{"title":"Attila Németh, Epicurus on the Self, Routledge, London-New York, 2017, 205 p., ISBN 978-1-138-63385-8 [hbk], £ 105","authors":"Francesco Verde","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"78 1","pages":"1 - 205 - 236 - 244"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88526841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this book Diana Quarantotto carries out an analysis of Aristotle’s conception of place. The title of the text, L’universo senza spazio. Aristotele e la teoria del luogo (The universe without space: Aristotle and the theory of place) briefly encapsulates how Aristotle conceives of things’ location: space, as a three-dimensional extension existing independently of the things that occupy it, is not Aristotle’s considered understanding of location; rather for Aristotle things are in a place, for it is true of them to say that they are somewhere. Conversely, every portion of space turns out to be occupied by a body – if only by air – so that Aristotle’s universe is a plenum, that is, a universe where no space is empty. In such a universe, explains Quarantotto, to hypothesise the existence of space would be to multiply entities unnecessarily (p. 38). Since antiquity Aristotle’s theory of place has never failed to provoke controversy, and in fact has been rarely accepted as it stands. The theory has been deemed irremediably unsatisfying, ‘open to serious objections’ (Ross),1 ‘inadequate’ (Hussey),2 vel sim. In the recent debate, however, interpreters have started to reassess Aristotle’s theory and to pay due respect to its own philosophical merits. Quarantotto belongs to this camp in so far as she attempts to bring out the virtues of Aristotle’s theory; but she also highlights the reasons why such a theory may well fail to command agreement to contemporary readers. Quarantotto’s book consists of a close analysis of Aristotle’s Physics IV.1–5.3 Accordingly, the volume breaks down into 5 chapters, each chapter being devoted to its correspondent chapter in Aristotle’s Physics. The reader will find a glossary at the end, with key terms, as well as an index locorum. An introduction is devoted to frame Aristotle’s investigation within the larger project of his Physics. This makes for a succinct but highly illuminating lead-in to Aristotle’s treatise as
在这本书中，Diana Quarantotto对亚里士多德的地方概念进行了分析。这篇文章的标题是L ' universverso senza spazio。亚里士多德的《没有空间的宇宙:亚里士多德和位置理论》简要概括了亚里士多德对事物位置的看法:空间是独立于占据它的事物而存在的三维延伸，并不是亚里士多德对位置的理解;而对亚里士多德来说，事物是在一个地方，因为它们说它们在某个地方是对的。相反，空间的每一部分都被一个物体所占据——如果只是空气的话——所以亚里士多德的宇宙是一个充满空间的宇宙，也就是说，没有空间是空的。Quarantotto解释说，在这样一个宇宙中，假设空间的存在将是不必要地增加实体(第38页)。自古以来，亚里士多德的位置理论总是引起争议，事实上，很少有人接受它的立场。这个理论被认为是无法弥补的不令人满意，“有严重的反对意见”(罗斯)，1“不充分”(赫西)，2页。然而，在最近的争论中，解释者开始重新评估亚里士多德的理论，并对其自身的哲学价值给予应有的尊重。夸伦托属于这一阵营，因为她试图揭示亚里士多德理论的优点;但她也强调了为什么这种理论很可能无法得到当代读者的认同。Quarantotto的书包含了对亚里士多德物理学IV.1-5.3的详细分析，因此，全书分为5章，每一章都专门介绍亚里士多德物理学的相应章节。读者将在最后发现一个词汇表，其中包括关键术语，以及索引词典。一篇引言致力于将亚里士多德的研究框架置于他的物理学的更大项目中。这为亚里士多德的论著提供了一个简洁但极具启发性的引子
{"title":"Diana Quarantotto, L’universo senza spazio. Aristotele e la teoria del luogo, Bibliopolis, Naples, 2017, 290 p., ISBN 978-8870886481, € 29.75","authors":"Giulio Di Basilio","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0011","url":null,"abstract":"In this book Diana Quarantotto carries out an analysis of Aristotle’s conception of place. The title of the text, L’universo senza spazio. Aristotele e la teoria del luogo (The universe without space: Aristotle and the theory of place) briefly encapsulates how Aristotle conceives of things’ location: space, as a three-dimensional extension existing independently of the things that occupy it, is not Aristotle’s considered understanding of location; rather for Aristotle things are in a place, for it is true of them to say that they are somewhere. Conversely, every portion of space turns out to be occupied by a body – if only by air – so that Aristotle’s universe is a plenum, that is, a universe where no space is empty. In such a universe, explains Quarantotto, to hypothesise the existence of space would be to multiply entities unnecessarily (p. 38). Since antiquity Aristotle’s theory of place has never failed to provoke controversy, and in fact has been rarely accepted as it stands. The theory has been deemed irremediably unsatisfying, ‘open to serious objections’ (Ross),1 ‘inadequate’ (Hussey),2 vel sim. In the recent debate, however, interpreters have started to reassess Aristotle’s theory and to pay due respect to its own philosophical merits. Quarantotto belongs to this camp in so far as she attempts to bring out the virtues of Aristotle’s theory; but she also highlights the reasons why such a theory may well fail to command agreement to contemporary readers. Quarantotto’s book consists of a close analysis of Aristotle’s Physics IV.1–5.3 Accordingly, the volume breaks down into 5 chapters, each chapter being devoted to its correspondent chapter in Aristotle’s Physics. The reader will find a glossary at the end, with key terms, as well as an index locorum. An introduction is devoted to frame Aristotle’s investigation within the larger project of his Physics. This makes for a succinct but highly illuminating lead-in to Aristotle’s treatise as","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"79 1","pages":"1 - 232 - 236 - 290"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86458485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the Phaedo the character Socrates argues that suicide is morally wrong. This is in fact one of only two places in the entire Platonic corpus where suicide is discussed. It is a brief passage, and a notoriously perplexing one. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments that Socrates gives in support of his claim. I argue that one of them (what I call the Gods Argument) is not to be taken literally, while the other (what I call the Prison Argument) represents the deeper reason for the prohibition of suicide. I further relate the question of suicide to the overarching concerns of the Phaedo as a whole: the nature of our incarnate “imprisonment”, the nature and purpose of philosophy, the philosophical “purification” of the soul, the human pursuit of knowledge, and the nature of the divine.
{"title":"Suicide in the Phaedo","authors":"Daniel S. Werner","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the Phaedo the character Socrates argues that suicide is morally wrong. This is in fact one of only two places in the entire Platonic corpus where suicide is discussed. It is a brief passage, and a notoriously perplexing one. In this article, I distinguish between two arguments that Socrates gives in support of his claim. I argue that one of them (what I call the Gods Argument) is not to be taken literally, while the other (what I call the Prison Argument) represents the deeper reason for the prohibition of suicide. I further relate the question of suicide to the overarching concerns of the Phaedo as a whole: the nature of our incarnate “imprisonment”, the nature and purpose of philosophy, the philosophical “purification” of the soul, the human pursuit of knowledge, and the nature of the divine.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"26 1","pages":"157 - 188"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84878990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo, because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus, where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul.
{"title":"Plato’s Recollection Argument in the Philebus","authors":"Naoya Iwata","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Many scholars have denied that Plato’s argument about desire at Philebus 34c10–35d7 is related to his recollection arguments in the Meno and Phaedo, because it is concerned only with postnatal experiences of pleasure. This paper argues against their denial by showing that the desire argument in question is intended to prove the soul’s possession of innate memory of pleasure. This innateness interpretation will be supported by a close analysis of the Timaeus, where Plato suggests that our inborn desires for food and drink derive from the primitive experiences of pleasure that have naturally been incorporated into the appetitive part of the soul.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"49 1","pages":"189 - 212"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81124493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract According to Dicaearchus, metempsychosis was the best known among Pythagoras’ teachings. In this paper, I investigate two features of Pythagorean metempsychosis: its non-retributive character and its epistemological value. I argue that the Pythagoreans did not conceive of reincarnation as a punishment for the wicked and a reward for the virtuous, but rather as a way to gain experience, knowledge and therefore wisdom. This reading enables us to throw light on the puzzling list of Pythagoras’ past lives, which includes Aethalides son of Hermes, Euphorbus the warrior, Pyrrhus the fisherman and even Alco the harlot.
{"title":"The Lives of Pythagoras: A Proposal for Reading Pythagorean Metempsychosis","authors":"Caterina Pellò","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0007","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to Dicaearchus, metempsychosis was the best known among Pythagoras’ teachings. In this paper, I investigate two features of Pythagorean metempsychosis: its non-retributive character and its epistemological value. I argue that the Pythagoreans did not conceive of reincarnation as a punishment for the wicked and a reward for the virtuous, but rather as a way to gain experience, knowledge and therefore wisdom. This reading enables us to throw light on the puzzling list of Pythagoras’ past lives, which includes Aethalides son of Hermes, Euphorbus the warrior, Pyrrhus the fisherman and even Alco the harlot.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"17 1","pages":"135 - 156"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87854642","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical wisdom is mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter.
{"title":"Two Aspects of Moral Habituation in Aristotle’s Practical Science","authors":"Siyi Chen","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Through a detailed reconstruction of the process of moral habituation, which includes both a desiderative and an intellectual aspect, I demonstrate in this essay that Aristotelian practical science does not make people practically wise on a ground and personal level, but teaches moral educators how to produce basically good men in and through practice. In particular, the formation of the correct wish for happiness is the natural culmination of desiderative habituation, and intellectual habituation that develops personal practical wisdom is mainly a process of moral apprenticeship under senior statesmen. My analyses of the aspects of moral habituation should reveal that even in his practical science, that is, in a kind of theory pursued for the sake of practice, Aristotle still maintains the clear distinction between theoretical and practical intelligence and shows deep insights into the peculiarity of the latter.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"37 1","pages":"213 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78032052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The ontology of Stoic causes and effects was clearly anti-platonic, since the Stoics did not want to admit that any incorporeal entity could have an effect. However, by asserting that any cause was the cause of an incorporeal effect, they returned to Plato’s syntax of causes in the Sophist, whose doctrine of the asymmetry of nouns and verbs identified names with the agents and verbs with the actions. The ontological asymmetry of causes and effects blocked the multiplication of causes by reducing it to an efficient cause. However, while ontology and syntax merged into the doctrine of the effect as an incorporeal predicate, this was further complicated by a relational description of a cause as the effect of a body on a body and by the distinction of causes. Since there are different kinds of causes, not every kind of cause has the same syntactical role in the nexus of causal relations. This refinement of the original syntactical model presumably allowed the Stoics to give a more coherent view of human action than is usually assumed.
{"title":"The Ontology and Syntax of Stoic Causes and Effects","authors":"J. Gourinat","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0005","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ontology of Stoic causes and effects was clearly anti-platonic, since the Stoics did not want to admit that any incorporeal entity could have an effect. However, by asserting that any cause was the cause of an incorporeal effect, they returned to Plato’s syntax of causes in the Sophist, whose doctrine of the asymmetry of nouns and verbs identified names with the agents and verbs with the actions. The ontological asymmetry of causes and effects blocked the multiplication of causes by reducing it to an efficient cause. However, while ontology and syntax merged into the doctrine of the effect as an incorporeal predicate, this was further complicated by a relational description of a cause as the effect of a body on a body and by the distinction of causes. Since there are different kinds of causes, not every kind of cause has the same syntactical role in the nexus of causal relations. This refinement of the original syntactical model presumably allowed the Stoics to give a more coherent view of human action than is usually assumed.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"25 1","pages":"108 - 87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86949718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Contrary to their predecessors, the Stoics put forward a unified notion of cause: a cause is a bodily because-of-which (δι’ ὅ). Against the backdrop of Plato’s and Aristotle’s influential views, this is an original proposal. It involves the rejection of an earlier trend, according to which causes and explanations are closely associated. It also involves a pulling apart of causes and principles. And it comes with a charge against Plato and Aristotle, namely that they introduce a swarm of causes, a turba causarum.
{"title":"A Unified Notion of Cause","authors":"K. Vogt","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Contrary to their predecessors, the Stoics put forward a unified notion of cause: a cause is a bodily because-of-which (δι’ ὅ). Against the backdrop of Plato’s and Aristotle’s influential views, this is an original proposal. It involves the rejection of an earlier trend, according to which causes and explanations are closely associated. It also involves a pulling apart of causes and principles. And it comes with a charge against Plato and Aristotle, namely that they introduce a swarm of causes, a turba causarum.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"122 1","pages":"65 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89635838","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract A familiar interpretation of the Stoic doctrine of the πάθη runs as follows: The Stoics claim the πάθη are impulses (ὁρμαί). The Stoics take impulses to be causes of action. So, the Stoics think the πάθη are causes of action Premise (1) is uncontroversial, but the evidence for (2) needs to be reconsidered. I argue that the Stoics have two distinct but related conceptions of ὁρμή – a psychological construal and a behavioural construal. On the psychological construal (2) is true, but there is strong evidence that (1) is true only on the behavioural construal. That is, when the Stoics classify πάθη as impulses they are thinking of them not as impulses to act, but as cases of action in their own right.
{"title":"Passion, Impulse, and Action in Stoicism","authors":"S. Meyer","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0006","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A familiar interpretation of the Stoic doctrine of the πάθη runs as follows: The Stoics claim the πάθη are impulses (ὁρμαί). The Stoics take impulses to be causes of action. So, the Stoics think the πάθη are causes of action Premise (1) is uncontroversial, but the evidence for (2) needs to be reconsidered. I argue that the Stoics have two distinct but related conceptions of ὁρμή – a psychological construal and a behavioural construal. On the psychological construal (2) is true, but there is strong evidence that (1) is true only on the behavioural construal. That is, when the Stoics classify πάθη as impulses they are thinking of them not as impulses to act, but as cases of action in their own right.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"30 1","pages":"109 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80547568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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