In this work, I will present a way to avoid the most recurrent problems in a certain version of logical pluralism, one that argues that even considering a fixed language there are multiple legitimate logical systems. To do this, it will be necessary to consider the starting points of the pluralist program and explain the problems that arise from them, mainly the Quine Challenge and the Collapse Problem. Then, I will propose a modification for what is understood by logical consequence, to be able to consider a family of logical systems, mixed logics, which cover both pure and impure logics. Finally, I will show that with a reasonable interpretation of the formalism, those problems can be avoided while respecting the spirit of the pluralist program.
{"title":"Las Lógicas Mixtas como escape al Problema del Colapso y al Desafío de Quine","authors":"Joaquín Santiago Toranzo Calderón","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.319","url":null,"abstract":"In this work, I will present a way to avoid the most recurrent problems in a certain version of logical pluralism, one that argues that even considering a fixed language there are multiple legitimate logical systems. To do this, it will be necessary to consider the starting points of the pluralist program and explain the problems that arise from them, mainly the Quine Challenge and the Collapse Problem. Then, I will propose a modification for what is understood by logical consequence, to be able to consider a family of logical systems, mixed logics, which cover both pure and impure logics. Finally, I will show that with a reasonable interpretation of the formalism, those problems can be avoided while respecting the spirit of the pluralist program.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"247-272"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44111399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The barcode image has been imposed to refer to a mitochondrial DNA sequence that is used to measure the genetic distance between animal populations. According to the essentialist interpretation of this analogy, this measurement method would serve not only for the rapid identification of specimens or fragmentary samples of previously classified species, but also, by itself, for the discovery of new species. Integrative taxonomists have rejected this latter use of the DNA barcode method, since biological complexity precludes its precise application in recent speciation events. I will argue, however, that the method fails for conceptual and not merely empirical reasons. Even if it wouldn’t have any empirical impediment, the DNA barcode could not be a method of species discovery.
{"title":"Código de barras de ADN","authors":"Julio Torres Meléndez","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.352","url":null,"abstract":"The barcode image has been imposed to refer to a mitochondrial DNA sequence that is used to measure the genetic distance between animal populations. According to the essentialist interpretation of this analogy, this measurement method would serve not only for the rapid identification of specimens or fragmentary samples of previously classified species, but also, by itself, for the discovery of new species. Integrative taxonomists have rejected this latter use of the DNA barcode method, since biological complexity precludes its precise application in recent speciation events. I will argue, however, that the method fails for conceptual and not merely empirical reasons. Even if it wouldn’t have any empirical impediment, the DNA barcode could not be a method of species discovery.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"45 1","pages":"169-185"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70201133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jurgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971, -surprisingly neglected in most approaches to the debate-, in which Habermas did include such a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are no such good reasons.
{"title":"Habermas, Rorty, and the Problem of Competent Interlocutors","authors":"Claudio Cormick","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.368","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.368","url":null,"abstract":"In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jurgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971, -surprisingly neglected in most approaches to the debate-, in which Habermas did include such a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are no such good reasons.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"213-246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45630507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Las interpretaciones tradicionales de Frege tienden a explicar su antipsicologismo como indicando que ninguna consideración subjetivista debe interferir en la elaboración de un lenguaje lógico; dichas interpretaciones, sin embargo, tienen problemas para explicar el énfasis dado por el mismo Frege a conceptos como el de fuerza asertiva. Este artículo pretende solucionar esta extrañeza investigando, a partir de su concepto de ciencia, algunas de las ideas epistemológicas de Frege. Esto nos llevará a concluir que una concepción de la verdad como fenómeno esencialmente público puede resolver este y otros problemas interpretativos.
{"title":"La lógica de lo público","authors":"F. Cuervo","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.331","url":null,"abstract":"Las interpretaciones tradicionales de Frege tienden a explicar su antipsicologismo como indicando que ninguna consideración subjetivista debe interferir en la elaboración de un lenguaje lógico; dichas interpretaciones, sin embargo, tienen problemas para explicar el énfasis dado por el mismo Frege a conceptos como el de fuerza asertiva. Este artículo pretende solucionar esta extrañeza investigando, a partir de su concepto de ciencia, algunas de las ideas epistemológicas de Frege. Esto nos llevará a concluir que una concepción de la verdad como fenómeno esencialmente público puede resolver este y otros problemas interpretativos.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44317289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In past years, several substructural solutions to semantical paradoxes have been developed. In particular, nontransitive, noncontractive, nonmonotonic and nonreflexive theories have been proposed. However, when such solutions are presented using sequent-calculi it emerges what I call the problem of the dependence. In a nutshell, this problem consists in that it’s not easy (or sometimes even possible) to distinguish between the structural rules and the other rules of the calculus. In this article, I will present in detail this problem and I show that even worst there DOI: 10.36446/af.2020.337
{"title":"Las soluciones subestructurales a las paradojas y el problema de la dependencia","authors":"Bruno Da Ré","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.337","url":null,"abstract":"In past years, several substructural solutions to semantical paradoxes have been developed. In particular, nontransitive, noncontractive, nonmonotonic and nonreflexive theories have been proposed. However, when such solutions are presented using sequent-calculi it emerges what I call the problem of the dependence. In a nutshell, this problem consists in that it’s not easy (or sometimes even possible) to distinguish between the structural rules and the other rules of the calculus. In this article, I will present in detail this problem and I show that even worst there DOI: 10.36446/af.2020.337","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"41-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42154850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Recordando a un maestro: Mario Bunge","authors":"Martha Frassineti, Alicia Gianella, María Cristina González, Estela Santilli, Nora Stigol","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.339","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"149-152"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45375919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thomas S. Kuhn, Desarrollo científico y cambio de léxico, Montevideo, FIC-UDELAR/ ANII /SADAF, 2017, 153 pp.","authors":"M. González","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.349","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"153-155"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48185712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory experiences. On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation. Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems. In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account. I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories.
{"title":"Observer memories and the perspectival mind","authors":"Marina Trakas","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.335","url":null,"abstract":"Observer memories, memories where one sees oneself in the remembered scene, from-the-outside, are commonly considered less accurate and genuine than visual field memories, memories in which the scene remembered is seen as one originally experienced it. In Remembering from the Outside (OUP, 2019), Christopher McCarroll debunks this commonsense conception by offering a detailed analysis of the nature of observer memories. On the one hand, he explains how observer and field perspectives are not really mutually exclusive in an experience, including memory experiences. On the other hand, he argues that in observer memories there is no additional explicit representation of oneself experiencing the event: the self-presence is transparent and given by the mode of presentation. Whereas these are two lines of strategic and original argumentation, they are not exempt of problems. In this critical notice, I focus on the problematic aspects of McCarroll’s account. I show that it presents some issues that affect the internal coherence of the overall framework, and that some aspects and central notions would have needed more development to offer a precise picture of the nature of observer memories.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"123-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49330602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we examine a case of application of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity (HLR): the influence of the grammatical gender of languages on the cognition or thinking of speakers. Since languages differ both in their lexical repertoires, but, specially, in their gender grammars to refer to people, other animated beings and even inanimate entities, our purpose will be, first, to review the recent experimental evidence that would support the HLR on this domain, because they verify a variety of cognitive and psychological impacts, variable according to the languages of the speakers. In particular, we will identify what are the “relativist effects” in the case of morphosyntactic features of gender-loaded languages and in a relation to the universalization of the male gender. Based on the evaluation carried out and incorporating the contributions of “gender and language” studies of feminist approaches, we will conclude by pointing out in what ways it is viable and important to promote inclusive uses of language and even deeper changes towards an inclusive language, with special reference to Spanish.
{"title":"Relatividad lingüística, gramáticas de género y lenguaje inclusivo: algunas consideraciones","authors":"Silvia Carolina Scotto, Diana I. Pérez","doi":"10.36446/af.2020.318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.36446/af.2020.318","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we examine a case of application of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity (HLR): the influence of the grammatical gender of languages on the cognition or thinking of speakers. Since languages differ both in their lexical repertoires, but, specially, in their gender grammars to refer to people, other animated beings and even inanimate entities, our purpose will be, first, to review the recent experimental evidence that would support the HLR on this domain, because they verify a variety of cognitive and psychological impacts, variable according to the languages of the speakers. In particular, we will identify what are the “relativist effects” in the case of morphosyntactic features of gender-loaded languages and in a relation to the universalization of the male gender. Based on the evaluation carried out and incorporating the contributions of “gender and language” studies of feminist approaches, we will conclude by pointing out in what ways it is viable and important to promote inclusive uses of language and even deeper changes towards an inclusive language, with special reference to Spanish.","PeriodicalId":40940,"journal":{"name":"Analisis Filosofico","volume":"40 1","pages":"5-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45622621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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