Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0007
J. Knobe
In the early days of experimental philosophy, a number of studies seemed to suggest that people's philosophical intuitions were in a certain sense unstable. Such studies typically used one of two broad approaches. First, some studies looked at the impact of demographic factors. In these studies, all participants received the same question, but different participants belonged to different demographic groups. The results appeared to show that people from different demographic groups had radically different patterns of philosophical intuition (e.g., Machery, Mallon, Nichols & Stich, 2004; Weinberg, Nichols & Stich, 2001). Second, some studies manipulated features of the situation. In these studies, all participants received the same question, but researchers manipulated something about the situation participants were in while answering. The results appeared to show that people in different situations had very different patterns of philosophical intuition (e.g., Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). These early studies attracted an enormous amount of attention in the philosophical community, and they inspired a sustained effort to explore the philosophical implications of instability. The core question guiding this research has been: “If we learn that people's intuitions are unstable, what should we conclude about the use of intuitions in philosophy?” Attempts to answer this question have shown truly impressive levels of sophistication and ingenuity. In more recent years, however, there has been an explosion of new empirical research about philosophical intuitions. These more recent studies offer a very different picture of people's philosophical intuitions. The evidence now suggests that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable . Indeed, the available evidence suggests that philosophical intuitions are surprisingly stable across both demographic groups and situations. The entire aim of the present paper is to review evidence for this one claim. Of course, if the claim does turn out to be true, it immediately leaves us with some deeper theoretical questions, but I will not be defending any view about those deeper questions here. The reason is not that such questions lie outside the scope of the paper. It is simply that I have not been able to come up with any good answers.
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Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0003
Peter Galbács
This paper is an attempt to understand Robert E. Lucas’s microfounded models of the 1960-70s as results of a structuralist project. It is argued that the way Lucas derived macroeconomic outcomes from the decisions of market agents is in line with the basic tenet of the semirealist version of structural realism, where structures are conceived as relations emerging between properties of relata under specific conditions. Accordingly, after an overview of semirealism, it is emphasized that in his microfoundations project Lucas formulated the basic decision problem so that large-scale fluctuations could plausibly be traced back to agents’ properties. The transition from Lucas and Rapping’s model of the labor market to Lucas’s monetary island model is described as placing the same decision makers in a setting the specifics of which are in consonance with the assumed actions and interactions of market participants.
本文试图理解罗伯特·e·卢卡斯(Robert E. Lucas) 20世纪60-70年代的微观模型是一个结构主义项目的结果。有人认为，卢卡斯从市场主体的决策中得出宏观经济结果的方式符合结构现实主义的半现实主义版本的基本原则，其中结构被认为是在特定条件下相关属性之间出现的关系。因此，在概述了半现实主义之后，强调Lucas在他的微基础项目中制定了基本决策问题，以便大规模的波动可以合理地追溯到agent的属性。从Lucas和Rapping的劳动力市场模型到Lucas的货币岛模型的转变被描述为将相同的决策者置于一个与市场参与者的假设行为和互动相一致的环境中。
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Pub Date : 2021-12-01DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0008
David Bordonaba-Plou
According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, The Argument from Philosophical Practice claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, The Argument from Intuition Talk contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreements — a topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.
{"title":"An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements","authors":"David Bordonaba-Plou","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0008","url":null,"abstract":"According to Cappelen (2012), analytic philosophers have traditionally used two arguments to defend the role of intuitions in philosophy. On the one hand, The Argument from Philosophical Practice claims that analytic philosophers rely on intuitions when defending their theories. On the other hand, The Argument from Intuition Talk contends that intuitions must play a prominent role in analytic philosophy because analytic philosophers use intuition talk profusely. Cappelen (2012) identifies three questions to be considered when assessing the Argument from Intuition Talk: a quantitative question, a centrality question, and an interpretative question. The available studies have mainly focused on the quantitative and interpretative questions. In this paper, I examine the centrality question, taking as a case study the literature on taste disagreements — a topic that has received significant attention in the philosophy of language in the last fifteen years. To this end, I first build a corpus with the most relevant works in the area and then examine the centrality of intuition talk. The results show that the use of intuition talk is central in the literature on taste disagreements, and that intuitions are taken as evidence in favor of a given theory if the theory can account for them.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44229271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0016
Jarosław Boruszewski, Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy
{"title":"Economic Models as Cultural Artifacts: A Philosophical Primer","authors":"Jarosław Boruszewski, Krzysztof Nowak-Posadzy","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0016","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43453555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0019
Ł. Hardt, M. Poręba
{"title":"Philosophy of Economics and the Significance of Economics to Philosophy: Introduction to the Topical Collection \"Philosophy of Economics\"","authors":"Ł. Hardt, M. Poręba","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0019","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43485912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0018
T. Kwarciński, Krzysztof M. Turek
{"title":"Can Normative Economics Be Convincing without the Notion of Well-Being?","authors":"T. Kwarciński, Krzysztof M. Turek","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0018","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46568437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0002
P. Rojek
I NGARDEN ’ S B URNING I SSUE : P LATONISM , U NIVERSALS , AND R ELATIONAL B EINGS In my recent book Tropy i uniwersalia ( Tropes and Universals ), I argued that Roman Ingarden’s theory of universals is in fact a kind of hidden nominalism. This claim has been subjected to serious criticism by Marek Piwowarczyk, who has defended Ingarden’s position and attempted to flesh out the Platonic theory of universals. In my reply, I argue that his interpretation of Platonism, though it fits Plato’s doctrine, does not correspond to Ingarden’s ontology. Ingarden, contrary to Piwowarczyk, did not regard participation between individual properties and pure ideal qualities as a kind of ontological dependence. Moreover, robust Platonism, proposed by Piwowarczyk, though solves some problems indicated in my book, has serious ontological consequences. Individuals have their character and existence in virtue of their relations to forms. Therefore, individuals are no longer independent substances, but rather relational beings. Perhaps it was Plato’s actual teaching, but it certainly contradicts Ingarden’s crucial insight that the world is ontologically autonomous. In this way, robust Platonism turns out to be surprisingly close to Idealism.
{"title":"Piekący problemat Ingardena. Platonizm, uniwersalia i byty relacyjne","authors":"P. Rojek","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0002","url":null,"abstract":"I NGARDEN ’ S B URNING I SSUE : P LATONISM , U NIVERSALS , AND R ELATIONAL B EINGS In my recent book Tropy i uniwersalia ( Tropes and Universals ), I argued that Roman Ingarden’s theory of universals is in fact a kind of hidden nominalism. This claim has been subjected to serious criticism by Marek Piwowarczyk, who has defended Ingarden’s position and attempted to flesh out the Platonic theory of universals. In my reply, I argue that his interpretation of Platonism, though it fits Plato’s doctrine, does not correspond to Ingarden’s ontology. Ingarden, contrary to Piwowarczyk, did not regard participation between individual properties and pure ideal qualities as a kind of ontological dependence. Moreover, robust Platonism, proposed by Piwowarczyk, though solves some problems indicated in my book, has serious ontological consequences. Individuals have their character and existence in virtue of their relations to forms. Therefore, individuals are no longer independent substances, but rather relational beings. Perhaps it was Plato’s actual teaching, but it certainly contradicts Ingarden’s crucial insight that the world is ontologically autonomous. In this way, robust Platonism turns out to be surprisingly close to Idealism.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42090911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0004
Katarzyna Barska
{"title":"Ontologia Romana Ingardena wobec sporu o uniwersalia. W związku z książką Pawła Rojka „Tropy i uniwersalia”","authors":"Katarzyna Barska","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45918487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-25DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0005
M. Głowacki
I S M ATHEMATICS S YNTAX OF L ANGUAGE ? K URT G ÖDEL ’ S A RGUMENT AGAINST F ORMALISM In this paper, I critically examine Kurt Gödel’s argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. While the main aim is to analyze the argument, I also wish to underscore the rele-vance of the original elements of Gödel’s philosophical thought. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, I introduce the reader to Gödel’s philosophy. In the second part, I reconstruct the formalist stance in the philosophy of mathematics, which is the object of Gödel’s criticism. In the third part, I sketch his argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. Finally, I discuss some controversies regarding the argument.
{"title":"Czy matematyka jest składnią języka? Kurta Gödla argument przeciwko formalizmowi","authors":"M. Głowacki","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0005","url":null,"abstract":"I S M ATHEMATICS S YNTAX OF L ANGUAGE ? K URT G ÖDEL ’ S A RGUMENT AGAINST F ORMALISM In this paper, I critically examine Kurt Gödel’s argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. While the main aim is to analyze the argument, I also wish to underscore the rele-vance of the original elements of Gödel’s philosophical thought. The paper consists of four parts. In the first part, I introduce the reader to Gödel’s philosophy. In the second part, I reconstruct the formalist stance in the philosophy of mathematics, which is the object of Gödel’s criticism. In the third part, I sketch his argument against the syntactic interpretation of mathematics. Finally, I discuss some controversies regarding the argument.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-10-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47241644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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