Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0001
W. Grygiel
An analysis of two different reconstructions of Aristotelian mechanics in the language of contemporary physics reveals interesting aspects of the historical development of physics: (1) there exists a structural invariant in all physical representations of reality in the form of the Cartesian product and (2) all intertheoretical transitions to date, at each stage of unification, have occurred in accordance with the correspondence principle. This means that the historical development of physics can be regarded as rational in the sense that subsequent theories become ever more general and Aristotelian mechanics can be treated as a natural forerunner of Newtonian mechanics and, by extension, Einstein’s relativity theory.
{"title":"Mechanika arystotelesowska a współczesna fizyka. Na tropach ciągłości wewnętrznej logiki rozwoju nauki","authors":"W. Grygiel","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0001","url":null,"abstract":"An analysis of two different reconstructions of Aristotelian mechanics in the language of contemporary physics reveals interesting aspects of the historical development of physics: (1) there exists a structural invariant in all physical representations of reality in the form of the Cartesian product and (2) all intertheoretical transitions to date, at each stage of unification, have occurred in accordance with the correspondence principle. This means that the historical development of physics can be regarded as rational in the sense that subsequent theories become ever more general and Aristotelian mechanics can be treated as a natural forerunner of Newtonian mechanics and, by extension, Einstein’s relativity theory.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42013148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2020-03-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2020.0005
M. Sikora
This is a review of Radoslaw Kazibut’s book Filozofia przyrody i przyrodoznawstwa Roberta Boyle’a. Filozoficzna geneza nauki laboratoryjnej (Robert Boyle’s Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science: The Philosophical Origins of Laboratory Research), in which I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed approach. On the one hand, I appreciate the author’s effort to examine the origin of the laboratory style of research, which is found in Boyle’s studies, as a basis for a novel approach to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. On the other hand, I am critical of the fact that the author has overlooked several issues relating to the subject matter which, in the context of the topics addressed in the book, should be recognized as relevant. The characterization of the laboratory sciences presented in the book is too selective as it ignores the problem of the undesirable products of the laboratory sciences as well as their increasingly practical character.
本文是对Radoslaw Kazibut的著作《Filozofia przyroronawstwa Roberta Boyle’a》的评论。Robert Boyle的《自然哲学和自然科学:实验室研究的哲学起源》，我在其中强调了所提出方法的优点和缺点。一方面，我很欣赏作者在波义耳的研究中发现的实验室研究风格的起源的努力，作为解决哲学与科学关系问题的新方法的基础。另一方面，我对作者忽略了与主题有关的几个问题这一事实持批评态度，这些问题在书中所讨论的主题的背景下应该被认为是相关的。在书中提出的实验室科学的特征是过于选择性，因为它忽略了实验室科学的不良产品的问题，以及他们日益实际的特点。
{"title":"Filozofia a nauka w kontekście laboratoryjnego stylu badań naukowych Roberta Boyle’a","authors":"M. Sikora","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2020.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2020.0005","url":null,"abstract":"This is a review of Radoslaw Kazibut’s book Filozofia przyrody i przyrodoznawstwa Roberta Boyle’a. Filozoficzna geneza nauki laboratoryjnej (Robert Boyle’s Philosophy of Nature and Natural Science: The Philosophical Origins of Laboratory Research), in which I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed approach. On the one hand, I appreciate the author’s effort to examine the origin of the laboratory style of research, which is found in Boyle’s studies, as a basis for a novel approach to the problem of the relationship between philosophy and science. On the other hand, I am critical of the fact that the author has overlooked several issues relating to the subject matter which, in the context of the topics addressed in the book, should be recognized as relevant. The characterization of the laboratory sciences presented in the book is too selective as it ignores the problem of the undesirable products of the laboratory sciences as well as their increasingly practical character.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41559761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0025
Mariusz Maziarz
Recently, two distinct notions of pluralism have been put forward in regard to research methods in economics: (1) model pluralism, stating that economists construct many theoretical models offering descriptions of actual or possible mechanisms and use different models for different purposes, and (2) evidential pluralism, according to which causal claims are established on the basis of theoretical conjecture and by observing the operation of a difference-making factor. In this paper, I make a case for methodological pluralism. I argue that economists not only use different research methods but also interpret their role in causal inference differently — depending on which (big-M) Methodological school they subscribe to. The argument proceeds by analyzing examples of recent economic research appealing to different Methodological commitments.
{"title":"Methodological Pluralism in Economics: The ‘Why’ and ‘How’ of Causal Inferences","authors":"Mariusz Maziarz","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0025","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, two distinct notions of pluralism have been put forward in regard to research methods in economics: (1) model pluralism, stating that economists construct many theoretical models offering descriptions of actual or possible mechanisms and use different models for different purposes, and (2) evidential pluralism, according to which causal claims are established on the basis of theoretical conjecture and by observing the operation of a difference-making factor. In this paper, I make a case for methodological pluralism. I argue that economists not only use different research methods but also interpret their role in causal inference differently — depending on which (big-M) Methodological school they subscribe to. The argument proceeds by analyzing examples of recent economic research appealing to different Methodological commitments.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48485232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-12-31DOI: 10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0023
Eden T. Smith
Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. To illustrate this, I outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally discarded, continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals. In doing so, I highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights into how the uses of current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012, Brigandt 2012, Feest 2010, Steinle 2012), the second strand comes from the technoscientific studies focused on non-human agency (Pickering 1995), and the third draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008, Tiles 1984).
{"title":"Examining the Structured Uses of Concepts as Tools: Converging Insights","authors":"Eden T. Smith","doi":"10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/FILNAU.2019.0023","url":null,"abstract":"Examining the historical development of scientific concepts is important for understanding the structured routines within which these concepts are currently used as goal-directed tools in experiments. To illustrate this, I outline how the concepts of mental imagery and hallucinations each draw on an older interdependent set of associations that, although nominally discarded, continues to structure their current independent uses for pursuing discrete experimental goals. In doing so, I highlight how three strands of literature offer mutually instructive insights into how the uses of current scientific concepts contribute to experimental practices. The first strand of literature includes recent scholarship examining how the uses of scientific concepts can enable scientific practices (e.g., Boon 2012, Brigandt 2012, Feest 2010, Steinle 2012), the second strand comes from the technoscientific studies focused on non-human agency (Pickering 1995), and the third draws attention to how the functions of concepts are grounded by the set of historically contingent experimental practices (e.g., Canguilhem 2008, Tiles 1984).","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42200392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0020
Joanna Luc
The aim of this paper is to analyze Ronald N. Giere’s claim that the four characteristics associated with laws of nature — truth, universality, necessity, and objectivity — have a theological origin. It is argued that in some important cases theological justification of these features was absent, that some theological ideas made it even more difficult to think about laws of nature in this way, and that there were good reasons internal to science to formulate the notion of laws of nature in this particular way.
{"title":"Co mówi o prawach przyrody geneza tego pojęcia? Polemika z Ronaldem N. Gierem","authors":"Joanna Luc","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0020","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is to analyze Ronald N. Giere’s claim that the four characteristics associated with laws of nature — truth, universality, necessity, and objectivity — have a theological origin. It is argued that in some important cases theological justification of these features was absent, that some theological ideas made it even more difficult to think about laws of nature in this way, and that there were good reasons internal to science to formulate the notion of laws of nature in this particular way.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45835916","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0018
M. Pawłowski
This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.
{"title":"Neopopperowski argument przeciw funkcjonalizmowi","authors":"M. Pawłowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46935870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0016
Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez
According to the Content View (CV), visual perceptual experiences represent the subject’s surroundings or have representational content. A critical question posed by Charles Travis against CV is how the subject of experiences could index or introspectively ascribe a specific representational content of a given (occurring) visual experience: if her visual experiences incorporate representational contents, how could she ascribe a particular content to any given visual experience of hers? According to Travis, while visual representation is supposed to be “a familiar phenomenon; something we can tell is happening” (Travis 2004: 86), there is no good available evidence that our visual experiences represent our surroundings; and he thinks so because there seems to be no method of visual contents’ indexation or self-ascription. The aim of this paper is to show how CV could meet what I shall call the Indexing Problem for perceptual — more specifically, visual — content. My main positive suggestion turns on the thought that the contents of visual experiences could be indexed by the way things demonstrably look to the subject of experiences.
{"title":"How to Index Visual Contents","authors":"Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0016","url":null,"abstract":"According to the Content View (CV), visual perceptual experiences represent the subject’s surroundings or have representational content. A critical question posed by Charles Travis against CV is how the subject of experiences could index or introspectively ascribe a specific representational content of a given (occurring) visual experience: if her visual experiences incorporate representational contents, how could she ascribe a particular content to any given visual experience of hers? According to Travis, while visual representation is supposed to be “a familiar phenomenon; something we can tell is happening” (Travis 2004: 86), there is no good available evidence that our visual experiences represent our surroundings; and he thinks so because there seems to be no method of visual contents’ indexation or self-ascription. The aim of this paper is to show how CV could meet what I shall call the Indexing Problem for perceptual — more specifically, visual — content. My main positive suggestion turns on the thought that the contents of visual experiences could be indexed by the way things demonstrably look to the subject of experiences.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41935158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0015
M. Zouhar
It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters “This is tasty” and another one responds with “That’s not true.” The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are unable to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which another kind of dissent phrase — like “Nuh-uh” — is employed). This is because utterances of “That’s not true” are typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it, however, that when one utters “This is tasty,” one typically manifests her evaluative attitude (which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward that thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism in the case of disagreements in which speakers respond with “Nuh-uh” but departs from it in situations in which they respond with “That’s not true.” The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty or not.
可以构建这样的情景（在适当的环境下），一个说话者说出“这很美味”，另一个说话者回答“这不是真的”。“这篇论文的目的是激发这样一种观点，即典型的（广泛的）表达主义者对品味分歧的描述无法解释这种情况（尽管其中一些可以成功地解释使用了另一种异议短语——比如“Nuh uh”——的分歧）。这是因为“那不是真的”的话语通常被用来将虚假归因于命题。然而，味觉表达主义认为，当一个人说出“这很美味”时，通常会表现出她对某件事的评价态度（这是非命题的），而不是描述她对那件事的态度。这篇论文的另一个目的是提出一种对品味分歧的替代解释。在分歧的情况下，说话者用“Nuh uh”回应，但在他们用“That not true”回应的情况下则偏离了味觉表达主义。该叙述是在语境主义框架内发展起来的，根据该框架，味觉话语表达了丰富的语境命题，其中包含了评价事物是否美味的评判者。
{"title":"On the Insufficiency of Taste Expressivism","authors":"M. Zouhar","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0015","url":null,"abstract":"It is possible to construct situations (with a suitable kind of setting) in which one speaker utters “This is tasty” and another one responds with “That’s not true.” The aim of this paper is to motivate the idea that typical (broadly) expressivist accounts of taste disagreements are unable to explain such situations (although some of them can successfully explain disagreements in which another kind of dissent phrase — like “Nuh-uh” — is employed). This is because utterances of “That’s not true” are typically used to ascribe falsehood to propositions. Taste expressivism has it, however, that when one utters “This is tasty,” one typically manifests her evaluative attitude (which is non-propositional) toward something rather than describes what attitude she bears toward that thing. Another aim of the paper consists in proposing an alternative account of taste disagreements. It is close to taste expressivism in the case of disagreements in which speakers respond with “Nuh-uh” but departs from it in situations in which they respond with “That’s not true.” The account is developed within a contextualist framework according to which taste utterances express contextually enriched propositions that contain judges who evaluate things as tasty or not.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43282460","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0019
W. Sady
In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein declares that he is neither creating a theory nor explaining anything: he is merely describing the ways of using words and sentences, thus trying to make philosophical problems disappear. In fact, however, he proposes a theory of the nature of language games and their functions, even though — because of the above declaration — he expresses it in a fragmentary and unclear way. After 1946, his views underwent significant transformations: he abandoned the philosophy of mathematics for the philosophy of psychology. And in the last months of his life, in the notes published posthumously as On Certainty, he expressed a number of epistemological claims that explain our cognitive attitudes. He did not manage to finish this work. We have to do it for him, and crucial supplements are provided — as this paper argues — by Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought collectives and thought styles.
{"title":"Uwagi Wittgensteina O pewności a teoria kolektywów myślowych i stylów myślowych Flecka","authors":"W. Sady","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0019","url":null,"abstract":"In his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Wittgenstein declares that he is neither creating a theory nor explaining anything: he is merely describing the ways of using words and sentences, thus trying to make philosophical problems disappear. In fact, however, he proposes a theory of the nature of language games and their functions, even though — because of the above declaration — he expresses it in a fragmentary and unclear way. After 1946, his views underwent significant transformations: he abandoned the philosophy of mathematics for the philosophy of psychology. And in the last months of his life, in the notes published posthumously as On Certainty, he expressed a number of epistemological claims that explain our cognitive attitudes. He did not manage to finish this work. We have to do it for him, and crucial supplements are provided — as this paper argues — by Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought collectives and thought styles.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45898697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-10-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2019.0017
Anita Pacholik-Żuromska
This article argues for an externalist self-model in self-knowledge, as an answer to the question of how to defend self-knowledge in the face of evident errors in self-cognition such as self-illusions. The externalist model is contrasted with an internalist model, although both are based on a predictive coding mechanism. The main thesis is that for preserving the status of self-knowledge as knowledge an external element is needed — namely, some feedback from the environment — which corrects not only cognitive prediction errors regarding the world but also errors in self-cognition by forcing the proper action of the subject (agent) and dynamic adaptation of the model of the embodied self. The mechanism of self-corrections is best described by externalist models.
{"title":"Modele jaźni w samowiedzy","authors":"Anita Pacholik-Żuromska","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0017","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues for an externalist self-model in self-knowledge, as an answer to the question of how to defend self-knowledge in the face of evident errors in self-cognition such as self-illusions. The externalist model is contrasted with an internalist model, although both are based on a predictive coding mechanism. The main thesis is that for preserving the status of self-knowledge as knowledge an external element is needed — namely, some feedback from the environment — which corrects not only cognitive prediction errors regarding the world but also errors in self-cognition by forcing the proper action of the subject (agent) and dynamic adaptation of the model of the embodied self. The mechanism of self-corrections is best described by externalist models.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44961109","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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