Pub Date : 2011-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843011000650
S. Stuart
In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent's intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the perturbation, and then the balance and counter-balance, the attunement and co-ordination of whole-body interaction through reciprocal adaptation.
{"title":"Enkinaesthesia: the fundamental challenge for machine consciousness","authors":"S. Stuart","doi":"10.1142/S1793843011000650","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000650","url":null,"abstract":"In this short paper I will introduce an idea which, I will argue, presents a fundamental additional challenge to the machine consciousness community. The idea takes the questions surrounding phenomenology, qualia and phenomenality one step further into the realm of intersubjectivity but with a twist, and the twist is this: that an agent's intersubjective experience is deeply felt and necessarily co-affective; it is enkinaesthetic, and only through enkinaesthetic awareness can we establish the affective enfolding which enables first the perturbation, and then the balance and counter-balance, the attunement and co-ordination of whole-body interaction through reciprocal adaptation.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133411942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2011-04-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843012400276
J. Bryson
This article argues that conscious attention exists not so much for selecting an immediate action as for using the current task to focus specialized learning for the action-selection mechanism(s) and predictive models on tasks and environmental contingencies likely to affect the conscious agent. It is perfectly possible to build this sort of a system into machine intelligence, but it would not be strictly necessary unless the intelligence needs to learn and is resource-bounded with respect to the rate of learning versus the rate of relevant environmental change. Support for this theory is drawn from scientific research and AI simulations. Consequences are discussed with respect to self-consciousness and ethical obligations to and for AI.
{"title":"A ROLE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS IN ACTION SELECTION","authors":"J. Bryson","doi":"10.1142/S1793843012400276","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843012400276","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that conscious attention exists not so much for selecting an immediate action as for using the current task to focus specialized learning for the action-selection mechanism(s) and predictive models on tasks and environmental contingencies likely to affect the conscious agent. It is perfectly possible to build this sort of a system into machine intelligence, but it would not be strictly necessary unless the intelligence needs to learn and is resource-bounded with respect to the rate of learning versus the rate of relevant environmental change. Support for this theory is drawn from scientific research and AI simulations. Consequences are discussed with respect to self-consciousness and ethical obligations to and for AI.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"120 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122638048","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S179384301000045X
Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma, A. Sanchis
The progress in the machine consciousness research field has to be assessed in terms of the features demonstrated by the new models and implementations currently being designed. In this paper, we focus on the functional aspects of consciousness and propose the application of a revision of ConsScale — a biologically inspired scale for measuring cognitive development in artificial agents — in order to assess the cognitive capabilities of machine consciousness implementations. We argue that the progress in the implementation of consciousness in artificial agents can be assessed by looking at how key cognitive abilities associated to consciousness are integrated within artificial systems. Specifically, we characterize ConsScale as a partially ordered set and propose a particular dependency hierarchy for cognitive skills. Associated to that hierarchy a graphical representation of the cognitive profile of an artificial agent is presented as a helpful analytic tool. The proposed evaluation schema is discussed and applied to a number of significant machine consciousness models and implementations. Finally, the possibility of generating qualia and phenomenological states in machines is discussed in the context of the proposed analysis.
{"title":"THE COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS IMPLEMENTATIONS","authors":"Raúl Arrabales, Agapito Ledezma, A. Sanchis","doi":"10.1142/S179384301000045X","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S179384301000045X","url":null,"abstract":"The progress in the machine consciousness research field has to be assessed in terms of the features demonstrated by the new models and implementations currently being designed. In this paper, we focus on the functional aspects of consciousness and propose the application of a revision of ConsScale — a biologically inspired scale for measuring cognitive development in artificial agents — in order to assess the cognitive capabilities of machine consciousness implementations. We argue that the progress in the implementation of consciousness in artificial agents can be assessed by looking at how key cognitive abilities associated to consciousness are integrated within artificial systems. Specifically, we characterize ConsScale as a partially ordered set and propose a particular dependency hierarchy for cognitive skills. Associated to that hierarchy a graphical representation of the cognitive profile of an artificial agent is presented as a helpful analytic tool. The proposed evaluation schema is discussed and applied to a number of significant machine consciousness models and implementations. Finally, the possibility of generating qualia and phenomenological states in machines is discussed in the context of the proposed analysis.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"133423420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000552
Andrea Stocco, C. Lebiere, A. Samsonovich
Recent years have seen a gradual convergence of seemingly distant research fields over a single goal: understanding and replicating biological intelligence in artifacts. This work presents a general overview on the origin, the state-of-the-art, scientific challenges and the future of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) research. Our perspective decomposes the field into the four principal semantic components associated with the BICA challenge that together call for an integration of efforts of researchers across disciplines. Areas and directions of study where new integrated efforts will be primarily needed are summarized.
{"title":"THE B-I-C-A OF BIOLOGICALLY INSPIRED COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURES","authors":"Andrea Stocco, C. Lebiere, A. Samsonovich","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000552","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000552","url":null,"abstract":"Recent years have seen a gradual convergence of seemingly distant research fields over a single goal: understanding and replicating biological intelligence in artifacts. This work presents a general overview on the origin, the state-of-the-art, scientific challenges and the future of Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA) research. Our perspective decomposes the field into the four principal semantic components associated with the BICA challenge that together call for an integration of efforts of researchers across disciplines. Areas and directions of study where new integrated efforts will be primarily needed are summarized.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117183493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000539
R. Ventura
For over a decade neuroscience has uncovered that appropriate decision-making in daily life decisions results from a strong interplay between cognition and covert biases produced by emotional processes. This interplay is particularly important in social contexts: lesions in the pathways supporting these processes provoke serious impairments on social behavior. One important mechanism in social contexts is empathy, fundamental for appropriate social behavior. This paper presents arguments supporting this connection between cognition and emotion, in individual as well as in social contexts. The central claim of this paper is that biologically inspired cognitive architectures ought to include these mechanisms. A taxonomy of computational models addressing emotions is presented, together with a brief survey of the research published in this area. The Prisoner Dilemma game is used as a case study exposing the trade-off between individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Experiments using a simple implementation of empathy and emotion expression, employing an Iterated Prisoner Dilemma setup, illustrate the emergence of a cooperative behavior mutually beneficial for both players.
{"title":"EMOTIONS AND EMPATHY: A BRIDGE BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY?","authors":"R. Ventura","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000539","url":null,"abstract":"For over a decade neuroscience has uncovered that appropriate decision-making in daily life decisions results from a strong interplay between cognition and covert biases produced by emotional processes. This interplay is particularly important in social contexts: lesions in the pathways supporting these processes provoke serious impairments on social behavior. One important mechanism in social contexts is empathy, fundamental for appropriate social behavior. This paper presents arguments supporting this connection between cognition and emotion, in individual as well as in social contexts. The central claim of this paper is that biologically inspired cognitive architectures ought to include these mechanisms. A taxonomy of computational models addressing emotions is presented, together with a brief survey of the research published in this area. The Prisoner Dilemma game is used as a case study exposing the trade-off between individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Experiments using a simple implementation of empathy and emotion expression, employing an Iterated Prisoner Dilemma setup, illustrate the emergence of a cooperative behavior mutually beneficial for both players.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"201 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121285761","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000497
Shane T. Mueller
The Cognitive Decathlon is a proposed set of tasks that can be tested on both human and artificially intelligent agents, and which constitutes a modern specification for the Turing Test. In this paper, a partial implementation of the Cognitive Decathlon is described using the Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL). The tasks focus not simply on generic human abilities, but on critical skills that highlight aspects of human performance that are at odds with common artificial intelligence approaches. The differences between human and algorithmic behavior in such tasks can reveal properties of the human cognitive architecture, and production of similar behavior by artificial systems can help constrain and validate biologically-inspired systems.
{"title":"A PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BICA COGNITIVE DECATHLON USING THE PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENT BUILDING LANGUAGE (PEBL)","authors":"Shane T. Mueller","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000497","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000497","url":null,"abstract":"The Cognitive Decathlon is a proposed set of tasks that can be tested on both human and artificially intelligent agents, and which constitutes a modern specification for the Turing Test. In this paper, a partial implementation of the Cognitive Decathlon is described using the Psychology Experiment Building Language (PEBL). The tasks focus not simply on generic human abilities, but on critical skills that highlight aspects of human performance that are at odds with common artificial intelligence approaches. The differences between human and algorithmic behavior in such tasks can reveal properties of the human cognitive architecture, and production of similar behavior by artificial systems can help constrain and validate biologically-inspired systems.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134579801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000527
J. Takeno, Soichiro Akimoto
Humans normally feel physical and mental pain. In this paper, we refer to physical pain as "pain in the body" and mental pain as "pain in the mind". We took an interest in the mechanism that makes a robot feel such pain in its mind and act appropriately to the sensation of pain. We developed a neural network program called MoNAD that can explain almost all of the phenomena of human consciousness. We noted that the program outputed stable information on what had been learned but became unstable when unknown information was inputed or a system error occurred. We thought that we could create "pain in the mind" of robot by making use of this phenomenon. This paper proposes a demonstration of "pain in the mind" in robot. We expect that this research will also lead to a deeper understanding of humans.
{"title":"Mental pain in the mind of a robot","authors":"J. Takeno, Soichiro Akimoto","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000527","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000527","url":null,"abstract":"Humans normally feel physical and mental pain. In this paper, we refer to physical pain as \"pain in the body\" and mental pain as \"pain in the mind\". We took an interest in the mechanism that makes a robot feel such pain in its mind and act appropriately to the sensation of pain. We developed a neural network program called MoNAD that can explain almost all of the phenomena of human consciousness. We noted that the program outputed stable information on what had been learned but became unstable when unknown information was inputed or a system error occurred. We thought that we could create \"pain in the mind\" of robot by making use of this phenomenon. This paper proposes a demonstration of \"pain in the mind\" in robot. We expect that this research will also lead to a deeper understanding of humans.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"02 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129097709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-12-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000503
V. Seidita, M. Cossentino
Engineering self-conscious robotic systems is a challenging issue because of the intrinsic complexity of such systems; a self-conscious robot has to acquire knowledge, to understand its world and to autonomously interact with its environment. In this paper, the externalist point of view is used for developing a complete process for the design and implementation of a conscious robotic system that is able to interact with a dynamic environment in a human-like fashion without possessing detailed knowledge about the environment and pre-programmed tasks and algorithms. The paper mainly focuses on the configuration part of the whole process that make the robot able to decide and to learn from experiences.
{"title":"FROM MODELING TO IMPLEMENTING THE PERCEPTION LOOP IN SELF-CONSCIOUS SYSTEMS","authors":"V. Seidita, M. Cossentino","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000503","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000503","url":null,"abstract":"Engineering self-conscious robotic systems is a challenging issue because of the intrinsic complexity of such systems; a self-conscious robot has to acquire knowledge, to understand its world and to autonomously interact with its environment. In this paper, the externalist point of view is used for developing a complete process for the design and implementation of a conscious robotic system that is able to interact with a dynamic environment in a human-like fashion without possessing detailed knowledge about the environment and pre-programmed tasks and algorithms. The paper mainly focuses on the configuration part of the whole process that make the robot able to decide and to learn from experiences.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114959497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000278
Colin G. Hales
{"title":"THE WELL-TESTED YOUNG SCIENTIST","authors":"Colin G. Hales","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000278","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116908725","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2010-06-01DOI: 10.1142/S1793843010000242
P. Boltuc
Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.
{"title":"SLOMAN AND H-CONSCIOUSNESS","authors":"P. Boltuc","doi":"10.1142/S1793843010000242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793843010000242","url":null,"abstract":"Sloman criticizes all existing attempts to define machine consciousness for being overly one-sided. He argues that such definition is not only unattainable but also unnecessary. The critique is well taken in part; yet, whatever his intended aims, by not acknowledging the non-reductive aspects of consciousness, Sloman, in fact, sides with the reductivist view.","PeriodicalId":418022,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Machine Consciousness","volume":"53 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120839395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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