{"title":"Book Review Fleur Jongepier and Michael Klenk (Eds.) The Philosophy of Online Manipulation","authors":"J. Macaranas","doi":"10.46992/pijp.24.1.r.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.24.1.r.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43939197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What do Paraconsistent Logics Reject? A Defense of the Law of Contradiction","authors":"Xudong Hao","doi":"10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46817413","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cicero and Wang Chong and their Critique of Divination","authors":"Mark Kevin S. Cabural","doi":"10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42226928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-30DOI: 10.11648/j.ijp.20231101.11
Junheng Sun, Tan Gong, Xinyu Zhang
{"title":"On the Highlights and Limits of Laozi's Tao","authors":"Junheng Sun, Tan Gong, Xinyu Zhang","doi":"10.11648/j.ijp.20231101.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20231101.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82502774","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Facts, Abilities and Concepts: Knowledge Argument and Physicalism","authors":"Napoleon Mabaquiao, Jose Ramon de Leon","doi":"10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47547775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Questioning Demeterio’s Approach to Filipino Philosophy","authors":"Hazel T. Biana, J. J. Joaquin","doi":"10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.24.1.a.8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49017896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper critically analyses the quest for identity and the existential crisis of Meursault, the central protagonist of the novel The Stranger, an existentialist novel, published in 1942. The novel is based on Mersualt, who is disconnected from the societal norms and is lost in the incomprehensible complexities of life. Through the central character of the novel, Mersault, the paper aims to explore the crisis of the “absurd man”, who “does not hesitate to draw the inevitable conclusions from a fundamental absurdity” (Sartre an Explication 4). Concepts like choice, responsibility, and bad faith are used to portray how Meursault is confronted with absurd circumstances in his mundane daily life that lead to the destabilization of his thought and identity hence bringing forward the world's meaninglessness and how he attempts to rationalize an incomprehensible, unorderly existence.
{"title":"The Incomprehensibility of Life: An Analysis of Albert Camus’ the Stranger","authors":"Milkah Njoki Macharia","doi":"10.47941/ijp.1083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47941/ijp.1083","url":null,"abstract":"This paper critically analyses the quest for identity and the existential crisis of Meursault, the central protagonist of the novel The Stranger, an existentialist novel, published in 1942. The novel is based on Mersualt, who is disconnected from the societal norms and is lost in the incomprehensible complexities of life. Through the central character of the novel, Mersault, the paper aims to explore the crisis of the “absurd man”, who “does not hesitate to draw the inevitable conclusions from a fundamental absurdity” (Sartre an Explication 4). Concepts like choice, responsibility, and bad faith are used to portray how Meursault is confronted with absurd circumstances in his mundane daily life that lead to the destabilization of his thought and identity hence bringing forward the world's meaninglessness and how he attempts to rationalize an incomprehensible, unorderly existence.","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77773600","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, there are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the oldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. Epistemic relativism is the position that knowledge is valid only relatively to a specific context, society, culture or individual. The discussion about epistemic relativism is one of the most fundamental discussions in epistemology concerning our understanding of notions such as 'justification' and 'good reason'. All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system,” that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. Purpose: In one sense, this work, in defense of Harvey Siegel, takes issue with anti-realist views that eschew objectivity. But, in another sense, it interrogates the epistemic absolutism of Harvey Siegel, showing some of its untoward implications for the furtherance of knowledge, as typified in most ambitious versions of foundationalist or dogmatic epistemology. Minimally, objectivity maintains that an objective gap between what is the case and what we take to be the case, exists. Plato was very clear in his claim that epistemological relativism was self-defeating in two ways. As reformulated by Siegel: First, arguments for relativism are either relativistically or non-relativistically sound. Second, relativism is either relativistically or non-relativistically true. Either choice commits the relativist to major concessions to his or her opponent. In each case, they are dialectically ineffective for the relativist. Results: One cannot live reasonably as a relativist, because relativism leads to epistemic paralysis. Relativism is rationally indefensible, because it is incoherent. It is incoherent because it can be true only if it is false. Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy: In the midst of different proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. He argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry, and maintains that inclusion, as an epistemic virtue, is neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that in order not to become victims of relativism, certain criteria are needed to distinguish what is indeed rational. Insofar as relativism might be construed, by some
{"title":"A Ratiocinative Appraisal of Harvey Siegel’s Critique of Epistemological Relativism","authors":"Joseph T. Ekong","doi":"10.47941/ijp.1051","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47941/ijp.1051","url":null,"abstract":"Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Admittedly, there are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the oldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. Epistemic relativism is the position that knowledge is valid only relatively to a specific context, society, culture or individual. The discussion about epistemic relativism is one of the most fundamental discussions in epistemology concerning our understanding of notions such as 'justification' and 'good reason'. All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system,” that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. \u0000Purpose: In one sense, this work, in defense of Harvey Siegel, takes issue with anti-realist views that eschew objectivity. But, in another sense, it interrogates the epistemic absolutism of Harvey Siegel, showing some of its untoward implications for the furtherance of knowledge, as typified in most ambitious versions of foundationalist or dogmatic epistemology. Minimally, objectivity maintains that an objective gap between what is the case and what we take to be the case, exists. Plato was very clear in his claim that epistemological relativism was self-defeating in two ways. As reformulated by Siegel: First, arguments for relativism are either relativistically or non-relativistically sound. Second, relativism is either relativistically or non-relativistically true. Either choice commits the relativist to major concessions to his or her opponent. In each case, they are dialectically ineffective for the relativist. \u0000Results: One cannot live reasonably as a relativist, because relativism leads to epistemic paralysis. Relativism is rationally indefensible, because it is incoherent. It is incoherent because it can be true only if it is false. Relativism has been, in its various guises, both one of the most popular and most reviled philosophical doctrines of our time. Defenders see it as a harbinger of tolerance and the only ethical and epistemic stance worthy of the open-minded and tolerant. Detractors dismiss it for its alleged incoherence and uncritical intellectual permissiveness. \u0000Unique Contribution to theory, practice and policy: In the midst of different proponents of critical thinking, Harvey Siegel stands out in his attempt to address fundamental epistemological issues. He argues that discursive inclusion of diverse groups should not be confused with rational justification of the outcome of inquiry, and maintains that inclusion, as an epistemic virtue, is neither necessary nor sufficient for rational judgment, and that in order not to become victims of relativism, certain criteria are needed to distinguish what is indeed rational. Insofar as relativism might be construed, by some","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74718568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Purpose: This work has three main objectives: Firstly, it offers an elucidation of the notion of ontological commitment. Secondly, it assesses the adequacy of the criterion of ontological commitment for different languages. Thirdly, it offers some speculative and evaluative remarks regarding the significance of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. Many ontologists, within the analytic tradition, often appeal to Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, when debating whether an assertion or theory implies the existence of a certain entity. Regarding his goal in formulating this criterion, he says that the criterion does not aim to help us discover what it is that there is, but only what a theory says there is: “I look to variables and quantification for evidence as to what a theory says that there is, not for evidence as to what there is” (Quine, 1960: 225). Its most popular formulation, using textual evidence from Quine's oeuvre, is: “To be is to be the value of a bound variable,” (Quine, 1961: 15). However, this formulation is susceptible to gross misunderstanding, especially if one is influenced by the formalities and technical maneuvers of model theory. In mathematical logic, model theory is the study of the relationship between formal theories (a collection of sentences in a formal language expressing statements about a mathematical structure), and their models (those structures in which the statements of the theory hold). Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic where we study mathematical structures by considering the first-order sentences true in those structures and the sets definable by first-order formulas. Model theory studies the relations between sentences of a formal language and the interpretations (or ‘structures’) which make these sentences true or false. It offers precise definitions of truth, logical truth and consequence, meanings and modalities. Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Of course, there are familiar philosophical problems which are within the discursive framework of ‘ontology,’ often phrased by asking if something or some category of things are “real,” or whether “they exist,” concretely. An outstanding example is provided by the traditional problem of universals, which issues in the nominalist-realist controversy, as to the real existence of universals, or of abstract entities such as classes (in the mathematical sense) or propositions (in the abstract sense, referring to the content of an assertion in abstraction from the particular words used to convey it). Results: In as much as one might agree with Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment, one might also opine that it is nonetheless a feature of first-order language (i.e. the language embodied in first-order logic; a symbolized reasoning process comprising relations, functions and constants, in which each sentence or statement is broken down into a subject and a predicate. In this re
{"title":"A Ratiocinative Study and Assessment of W. V. O. Quine’s “Criterion of Ontological Commitment”","authors":"Joseph T. Ekong","doi":"10.47941/ijp.1052","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.47941/ijp.1052","url":null,"abstract":"Purpose: This work has three main objectives: Firstly, it offers an elucidation of the notion of ontological commitment. Secondly, it assesses the adequacy of the criterion of ontological commitment for different languages. Thirdly, it offers some speculative and evaluative remarks regarding the significance of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. Many ontologists, within the analytic tradition, often appeal to Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, when debating whether an assertion or theory implies the existence of a certain entity. Regarding his goal in formulating this criterion, he says that the criterion does not aim to help us discover what it is that there is, but only what a theory says there is: “I look to variables and quantification for evidence as to what a theory says that there is, not for evidence as to what there is” (Quine, 1960: 225). Its most popular formulation, using textual evidence from Quine's oeuvre, is: “To be is to be the value of a bound variable,” (Quine, 1961: 15). However, this formulation is susceptible to gross misunderstanding, especially if one is influenced by the formalities and technical maneuvers of model theory. In mathematical logic, model theory is the study of the relationship between formal theories (a collection of sentences in a formal language expressing statements about a mathematical structure), and their models (those structures in which the statements of the theory hold). Model theory is a branch of mathematical logic where we study mathematical structures by considering the first-order sentences true in those structures and the sets definable by first-order formulas. Model theory studies the relations between sentences of a formal language and the interpretations (or ‘structures’) which make these sentences true or false. It offers precise definitions of truth, logical truth and consequence, meanings and modalities. \u0000Methodology: This work is expository, analytic, critical and evaluative in its methodology. Of course, there are familiar philosophical problems which are within the discursive framework of ‘ontology,’ often phrased by asking if something or some category of things are “real,” or whether “they exist,” concretely. An outstanding example is provided by the traditional problem of universals, which issues in the nominalist-realist controversy, as to the real existence of universals, or of abstract entities such as classes (in the mathematical sense) or propositions (in the abstract sense, referring to the content of an assertion in abstraction from the particular words used to convey it). \u0000Results: In as much as one might agree with Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment, one might also opine that it is nonetheless a feature of first-order language (i.e. the language embodied in first-order logic; a symbolized reasoning process comprising relations, functions and constants, in which each sentence or statement is broken down into a subject and a predicate. In this re","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72548730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Radically Invested: Laclau’s Discursive Ontology and the Universality of Hegemony","authors":"Min Seong Kim","doi":"10.46992/pijp.23.2.a.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.46992/pijp.23.2.a.2","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40692,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia-International Journal of Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46121624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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