Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000820
B. Mitterauer
A brain model based on glial-neuronal interactions is proposed. Glial-neuronal synaptic units are interpreted as elementary reflection mechanisms, called proemial synapses. In glial networks (syncytia), cyclic intentional programs are generated, interpreted as auto-reflective intentional programming. Both types of reflection mechanisms are formally described and may be implementable in a robot brain. Based on the logic of acceptance and rejection, the robot is capable of rejecting irrelevant environmental information, showing at least a "touch" of subjective behavior. Since reflective intentional programming generates both relevant and irrelevant structures already within the brain, ontological gaps arise which must be integrated. In the human brain, the act of self-reference may exert a holistic function enabling self-consciousness. However, since the act of self-reference is a mysterious function not experimentally testable in brain research, it cannot be implemented in a robot brain. Therefore, the creation of self-conscious robots may never be possible. Finally, some philosophical implications are discussed.
{"title":"BRAIN-BASED ELEMENTARY AUTO-REFLECTION MECHANISMS FOR CONSCIOUS ROBOTS: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS","authors":"B. Mitterauer","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000820","url":null,"abstract":"A brain model based on glial-neuronal interactions is proposed. Glial-neuronal synaptic units are interpreted as elementary reflection mechanisms, called proemial synapses. In glial networks (syncytia), cyclic intentional programs are generated, interpreted as auto-reflective intentional programming. Both types of reflection mechanisms are formally described and may be implementable in a robot brain. Based on the logic of acceptance and rejection, the robot is capable of rejecting irrelevant environmental information, showing at least a \"touch\" of subjective behavior. Since reflective intentional programming generates both relevant and irrelevant structures already within the brain, ontological gaps arise which must be integrated. In the human brain, the act of self-reference may exert a holistic function enabling self-consciousness. However, since the act of self-reference is a mysterious function not experimentally testable in brain research, it cannot be implemented in a robot brain. Therefore, the creation of self-conscious robots may never be possible. Finally, some philosophical implications are discussed.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127212340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000789
J. Taylor
{"title":"IS CONSCIOUSNESS ONLY CONTENT, OR IS THERE MORE?","authors":"J. Taylor","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000789","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"32 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116881932","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000728
S. Franklin
Following a brief review of Shanahan's so many, and so important, contributions to global workspace theory, as presented in his Embodiment and the Inner Life, we attempt to interpret, and flesh out, Shanahan's top-down account of GWT from a bottom-up perspective guided by our LIDA model of consciousness and cognition.
{"title":"GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY, SHANAHAN, AND LIDA","authors":"S. Franklin","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000728","url":null,"abstract":"Following a brief review of Shanahan's so many, and so important, contributions to global workspace theory, as presented in his Embodiment and the Inner Life, we attempt to interpret, and flesh out, Shanahan's top-down account of GWT from a bottom-up perspective guided by our LIDA model of consciousness and cognition.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"123643440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000741
S. Harnad
The "global workspace" model would explain our performance capacity if it could actually be shown to generate our performance capacity. (So far, it is still just a promissory note.) That would solve the "easy" problem. But that still would not explain how and why it generates consciousness (if it does). That is a rather harder problem.
{"title":"Zen and the Art of Explaining the Mind","authors":"S. Harnad","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000741","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000741","url":null,"abstract":"The \"global workspace\" model would explain our performance capacity if it could actually be shown to generate our performance capacity. (So far, it is still just a promissory note.) That would solve the \"easy\" problem. But that still would not explain how and why it generates consciousness (if it does). That is a rather harder problem.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127643923","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000704
I. Aleksander
{"title":"WORKSPACE THEORIES ARE ALIVE AND WELL","authors":"I. Aleksander","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000704","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000704","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121299076","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000790
M. Shanahan
First, I would like to thank all the reviewers for taking the time and trouble to read and comment on my book, as well as opening up many interesting areas for discussion and debate. This has highlighted various ways in which the book could perhaps have been more clear. I am also grateful for the opportunity to respond. Many of the reviewers have said complementary and supportive things. I have little to say in reply to the useful and (mostly) kind reviews by Franklin, Kuipers, and Montandon and Baars, or to the constructive criticisms of Beaudoin, or to Haikonen, whose work on cognitive architecture is (I think) quite compatible with my own, except to thank them for all their attention. So the response that follows will focus on the critical points that were highlighted by other authors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most controversial portion of the book seems to be the opening chapter, where I make my stand on philosophical matters. So, let us begin there. According to Manzotti, the book displays contempt for. . .metaphysical attitudes". I am not sure to what extent the word contempt" was intended here to carry its full load of negative valence, but it is worth counteracting this impression. I respect metaphysics, as a climber respects a great mountain. I am irresistably drawn to it. I fear it. (Thinking about the mind-body problem can drive you to the edge of madness.) Contempt is not the right word for such an adversary. When Harnad anticipates that I will accuse him of having not been su±ciently postre°ective" to overcome his metaphysical tendencies, he is absolutely right. But I would hesitate to claim the required level of post-re°ective calm myself. I am still troubled by metaphysical thinking. However, I do have an inkling of what might lie beyond it. The post-re°ective standpoint is not committed to the view that, as
{"title":"EMBODIMENT AND THE INNER LIFE: A RESPONSE TO MY REVIEWERS","authors":"M. Shanahan","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000790","url":null,"abstract":"First, I would like to thank all the reviewers for taking the time and trouble to read and comment on my book, as well as opening up many interesting areas for discussion and debate. This has highlighted various ways in which the book could perhaps have been more clear. I am also grateful for the opportunity to respond. Many of the reviewers have said complementary and supportive things. I have little to say in reply to the useful and (mostly) kind reviews by Franklin, Kuipers, and Montandon and Baars, or to the constructive criticisms of Beaudoin, or to Haikonen, whose work on cognitive architecture is (I think) quite compatible with my own, except to thank them for all their attention. So the response that follows will focus on the critical points that were highlighted by other authors. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most controversial portion of the book seems to be the opening chapter, where I make my stand on philosophical matters. So, let us begin there. According to Manzotti, the book displays contempt for. . .metaphysical attitudes\". I am not sure to what extent the word contempt\" was intended here to carry its full load of negative valence, but it is worth counteracting this impression. I respect metaphysics, as a climber respects a great mountain. I am irresistably drawn to it. I fear it. (Thinking about the mind-body problem can drive you to the edge of madness.) Contempt is not the right word for such an adversary. When Harnad anticipates that I will accuse him of having not been su±ciently postre°ective\" to overcome his metaphysical tendencies, he is absolutely right. But I would hesitate to claim the required level of post-re°ective calm myself. I am still troubled by metaphysical thinking. However, I do have an inkling of what might lie beyond it. The post-re°ective standpoint is not committed to the view that, as","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132540812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000765
R. Manzotti
Shanahan's work admirably and convincingly supports Baars' global workspace by means of plausible and updated neural models. Yet little of his work is related with the issue of consciousness as phenomenal experience. He focuses his effort mostly on the behavioral correlates of consciousness like autonomy, flexibility, and information integration. Moreover, although the importance of embodiment and situated cognition is emphasized, most of the conceptual tools suggested (dynamic systems, complex networks, global workspace) require the external world only during their development. Leaving aside the issue of phenomenal experience, the book fleshes out a convincing and thought-provoking model for many aspects of conscious behaviour.
{"title":"IS CONSCIOUSNESS JUST CONSCIOUS BEHAVIOR","authors":"R. Manzotti","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000765","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000765","url":null,"abstract":"Shanahan's work admirably and convincingly supports Baars' global workspace by means of plausible and updated neural models. Yet little of his work is related with the issue of consciousness as phenomenal experience. He focuses his effort mostly on the behavioral correlates of consciousness like autonomy, flexibility, and information integration. Moreover, although the importance of embodiment and situated cognition is emphasized, most of the conceptual tools suggested (dynamic systems, complex networks, global workspace) require the external world only during their development. Leaving aside the issue of phenomenal experience, the book fleshes out a convincing and thought-provoking model for many aspects of conscious behaviour.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"124971349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000716
Luc Beaudoin
Shanahan expounds upon a creative and bold possibility, that concepts from dynamics and networks can be applied to Baars' [1988] global workspace architecture to explain fundamental biological and psychological phenomena. Shanahan proposes that the connective core is critical to cognitive and neuroscience. This review proposes to study the surrounding space of possible designs more systematically, with particular attention to purposive agency requirements and design assumptions which might resist the quantitative reduction Shanahan has attempted.
{"title":"THE DESIGNER STANCE TOWARDS SHANAHAN'S DYNAMIC NETWORK THEORY OF THE \"CONSCIOUS CONDITION\"","authors":"Luc Beaudoin","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000716","url":null,"abstract":"Shanahan expounds upon a creative and bold possibility, that concepts from dynamics and networks can be applied to Baars' [1988] global workspace architecture to explain fundamental biological and psychological phenomena. Shanahan proposes that the connective core is critical to cognitive and neuroscience. This review proposes to study the surrounding space of possible designs more systematically, with particular attention to purposive agency requirements and design assumptions which might resist the quantitative reduction Shanahan has attempted.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126327005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S179384301100073X
P. Haikonen
Murray Shanahan [2010] has written a nice book about the neural underpinnings of the conscious condition. He begins with some philosophical background remarks (Chap. 1) and proceeds then to the issues of cognition and embodiment and nally to his model of consciousness, which is inspired by the Baars' global workspace model [Baars, 1997]. The objective of this book is obviously the phenomenon of consciousness, but Shanahan wisely limits his pursuit and attempts to explain the conscious/unconscious distinction. The Baars global workspace model is based on earlier black board models used in Arti cial Intelligence. In these models, the black board is a working memory containing the task at hand. A number of autonomous experts read the black board and compete for permission to write on it. At each moment, the access is granted to the expert that has the most relevant piece of information to o®er. According to Baars, the brain can be thought as a system of a number of autonomous expert modules and a global workspace. The global workspace is a working memory, which contains the contents of consciousness. Baars states that the global workspace is a kind of a theater stage, where inner speech and inner imagery take place in a serial way. Thus, the global workspace model is a theater model. Baars proposes that in the brain, the global workspace is located at the sensory projection areas of the cortex. According to Baars, the expert module processes are unconscious and the global workspace process is conscious. Shanahan's view about the global workspace is di®erent. Firstly, he wishes to distance himself from the theater model by recasting the role of the global workspace. Instead of a working memory, the global workspace should be thought as a communications infrastructure that connects the various autonomous units with each other: Indeed, unless recast this way, the putative workspace might be mistaken for a dedicated brain region, something akin to the Cartesian theater ridiculed by Dennett." Shanahan proposes that in the brain, the global workspace consists of the International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011) 339 341 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S179384301100073X
{"title":"OPEN QUESTIONS ON SHANAHAN'S WORKSPACE","authors":"P. Haikonen","doi":"10.1142/S179384301100073X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S179384301100073X","url":null,"abstract":"Murray Shanahan [2010] has written a nice book about the neural underpinnings of the conscious condition. He begins with some philosophical background remarks (Chap. 1) and proceeds then to the issues of cognition and embodiment and nally to his model of consciousness, which is inspired by the Baars' global workspace model [Baars, 1997]. The objective of this book is obviously the phenomenon of consciousness, but Shanahan wisely limits his pursuit and attempts to explain the conscious/unconscious distinction. The Baars global workspace model is based on earlier black board models used in Arti cial Intelligence. In these models, the black board is a working memory containing the task at hand. A number of autonomous experts read the black board and compete for permission to write on it. At each moment, the access is granted to the expert that has the most relevant piece of information to o®er. According to Baars, the brain can be thought as a system of a number of autonomous expert modules and a global workspace. The global workspace is a working memory, which contains the contents of consciousness. Baars states that the global workspace is a kind of a theater stage, where inner speech and inner imagery take place in a serial way. Thus, the global workspace model is a theater model. Baars proposes that in the brain, the global workspace is located at the sensory projection areas of the cortex. According to Baars, the expert module processes are unconscious and the global workspace process is conscious. Shanahan's view about the global workspace is di®erent. Firstly, he wishes to distance himself from the theater model by recasting the role of the global workspace. Instead of a working memory, the global workspace should be thought as a communications infrastructure that connects the various autonomous units with each other: Indeed, unless recast this way, the putative workspace might be mistaken for a dedicated brain region, something akin to the Cartesian theater ridiculed by Dennett.\" Shanahan proposes that in the brain, the global workspace consists of the International Journal of Machine Consciousness Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011) 339 341 #.c World Scienti c Publishing Company DOI: 10.1142/S179384301100073X","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132611422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000753
B. Kuipers
{"title":"Exciting and Provocative Book, Starting with Chapter Two","authors":"B. Kuipers","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000753","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000753","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"15 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132878909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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