Abstract In the article, we make three claims. First, we argue that a large number of what are traditionally seen as separate torts are, at their core, all about affronts to the dignity of the victim. These include offensive battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, some nuisances, and abuse of process (malicious prosecution). These torts do not involve direct physical harm but, rather, emotional distress from having your dignity attacked. Second, we argue that as these torts have developed inside of their own doctrinal silos, there are important differences among the laws governing them. Third, we argue that these differences are not justified and that it would be better to create a consistent tort approach to dignitary harm: tort recovery should lie for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct that is highly offensive and causes more than minor harm. This, it turns out, is the standard that currently applies in a majority of jurisdictions for privacy invasions. If more widely adopted, this standard would, for example, far more easily allow recovery for nasty verbal sexual (or other) harassment, since intentional infliction of emotional distress currently requires a much stronger showing. At the same time, it would preclude recovery for minor physical touchings that technically now qualify as offensive battery. We think this achieves the balance much better.
{"title":"Re-imagining the Dignitary Torts","authors":"S. Sugarman, Caitlin Boucher","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3450107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3450107","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the article, we make three claims. First, we argue that a large number of what are traditionally seen as separate torts are, at their core, all about affronts to the dignity of the victim. These include offensive battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy, some nuisances, and abuse of process (malicious prosecution). These torts do not involve direct physical harm but, rather, emotional distress from having your dignity attacked. Second, we argue that as these torts have developed inside of their own doctrinal silos, there are important differences among the laws governing them. Third, we argue that these differences are not justified and that it would be better to create a consistent tort approach to dignitary harm: tort recovery should lie for injuries resulting from wrongful conduct that is highly offensive and causes more than minor harm. This, it turns out, is the standard that currently applies in a majority of jurisdictions for privacy invasions. If more widely adopted, this standard would, for example, far more easily allow recovery for nasty verbal sexual (or other) harassment, since intentional infliction of emotional distress currently requires a much stronger showing. At the same time, it would preclude recovery for minor physical touchings that technically now qualify as offensive battery. We think this achieves the balance much better.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"14 1","pages":"101 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47952553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Public hospitals are critical institutions in the American healthcare delivery system. Yet because they are publicly owned, they sit apart from the rest of the medical sector, enjoying in some instances immunities from suit or significant limitations on damage recovery due to their public status. In today’s environment where states have legislated carefully balanced systems regulating medical malpractice liability, the prospect of immunity provides public hospitals and their employees, additional, in many cases more stringent protection from suit. This aspect of public hospital immunity has been obscured by the variety of systems from state to state governing immunity of public entities and their employees. The attention paid the subject appears to be in inverse relationship to the significance of public hospitals in our health care system. Public hospitals provide care for large segments of the population and are particularly important providers of care for poor, urban, and un- or underinsured citizens. They are centers offering specialized care and around which specialized care providers are organized in many communities. Public hospitals are particularly associated with transplant and burn centers. In addition, they are usually the highest-level trauma care centers in the communities they support. Much of what makes public hospitals critical to their communities relates to their propensity to be centers of education and training. They are often associated with medical schools, offering clinical training opportunities to medical students and are either partners with medical schools in offering graduate medical education or sponsors of such education independently.
{"title":"“But Vestiges Remain”: The Anomaly of Sovereign Immunity for Public Hospitals","authors":"J. White","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2019-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2019-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Public hospitals are critical institutions in the American healthcare delivery system. Yet because they are publicly owned, they sit apart from the rest of the medical sector, enjoying in some instances immunities from suit or significant limitations on damage recovery due to their public status. In today’s environment where states have legislated carefully balanced systems regulating medical malpractice liability, the prospect of immunity provides public hospitals and their employees, additional, in many cases more stringent protection from suit. This aspect of public hospital immunity has been obscured by the variety of systems from state to state governing immunity of public entities and their employees. The attention paid the subject appears to be in inverse relationship to the significance of public hospitals in our health care system. Public hospitals provide care for large segments of the population and are particularly important providers of care for poor, urban, and un- or underinsured citizens. They are centers offering specialized care and around which specialized care providers are organized in many communities. Public hospitals are particularly associated with transplant and burn centers. In addition, they are usually the highest-level trauma care centers in the communities they support. Much of what makes public hospitals critical to their communities relates to their propensity to be centers of education and training. They are often associated with medical schools, offering clinical training opportunities to medical students and are either partners with medical schools in offering graduate medical education or sponsors of such education independently.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"33 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2019-0007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47597521","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The influence of tort law on some basic aspects of health law is well known. For example, a patient may sue a physician in negligence when the physician deviates from the standard of care with respect to the performance of a medical treatment, surgical procedure, or diagnostic examination. By further example, the battery cause of action may be appropriate when a physician performs a medical treatment or surgical procedure without any consent from the patient. Or, a patient may allege negligence when a physician obtains technical consent to treatment but fails to provide information sufficient to enable the patient to give informed consent. At the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting held on January 4, 2019, in New Orleans, Louisiana, the AALS Section on Torts and Compensation Systems convened a panel featuring four distinguished speakers who examined other, less obvious ties and relationships between the fields of tort law and health law. Mark Rothstein, the Herbert F. Boehl Chair of Law and Medicine and the Founding Director of the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law at the University of Louisville School of Medicine, opened the panel. Professor Rothstein examined one of the most controversial and misunderstood issues in clinical genetics; that is, whether a physician has a duty in tort to warn a patient’s genetically at-risk relatives. Arguing that the physician’s patient, not the physician, is in the best ethical and legal position to issue warnings, Professor Rothstein recommended that physicians assist their patients by
{"title":"Foreword: Tort Law and Health Law: Intersections and Opportunities","authors":"Stacey A. Tovino","doi":"10.1515/JTL-2019-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JTL-2019-0005","url":null,"abstract":"The influence of tort law on some basic aspects of health law is well known. For example, a patient may sue a physician in negligence when the physician deviates from the standard of care with respect to the performance of a medical treatment, surgical procedure, or diagnostic examination. By further example, the battery cause of action may be appropriate when a physician performs a medical treatment or surgical procedure without any consent from the patient. Or, a patient may allege negligence when a physician obtains technical consent to treatment but fails to provide information sufficient to enable the patient to give informed consent. At the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting held on January 4, 2019, in New Orleans, Louisiana, the AALS Section on Torts and Compensation Systems convened a panel featuring four distinguished speakers who examined other, less obvious ties and relationships between the fields of tort law and health law. Mark Rothstein, the Herbert F. Boehl Chair of Law and Medicine and the Founding Director of the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law at the University of Louisville School of Medicine, opened the panel. Professor Rothstein examined one of the most controversial and misunderstood issues in clinical genetics; that is, whether a physician has a duty in tort to warn a patient’s genetically at-risk relatives. Arguing that the physician’s patient, not the physician, is in the best ethical and legal position to issue warnings, Professor Rothstein recommended that physicians assist their patients by","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"5 - 7"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JTL-2019-0005","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44274136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This book is both narrow yet courageous, it is not highly theorized yet subtle and multitracked in its use of theory, it is a bold feminist statement yet tacks to an independent path, it is radical but rests on old revered foundations, it hits hard yet is carefully crafted in logic. What a joy it is to read and to review. It coincides with a core of my ideas of the nature of private common law, but I find I have disagreements with some of the assertions of tort law principles that ground some of the major conclusions. Here Professor Bernstein is at her iconoclastic best in presenting a tract of tort scholarship that challenges all those who have brought the law of torts to its present state. No universal theory is presented. The unifying theory has been much favored since the turn of the twenty-first century. No underlying extra-legal explanations are provided, although rich history and philosophical, psychological and sociological insights give thrust to the arguments. And at the pole she is scathingly political. As she recognizes, readers who come to the book expecting dismissal of the common law from the stage for new visions of a transformed body of law will find an argument that starts with us accepting the spirit of the common law and a rejection of all that Jeremy Bentham was to prescribe as a cure for its inadequacies. Bentham, we are told, was an “interlocutor” on the author’s “mental shoulder” as she wrote the book. It seems remarkable that when she visited Bentham’s “auto-icon,” as exhibited in NYC, it did not rise up in objection to one who does not share his faith in the grandeur and fruitfulness of legislative codes as maximizing happiness. In presenting the argument she departs, as she
{"title":"The Spirit of the Common Law and the Rights of Women: A Review of Bernstein, the Common Law Inside the Female Body","authors":"David F. Partlett","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2019-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2019-0010","url":null,"abstract":"This book is both narrow yet courageous, it is not highly theorized yet subtle and multitracked in its use of theory, it is a bold feminist statement yet tacks to an independent path, it is radical but rests on old revered foundations, it hits hard yet is carefully crafted in logic. What a joy it is to read and to review. It coincides with a core of my ideas of the nature of private common law, but I find I have disagreements with some of the assertions of tort law principles that ground some of the major conclusions. Here Professor Bernstein is at her iconoclastic best in presenting a tract of tort scholarship that challenges all those who have brought the law of torts to its present state. No universal theory is presented. The unifying theory has been much favored since the turn of the twenty-first century. No underlying extra-legal explanations are provided, although rich history and philosophical, psychological and sociological insights give thrust to the arguments. And at the pole she is scathingly political. As she recognizes, readers who come to the book expecting dismissal of the common law from the stage for new visions of a transformed body of law will find an argument that starts with us accepting the spirit of the common law and a rejection of all that Jeremy Bentham was to prescribe as a cure for its inadequacies. Bentham, we are told, was an “interlocutor” on the author’s “mental shoulder” as she wrote the book. It seems remarkable that when she visited Bentham’s “auto-icon,” as exhibited in NYC, it did not rise up in objection to one who does not share his faith in the grandeur and fruitfulness of legislative codes as maximizing happiness. In presenting the argument she departs, as she","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"127 - 153"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2019-0010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42348032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The William L. Prosser Award, bestowed by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Torts and Compensation Systems, recognizes outstanding contributions of law teachers in scholarship, teaching and service relating to torts and compensation systems. Designed to recognize a lifetime of truly outstanding contribution to the world of torts, the Prosser Award was first bestowed upon Leon Green in 1974. Subsequent Prosser Award winners included Fleming James, Wex Malone, Page Keeton, John Wade, and Willard Pedrick. Revived in 2008, recent Prosser Award winners include Robert Rabin (2008), Dan Dobbs (2009), Oscar Gray (2010), Guido Calabresi (2011), Richard Posner (2012), Jane Stapleton (2013), James Henderson, Jr (2014), Michael Green (2015), Aaron Twerski (2016), Stephen Sugarman (2017), and Marshall Shapo (2018). It is my great honor and pleasure to announce that Kenneth W. Simons, Chancellor’s Professor of Law at the University of California Irvine (UC Irvine) School of Law, is the 2019 Prosser Award winner. Professor Simons is a leading scholar of tort law, criminal law, and law and philosophy and Co-director of UC Irvine’s Center for Legal Philosophy. Since 2014, he has served as Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement Third of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons. Professor Simons has published influential scholarship concerning consent, assumption of risk and contributory negligence; the nature and role
{"title":"AALS Section on Torts and Compensation Systems Bestows William L. Prosser Award on Kenneth W. Simons","authors":"Stacey A. Tovino, K. Simons","doi":"10.1515/JTL-2019-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JTL-2019-0006","url":null,"abstract":"The William L. Prosser Award, bestowed by the Association of American Law Schools Section on Torts and Compensation Systems, recognizes outstanding contributions of law teachers in scholarship, teaching and service relating to torts and compensation systems. Designed to recognize a lifetime of truly outstanding contribution to the world of torts, the Prosser Award was first bestowed upon Leon Green in 1974. Subsequent Prosser Award winners included Fleming James, Wex Malone, Page Keeton, John Wade, and Willard Pedrick. Revived in 2008, recent Prosser Award winners include Robert Rabin (2008), Dan Dobbs (2009), Oscar Gray (2010), Guido Calabresi (2011), Richard Posner (2012), Jane Stapleton (2013), James Henderson, Jr (2014), Michael Green (2015), Aaron Twerski (2016), Stephen Sugarman (2017), and Marshall Shapo (2018). It is my great honor and pleasure to announce that Kenneth W. Simons, Chancellor’s Professor of Law at the University of California Irvine (UC Irvine) School of Law, is the 2019 Prosser Award winner. Professor Simons is a leading scholar of tort law, criminal law, and law and philosophy and Co-director of UC Irvine’s Center for Legal Philosophy. Since 2014, he has served as Chief Reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement Third of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons. Professor Simons has published influential scholarship concerning consent, assumption of risk and contributory negligence; the nature and role","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"1 - 4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/JTL-2019-0006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44007513","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article considers ways that torts decisions and doctrine may operate discriminatorily against the unhealthy. The discussion draws from one chapter of my recently published book, Healthism: Health Status Discrimination and the Law, specifically, the chapter on “Healthism in Private Law.” Healthism examines, across contexts, instances of discrimination based on health status, suggesting that in at least some circumstances, treating people differently because of their health status or health habits is normatively wrong and, thus, “healthist.” We discuss many examples in the book, but our ultimate goal is to introduce the term into the public lexicon and attune readers to additional examples, which, we maintain, abound: Consider non-smoking policies in public housing; airlines or movie theaters charging obese passengers for two seats; employers refusing to hire based on out-of-work health habits and conditions, including tobacco use and obesity; or a physician refusing to treat a patient with multiple conditions and a history of noncompliance. Each of these scenarios carries a potential for healthism.
{"title":"Healthism in Tort Law","authors":"E. Weeks","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2019-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2019-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article considers ways that torts decisions and doctrine may operate discriminatorily against the unhealthy. The discussion draws from one chapter of my recently published book, Healthism: Health Status Discrimination and the Law, specifically, the chapter on “Healthism in Private Law.” Healthism examines, across contexts, instances of discrimination based on health status, suggesting that in at least some circumstances, treating people differently because of their health status or health habits is normatively wrong and, thus, “healthist.” We discuss many examples in the book, but our ultimate goal is to introduce the term into the public lexicon and attune readers to additional examples, which, we maintain, abound: Consider non-smoking policies in public housing; airlines or movie theaters charging obese passengers for two seats; employers refusing to hire based on out-of-work health habits and conditions, including tobacco use and obesity; or a physician refusing to treat a patient with multiple conditions and a history of noncompliance. Each of these scenarios carries a potential for healthism.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"232 2","pages":"126 - 81"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2019-0004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41287185","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The law of negligence is designed to apply uniformly across contexts. Whether dealing with a car accident, medical malpractice, or a slip-and-fall case, tort law consistently asks whether a defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether he exercised reasonable care in fulfilling that duty. Tort law defenses, too, are generally understood to be context-neutral. The doctrines of comparative negligence and assumption of risk should not vary depending on the precise circumstances surrounding an injury. And yet, there is a peculiar inconsistency in how some defenses are applied in cases of medical malpractice as compared to cases outside the health care context. Specifically, reliance on secondary implied assumption of risk seems to require greater knowledge on the part of the plaintiff in malpractice cases than in other contexts. In recreational sport cases, for example, a plaintiff will be denied recovery if he voluntarily encountered a known risk of physical injury – regardless of whether he understood that the risk was the result of a defendant’s negligence. In contrast, in medical malpractice cases, most people’s intuition is that the plaintiff’s recovery should be denied or limited only if he had knowledge of the risk of physical injury as well as the fact that this risk was created by a negligent defendant. There is no clear doctrinal explanation for this distinction. This article describes this conundrum and poses the question of whether and when such context-specific adjustments might be doctrinally justified. Ultimately, the most likely explanation is grounded in medical exceptionalist claims that the unique nature of health care justifies a more flexible and nuanced application of legal doctrine. While this conclusion may be unsatisfying to some, it presents a valuable opportunity to revisit debates about the supposed context-neutrality of tort law.
{"title":"Defining The Known Risk: Context-Sensitivity In Tort Law Defenses","authors":"Nadia N Sawicki","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2019-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2019-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The law of negligence is designed to apply uniformly across contexts. Whether dealing with a car accident, medical malpractice, or a slip-and-fall case, tort law consistently asks whether a defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether he exercised reasonable care in fulfilling that duty. Tort law defenses, too, are generally understood to be context-neutral. The doctrines of comparative negligence and assumption of risk should not vary depending on the precise circumstances surrounding an injury. And yet, there is a peculiar inconsistency in how some defenses are applied in cases of medical malpractice as compared to cases outside the health care context. Specifically, reliance on secondary implied assumption of risk seems to require greater knowledge on the part of the plaintiff in malpractice cases than in other contexts. In recreational sport cases, for example, a plaintiff will be denied recovery if he voluntarily encountered a known risk of physical injury – regardless of whether he understood that the risk was the result of a defendant’s negligence. In contrast, in medical malpractice cases, most people’s intuition is that the plaintiff’s recovery should be denied or limited only if he had knowledge of the risk of physical injury as well as the fact that this risk was created by a negligent defendant. There is no clear doctrinal explanation for this distinction. This article describes this conundrum and poses the question of whether and when such context-specific adjustments might be doctrinally justified. Ultimately, the most likely explanation is grounded in medical exceptionalist claims that the unique nature of health care justifies a more flexible and nuanced application of legal doctrine. While this conclusion may be unsatisfying to some, it presents a valuable opportunity to revisit debates about the supposed context-neutrality of tort law.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"2674 1","pages":"31 - 9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2019-0003","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66902630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In novel cases, judges often weigh policy considerations based on common sense assumptions and personal experience about how certain individuals, groups and institutions behave. For example, in assessing the consequences of creating a new category of duty of care, a new immunity from suit or even a new tort, judges are invited to predict (or speculate about) how individuals, groups, professions and institutions would behave if the law was different. In routine cases, judges also rely on assumptions and experience in deciding questions of reasonableness and past hypothetical facts about causation. In deciding both novel and routine cases on the basis of assumptions and experience, judges are prone to cognitive biases that affect decision-making in general.
{"title":"Deciding Novel and Routine Cases without Evidence","authors":"Peter Applegarth","doi":"10.1515/jtl-2018-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jtl-2018-0011","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In novel cases, judges often weigh policy considerations based on common sense assumptions and personal experience about how certain individuals, groups and institutions behave. For example, in assessing the consequences of creating a new category of duty of care, a new immunity from suit or even a new tort, judges are invited to predict (or speculate about) how individuals, groups, professions and institutions would behave if the law was different. In routine cases, judges also rely on assumptions and experience in deciding questions of reasonableness and past hypothetical facts about causation. In deciding both novel and routine cases on the basis of assumptions and experience, judges are prone to cognitive biases that affect decision-making in general.","PeriodicalId":39054,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Tort Law","volume":"11 1","pages":"173 - 208"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/jtl-2018-0011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43126681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}