Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0022
Michał Oleksowicz
{"title":"Some Philosophical Remarks on the Concept of Structure: Framing Michał Heller’s Perspective","authors":"Michał Oleksowicz","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0022","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66789596","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-31DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0021
I. Hanzel
{"title":"Definition by Abstraction as a Method of the Empirical Sciences","authors":"I. Hanzel","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0021","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42390526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0013
Adrian Ziółkowski
In this paper, I report new empirical data on folk semantic intuitions concerning color adjectives in so-called context-shifting experiments. Contextualists present such experiments — that is, they describe different conversational contexts in which a given sentence is uttered — in order to argue that context can shape meaning and truth conditions to such a degree that competent speakers would give opposite truth evaluations of the same sentence in different contexts. The initial findings of Hansen and Chemla (2013) suggest that laypersons’ semantic judgments are sensitive to context in the same way that is predicted by contextualists. In this paper, I focus on context-shifting experiments that involve color adjectives; also, I present experiments that are a partial replication and methodological extension of Hansen and Chemla’s study. One aim of my study was to corroborate these authors’ findings using a bigger sample (total N = 1128), but the main goal was to test the stability of results in different methodological variants of empirical adaptations of con-text-shifting experiments. This part of the study addresses the issues pointed out in my earlier paper (Zió ł kowski 2017), where I argued that certain experimental settings (within-subjects) might bring data that is more favorable to contextualism than other settings (between-subjects). My study compares three different experimental settings: within-subjects (with randomized order of context presentation), between-subjects (where participants evaluating different contexts are distinct groups), and “contrastive design” (where both contexts are presented side by side on the same screen). My results are highly consistent across the methodological variants I employed, but while they show some of the effects expected by contextualists, it is disputable whether they bring strong support to contextualism with respect to color adjectives.
{"title":"The Context-Sensitivity of Color Adjectives and Folk Intuitions","authors":"Adrian Ziółkowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0013","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I report new empirical data on folk semantic intuitions concerning color adjectives in so-called context-shifting experiments. Contextualists present such experiments — that is, they describe different conversational contexts in which a given sentence is uttered — in order to argue that context can shape meaning and truth conditions to such a degree that competent speakers would give opposite truth evaluations of the same sentence in different contexts. The initial findings of Hansen and Chemla (2013) suggest that laypersons’ semantic judgments are sensitive to context in the same way that is predicted by contextualists. In this paper, I focus on context-shifting experiments that involve color adjectives; also, I present experiments that are a partial replication and methodological extension of Hansen and Chemla’s study. One aim of my study was to corroborate these authors’ findings using a bigger sample (total N = 1128), but the main goal was to test the stability of results in different methodological variants of empirical adaptations of con-text-shifting experiments. This part of the study addresses the issues pointed out in my earlier paper (Zió ł kowski 2017), where I argued that certain experimental settings (within-subjects) might bring data that is more favorable to contextualism than other settings (between-subjects). My study compares three different experimental settings: within-subjects (with randomized order of context presentation), between-subjects (where participants evaluating different contexts are distinct groups), and “contrastive design” (where both contexts are presented side by side on the same screen). My results are highly consistent across the methodological variants I employed, but while they show some of the effects expected by contextualists, it is disputable whether they bring strong support to contextualism with respect to color adjectives.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49353415","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0011
Joanna Komorowska-Mach, Andrzej Szczepura
In this paper, we analyze the problem of first-person authority and the possibility of disagreement over mental states between first-and third-person ascribers. We explain why discussion on this matter should be preceded by empirical study on the actual strength, scope, and restrictions to such authority. We present a new study in which we show that the type of the ascribed mental state and the kind of interpersonal relationship between speakers both influence the strength of first-person authority. We also suggest that analysis of a disagreement between a first-and a third-person ascriber of a mental state should take into account the intuition that it is possible that neither of these disagreeing speakers is wrong in their ascriptions
{"title":"First-Person Authority Through the Lens of Experimental Philosophy","authors":"Joanna Komorowska-Mach, Andrzej Szczepura","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0011","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the problem of first-person authority and the possibility of disagreement over mental states between first-and third-person ascribers. We explain why discussion on this matter should be preceded by empirical study on the actual strength, scope, and restrictions to such authority. We present a new study in which we show that the type of the ascribed mental state and the kind of interpersonal relationship between speakers both influence the strength of first-person authority. We also suggest that analysis of a disagreement between a first-and a third-person ascriber of a mental state should take into account the intuition that it is possible that neither of these disagreeing speakers is wrong in their ascriptions","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45023132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0012
R. Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski, J. Weinberg
{"title":"The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work","authors":"R. Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski, J. Weinberg","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42920775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0015
Adrian Ziółkowski
{"title":"The Adolescence of Experimental Philosophy: Introduction to the Special Issue of Filozofia Nauki","authors":"Adrian Ziółkowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43914918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-03DOI: 10.14394/filnau.2021.0014
Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, Sarah Turri, John Turri
Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie. keywords: lying; assertion; communication; omission; signaling * This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science). Please cite the final, published version if possible. Data and materials available here: https://osf.io/a6ehs
{"title":"Lying by Omission: Experimental Studies","authors":"Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, Sarah Turri, John Turri","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0014","url":null,"abstract":"Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie. keywords: lying; assertion; communication; omission; signaling * This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science). Please cite the final, published version if possible. Data and materials available here: https://osf.io/a6ehs","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46462119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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