Francis Hutcheson's An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, published in 1725, arguably contains the first broadly utilitarian theory of rights ever formulated. In this essay, I argue that, despite its subtlety, there are crucial lacunae in Hutcheson's theory. One of the most important, which Mill seeks to repair, is that his theory of rights lacks a conceptually necessary companion, namely, a corollary account of obligation. Hutcheson has no theory of fully deontic obligations, much less an account of the relational obligations that, as Hohfeld famously argued, are the conceptually necessary correlates of claim rights of the kind Hutcheson wishes to theorise. Like Hume, Hutcheson subversively redefines ‘obligation’ as a motive of self-interest or the approval of morally good motives by moral sense (Hume's ‘natural obligation’ and ‘moral obligation’, respectively). This leaves Hutcheson without any account of the obligations that are the necessary correlates of claim rights. Mill does significantly better on this score but ends up giving a pragmatic ‘reason of the wrong kind’ for rights and obligations. Hutcheson thus begins a line of thought shown by him to have been powerless to ground rights without independent deontic premises from the start.
{"title":"Hutcheson in the History of Rights","authors":"Stephen Darwall","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0327","url":null,"abstract":"Francis Hutcheson's An Inquiry Into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, published in 1725, arguably contains the first broadly utilitarian theory of rights ever formulated. In this essay, I argue that, despite its subtlety, there are crucial lacunae in Hutcheson's theory. One of the most important, which Mill seeks to repair, is that his theory of rights lacks a conceptually necessary companion, namely, a corollary account of obligation. Hutcheson has no theory of fully deontic obligations, much less an account of the relational obligations that, as Hohfeld famously argued, are the conceptually necessary correlates of claim rights of the kind Hutcheson wishes to theorise. Like Hume, Hutcheson subversively redefines ‘obligation’ as a motive of self-interest or the approval of morally good motives by moral sense (Hume's ‘natural obligation’ and ‘moral obligation’, respectively). This leaves Hutcheson without any account of the obligations that are the necessary correlates of claim rights. Mill does significantly better on this score but ends up giving a pragmatic ‘reason of the wrong kind’ for rights and obligations. Hutcheson thus begins a line of thought shown by him to have been powerless to ground rights without independent deontic premises from the start.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49241747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of this paper is to present a comparative analysis and reconstruction of the approach to social, moral, and institutional change in the theories of Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. In their theories moral philosophy is inextricably linked with social thought. I also discuss the role of education and institutions in such a process. I argue that Smith's and de Grouchy's understanding of the roles of sympathy and institutions are strictly connected to the way they perceive the process of social change. Both philosophers considered people as equals and equally capable of sympathizing with others. For both of them, sympathy is a key element in reconstructing how societies change. In my opinion, both these philosophers believe that such a change can be induced: in the case of de Grouchy, this would be done primarily by legislators. In the case of Smith, respected people are capable of initiating change and are subsequently followed by others.
{"title":"Changing Society and Institutions in the Theories of Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy","authors":"A. Markwart","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0320","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0320","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to present a comparative analysis and reconstruction of the approach to social, moral, and institutional change in the theories of Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. In their theories moral philosophy is inextricably linked with social thought. I also discuss the role of education and institutions in such a process. I argue that Smith's and de Grouchy's understanding of the roles of sympathy and institutions are strictly connected to the way they perceive the process of social change. Both philosophers considered people as equals and equally capable of sympathizing with others. For both of them, sympathy is a key element in reconstructing how societies change. In my opinion, both these philosophers believe that such a change can be induced: in the case of de Grouchy, this would be done primarily by legislators. In the case of Smith, respected people are capable of initiating change and are subsequently followed by others.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47221660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Terence Cuneo, Thomas Reid on the Ethical Life","authors":"James J. S. Foster","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0322","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49345844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.
{"title":"Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds","authors":"Stephe Harrop","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0317","url":null,"abstract":"I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43970467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently.
George Berkeley认为视觉是上帝的语言，视觉的直接对象是触觉对象的任意符号，我们所看到的和我们所触摸的之间没有必要的联系。另一方面，托马斯·里德的目标是在视觉和触觉图形之间建立几何联系。因此，尽管里德和伯克利的视觉理论有着共同的重要元素，但里德明确反对伯克利的观点，即可见的图形只是有形物体的任意标志。但他这样做对吗？我指出，伯克利关于视觉的著作中的许多段落表明，他承认视觉和有形之间存在几何联系。因此，伯克利所捍卫的任意性与几何联系之间的对立不可能像里德所认为的那样普遍。本文试图在这方面对伯克利的视觉理论提供一个合理的解读，并解释里德为什么对伯克利有不同的解释。
{"title":"A Reiding of Berkeley's Theory of Vision","authors":"Hannes Ole Matthiessen","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0318","url":null,"abstract":"George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44192696","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hume's Natural History of Religion is generally regarded as a reductionist project, in which religion is traced to its universal natural roots in the passions and imagination. This interpretation neglects: (1) Hume's view that humankind is social by nature, which implies that any naturalist explanation of religion cannot appeal to facts about individual minds alone, and (2) Hume's interest in religion as it concerns religion's effects on morality and society, effects that occur within socio-historical contexts. Religion is generated out of universal propensities, in response to the particular needs and values of communities. Both these aspects are relevant for religious policy. Hume's naturalist approach helps explain problems that attend religion, but questions about how to address these problems as they arise in particular cultures can be answered only in context. The salutary effects of toleration, for example, are not guaranteed at all times and places. The Natural History nevertheless urges the reader towards a tolerant mindset by exposing religion's universality as well as its diversity, and the moral importance of acknowledging both.
{"title":"Religion in context: History and Policy in Hume's Natural History of Religion","authors":"Hannah Lingier","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0319","url":null,"abstract":"Hume's Natural History of Religion is generally regarded as a reductionist project, in which religion is traced to its universal natural roots in the passions and imagination. This interpretation neglects: (1) Hume's view that humankind is social by nature, which implies that any naturalist explanation of religion cannot appeal to facts about individual minds alone, and (2) Hume's interest in religion as it concerns religion's effects on morality and society, effects that occur within socio-historical contexts. Religion is generated out of universal propensities, in response to the particular needs and values of communities. Both these aspects are relevant for religious policy. Hume's naturalist approach helps explain problems that attend religion, but questions about how to address these problems as they arise in particular cultures can be answered only in context. The salutary effects of toleration, for example, are not guaranteed at all times and places. The Natural History nevertheless urges the reader towards a tolerant mindset by exposing religion's universality as well as its diversity, and the moral importance of acknowledging both.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47171317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Max Skjönsberg, The Persistence of Party: Ideas of Harmonious Discord in Eighteenth-Century Britain","authors":"Craig Smith","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43214557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Hsueh M. Qu, Hume's Epistemological Evolution","authors":"Nathan I. Sasser","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2022.0323","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0323","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43407326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In A Series of Popular Essays (1813 ) , Scottish philosopher Elizabeth Hamilton (1758–1816) identifies two ‘principles’ in the human mind: sympathy and the selfish principle. While sharing Adam Smith's understanding of sympathy as a capacity for fellow-feeling, Hamilton also criticizes Smith's account of sympathy as involving the imagination. Even more important for Hamilton is the selfish principle, a ‘propensity to expand or enlarge the idea of self’ that she distinguishes from both selfishness and self-love. Counteracting the selfish principle requires cultivating sympathy and benevolent affections from birth. Since no one can do this alone, Hamilton's prescription appeals ineliminably to the caregivers of the very young; and Hamilton was ahead of her time in claiming that these caregivers need not be female.
{"title":"Elizabeth Hamilton on Sympathy and the Selfish Principle","authors":"D. Boyle","doi":"10.3366/jsp.2021.0309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2021.0309","url":null,"abstract":"In A Series of Popular Essays (1813 ) , Scottish philosopher Elizabeth Hamilton (1758–1816) identifies two ‘principles’ in the human mind: sympathy and the selfish principle. While sharing Adam Smith's understanding of sympathy as a capacity for fellow-feeling, Hamilton also criticizes Smith's account of sympathy as involving the imagination. Even more important for Hamilton is the selfish principle, a ‘propensity to expand or enlarge the idea of self’ that she distinguishes from both selfishness and self-love. Counteracting the selfish principle requires cultivating sympathy and benevolent affections from birth. Since no one can do this alone, Hamilton's prescription appeals ineliminably to the caregivers of the very young; and Hamilton was ahead of her time in claiming that these caregivers need not be female.","PeriodicalId":41417,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Scottish Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49334898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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