Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400094
B. Goertzel
What does it mean for one mind to be a different version of another one, or a natural continuation of another one? Or put differently: when can two minds sensibly be considered versions of one another? This question occurs in relation to mind uploading, where one wants to be able to assess whether an approximate upload constitutes a genuine continuation of the uploaded mind or not. It also occurs in the context of the rapid mental growth that is likely to follow mind uploading, at least in some cases — here the question is, when is growth so rapid or discontinuous as to cause the new state of the mind to no longer be sensibly considerable as a continuation of the previous one? Provisional answers to these questions are sketched, using mathematical tools drawn from category theory and probability theory. It is argued that if a mind's growth is "approximately smooth", in a certain sense, then there will be "continuity of self" and the mind will have a rough comprehension of its growth and change process as it occurs. The treatment is somewhat abstract, and intended to point a direction for ongoing research rather than as a definitive practical solution. These ideas may have practical value in future, however, for those whose values favor neither strict self-preservation nor unrestricted growth, but rather growth that is constrained to be at least quasi-comprehensible to the minds doing the growing.
{"title":"WHEN SHOULD TWO MINDS BE CONSIDERED VERSIONS OF ONE ANOTHER","authors":"B. Goertzel","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400094","url":null,"abstract":"What does it mean for one mind to be a different version of another one, or a natural continuation of another one? Or put differently: when can two minds sensibly be considered versions of one another? This question occurs in relation to mind uploading, where one wants to be able to assess whether an approximate upload constitutes a genuine continuation of the uploaded mind or not. It also occurs in the context of the rapid mental growth that is likely to follow mind uploading, at least in some cases — here the question is, when is growth so rapid or discontinuous as to cause the new state of the mind to no longer be sensibly considerable as a continuation of the previous one? Provisional answers to these questions are sketched, using mathematical tools drawn from category theory and probability theory. It is argued that if a mind's growth is \"approximately smooth\", in a certain sense, then there will be \"continuity of self\" and the mind will have a rough comprehension of its growth and change process as it occurs. The treatment is somewhat abstract, and intended to point a direction for ongoing research rather than as a definitive practical solution. These ideas may have practical value in future, however, for those whose values favor neither strict self-preservation nor unrestricted growth, but rather growth that is constrained to be at least quasi-comprehensible to the minds doing the growing.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125951979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400124
Tadeusz W. Zawidzki
Drawing on Charles Stross's recent trans-humanist, science fiction novel, Accelerando, I argue that phenomenology can play an important supplementary role in arguments for the hypothesis of extended cognition — the view that the mind might sometimes extend beyond the skull. In their initial arguments for this hypothesis Clark and Chalmers [Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. [1998] "The extended mind," Analysis58(1), 7–19], deliberately downplay the role of phenomenology, emphasizing third person, functionalist reasons for it. However, passages from Stross's novel suggest that feasible, extra-cranial cognitive technology will have dramatic effects on phenomenology. Such "trans-human" phenomenology will likely eliminate intuitive resistance to the hypothesis of extended cognition, thereby supporting functionalist arguments for it. Although this is not sufficient to establish that consciousness itself might extend beyond the skull, I also argue that any view on which consciousness supervenes on the functional properties of the nervous system, like Chalmers, D. [1996] The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, New York) and Baars, B. [1988] A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK); Baars, B. [1997] In the Theatre of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, New York); Baars, B. [2002] The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence, Trends in Cognitive Science6, 47–52; Baars, B. [2003] How brain reveals mind: Neuroimaging supports the central role of conscious experience, Journal of Consciousness Studies10, 100–114, must accept this possibility.
根据查尔斯·斯特罗斯(Charles Stross)最近的跨人文主义科幻小说《加速》(Accelerando)，我认为现象学可以在扩展认知假说的论证中发挥重要的补充作用——扩展认知假说认为，思维有时可能超越颅骨。克拉克和查尔默斯[Clark, A. and Chalmers, D.[1998]《扩展思维》，《分析》58(1)，7-19]在他们对这一假说的最初论证中，故意淡化现象学的作用，强调其第三人称、功能主义的原因。然而，斯特罗斯小说中的段落表明，可行的颅外认知技术将对现象学产生巨大影响。这种“跨人类”现象学可能会消除对扩展认知假说的直觉抵制，从而支持功能主义的论点。虽然这不足以证明意识本身可能超越了头骨，但我也认为，任何关于意识监督神经系统功能特性的观点，如Chalmers, D. [1996] the Conscious Mind(牛津大学出版社，纽约)和Baars, B. [1988] A Cognitive Theory of consciousness(剑桥大学出版社，剑桥，英国);[1997]《意识剧场》(牛津大学出版社，纽约);Baars, B.[2002]意识获取假说:起源和最新证据，认知科学趋势(6)，47-52;[2003]神经影像技术支持意识经验的中心作用，《意识研究》，第10期，100-114页，必须接受这种可能性。
{"title":"TRANS-HUMAN COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT, PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EXTENDED MIND","authors":"Tadeusz W. Zawidzki","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400124","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on Charles Stross's recent trans-humanist, science fiction novel, Accelerando, I argue that phenomenology can play an important supplementary role in arguments for the hypothesis of extended cognition — the view that the mind might sometimes extend beyond the skull. In their initial arguments for this hypothesis Clark and Chalmers [Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. [1998] \"The extended mind,\" Analysis58(1), 7–19], deliberately downplay the role of phenomenology, emphasizing third person, functionalist reasons for it. However, passages from Stross's novel suggest that feasible, extra-cranial cognitive technology will have dramatic effects on phenomenology. Such \"trans-human\" phenomenology will likely eliminate intuitive resistance to the hypothesis of extended cognition, thereby supporting functionalist arguments for it. Although this is not sufficient to establish that consciousness itself might extend beyond the skull, I also argue that any view on which consciousness supervenes on the functional properties of the nervous system, like Chalmers, D. [1996] The Conscious Mind (Oxford University Press, New York) and Baars, B. [1988] A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK); Baars, B. [1997] In the Theatre of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, New York); Baars, B. [2002] The conscious access hypothesis: Origins and recent evidence, Trends in Cognitive Science6, 47–52; Baars, B. [2003] How brain reveals mind: Neuroimaging supports the central role of conscious experience, Journal of Consciousness Studies10, 100–114, must accept this possibility.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"74 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125065973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400100
M. Hauskeller
The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving "digital immortality" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made when mind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological effects (if any at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploaded mind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled.
{"title":"MY BRAIN, MY MIND, AND I: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF MIND-UPLOADING","authors":"M. Hauskeller","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400100","url":null,"abstract":"The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving \"digital immortality\" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made when mind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological effects (if any at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploaded mind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127605760","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400057
K. Hayworth
The goal of uploading a human mind into a computer is far beyond today's technology. But exactly how far? Here I review our best cognitive and neuroscience model of the mind and show that it is well suited to provide a framework to answer this question. The model suggests that our unique "software" is mainly digital in nature and is stored redundantly in the brain's synaptic connectivity matrix (i.e., our Connectome) in a way that should allow a copy to be successfully simulated. I review the resolution necessary for extracting this Connectome and conclude that today's FIBSEM technique already meets this requirement. I then sketch out a process capable of reducing a chemically-fixed, plastic-embedded brain into a set of tapes containing 20 × 20 micron tissue pillars optimally sized for automated FIBSEM imaging, and show how these tapes could be distributed among a large number of imaging machines to accomplish the task of extracting a Connectome. The scale of such an endeavor makes it impractical, but a v...
{"title":"ELECTRON IMAGING TECHNOLOGY FOR WHOLE BRAIN NEURAL CIRCUIT MAPPING","authors":"K. Hayworth","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400057","url":null,"abstract":"The goal of uploading a human mind into a computer is far beyond today's technology. But exactly how far? Here I review our best cognitive and neuroscience model of the mind and show that it is well suited to provide a framework to answer this question. The model suggests that our unique \"software\" is mainly digital in nature and is stored redundantly in the brain's synaptic connectivity matrix (i.e., our Connectome) in a way that should allow a copy to be successfully simulated. I review the resolution necessary for extracting this Connectome and conclude that today's FIBSEM technique already meets this requirement. I then sketch out a process capable of reducing a chemically-fixed, plastic-embedded brain into a set of tapes containing 20 × 20 micron tissue pillars optimally sized for automated FIBSEM imaging, and show how these tapes could be distributed among a large number of imaging machines to accomplish the task of extracting a Connectome. The scale of such an endeavor makes it impractical, but a v...","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114794247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400070
M. Rothblatt
The Terasem Mind Uploading Experiment is a multi-decade test of the comparability of single person actual human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological review of their digitized interactions with same person purported human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological interviews of personality software that draws upon a database comprised of the original actual person's digitized interactions. The experiment is based upon a hypothesis that the paper analyzes for its conformance with scientific testability in accordance with the criteria set forth by Karl Popper. Strengths and weaknesses of both the hypothesis and the experiment are assessed in terms of other tests of digital consciousness, scientific rigor and good clinical practices. Recommendations for improvement include stronger parametrization of endpoint assessment and better attention to compliance with informed consent in the event there is emergence of software-based consciousness.
{"title":"THE TERASEM MIND UPLOADING EXPERIMENT","authors":"M. Rothblatt","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400070","url":null,"abstract":"The Terasem Mind Uploading Experiment is a multi-decade test of the comparability of single person actual human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological review of their digitized interactions with same person purported human consciousness as assessed by expert psychological interviews of personality software that draws upon a database comprised of the original actual person's digitized interactions. The experiment is based upon a hypothesis that the paper analyzes for its conformance with scientific testability in accordance with the criteria set forth by Karl Popper. Strengths and weaknesses of both the hypothesis and the experiment are assessed in terms of other tests of digital consciousness, scientific rigor and good clinical practices. Recommendations for improvement include stronger parametrization of endpoint assessment and better attention to compliance with informed consent in the event there is emergence of software-based consciousness.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115393878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400173
Kaj Sotala, H. Valpola
We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where artificial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as parts of the biological brain integrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route for mind uploading, as a person's personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary.
{"title":"COALESCING MINDS: BRAIN UPLOADING-RELATED GROUP MIND SCENARIOS","authors":"Kaj Sotala, H. Valpola","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400173","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400173","url":null,"abstract":"We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where artificial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the brain as seamlessly as parts of the biological brain integrate with each other. An exocortex may also prove to be the easiest route for mind uploading, as a person's personality gradually moves away from the aging biological brain onto the exocortex. Memories might also be copied and shared even without minds being permanently merged. Over time, the borders of personal identity may become loose or even unnecessary.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132827729","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400082
W. Bainbridge
A research study that obtained questionnaire data via mobile communications from 3,267 residents of all 50 US states illustrates how personality capture can be accomplished in a manner suitable for later emulation inside a virtual world or comparable computer system by means of artificial intelligence agents calibrated to match the personality profiles of specific people. This was the most recent step in a research project that had already developed methods for computer administration of massive questionnaires, and it focused on one of the most prominent models of personality, the so-called Big Five dimensions. The key innovation of mobile data collection will allow efficient personality capture at low cost in effort to the individual, and thus with greater ultimate accuracy because of the very large number of diverse measures that can be obtained. Factor analysis of the data shows how it is possible to develop a flexible system for aggregation of measures that can be adapted to emulation across a changing array of environments.
{"title":"WHOLE-PERSONALITY EMULATION","authors":"W. Bainbridge","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400082","url":null,"abstract":"A research study that obtained questionnaire data via mobile communications from 3,267 residents of all 50 US states illustrates how personality capture can be accomplished in a manner suitable for later emulation inside a virtual world or comparable computer system by means of artificial intelligence agents calibrated to match the personality profiles of specific people. This was the most recent step in a research project that had already developed methods for computer administration of massive questionnaires, and it focused on one of the most prominent models of personality, the so-called Big Five dimensions. The key innovation of mobile data collection will allow efficient personality capture at low cost in effort to the individual, and thus with greater ultimate accuracy because of the very large number of diverse measures that can be obtained. Factor analysis of the data shows how it is possible to develop a flexible system for aggregation of measures that can be adapted to emulation across a changing array of environments.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"66 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122899048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400021
S. Bamford
I outline some recent developments in the field of neural prosthesis concerning functional replacement of brain parts. Noting that functional replacement of brain parts could conceivably lead to a form of "mind-substrate transfer" (defined herein), I briefly review other proposed approaches to mind-substrate transfer then I propose a framework in which to place these approaches, classifying them along two axes: top-down versus bottom-up, and on-line versus off-line; I outline a further hypothetical approach suggested by this framework. I argue that underlying technological questions about mind-substrate transfer, there is a fundamental question which concerns our beliefs about continuity of identity.
{"title":"A FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHES TO TRANSFER OF A MIND'S SUBSTRATE","authors":"S. Bamford","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400021","url":null,"abstract":"I outline some recent developments in the field of neural prosthesis concerning functional replacement of brain parts. Noting that functional replacement of brain parts could conceivably lead to a form of \"mind-substrate transfer\" (defined herein), I briefly review other proposed approaches to mind-substrate transfer then I propose a framework in which to place these approaches, classifying them along two axes: top-down versus bottom-up, and on-line versus off-line; I outline a further hypothetical approach suggested by this framework. I argue that underlying technological questions about mind-substrate transfer, there is a fundamental question which concerns our beliefs about continuity of identity.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131094136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400148
L. Swan, J. Howard
In this paper, we explore from several angles the possibility, and practicality, of one of the major tenets of the transhumanist movement — the intention to upload human minds to computers. The first part of the paper assumes that mind-uploading is possible and will become quite commonplace in the near (21st century) future a la Ray Kurzweil and cohorts. This assumption allows us to explore several of its problematic implications for personal identity, especially the effects it will have on questions of duty, responsibility, interpersonal relationships, and culpability in the case of crime. In the second part of the paper, we take a deeper and more critical look at whether mind-uploading is indeed metaphysically possible, and offer some neurobiologically-inspired arguments against its feasibility.
{"title":"DIGITAL IMMORTALITY: SELF OR 0010110?","authors":"L. Swan, J. Howard","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400148","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we explore from several angles the possibility, and practicality, of one of the major tenets of the transhumanist movement — the intention to upload human minds to computers. The first part of the paper assumes that mind-uploading is possible and will become quite commonplace in the near (21st century) future a la Ray Kurzweil and cohorts. This assumption allows us to explore several of its problematic implications for personal identity, especially the effects it will have on questions of duty, responsibility, interpersonal relationships, and culpability in the case of crime. In the second part of the paper, we take a deeper and more critical look at whether mind-uploading is indeed metaphysically possible, and offer some neurobiologically-inspired arguments against its feasibility.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"57 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125706718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2012-06-14DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400112
B. Oto
The potential for the near-future development of two technologies — artificial forms of intelligence, as well as the ability to "upload" human minds into artificial forms — raises several ethical questions regarding the proper treatment and understanding of these artificial minds. The crux of the dilemma is whether or not such creations should be accorded the same rights we currently grant humans, and this question seems to hinge upon whether they will exhibit their own "subjectivity", or internal viewpoints. Recognizing this as the essential factor yields some ethical guidance, but these issues need further exploration before such technologies become available.
{"title":"SEEKING NORMATIVE GUIDELINES FOR NOVEL FUTURE FORMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS","authors":"B. Oto","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400112","url":null,"abstract":"The potential for the near-future development of two technologies — artificial forms of intelligence, as well as the ability to \"upload\" human minds into artificial forms — raises several ethical questions regarding the proper treatment and understanding of these artificial minds. The crux of the dilemma is whether or not such creations should be accorded the same rights we currently grant humans, and this question seems to hinge upon whether they will exhibit their own \"subjectivity\", or internal viewpoints. Recognizing this as the essential factor yields some ethical guidance, but these issues need further exploration before such technologies become available.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"82 3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116412990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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