Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0001
Włodzimierz Heflik
{"title":"Wokół Der Gedanke. Spór Russella z Fregem o naturę myśli, sądu i faktu","authors":"Włodzimierz Heflik","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47550285","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0019
Marcin Drofiszyn
The paper presents a relative preference semantics for multimodal logic of good and ought inspired by the axiological writings of Henryk Elzenberg. Its central concept is the act of preference between alternative possibilities performed by a metaempirical will, guided only by pure reasons. In semantics, the act of a metaempirical will is modeled using an orderly relation between possible worlds. Using this logic, I formalize some relationships between good and ought posited by Elzenberg.
{"title":"Formalne związki między powinnością a dobrem. Rozważania na marginesie prac Henryka Elzenberga","authors":"Marcin Drofiszyn","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0019","url":null,"abstract":"The paper presents a relative preference semantics for multimodal logic of good and ought inspired by the axiological writings of Henryk Elzenberg. Its central concept is the act of preference between alternative possibilities performed by a metaempirical will, guided only by pure reasons. In semantics, the act of a metaempirical will is modeled using an orderly relation between possible worlds. Using this logic, I formalize some relationships between good and ought posited by Elzenberg.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47035398","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0023
W. Sady
Recently, it has been claimed that Aristotle’s mechanics is a special case of Newton’s mechanics, adequate for speeds tending to zero (Grygiel 2020). I show in the article that this claim does not stand up to closer scrutiny. But there is a peculiar historical relationship between the two theories. Attempts to reconcile the tenets of Aristotelian mechanics with the results of everyday observations by Greek, Arabic, and Latin commentators led to the addition of the theory of impetus to this mechanics. The theory of impetus, in conjunction with the basic principles of Aristotle’s physics, led to conclusions that shattered the system’s coherence. In the seventeenth century, some of these conclusions were elevated to the rank of independent principles, and after being separated from their sources, they gave rise to the research program of Newtonian mechanics.
{"title":"O historycznym związku mechaniki Arystotelesa i mechaniki Newtona","authors":"W. Sady","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2020.0023","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, it has been claimed that Aristotle’s mechanics is a special case of Newton’s mechanics, adequate for speeds tending to zero (Grygiel 2020). I show in the article that this claim does not stand up to closer scrutiny. But there is a peculiar historical relationship between the two theories. Attempts to reconcile the tenets of Aristotelian mechanics with the results of everyday observations by Greek, Arabic, and Latin commentators led to the addition of the theory of impetus to this mechanics. The theory of impetus, in conjunction with the basic principles of Aristotle’s physics, led to conclusions that shattered the system’s coherence. In the seventeenth century, some of these conclusions were elevated to the rank of independent principles, and after being separated from their sources, they gave rise to the research program of Newtonian mechanics.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48182146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0016
Tomasz A. Puczyłowski
The aim of this article is to defend the thesis that every conversational implication is cancellable. To this end, I propose a precising definition of cancellability and, based on an analysis of examples proposed by Bach (2006) and Carston (2002), introduce the category of indirectly saying that p. I stipulate that person X said indirectly that p iff (i) X did not say (directly) that p, (ii) from what X said and the analytical truths of the language, it follows that p, and (iii) X meant that p. I definecancellability as follows: if the use of sentence S in context C implies proposition P then P is a cancellable part of this act iff there is a sentence S* and a context C* such that (i) S is a proper part of S*, (ii) S follows from S*, and (iii) P is not implied by S* in C*, but assertion of S* is admissible in C*.
{"title":"Odwoływalność i mówienie nie wprost","authors":"Tomasz A. Puczyłowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0016","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this article is to defend the thesis that every conversational implication is cancellable. To this end, I propose a precising definition of cancellability and, based on an analysis of examples proposed by Bach (2006) and Carston (2002), introduce the category of indirectly saying that p. I stipulate that person X said indirectly that p iff (i) X did not say (directly) that p, (ii) from what X said and the analytical truths of the language, it follows that p, and (iii) X meant that p. I definecancellability as follows: if the use of sentence S in context C implies proposition P then P is a cancellable part of this act iff there is a sentence S* and a context C* such that (i) S is a proper part of S*, (ii) S follows from S*, and (iii) P is not implied by S* in C*, but assertion of S* is admissible in C*.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49118255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0015
Paweł Stacewicz, Radosław Siedliński
The main aim of this paper is to justify the thesis that in molecular biology — in the scope of phenomena fundamental for the functioning of the cell — a significant role is played by analog (nondiscrete) information, which can be described in computational terms. It is a methodological thesis, indicating a certain direction of advancing new biological hypotheses. This aim is realized in two stages. In sections 1 and 2 we discuss the computer-science concept of analogicity, generally describing different concepts of analog-continuous and analog-empirical computations, as well as discussing the relationship between analogicity and digitality. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze some components of the process of protein formation, emphasizing that an adequate description of this process requires taking into account information of an analog nature, which, with a certain research attitude, can be described, but also used, computationally.
{"title":"O informatycznej kategorii analogowości i jej stosowalności w biologii molekularnej","authors":"Paweł Stacewicz, Radosław Siedliński","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0015","url":null,"abstract":"The main aim of this paper is to justify the thesis that in molecular biology — in the scope of phenomena fundamental for the functioning of the cell — a significant role is played by analog (nondiscrete) information, which can be described in computational terms. It is a methodological thesis, indicating a certain direction of advancing new biological hypotheses. This aim is realized in two stages. In sections 1 and 2 we discuss the computer-science concept of analogicity, generally describing different concepts of analog-continuous and analog-empirical computations, as well as discussing the relationship between analogicity and digitality. In sections 3 and 4 we analyze some components of the process of protein formation, emphasizing that an adequate description of this process requires taking into account information of an analog nature, which, with a certain research attitude, can be described, but also used, computationally.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42583307","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0013
H. Sankey
The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the epistemic objectivity of science. A distinction is made between theoretical virtues that may be possessed by scientific theories and epistemic virtues that may be exercised by individual scientists. A distinction is then made between ontological objectivity, objectivity of truth and epistemic objectivity, the latter being the principal focus of the paper. It is then noted that a role must be played by deliberative judgement in determining how to apply the theoretical virtues. It is suggested that such judgement may be virtuous in light of the exercise of the epistemic virtues. It is argued that the primary location of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues, whereas the epistemic virtues of scientists play a subordinate role.
{"title":"Epistemic Objectivity and the Virtues","authors":"H. Sankey","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0013","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to bring the resources of virtue epistemology to bear on the issue of the epistemic objectivity of science. A distinction is made between theoretical virtues that may be possessed by scientific theories and epistemic virtues that may be exercised by individual scientists. A distinction is then made between ontological objectivity, objectivity of truth and epistemic objectivity, the latter being the principal focus of the paper. It is then noted that a role must be played by deliberative judgement in determining how to apply the theoretical virtues. It is suggested that such judgement may be virtuous in light of the exercise of the epistemic virtues. It is argued that the primary location of epistemic objectivity is the theoretical virtues, whereas the epistemic virtues of scientists play a subordinate role.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43291068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0006
Marcin Czakon
This is a review of the book Jednośc i wielośc logik modalnych (The Unity and Diversity of Modal Logics) edited by Marcin Tkaczyk. The book contains discussions of the most recent results of contemporary modal logic, focusing on regular modal logics, epistemic logic, and temporal logic. The book comprises four chapter, each of which deals with selected formal-logical and philosophical problems associated with modal logic.
{"title":"Siła i słabość logik modalnych","authors":"Marcin Czakon","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0006","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review of the book Jednośc i wielośc logik modalnych (The Unity and Diversity of Modal Logics) edited by Marcin Tkaczyk. The book contains discussions of the most recent results of contemporary modal logic, focusing on regular modal logics, epistemic logic, and temporal logic. The book comprises four chapter, each of which deals with selected formal-logical and philosophical problems associated with modal logic.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41422339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0004
M. Tarnowski
In this article, I investigate the relation between the concept of object-dependent thoughts (ODTs) and the semantics of complex demonstratives. I begin by showing that a strong syntactic version of ODTs proposed by Adams and colleagues suffers from problems similar to those plaguing several semantic theories (Richard 1993, Larson, Segal 1995). Next, I turn to Eros Corazza’s counterproposal of perspectival thoughts and investigate whether it can provide us with promised explanatory benefits. I conclude by formulating an alternative picture of ODTs based on Evans’ work and showing that it successfully handles the problems posed for semantics of complex demonstratives. In order to do this, I introduce and defend a view of individual perceptive concepts that may serve as a mental counterpart of demonstration.
{"title":"Wskazywanie w myślach. Myśli zależne od przedmiotu a semantyka złożonych wyrażeń wskazujących","authors":"M. Tarnowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0004","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I investigate the relation between the concept of object-dependent thoughts (ODTs) and the semantics of complex demonstratives. I begin by showing that a strong syntactic version of ODTs proposed by Adams and colleagues suffers from problems similar to those plaguing several semantic theories (Richard 1993, Larson, Segal 1995). Next, I turn to Eros Corazza’s counterproposal of perspectival thoughts and investigate whether it can provide us with promised explanatory benefits. I conclude by formulating an alternative picture of ODTs based on Evans’ work and showing that it successfully handles the problems posed for semantics of complex demonstratives. In order to do this, I introduce and defend a view of individual perceptive concepts that may serve as a mental counterpart of demonstration.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45506844","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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