Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.002
Dooseok Jang
By conducting a boycott experiment, this paper studied whether the reciprocity of consumers affects boycott decision. The boycott experiment is a two-stage post-offer market game, in which a seller first decides an asking price and then consumers decide to purchase goods after observing the asking price. To find the effect of reciprocity on consumer's purchase decision, the level of information provided to the consumers corresponding to the previous asking price and another consumer's boycott history, on average, was modified. Consequently, the sellers lowered the asking price with the belief that disclosing additional information about their previous profit fractions decreases the consumer's purchase frequency. Moreover, consumers' purchase frequency is affected by both the given value of the goods and the asking price, but not by the different levels of information provided. Therefore, the consumers appear to have no reciprocity preferences on a boycott.
{"title":"Influences of Reciprocity on a Consumer Boycott in an Experiment","authors":"Dooseok Jang","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.002","url":null,"abstract":"By conducting a boycott experiment, this paper studied whether the reciprocity of consumers affects boycott decision. The boycott experiment is a two-stage post-offer market game, in which a seller first decides an asking price and then consumers decide to purchase goods after observing the asking price. To find the effect of reciprocity on consumer's purchase decision, the level of information provided to the consumers corresponding to the previous asking price and another consumer's boycott history, on average, was modified. Consequently, the sellers lowered the asking price with the belief that disclosing additional information about their previous profit fractions decreases the consumer's purchase frequency. Moreover, consumers' purchase frequency is affected by both the given value of the goods and the asking price, but not by the different levels of information provided. Therefore, the consumers appear to have no reciprocity preferences on a boycott.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"31 1","pages":"41-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342235","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.003
Hosin Song
{"title":"Monte carlo evidences on finite sample performances of the simulated integrated conditional moment estimator for the binary choice model","authors":"Hosin Song","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"30 1","pages":"88-99"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.2.004
Jaeho Yun
Using the yield data for Korean government bonds, I examine several discrete-time affine term structure models with unspanned macro factors, such as output and inflation, and compares term premia implied from alternative models with different combinations of output and inflation variables. Empirical analysis shows that, except for 1-year maturity ones, there is little difference among the medium- to long-term term premia across alternative models. The model-implied term premium estimates do not show a significant pro- or counter-cyclicality in relation to output variables, but show a highly positive correlation with inflation variables. In addition, I test the traditional expectation hypothesis by fitting Campbell-Shiller long-rate regressions to the Korean bond data, the expectation hypothesis is strongly rejected as in the case of the US, due to time-varying term premia, and an additional Monte Carlo simulation study indicates that the term structure models considered in this paper show a success in matching the regression coefficients estimated from the sample.
{"title":"Term Premia in Affine Term Structure Models with Unspanned Macroeconomic Factors: the Case of Korea","authors":"Jaeho Yun","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.2.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.2.004","url":null,"abstract":"Using the yield data for Korean government bonds, I examine several discrete-time affine term structure models with unspanned macro factors, such as output and inflation, and compares term premia implied from alternative models with different combinations of output and inflation variables. Empirical analysis shows that, except for 1-year maturity ones, there is little difference among the medium- to long-term term premia across alternative models. The model-implied term premium estimates do not show a significant pro- or counter-cyclicality in relation to output variables, but show a highly positive correlation with inflation variables. In addition, I test the traditional expectation hypothesis by fitting Campbell-Shiller long-rate regressions to the Korean bond data, the expectation hypothesis is strongly rejected as in the case of the US, due to time-varying term premia, and an additional Monte Carlo simulation study indicates that the term structure models considered in this paper show a success in matching the regression coefficients estimated from the sample.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"31 1","pages":"70-110"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.004
Chongmin Kim
A key input manufacturer with a patent can raise its rivals’ costs in upstream market either by raising the possibility of patent infringement litigation in case a license is not given or by raising the royalty in case a license is given to its rivals. We study under which scenarios the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs. There is related literature investigating the patent holder’s incentive to license its technology to its rivals such as Farrell and Gallini (1988), Rockett (1990), and Conner (1995) or investigating the vertically integrated input monopolists’ (or the patent holder’s) incentive to supply its input to its rivals such as Padilla and Wong-Ervin (2016) and Moresi and Schwartz (2017). This paper differs from those in that the patent holder allows its rivals to use its patent even without a license but keeps the option of patent litigation. That is, the patent holder has an option to grant a license to its rivals in the input market, called the component licensing, or to allow free access to its rivals and to give a license to the device manufacturers, called the end-product licensing. We show that in the component licensing model the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.
{"title":"Incentive to Raise Rivals' Costs: Patent Licensing in Vertically Integrated Markets","authors":"Chongmin Kim","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.4.004","url":null,"abstract":"A key input manufacturer with a patent can raise its rivals’ costs in upstream market either by raising the possibility of patent infringement litigation in case a license is not given or by raising the royalty in case a license is given to its rivals. We study under which scenarios the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs. There is related literature investigating the patent holder’s incentive to license its technology to its rivals such as Farrell and Gallini (1988), Rockett (1990), and Conner (1995) or investigating the vertically integrated input monopolists’ (or the patent holder’s) incentive to supply its input to its rivals such as Padilla and Wong-Ervin (2016) and Moresi and Schwartz (2017). This paper differs from those in that the patent holder allows its rivals to use its patent even without a license but keeps the option of patent litigation. That is, the patent holder has an option to grant a license to its rivals in the input market, called the component licensing, or to allow free access to its rivals and to give a license to the device manufacturers, called the end-product licensing. We show that in the component licensing model the patent holder has more incentive to raise its rivals’ costs.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"31 1","pages":"86-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342295","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.1.001
Sung-Ha Hwang, L. Rey-Bellet
We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game-a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive known criteria for potential games, as well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we prove (1) new integral tests for potential games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games, and (3) a new representation characterization for zero-sum equivalent games.
{"title":"Simple Characterizations of Potential Games and Zero-sum Equivalent Games","authors":"Sung-Ha Hwang, L. Rey-Bellet","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.1.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.1.001","url":null,"abstract":"We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game-a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive known criteria for potential games, as well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we prove (1) new integral tests for potential games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games, and (3) a new representation characterization for zero-sum equivalent games.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"31 1","pages":"1-13"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.3.003
Jung Yongseung
This paper investigates sources of business cycles in Korea to shed some lights on the role of limited participation in financial market along the line of Christiano (1992) and King and Watson (1996). For this purpose, the paper sets up a small open economy model with two agents subject to limited participation in financial markets. Applying Watson (1993)'s measure of fit to evaluate the role of limited participation over Korean business cycles, it finds that the household's limited participation has played an important role in the business cycle in Korea after the Asian financial crisis.
本文沿着Christiano(1992)和King and Watson(1996)的思路研究了韩国经济周期的来源，以阐明有限参与金融市场的作用。为此，本文建立了一个具有两个有限参与金融市场的主体的小型开放经济模型。运用Watson(1993)的拟合度量来评价有限参与对韩国经济周期的作用，发现家庭的有限参与在亚洲金融危机后的韩国经济周期中发挥了重要作用。
{"title":"Business Cycles and Limited Participation in Financial Markets: The Case of Korea","authors":"Jung Yongseung","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.3.003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2020.31.3.003","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates sources of business cycles in Korea to shed some lights on the role of limited participation in financial market along the line of Christiano (1992) and King and Watson (1996). For this purpose, the paper sets up a small open economy model with two agents subject to limited participation in financial markets. Applying Watson (1993)'s measure of fit to evaluate the role of limited participation over Korean business cycles, it finds that the household's limited participation has played an important role in the business cycle in Korea after the Asian financial crisis.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"31 1","pages":"44-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.004
Chirok Han, Kim, Dukpa
{"title":"Test of Block Zero Restrictions in Factor Loadings","authors":"Chirok Han, Kim, Dukpa","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"30 1","pages":"100-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41528361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-09-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.001
Hahn Guangsug, Kwon, Joon-Yeop
The study investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in an executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. If the inside owner offers marketbased compensation contract to the risk-averse manager, the inside owner expects higher utility than when stock prices are excluded from the contract. If information cost displays an intermediate value, changes in the exogenous parameters generate the direct effect and the indirect effect via the information market. Finally, we find that the market-based compensation contract contributes to the increase of social welfare.
{"title":"Market-Based Executive Compensation Contract under Endogenous Information Acquisition","authors":"Hahn Guangsug, Kwon, Joon-Yeop","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.001","url":null,"abstract":"The study investigates how a publicly traded firm's liquidation value and stock price are used in an executive compensation contract when information acquisition in the asset market is endogenized. If the inside owner offers marketbased compensation contract to the risk-averse manager, the inside owner expects higher utility than when stock prices are excluded from the contract. If information cost displays an intermediate value, changes in the exogenous parameters generate the direct effect and the indirect effect via the information market. Finally, we find that the market-based compensation contract contributes to the increase of social welfare.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"30 1","pages":"1-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48818093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.2.002
Hyunjin Yang, Heejoon Han, C. Kim
{"title":"Additive Endogenous Regime Switching GARCH Model","authors":"Hyunjin Yang, Heejoon Han, C. Kim","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.2.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.2.002","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"30 1","pages":"20-54"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-01-01DOI: 10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.002
Yong-jin Kim, Chul-In Lee
We view social welfare as a system that redistributes resources (i) within a generation and (ii) across generations so as to maximize social wellbeing. By setting tax and expenditure institutions properly, we implement optimal social welfare. Notable are the following implications: (i) in the presence of rising earnings inequality, redistribution within a generation is more important than that across generations. Fiscal policies in this line need to be stressed. (ii) Under low rates of population and economic growth, redistribution in the form of pensions loses its efficacy and therefore should not be encouraged for welfare reasons. This point has also been supported by pension reforms in many welfare states. Our preliminary calibration analysis confirms these conclusions numerically.
{"title":"A New Approach to Social Welfare: tax-pension combination","authors":"Yong-jin Kim, Chul-In Lee","doi":"10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.22812/JETEM.2019.30.3.002","url":null,"abstract":"We view social welfare as a system that redistributes resources (i) within a generation and (ii) across generations so as to maximize social wellbeing. By setting tax and expenditure institutions properly, we implement optimal social welfare. Notable are the following implications: (i) in the presence of rising earnings inequality, redistribution within a generation is more important than that across generations. Fiscal policies in this line need to be stressed. (ii) Under low rates of population and economic growth, redistribution in the form of pensions loses its efficacy and therefore should not be encouraged for welfare reasons. This point has also been supported by pension reforms in many welfare states. Our preliminary calibration analysis confirms these conclusions numerically.","PeriodicalId":39995,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics","volume":"30 1","pages":"50-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68342377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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