Abstract This paper rehabilitates the Stoic conception of blending from the ground up, by freeing the Stoic conception of body from three interpretive presuppositions. First, the twin hylomorphic presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an incorporeal. Then, the atomistic presupposition that body is absolutely full and rigid, and the attendant notion that resistance (antitupia) must be ricochet. I argue that once we clear away these presuppositions about body, the foundations of Stoic corporealism fall into place. Body is fundamental (not hylomorphic). The two fundamental principles (archai) are bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē); and these two bodies are two, not matter and form all over again, nor actual and potential, but agent and patient. The independence of the two archai is no threat to the unity of the cosmos, however, because the Stoic theory of body allows for the complete coextension of the archai. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of the wax and its shape? The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient completely coextended in a through and through blend.
{"title":"The Resistance to Stoic Blending","authors":"Vanessa de Harven","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper rehabilitates the Stoic conception of blending from the ground up, by freeing the Stoic conception of body from three interpretive presuppositions. First, the twin hylomorphic presuppositions that where there is body there is matter, and that where there is reason or quality there is an incorporeal. Then, the atomistic presupposition that body is absolutely full and rigid, and the attendant notion that resistance (antitupia) must be ricochet. I argue that once we clear away these presuppositions about body, the foundations of Stoic corporealism fall into place. Body is fundamental (not hylomorphic). The two fundamental principles (archai) are bodies: divine active reason (logos) and passive matter (hulē); and these two bodies are two, not matter and form all over again, nor actual and potential, but agent and patient. The independence of the two archai is no threat to the unity of the cosmos, however, because the Stoic theory of body allows for the complete coextension of the archai. The hylomorphic thinker rightly asks, what relation could be tighter than that of the wax and its shape? The Stoic replies: a causal relation, the interaction of agent and patient completely coextended in a through and through blend.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"9 1","pages":"1 - 23"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80469916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2018-08-02DOI: 10.1515/rhiz-2018-frontmatter1
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Abstract The present paper studies a family of Stoic proofs of the intelligence of the cosmos, i. e. of the thesis that the cosmos is intelligent in the strong sense that it is, as a whole, something that thinks. This family, ‘F2’, goes back to a proof, ‘XP’, found in Philebus 29a9–30 a8 and Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8. F2 infers the intelligence of the cosmos, as XP does, from (i) the general idea that our intelligence proceeds from the cosmos, which is the ultimate cause of why we are intelligent, and (ii) the further claim that, since this is so, the cosmos itself must be intelligent. They differ from one another, however, in how they account for (i). In this paper, I present a new reason for why the accounts are different, that complements those given by David Sedley in a recent and important study of Stoic cosmology (Sedley 2007). Based on the analogy between intelligence and the four elements, XP puts forward the idea that the intelligence currently present in us is a portion of cosmic intelligence that has separated from it at some point in the past, and that has travelled from the outside cosmos to us. In contrast, the theory used by F2 to explain the generation of human intelligence is grounded not in the notions of separation and locomotion, but in that of transmission of a state. As I argue in some detail, the separation-locomotion model and the transmission model are not only different from each other, but also logically independent from one another: in general terms, neither entails the other. This transmission model used by the Stoics in a proof of the intelligence of the cosmos, I submit, is a major innovation in ancient cosmological and metaphysical thinking.
摘要:本文研究了宇宙智能的斯多葛证明，即宇宙智能。宇宙是有智慧的这一论点，在强烈的意义上说，作为一个整体，它是会思考的。这个家族，' F2 '，可以追溯到一个证明，' XP '，发现在菲勒伯斯29a9 - 30a8和色诺芬Mem. 1.4.8。和XP一样，F2推断宇宙的智慧来自(i)我们的智慧来自宇宙的一般观点，这是我们为什么有智慧的最终原因，以及(ii)进一步的主张，既然如此，宇宙本身一定是有智慧的。然而，它们彼此不同的是它们如何解释(i)。在本文中，我提出了一个新的原因来解释为什么这些描述是不同的，这补充了大卫·塞德利(David Sedley)在最近一项关于斯多葛派宇宙学的重要研究中给出的原因(Sedley 2007)。基于智能和四大元素之间的类比，XP提出了这样的观点，即目前存在于我们体内的智能是宇宙智能的一部分，它在过去的某个时刻与宇宙智能分离，并从外部宇宙传播到我们这里。相反，F2用来解释人类智能产生的理论不是建立在分离和运动的概念上，而是建立在状态传递的概念上。正如我详细论证的那样，分离-运动模型和传输模型不仅彼此不同，而且在逻辑上彼此独立:一般来说，两者都不需要对方。我认为，斯多葛学派在证明宇宙智慧时所使用的这种传递模型，是古代宇宙学和形而上学思想的重大创新。
{"title":"Why is the Cosmos Intelligent? (1)","authors":"R. Salles","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0003","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The present paper studies a family of Stoic proofs of the intelligence of the cosmos, i. e. of the thesis that the cosmos is intelligent in the strong sense that it is, as a whole, something that thinks. This family, ‘F2’, goes back to a proof, ‘XP’, found in Philebus 29a9–30 a8 and Xenophon Mem. 1.4.8. F2 infers the intelligence of the cosmos, as XP does, from (i) the general idea that our intelligence proceeds from the cosmos, which is the ultimate cause of why we are intelligent, and (ii) the further claim that, since this is so, the cosmos itself must be intelligent. They differ from one another, however, in how they account for (i). In this paper, I present a new reason for why the accounts are different, that complements those given by David Sedley in a recent and important study of Stoic cosmology (Sedley 2007). Based on the analogy between intelligence and the four elements, XP puts forward the idea that the intelligence currently present in us is a portion of cosmic intelligence that has separated from it at some point in the past, and that has travelled from the outside cosmos to us. In contrast, the theory used by F2 to explain the generation of human intelligence is grounded not in the notions of separation and locomotion, but in that of transmission of a state. As I argue in some detail, the separation-locomotion model and the transmission model are not only different from each other, but also logically independent from one another: in general terms, neither entails the other. This transmission model used by the Stoics in a proof of the intelligence of the cosmos, I submit, is a major innovation in ancient cosmological and metaphysical thinking.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"40 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73913907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article is a return to a theme I first tackled in “The Stoic criterion of identity” (1982): the Academics’ ‘Growing Argument’ (auxanomenos logos) and the Stoic response to its attack on diachronic identity. This time my aim is to separate out approximately five different stages of the debate between the two schools. This will be done by shifting more of the focus onto developments that seem likely to belong to the late second and/or early first century BC.
本文回归到我在1982年的《斯多葛学派的身份标准》(The Stoic criterion of identity)中首次讨论的主题:学术界的“日益增长的争论”(auxanomenos logos)以及斯多葛学派对其对历时性身份的攻击的回应。这一次，我的目标是将这两个学派之间辩论的大约五个不同阶段区分出来。这将通过将更多的注意力转移到似乎属于公元前二世纪末和/或公元前一世纪初的发展上来实现。
{"title":"Stoics and Their Critics on Diachronic Identity","authors":"D. Sedley","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2018-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2018-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article is a return to a theme I first tackled in “The Stoic criterion of identity” (1982): the Academics’ ‘Growing Argument’ (auxanomenos logos) and the Stoic response to its attack on diachronic identity. This time my aim is to separate out approximately five different stages of the debate between the two schools. This will be done by shifting more of the focus onto developments that seem likely to belong to the late second and/or early first century BC.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"117 1","pages":"24 - 39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77875707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: This article aims to give a critical and up to date survey on the medical theories expounded in the Timaeus, trying to make clear to which extent Plato took an interest in medicine, which medical issues in the dialogue are original and which are not. In providing an extended treatment of the medical ideas contained in the Timaeus, the Anonymus Londiniensis papyrus is also of assistance in this sense. This paper highlights those points on which the papyrus differs from the Platonic text, providing thus insight into Plato’s etiological assumptions.
{"title":"Plato, the Medicine, and the Paraphrase on the Timaeus in the Anonymus Londiniensis Papyrus","authors":"Jordi Crespo Saumell","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0009","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: This article aims to give a critical and up to date survey on the medical theories expounded in the Timaeus, trying to make clear to which extent Plato took an interest in medicine, which medical issues in the dialogue are original and which are not. In providing an extended treatment of the medical ideas contained in the Timaeus, the Anonymus Londiniensis papyrus is also of assistance in this sense. This paper highlights those points on which the papyrus differs from the Platonic text, providing thus insight into Plato’s etiological assumptions.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"59 1","pages":"148 - 176"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83694425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (eudaimonia) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. It argues that eudaimonia is theōria in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, happy life (eudaimōn bios) is a complex way of life which includes not only theoretical activity but also the exercising of other virtues including the so-called moral or social ones. The article shows that Aristotle differentiates between eudaimonia on the one hand and the happy or fulfilled life (eudaimōn bios) on the other, and shows how this distinction clarifies Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia.
{"title":"Divine Activity and Human Life","authors":"J. Jirsa","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The following article is a contribution to the rich debate concerning happiness or fulfilment (eudaimonia) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. It argues that eudaimonia is theōria in accordance with what Aristotle repeatedly says in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. However, happy life (eudaimōn bios) is a complex way of life which includes not only theoretical activity but also the exercising of other virtues including the so-called moral or social ones. The article shows that Aristotle differentiates between eudaimonia on the one hand and the happy or fulfilled life (eudaimōn bios) on the other, and shows how this distinction clarifies Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"2 1","pages":"210 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74287411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: Aristotle is committed to three propositions which seem to be mutually inconsistent: (1) He thinks that natural phenomena occur either always or for the most part. Natural phenomena, and a fortiori the core properties determining the nature of an entire species, cannot be rarities; (2) He states that theoretical understanding is an essential, dominant component of human nature; (3) He observes that human theoretical understanding is rare. I evaluate possible alternative ways of solving the inconsistency, and show that they all involve considerable difficulties.
{"title":"Aristotle on Nature, Human Nature and Human Understanding","authors":"M. Segev","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: Aristotle is committed to three propositions which seem to be mutually inconsistent: (1) He thinks that natural phenomena occur either always or for the most part. Natural phenomena, and a fortiori the core properties determining the nature of an entire species, cannot be rarities; (2) He states that theoretical understanding is an essential, dominant component of human nature; (3) He observes that human theoretical understanding is rare. I evaluate possible alternative ways of solving the inconsistency, and show that they all involve considerable difficulties.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"28 1","pages":"177 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82415281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: The Socratic instruction (64b) to clarify “what kind of death” a philosopher would deserve suggests two different notions of “death” in the Phaedo: physical demise and philosophy. This double meaning makes it possible for the Platonic Socrates to address a dual audience with a dual purpose: His interlocutors will receive consolation, while the perceptive reader will focus on practicing philosophy on the basis of the hypothesis of Forms. Socrates’ final words can also be illuminated as a vindication of his adherence to logos: the cock to Asclepius has to be offered as a sign of gratitude for healing misology.
{"title":"“What Kind of Death?”: On the Phaedo’s double topic","authors":"Panagiotis Thanassas","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0008","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: The Socratic instruction (64b) to clarify “what kind of death” a philosopher would deserve suggests two different notions of “death” in the Phaedo: physical demise and philosophy. This double meaning makes it possible for the Platonic Socrates to address a dual audience with a dual purpose: His interlocutors will receive consolation, while the perceptive reader will focus on practicing philosophy on the basis of the hypothesis of Forms. Socrates’ final words can also be illuminated as a vindication of his adherence to logos: the cock to Asclepius has to be offered as a sign of gratitude for healing misology.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"40 1","pages":"113 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89080966","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the concept of sunesis (comprehension) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Section I, I clarify the differences between phronēsis and sunesis, focusing on the roles they play in bouleusis (deliberation). I argue that sunesis is not directly involved in practical deliberation in the canonical sense of the notion. In Section II, I suggest an interpretation of sunesis as ethical discernment. We employ sunesis in cases without any immediate objects of practical deliberation, such as when we criticize an action in the past or give advice to others. In this function, discernment has a crucial role in the ethical life of individuals embedded in a community.
{"title":"Sunesis as Ethical Discernment in Aristotle","authors":"Attila Simon","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In this paper, I examine the concept of sunesis (comprehension) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Section I, I clarify the differences between phronēsis and sunesis, focusing on the roles they play in bouleusis (deliberation). I argue that sunesis is not directly involved in practical deliberation in the canonical sense of the notion. In Section II, I suggest an interpretation of sunesis as ethical discernment. We employ sunesis in cases without any immediate objects of practical deliberation, such as when we criticize an action in the past or give advice to others. In this function, discernment has a crucial role in the ethical life of individuals embedded in a community.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"6 1","pages":"79 - 90"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87832589","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract: In Physics I.8, Aristotle outlines and responds to an Eleatic argument against the reality of change. I defend a new reading according to which the argument assumes Predicational Monism, the claim that each being can possess only one property. In Phys. I.2, Aristotle responds to Predicational Monism, which he attributes to the Eleatics; I argue that he uses this response to distinguish coincidental from non-coincidental becoming, a distinction he employs in Phys I.8 to resolve the argument against the reality of change. The Eleatics’ acceptance of Predicational Monism, I argue, explains why this distinction is unavailable to them.
{"title":"The Eleatic Challenge in Aristotle’s Physics I.8","authors":"S. O’Connor","doi":"10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/rhiz-2017-0002","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: In Physics I.8, Aristotle outlines and responds to an Eleatic argument against the reality of change. I defend a new reading according to which the argument assumes Predicational Monism, the claim that each being can possess only one property. In Phys. I.2, Aristotle responds to Predicational Monism, which he attributes to the Eleatics; I argue that he uses this response to distinguish coincidental from non-coincidental becoming, a distinction he employs in Phys I.8 to resolve the argument against the reality of change. The Eleatics’ acceptance of Predicational Monism, I argue, explains why this distinction is unavailable to them.","PeriodicalId":40571,"journal":{"name":"Rhizomata-A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science","volume":"11 1","pages":"25 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75191596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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