Motion is the fundamental property of all-natural phenomena. However, when human life is concerned, the significance of motion or movement is beyond mere natural process, its concept beyond physical time and space. The genealogical-phenomenological approach is used to indicate that our conception of motion endures a historical transition; meaning, that the conceptual significances with respect to human movement and mobility have always been updated alongside technological progress. With a phenomenological analysis of the historical transition of concepts regarding motion, space, and other correlated notions concerning human existence, we try to show that the extension of these old concepts has been expanded, and the updated concepts are redefined and comprehended in a united but multifaceted way. To achieve this goal, this paper gives out a genealogical survey on some typical instances in the development of human mobility. Such a unified sense-complex of different significances of movement and mobility in human life will contribute to our understanding of the world in a diversified and pluralistic way.
{"title":"Mobility in Phenomenological Perspective: On Significance of Movement and Quasi-movement in Human Life","authors":"Licheng Qian","doi":"10.25138/14.3.A3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.3.A3","url":null,"abstract":"Motion is the fundamental property of all-natural phenomena. However, when human life is concerned, the significance of motion or movement is beyond mere natural process, its concept beyond physical time and space. The genealogical-phenomenological approach is used to indicate that our conception of motion endures a historical transition; meaning, that the conceptual significances with respect to human movement and mobility have always been updated alongside technological progress. With a phenomenological analysis of the historical transition of concepts regarding motion, space, and other correlated notions concerning human existence, we try to show that the extension of these old concepts has been expanded, and the updated concepts are redefined and comprehended in a united but multifaceted way. To achieve this goal, this paper gives out a genealogical survey on some typical instances in the development of human mobility. Such a unified sense-complex of different significances of movement and mobility in human life will contribute to our understanding of the world in a diversified and pluralistic way.","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"48-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47553938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the 1940s, Martin Heidegger held a series of lectures in which he interprets passages from Sophocles’ Antigone in order to understand the characterization of the human being as deinon, which Heidegger translates as unheimlich or “not at home.” This essential determination of the human being as a being which is constitutively not-at-home will be discussed in the first part of this paper. In the second part, I will discuss Jacques Derrida’s reading of another Sophoclean text, Oedipus at Colonus, in order to discuss the question of Oedipus’s foreignness. Heidegger’s and Derrida’s readings of Sophocles do have different approaches and methodologies, but considering the influence of Heidegger on Derrida’s thought, it is possible to find deep similarities, connections, and philosophically relevant divergences. This confrontation of the two readings concerning the question of being-at-home and foreignness will show that their approaches complement each other.
{"title":"To Be or Not to Be at Home. Heidegger and Derrida reading Sophocles","authors":"Diego D’Angelo","doi":"10.25138/14.3.A6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.3.A6","url":null,"abstract":"In the 1940s, Martin Heidegger held a series of lectures in which he interprets passages from Sophocles’ Antigone in order to understand the characterization of the human being as deinon, which Heidegger translates as unheimlich or “not at home.” This essential determination of the human being as a being which is constitutively not-at-home will be discussed in the first part of this paper. In the second part, I will discuss Jacques Derrida’s reading of another Sophoclean text, Oedipus at Colonus, in order to discuss the question of Oedipus’s foreignness. Heidegger’s and Derrida’s readings of Sophocles do have different approaches and methodologies, but considering the influence of Heidegger on Derrida’s thought, it is possible to find deep similarities, connections, and philosophically relevant divergences. This confrontation of the two readings concerning the question of being-at-home and foreignness will show that their approaches complement each other.","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"107-126"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2021-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45842220","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Midgley, Mary, What Is Philosophy For?","authors":"Jovito V. Carino","doi":"10.25138/14.2.BR1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.2.BR1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"110-112"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41818405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The primary objective of this paper is to find out whether there is any possibility of coming up with a philosophy that we can call Filipino. Inspired by the works of Leonardo Mercado, I suggest an exciting new area of philosophy that can get us to an answer: experimental philosophy. Secondly, I shall bridge the connection between experimental philosophy and the search for Filipino philosophy. More specifically, I shall provide an answer as to how experimental philosophy can be expected to lead to a Filipino philosophy. Then, I shall suggest a novel way in how to do experimental Filipino philosophy, that is, experimental philosophy in the service of discovering a Filipino philosophy, and it is by way of traditional empirical methods in anthropology, such as interviews and focus group discussions. Finally, I introduce the charge of limited applicability inspired by Roland Theuas Pada and respond to the objection. I conclude by inviting Filipino philosophers to integrate experimental philosophy in their search for a Filipino philosophy.
{"title":"Towards an Experimental Turn in Filipino Philosophy: A New Way Forward","authors":"Ian Anthony B. Davatos","doi":"10.25138/14.2.A5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.2.A5","url":null,"abstract":"The primary objective of this paper is to find out whether there is any possibility of coming up with a philosophy that we can call Filipino. Inspired by the works of Leonardo Mercado, I suggest an exciting new area of philosophy that can get us to an answer: experimental philosophy. Secondly, I shall bridge the connection between experimental philosophy and the search for Filipino philosophy. More specifically, I shall provide an answer as to how experimental philosophy can be expected to lead to a Filipino philosophy. Then, I shall suggest a novel way in how to do experimental Filipino philosophy, that is, experimental philosophy in the service of discovering a Filipino philosophy, and it is by way of traditional empirical methods in anthropology, such as interviews and focus group discussions. Finally, I introduce the charge of limited applicability inspired by Roland Theuas Pada and respond to the objection. I conclude by inviting Filipino philosophers to integrate experimental philosophy in their search for a Filipino philosophy.","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"73-96"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43737535","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
At the core of the principle of democracy is the claim that all individuals, or as many as possible, should decide for themselves and that they must be included in collective governance of the community in which the majority rules. However, drawing upon Hegel’s theory of the state, I will show in this paper that in a democracy, the emphasis on individual rights, at the expense of developing the notion of universal good, is not only problematic, but dangerous because in the absence of rational authority of the state, people rely mainly on public opinion for guidance, which results in what Hegel may call the tyranny of the majority. As a consequence, democracy, which purports itself to be the champion of freedom, tends to be exclusivist and totalitarian as dissenting ideas are silenced by the “ruling majority” in actual democratic processes. In fact, the notion of “legitimacy” (i.e., legitimated by the majority) conduces to the assault on the inner will to resist rendering individuals in a democracy as “conformists.” The paper concludes that, for Hegel, freedom can be realized not through democracy as espoused by the liberal theorists, but through his theory of the state―the state being not only a guarantor of basic rights and liberties, but as a dimension of freedom which commits itself to a substantive vision of the universal good as the paramount object of human aspiration.
{"title":"Tyranny of the Majority: Hegel on the Paradox of Democracy","authors":"Jeffry V. Ocay","doi":"10.25138/14.2.A1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.2.A1","url":null,"abstract":"At the core of the principle of democracy is the claim that all individuals, or as many as possible, should decide for themselves and that they must be included in collective governance of the community in which the majority rules. However, drawing upon Hegel’s theory of the state, I will show in this paper that in a democracy, the emphasis on individual rights, at the expense of developing the notion of universal good, is not only problematic, but dangerous because in the absence of rational authority of the state, people rely mainly on public opinion for guidance, which results in what Hegel may call the tyranny of the majority. As a consequence, democracy, which purports itself to be the champion of freedom, tends to be exclusivist and totalitarian as dissenting ideas are silenced by the “ruling majority” in actual democratic processes. In fact, the notion of “legitimacy” (i.e., legitimated by the majority) conduces to the assault on the inner will to resist rendering individuals in a democracy as “conformists.” The paper concludes that, for Hegel, freedom can be realized not through democracy as espoused by the liberal theorists, but through his theory of the state―the state being not only a guarantor of basic rights and liberties, but as a dimension of freedom which commits itself to a substantive vision of the universal good as the paramount object of human aspiration.","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":"6-18"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48138124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper I emphasize the link between Honneth’s critical theory and radical democracy as defined by C. Douglas Lummis. I, firstly, present Lummis’s portrayal of radical democracy, emphasizing the original meaning of the notion of democracy as essentially radical in contrast to muddled conceptions of democracy. I, then, briefly present a characterization of radical democracy as a philosophical and normative principle. I emphasize, following Lummis, that what is radical in democracy is common sense language that collectively binds people. I relate this to Hegel’s idea of Sittlichkeit. Gesturing towards the idea that democracy is a kind of participative discourse, I propose that Honneth’s theory of social freedom is a third possibility between Habermas’s deliberative discourse and Mouffe’s agonistic discourse. I, then, rehearse the three normative claims of Horkheimer to contextualize Honneth’s commitment to critical theory, allowing me to present a schematic account of his theory of social freedom which is ironically Hegelian inspired, but decidedly critical of Hegel’s characterization of democracy. I conclude by relating Benjamin’s image of “the tradition of the oppressed” with the notion of social freedom.
{"title":"Critical Theory and the Prospects of Radical Democracy","authors":"Paolo A. Bolaños","doi":"10.25138/14.2.A2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25138/14.2.A2","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I emphasize the link between Honneth’s critical theory and radical democracy as defined by C. Douglas Lummis. I, firstly, present Lummis’s portrayal of radical democracy, emphasizing the original meaning of the notion of democracy as essentially radical in contrast to muddled conceptions of democracy. I, then, briefly present a characterization of radical democracy as a philosophical and normative principle. I emphasize, following Lummis, that what is radical in democracy is common sense language that collectively binds people. I relate this to Hegel’s idea of Sittlichkeit. Gesturing towards the idea that democracy is a kind of participative discourse, I propose that Honneth’s theory of social freedom is a third possibility between Habermas’s deliberative discourse and Mouffe’s agonistic discourse. I, then, rehearse the three normative claims of Horkheimer to contextualize Honneth’s commitment to critical theory, allowing me to present a schematic account of his theory of social freedom which is ironically Hegelian inspired, but decidedly critical of Hegel’s characterization of democracy. I conclude by relating Benjamin’s image of “the tradition of the oppressed” with the notion of social freedom.","PeriodicalId":41978,"journal":{"name":"Kritike-An Online Journal of Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45240598","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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