Pub Date : 1989-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203022948.ch10
G. Selgin
A popular defense of central banks and fiat money claims that they are needed to protect the payments system against the peril of financial crises. A central bank can act as a “lender of last resort” to other banks, assuring depositors that they need never fear a general banking collapse; fiat money in turn guarantees that the lender of last resort itself will never go broke.’ A crucial assumption behind the lender of last resort argument is that fractional-reserve banking is inherently “fragile” and crisis prone—that central banking and fiat money are an unavoidable response tomarket failure. According to Minsky (1982, p. 17), “conditions conducive to financialcrises emerge from the normal functioning of a capitalist economy.” In a free market, says Minsky, such conditions will occasionally produce “wide and spreading bankruptcies” that could, however, be prevented by “an alert lender of last resort” (p. 13).2
为央行和法定货币辩护的一种流行说法是，央行和法定货币是为了保护支付系统免受金融危机的威胁。央行可以充当其他银行的“最后贷款人”，向储户保证，他们永远不必担心银行业的全面崩溃;法定货币反过来又保证了最后贷款人本身永远不会破产。“最后贷款人”观点背后的一个关键假设是，部分准备金制度本质上是“脆弱的”，容易发生危机——央行和法定货币是市场失灵不可避免的反应。根据Minsky (1982, p. 17)的说法，“有利于金融危机的条件出现在资本主义经济的正常运作中。”明斯基说，在自由市场中，这种情况偶尔会产生“广泛和蔓延的破产”，然而，“一个警惕的最后贷款人”可以防止这种破产(第13页)
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Pub Date : 1989-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1288-0_18
Jan Tumlir
{"title":"Economic Policy for a Stable World Order","authors":"Jan Tumlir","doi":"10.1007/978-94-017-1288-0_18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1288-0_18","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"21 1","pages":"355-364"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1989-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73897006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_13
G. Garcia
{"title":"The FSLIC Is \"Broke\" in More Ways than One","authors":"G. Garcia","doi":"10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_13","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"7 1","pages":"235-249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82786672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_5
Ii William F. Shughart
{"title":"A Public Choice Perspective of the Banking Act of 1933","authors":"Ii William F. Shughart","doi":"10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"539 1","pages":"595-619"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78164504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_11
Mark Toma
{"title":"THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN RESERVE REQUIREMENT REGULATION","authors":"Mark Toma","doi":"10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"3 1","pages":"209-226"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89224500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.4324/9780203029091.ch2
K. Dowd
Introduction One objective of this paper is to explain the automatic stabilizing mechanisms inherent in a free banking system. Starting from an initial primitive state of society, I will suggest how a banking system would evolve in the absence ofstate intervention. The state is assumed only to enforce contracts freely entered into by private individuals. Government expenses are paid through taxation, but there is no taxation specific to the monetary system. (In other words, there is no seignorage.) The evolutionary process is driven by individuals’ pursuit of their own private interests, and no one consciously attempts to promote any wider “social interest.” At each stage individuals seek to reduce their exchange or operating costs, and these attempts lead to the growth of new institutions that reduce the costs of coordinating economic activity.’ With no state interference to hinder it, this evolutionary process would lead to the development ofa highly sophisticated “free banking system” with several distinctive features, including: (1) multiple note issuers who would guarantee to redeem their notes in a commodity that the community recognizes as valuable; (2) a regular note exchange between these note issuers; and (3) the insertion of “option clauses” into the convertibility con-
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Pub Date : 1988-01-01DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_8
Gerald P. O'driscoll
{"title":"Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice","authors":"Gerald P. O'driscoll","doi":"10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-3277-7_8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":38832,"journal":{"name":"Cato Journal","volume":"30 1","pages":"165-179"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1988-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83292876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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