The United Kingdom fought its last colonial war in South Arabia (1963 t0 1967) during a pivotal era of waning economic strength, rising Arab nationalism, and growing anticolonialism. Determined to retain Britain’s international status, the Macmillan government considered military facilities in Aden essential to projecting power east of Suez. This article argues that policy decisions taken from 1937 onwards increased the likelihood of a nationalist insurgency and made countering it at an acceptable cost extraordinarily difficult. The British never devised a comprehensive strategy, responding to threats on an ad hoc basis. Contrary to what some scholars insist, South Arabia neither confirmed the failure of the British approach nor heralded a new era of counterinsurgency. The conflict was a political failure, not a military defeat.
It is little known that Hungarian soldiers, including Hussars, took part in Napoleon’s 1812 campaign against Russia. Moreover, the four, and later five Hussar regiments assigned to the so-called Imperial-Royal Auxiliary Corps clearly played an important role in the activities of this Corps. During the campaign, the Hussars were mainly responsible for the tasks of reconnaissance and securing the march, which was vital as the Auxiliary Corps was operating deep in hostile and unknown territory. The Hussars, of course, also distinguished themselves in small and large engagements. As an indication of their prominent role, in October 1812 a fifth Hussar regiment was sent to the theatre of war to reinforce the Hussars. This shifted the balance of the Auxiliary Corps’ cavalry even further in favour of the Hussars. Their special importance was also reflected in the new order of battle which was then introduced. This meant that Hussars were assigned to more major military formations than before, a clear indication of their indispensability and the importance of their deployment.
Naval and military historians have generally not focused on logistics, and this is true for Second World War naval historians and, more specifically, for United States Navy logistics of the Pacific War (1941–45). Naval logistics deserves more serious study as they circumscribe what surface fleets can accomplish. Recently, historians have started to treat this topic as an integral part of naval strategy, operations, and tactics, which is a step in the right direction. This article explores the current state of historical literature and demonstrates that further historical inquiry is necessary – the topic deserves more attention from historians and, indeed, today’s navies.
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