Philosophical argumentation presents a puzzle for pragma-dialectics: both from the perspective of 2500 years of history and from what we can ourselves witness in the present, philosophers seem to be exclusively intent on strengthening and elaborating their differences of opinion. Nothing like that happens in other academic endeavors. This is an anomaly in pragma-dialectical terms because, if philosophical discussants do not want to resolve their differences of opinion, then they would seem to be unreasonable by definition. In other words, no critical discussion would be possible in philosophy because of the peculiar way philosophers argue. The anomaly can, however, be dispelled by using the elementary distinction between single and multiple differences of opinion. It is argued that, in spite of occasional appearances, all philosophical differences of opinion are multiple. From that it is argued that the ‘institutional point’ (van Eemeren, 2010) of philosophy is to create the broadest map of arguable positions. If this is true, then philosophers may after all be pursuing a higher-order kind of consensus, bearing in particular on how many arguments can be marshaled around any given philosophical question.
{"title":"On philosophical argumentation","authors":"F. Leal","doi":"10.1075/jaic.19007.lea","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.19007.lea","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Philosophical argumentation presents a puzzle for\u0000 pragma-dialectics: both from the perspective of 2500 years of history and from\u0000 what we can ourselves witness in the present, philosophers seem to be\u0000 exclusively intent on strengthening and elaborating their differences of\u0000 opinion. Nothing like that happens in other academic endeavors. This is an\u0000 anomaly in pragma-dialectical terms because, if philosophical discussants do not\u0000 want to resolve their differences of opinion, then they would seem to be\u0000 unreasonable by definition. In other words, no critical discussion would be\u0000 possible in philosophy because of the peculiar way philosophers argue. The\u0000 anomaly can, however, be dispelled by using the elementary distinction between\u0000 single and multiple differences of opinion. It is argued that, in spite of\u0000 occasional appearances, all philosophical differences of\u0000 opinion are multiple. From that it is argued that the\u0000 ‘institutional point’ (van Eemeren,\u0000 2010) of philosophy is to create the broadest map of arguable\u0000 positions. If this is true, then philosophers may after all be pursuing a\u0000 higher-order kind of consensus, bearing in particular on how many arguments can\u0000 be marshaled around any given philosophical question.","PeriodicalId":41908,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Argumentation in Context","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47136138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we analyze the persuasive effects of conspiracy theories from a rhetorical and argumentative perspective. In particular, we scrutinize a case-study – the story of the “Stamina cure” in Italy –, interpreting it as a particular instance of conspiracy theory. First, we explain what conspiracy theories are, and why they are relevant within the contemporary health debate. Second, we situate our analysis in relation to other theoretical accounts, explaining why a discursive approach may be required to study conspiracies. Third, we investigate our case-study through the lenses of the three “entechnic” proofs of rhetoric: logos, ethos, and pathos. We conclude that a rhetorical approach can shed significant light on how conspiracies achieve their persuasive effect and it provides a first step toward the elaboration of a more comprehensive model to better address the practical and political implications of conspiracy argumentations.
{"title":"A rhetorical perspective on conspiracies","authors":"Roberta M Zagarella, M. Annoni","doi":"10.1075/jaic.18006.zag","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.18006.zag","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper, we analyze the persuasive effects of conspiracy\u0000 theories from a rhetorical and argumentative perspective. In particular, we\u0000 scrutinize a case-study – the story of the “Stamina cure” in Italy –,\u0000 interpreting it as a particular instance of conspiracy theory. First, we explain\u0000 what conspiracy theories are, and why they are relevant within the contemporary\u0000 health debate. Second, we situate our analysis in relation to other theoretical\u0000 accounts, explaining why a discursive approach may be required to study\u0000 conspiracies. Third, we investigate our case-study through the lenses of the\u0000 three “entechnic” proofs of rhetoric: logos, ethos, and\u0000 pathos. We conclude that a rhetorical approach can shed\u0000 significant light on how conspiracies achieve their persuasive effect and it\u0000 provides a first step toward the elaboration of a more comprehensive model to\u0000 better address the practical and political implications of conspiracy\u0000 argumentations.","PeriodicalId":41908,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Argumentation in Context","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45738419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Impartiality is one of the core values underlying the administration of justice. A complaint about a judge’s supposed lack of impartiality may be filed on the grounds of the judge’s verbal behavior. In this article I will analyze complaints that concern the judge’s use of rhetorical questions during court hearings. I will explore what role these complaints may play in the strategic maneuvering of a party who seeks the judge’s disqualification.
{"title":"Challenging judicial impartiality","authors":"H. Plug","doi":"10.1075/jaic.17026.plu","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.17026.plu","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Impartiality is one of the core values underlying the\u0000 administration of justice. A complaint about a judge’s supposed lack of\u0000 impartiality may be filed on the grounds of the judge’s verbal behavior. In this\u0000 article I will analyze complaints that concern the judge’s use of rhetorical\u0000 questions during court hearings. I will explore what role these complaints may\u0000 play in the strategic maneuvering of a party who seeks the judge’s\u0000 disqualification.","PeriodicalId":41908,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Argumentation in Context","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46856515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
With the help of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, this paper aims to analyze how Al Aswany, an Egyptian political columnist who argued in favor of the feasibility of democratization before the Arab Spring, maneuvered strategically by argumentation from example in two of his columns in supporting the standpoint that the Egyptian people had become no longer politically inactive. The analysis is conducted in view of the institutional preconditions of political columns and the specific rhetorical exigency a columnist may face in this specific argumentative situation.
{"title":"The strategic use of argumentation from example in\u0000 re-evaluating a people","authors":"A. A. Omar","doi":"10.1075/jaic.17031.oma","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/jaic.17031.oma","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 With the help of the extended pragma-dialectical theory, this\u0000 paper aims to analyze how Al Aswany, an Egyptian political columnist who argued\u0000 in favor of the feasibility of democratization before the Arab Spring,\u0000 maneuvered strategically by argumentation from example in two of his columns in\u0000 supporting the standpoint that the Egyptian people had become no longer\u0000 politically inactive. The analysis is conducted in view of the institutional\u0000 preconditions of political columns and the specific rhetorical exigency a\u0000 columnist may face in this specific argumentative situation.","PeriodicalId":41908,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Argumentation in Context","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8,"publicationDate":"2019-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41414837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}