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand in 2009 - enacted tax reforms that moved them from worldwide to territorial taxation, potentially changing the value of their preexisting tax sparing agreements. However, there is no detectable effect of these reforms on bilateral FDI in tax sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. These results are consistent with tax sparing being an important determinant of FDI in developing countries for MNCs from both worldwide and territorial home countries. We also find that these territorial reforms are associated with increases in certain forms of bilateral foreign aid from residence countries to sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. This suggests that tax sparing and foreign aid may function as substitutes.
{"title":"Tax Sparing, FDI, and Foreign Aid: Evidence from Territorial Tax Reforms","authors":"Céline Azémar, Dhammika Dharmapala","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2767184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2767184","url":null,"abstract":"The governments of many developing countries seek to attract inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) through the use of tax incentives for multinational corporations (MNCs). The effectiveness of these tax incentives depends crucially on MNCs’ residence country tax regime, especially where the residence country imposes worldwide taxation on foreign income. Tax sparing provisions are included in many bilateral tax treaties to prevent host country tax incentives being nullified by residence country taxation. We analyse the impact of tax sparing provisions using panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 23 OECD countries in 113 developing and transition economies over the period 2002-2012, coding tax sparing provisions in all bilateral tax treaties among these countries. We find that tax sparing agreements are associated with 30 percent to 123 percent higher FDI. The estimated effect is concentrated in the year that tax sparing comes into force and the subsequent years, with no effects in prior years, and is thus consistent with a causal interpretation. Four countries - Norway in 2004, and the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand in 2009 - enacted tax reforms that moved them from worldwide to territorial taxation, potentially changing the value of their preexisting tax sparing agreements. However, there is no detectable effect of these reforms on bilateral FDI in tax sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. These results are consistent with tax sparing being an important determinant of FDI in developing countries for MNCs from both worldwide and territorial home countries. We also find that these territorial reforms are associated with increases in certain forms of bilateral foreign aid from residence countries to sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. This suggests that tax sparing and foreign aid may function as substitutes.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115655948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The digital economy is characterized by the use of intellectual property such as software, patents and trademarks. The pricing of such intangibles is widely used to shift profits to low-tax countries. We analyze the role of a source tax on royalty payments for abusive transfer pricing, and optimal tax policy. First, we show that mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment behavior by multinationals. Second, it is in the vast majority of cases not optimal for a government to set the source tax equal to the corporate tax rate. The reason is that shutting down abusive transfer pricing activities needs to be traded off against mitigating the corporate tax distortion in capital investment. The latter can be achieved by some tax deductibility of royalty payments. If the true arm's length transfer price equals zero or for special corporate tax systems that treat debt and equity alike (i.e., for ACE and CBIT), it will be optimal to equate both tax rates.
{"title":"Taxing Royalty Payments","authors":"Steffen Juranek, Dirk Schindler, Guttorm Schjelderup","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2839756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2839756","url":null,"abstract":"The digital economy is characterized by the use of intellectual property such as software, patents and trademarks. The pricing of such intangibles is widely used to shift profits to low-tax countries. We analyze the role of a source tax on royalty payments for abusive transfer pricing, and optimal tax policy. First, we show that mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment behavior by multinationals. Second, it is in the vast majority of cases not optimal for a government to set the source tax equal to the corporate tax rate. The reason is that shutting down abusive transfer pricing activities needs to be traded off against mitigating the corporate tax distortion in capital investment. The latter can be achieved by some tax deductibility of royalty payments. If the true arm's length transfer price equals zero or for special corporate tax systems that treat debt and equity alike (i.e., for ACE and CBIT), it will be optimal to equate both tax rates.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115900793","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper surveys and evaluates the corporation tax (CT) systems of the Member States of the European Union on the basis of a comprehensive taxonomy of actual and potential regimes, which have as their base either profits, profits and interest, or economic rents. The current regimes give rise to various instate and interstate spillovers, which violate the basic tenets – neutrality and subsidiarity – of the single market. The trade-offs between the implications of these tenets – harmonization and diversity, respectively – can be reconciled by a bottom-up, reversible strategy of strengthening source-based taxation and approximating tax rates. The strategy starts with dual income taxation, proceeds with final source withholding taxes and rate approximation, and is made complete by comprehensive business income taxation. Common base taxation, if desired, should probably be left to the Member States themselves.
{"title":"Tackling Spillovers by Taxing Corporate Income in the European Union at Source","authors":"S. Cnossen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2760236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2760236","url":null,"abstract":"This paper surveys and evaluates the corporation tax (CT) systems of the Member States of the European Union on the basis of a comprehensive taxonomy of actual and potential regimes, which have as their base either profits, profits and interest, or economic rents. The current regimes give rise to various instate and interstate spillovers, which violate the basic tenets – neutrality and subsidiarity – of the single market. The trade-offs between the implications of these tenets – harmonization and diversity, respectively – can be reconciled by a bottom-up, reversible strategy of strengthening source-based taxation and approximating tax rates. The strategy starts with dual income taxation, proceeds with final source withholding taxes and rate approximation, and is made complete by comprehensive business income taxation. Common base taxation, if desired, should probably be left to the Member States themselves.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127767949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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