{"title":"Jacqueline Taylor (ed.), Reading Hume on the Principles of Morals and Esther Engels Kroeker and Willem Lemmens (eds), Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Guide","authors":"Pedro Faria","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0344","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47601938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Michelle Schwarze, Recognizing Resentment: Sympathy, Injustice, and Liberal Political Thought","authors":"K. Sankaran","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0343","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46648985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I begin with a diagnosis. Present-day scholarly work on the Scottish Enlightenment is bifurcated: it is either focused on the areas of moral philosophy or of natural philosophy, broadly construed in both cases. The aspiration to combine these inquiries is rare and unsystematic. This paper makes a case for the need and possibility of a perspective that conceives moral and natural inquiry as integrated enterprises in the period. It also suggests that potentially useful interpretive devices can be adopted from the historiography of science and philosophy, as well as science studies.
{"title":"A Plea for an Integrated Historiography of Natural and Moral Philosophy in Enlightenment Scotland: A Programmatic Essay","authors":"T. Demeter","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0335","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0335","url":null,"abstract":"I begin with a diagnosis. Present-day scholarly work on the Scottish Enlightenment is bifurcated: it is either focused on the areas of moral philosophy or of natural philosophy, broadly construed in both cases. The aspiration to combine these inquiries is rare and unsystematic. This paper makes a case for the need and possibility of a perspective that conceives moral and natural inquiry as integrated enterprises in the period. It also suggests that potentially useful interpretive devices can be adopted from the historiography of science and philosophy, as well as science studies.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42157722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Smith’s statements on wealth and happiness are paradoxical. On the one hand, Smith states that individuals’ pursuit of wealth is beneficial for society because it leads to economic growth and establishes rank and order in society. On the other hand, he appears to say that pursuit of wealth leaves individuals unhappy. Griswold refers to this as ‘comic irony’. In this paper, by examining what Smith says about wealth and happiness, we attempt to resolve this paradox. Towards this end, we analyze the unconscious that is implicit in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As we will describe, analyzing Smith’s statements by considering the role of the unconscious implies that the pursuit of great wealth can make individuals happy.
{"title":"The Paradox of Wealth and Happiness in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments","authors":"Ş. Özler","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0336","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0336","url":null,"abstract":"Smith’s statements on wealth and happiness are paradoxical. On the one hand, Smith states that individuals’ pursuit of wealth is beneficial for society because it leads to economic growth and establishes rank and order in society. On the other hand, he appears to say that pursuit of wealth leaves individuals unhappy. Griswold refers to this as ‘comic irony’. In this paper, by examining what Smith says about wealth and happiness, we attempt to resolve this paradox. Towards this end, we analyze the unconscious that is implicit in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. As we will describe, analyzing Smith’s statements by considering the role of the unconscious implies that the pursuit of great wealth can make individuals happy.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44756905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reid in the Nineteenth Century","authors":"A. Fraser","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0339","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49633290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Reid's discernment between a ‘relative’ and a ‘distinct’ conception plays a significant role in his theory of secondary and primary qualities and in his postulations on ‘instinctive’ and ‘rational’ aesthetic perceptions. However, relative conceptions and, hence, the relative/distinct conception discernment, are absent from one model of aesthetic perception which Reid endorses, as well as from his theory of ‘moral approbation’. This paper aims (1) to explore the importance of Reid's relative/distinct discernment for the conception of qualities and aesthetic features and (2) to point out and explain the significance of a different model of conception, which excludes relative conception, embraced by Reid for a certain context of aesthetic perception and for moral approbation.
{"title":"Reid’s Philosophy of Relative and Distinct Conceptions: Qualities, Aesthetics and Ethics","authors":"Adam Weiler Gur Arye","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0338","url":null,"abstract":"Reid's discernment between a ‘relative’ and a ‘distinct’ conception plays a significant role in his theory of secondary and primary qualities and in his postulations on ‘instinctive’ and ‘rational’ aesthetic perceptions. However, relative conceptions and, hence, the relative/distinct conception discernment, are absent from one model of aesthetic perception which Reid endorses, as well as from his theory of ‘moral approbation’. This paper aims (1) to explore the importance of Reid's relative/distinct discernment for the conception of qualities and aesthetic features and (2) to point out and explain the significance of a different model of conception, which excludes relative conception, embraced by Reid for a certain context of aesthetic perception and for moral approbation.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42690297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whatever the finer details, Francis Hutcheson is clearly some form of proto-, quasi-, pseudo-utilitarian. But for any utilitarian, the full picture of their moral theory will only emerge once we understand their theory of the good. What, according to said utilitarian, is the nature of happiness? How do we aggregate happiness across persons? In this paper, I discuss two important aspects of Hutcheson's utilitarian axiology each with their own puzzles of interpretation. The first involves Hutcheson's theory of happiness or the ‘natural good’. Hutcheson appears to vacillate between a quantitative hedonism (according to which the value of a pleasure just concerns its intrinsic pleasurableness; its intensity and duration) and a qualitative hedonism (according to which pleasures are not simply judged given their intensity and duration, but also a further qualitative operator). The second concerns Hutcheson's aggregative axiology. Hutcheson appears to offer three inconsistent approaches to understanding the overall good. Bringing these puzzles to light, I think, brings forward a number of challenges in understanding the normative ethics of a key figure in the development of utilitarian moral thought.
{"title":"The Natural and the Publick Good: Two Puzzles in Hutcheson's Axiology","authors":"D. Dorsey","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0331","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0331","url":null,"abstract":"Whatever the finer details, Francis Hutcheson is clearly some form of proto-, quasi-, pseudo-utilitarian. But for any utilitarian, the full picture of their moral theory will only emerge once we understand their theory of the good. What, according to said utilitarian, is the nature of happiness? How do we aggregate happiness across persons? In this paper, I discuss two important aspects of Hutcheson's utilitarian axiology each with their own puzzles of interpretation. The first involves Hutcheson's theory of happiness or the ‘natural good’. Hutcheson appears to vacillate between a quantitative hedonism (according to which the value of a pleasure just concerns its intrinsic pleasurableness; its intensity and duration) and a qualitative hedonism (according to which pleasures are not simply judged given their intensity and duration, but also a further qualitative operator). The second concerns Hutcheson's aggregative axiology. Hutcheson appears to offer three inconsistent approaches to understanding the overall good. Bringing these puzzles to light, I think, brings forward a number of challenges in understanding the normative ethics of a key figure in the development of utilitarian moral thought.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48232700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I argue both that Hutcheson has a theory of obligation that is different in important ways from the views of his predecessors and that his theory may not be as problematic as critics have claimed. After briefly sketching a picture of the rich conceptual landscape surrounding the concept of obligation in the Early Modern period, I offer an account of Hutcheson's theory of obligation. Not only does Hutcheson have a view on what previous figures called the source, end, and object of obligation, I illustrate that he focuses on the epistemological question of the origin of the idea of obligation, and he conceives of the necessity involved in obligation in a unique way, namely in terms of the necessity of a perception. I conclude by defending Hutcheson's theory against three objections.
{"title":"Hutcheson's Theory of Obligation","authors":"Michael Walschots","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0329","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0329","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I argue both that Hutcheson has a theory of obligation that is different in important ways from the views of his predecessors and that his theory may not be as problematic as critics have claimed. After briefly sketching a picture of the rich conceptual landscape surrounding the concept of obligation in the Early Modern period, I offer an account of Hutcheson's theory of obligation. Not only does Hutcheson have a view on what previous figures called the source, end, and object of obligation, I illustrate that he focuses on the epistemological question of the origin of the idea of obligation, and he conceives of the necessity involved in obligation in a unique way, namely in terms of the necessity of a perception. I conclude by defending Hutcheson's theory against three objections.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45380086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.
{"title":"Hutcheson and his Critics and Opponents on the Moral Sense","authors":"Ruth Boeker","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0330","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0330","url":null,"abstract":"This paper takes a new look at Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory and examines it in light of the views of his rationalist critics and opponents who claim that there has to be an antecedent moral standard prior to any sense or affections. I examine how Gilbert Burnet, Samuel Clarke, and Catharine Trotter Cockburn each argue for the priority of reason over a moral sense and how Hutcheson responds or could respond to their views. Furthermore, I consider the proposal that rather than regarding Hutcheson's moral sense theory as fundamentally opposed to moral rationalism, Hutcheson and Clarke endorse a shared moral metaphysics, as argued by Patricia Sheridan. Although I consider this proposal as too broad and believe it overlooks relevant metaphysical differences between Clarke and Hutcheson, I argue that the dispute between Hutcheson and his critics and opponents will not be settled without taking their underlying moral metaphysics into consideration.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45833458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Jonathan Dancy charges that Hutcheson's distinction between justifying reasons and motivating reasons is unimportant: it is simply between moral reasons and other good reasons. I argue that the distinction is between propositions (which, following Locke, are mental states) with different presuppositions and different functions. One identifies qualities of objects that we desire; the other identifies qualities that we approve. I situate Hutcheson in the current debate about the nature of practical reasons. I argue that he avoids problems posed for factivists (those who say that reasons are facts but have trouble explaining the motivation for actions not based on facts) and for Humeans (those who say that reasons consist in belief-desire pairs but have trouble explaining how these psychological states can justify). On Hutcheson's view, motivating and justifying reasons at times refer to the same qualities, which makes it possible for one to serve the function of the other.
{"title":"Hutcheson's Contributions to Action Theory","authors":"Elizabeth S. Radcliffe","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0328","url":null,"abstract":"Jonathan Dancy charges that Hutcheson's distinction between justifying reasons and motivating reasons is unimportant: it is simply between moral reasons and other good reasons. I argue that the distinction is between propositions (which, following Locke, are mental states) with different presuppositions and different functions. One identifies qualities of objects that we desire; the other identifies qualities that we approve. I situate Hutcheson in the current debate about the nature of practical reasons. I argue that he avoids problems posed for factivists (those who say that reasons are facts but have trouble explaining the motivation for actions not based on facts) and for Humeans (those who say that reasons consist in belief-desire pairs but have trouble explaining how these psychological states can justify). On Hutcheson's view, motivating and justifying reasons at times refer to the same qualities, which makes it possible for one to serve the function of the other.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49590409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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