Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments最新文献

We investigate the role played by the internal capital markets of bank holding companies in the distribution of the Capital Purchase Program funds to subsidiaries. We find that while all banks used a similar internal capital allocation to support their subsidiaries, program participants transferred more capital to their subsidiaries than nonparticipants. Smaller bank subsidiaries with lower capital and earnings received more capital than other subsidiaries. Our results support the argument that the distribution of capital was done in accordance with regulatory requirements that mandate bank holding companies to act as a source of strength for their subsidiaries.

It has become standard practice in the fund performance evaluation literature to use the bootstrap approach to distinguish “skills” from “luck”, while its reliability has not been subject to rigorous statistical analysis. This paper reviews and critiques the bootstrap schemes used in the literature, and provides a simulation analysis of the validity and reliability of the bootstrap approach by applying it to evaluating the performance of hypothetical funds under various assumptions. We argue that this approach can be misleading, regardless of using alpha estimates or their t-statistics. While alternative bootstrap schemes can result in improvements, they are not foolproof either. The case can be worse if the benchmark model is misspecified. It is therefore only with caution that we can use the bootstrap approach to evaluate the performance of funds and we offer some suggestions for improving it.

The Japanese economy is infamous for the magnitude of bank nonperforming loans that have originated back in the 1990s, whereas they are still causing controversies. Japan is also known for an extended quantitative easing programme of unprecedented scale. Yet the links between risk-taking activities, quantitative easing and bank competition are largely unexplored. This paper employs, for the first time, the Boone indicator to measure bank competition in Japan to examine these underlying linkages. Given the scale of nonperforming loans, we explicitly measure bank risk-taking based on a new data set of bankrupt and restructured loans. The dynamic panel threshold and panel Vector Autoregression analyses show that enhancing quantitative easing and competition would reduce bankrupt and restructured loans, but it would negatively affect financial stability. Given the recent adoption of negative rates in January 2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study provides new insights as clearly there is a trade-off between quantitative easing and financial stability beyond a certain threshold. Caution, therefore, regarding further scaling up quantitative easing is warranted.

Using provincial data from China between 2002 and 2011, we find substantial evidence indicating a positive association between the growth of bank loans issued by commercial banks and the political pressures faced by provincial leaders. This association is particularly true for state-owned banks, which are much more politically pressurized than others, but is relatively attenuated in provinces with a more developed banking sector. We also find that bank loans issued under greater political pressures are less commercially oriented and have lower quality. Our findings are robust to a variety of sensitivity analyses and alternative measures of political pressure. Overall, our study contribute to a growing literature emphasizing the role of the political incentives of government officials in fuelling economic growth through credit allocation.

We question whether the international diversification of multinational banks creates or destroys shareholder value. Based on a sample of 384 listed banks from 56 countries we provide new and robust evidence that bank cross-border activities create shareholder value, as shown by an economically and statistically significant premium for international diversification. Our results are confirmed controlling for bank fixed effects, time-varying bank characteristics, reverse causality, functional diversification, and instrumenting for the choice to expand abroad. The increase in shareholder value is slightly larger for banks in the middle range of international diversification and in the case of expansion towards less developed countries.

This paper evaluates whether reform efforts addressing “too big to fail” actually enhance the stability of the financial system, and whether trade-offs exist between stability and efficiency. We also present and discuss various measures of bank size and complexity since such measures are essential for implementing appropriate corrective remedies. As we will show, there are no unambiguous measures of size or complexity that can fully capture a bank's contribution to systemic risk. Their effects on efficiency are also impossible to capture with certainty. While we recognize the need for additional research and empirical evidence, we do identify weaknesses and strengths of proposed and implemented reforms that could have consequences for bank stability and efficiency.

In this paper, we examine managerial gaming of different types of equity grants, both at the initial award of the equity grants (front-end gaming) and the unwinding of the equity holdings in the future (back-end gaming). We find that the potential gains from stock price manipulation vary substantially across different types of equity grants. While traditional stock option grants are less vulnerable to front-end gaming, they are more vulnerable to back-end gaming than other types of equity grants (e.g., restricted stock grants). To prevent or discourage managerial gaming, firms should preset all terms of the equity grant in advance and link its future payoff to average stock prices (e.g., by granting Asian stock options).

Short-term, liquid assets are highly valued by lenders, but pose liquidity risk management challenges to borrowers. Basic principles to meet those challenges are to conduct liquidity stress scenario analysis; to form business plans for each stress scenario; to hold enough capital to sustain the planned, post-shock balance sheet; and to hold a large enough liquidity reserve to survive the transition from the pre- to the post-shock balance sheet. Historical failures, like Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, and MF Global have a lot to teach about implementing these principles. While regulatory frameworks constrain liquidity positions, they are no substitute for firm-specific liquidity risk management.

We extend the literature on crash prediction models in three main ways. First, we explicitly relate crash prediction measures and asset pricing models. Second, we present a statistical significance test for crash prediction models. Finally, we propose a definition and a measure of robustness for these models. We apply our statistical test and measure the robustness of selected model specifications of the Price-Earnings (P/E) ratio and Bond Stock Earning Yield Differential (BSEYD) measures. This analysis shows that the BSEYD and P/E ratios, were statistically significant robust predictors of corrections on the US equity market over the period 1964 to 2014.