Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0001
Benedetta Lanfrachi
Abstract This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy.
{"title":"A New Approach to African Philosophy: A Critique","authors":"Benedetta Lanfrachi","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article is a response to the new book by Bruce Janz, African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought, published in 2023 in the Bloomsbury Studies in World Philosophies series. Enactivist Cognition opens up a new space of conversation in the field of African philosophy—and world philosophies more broadly—through an innovative approach that applies insights from the cognitive sciences to the humanities in order to highlight the relationship between thought and context, between theorization and experience. Through the interpretive lens of enactivism, Janz ventures into new readings of well-known themes and personalities in African philosophy and also introduces interesting new themes and personalities to the African philosophical conversation. Janz also intentionally bridges African and Africana thought. While this article contests the application of enactivism to all the philosophers treated in Enactivist Cognition, it applauds Janz’s search for new, creative, and productive spaces for and of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"53 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0035
Grant Farred
Abstract This response to Bruce Janz’s African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition (2023) uses the work of Martin Heidegger and Stanley Cavell to understand the relationship among philosophy, thinking, and place and, most crucially, Africa as a place from which philosophy might be thought, that is, might be proposed as native to philosophy. Invoking the late Heidegger, for whom thinking presents itself as the question, and Cavell’s use of Ralph Waldo Emerson as a thinker native to America, the difficulty is raised as to how these relations manifest themselves in Janz’s Enactivist Cognition.
{"title":"What Is Native to Philosophy?","authors":"Grant Farred","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This response to Bruce Janz’s African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition (2023) uses the work of Martin Heidegger and Stanley Cavell to understand the relationship among philosophy, thinking, and place and, most crucially, Africa as a place from which philosophy might be thought, that is, might be proposed as native to philosophy. Invoking the late Heidegger, for whom thinking presents itself as the question, and Cavell’s use of Ralph Waldo Emerson as a thinker native to America, the difficulty is raised as to how these relations manifest themselves in Janz’s Enactivist Cognition.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"2017 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0043
Bruce B. Janz
Abstract The author of African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought responds to four critiques of his book. After giving some context and history of the book, he addresses points raised by each of the readers.
{"title":"Spaces of Thought: A Response to Critiques","authors":"Bruce B. Janz","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0043","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0043","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The author of African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought responds to four critiques of his book. After giving some context and history of the book, he addresses points raised by each of the readers.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"55 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857316","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0061
Husein Inusah, Paa Kweku Quansah
Abstract To liberate African philosophy from the remnants of the colonial style of thought, Kwesi Wiredu promotes the idea of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy. He argues that, to accomplish this project, African philosophers must theorize in African vernaculars. This article attempts to show that the project of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy by recourse to theorizing in African vernaculars is challenging. It examines a particular strategy that Wiredu deploys in “Conceptual Decolonization as an Imperative in Contemporary African Philosophy,” in which he hopes to demonstrate that the Akan conception of mind is superior to the Cartesian conception of mind. It demonstrates that Wiredu’s attempt to show the superiority of the Akan conception of mind is unsuccessful and that his project of conceptual decolonization fails. Nevertheless, it concludes that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization project still shows promise even in light of our criticisms.
{"title":"A Critique of Wiredu’s Project of Conceptual Decolonization of African Philosophy","authors":"Husein Inusah, Paa Kweku Quansah","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0061","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract To liberate African philosophy from the remnants of the colonial style of thought, Kwesi Wiredu promotes the idea of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy. He argues that, to accomplish this project, African philosophers must theorize in African vernaculars. This article attempts to show that the project of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy by recourse to theorizing in African vernaculars is challenging. It examines a particular strategy that Wiredu deploys in “Conceptual Decolonization as an Imperative in Contemporary African Philosophy,” in which he hopes to demonstrate that the Akan conception of mind is superior to the Cartesian conception of mind. It demonstrates that Wiredu’s attempt to show the superiority of the Akan conception of mind is unsuccessful and that his project of conceptual decolonization fails. Nevertheless, it concludes that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization project still shows promise even in light of our criticisms.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0023
Sanya Osha
Abstract This article addresses Bruce Janz’s “enactivist” reading of African philosophy from two perspectives. The space in which African philosophy finds itself remains problematic, and, thus, this article attempts to unpack this issue. Janz argues that African philosophy allows for only a few or no possibilities for radical thought. However, his own reading of the Nigerian philosopher Sophie Oluwole serves to debunk this claim. Oluwole’s thought highlights the challenges of building a modern African philosophy within the context of postcoloniality, in which problems of untranslatability are encountered when utilizing a metropolitan language, which, in her case, is English. But, beyond the problem of untranslatability, she is able to delineate a holistic cosmology that, in multiple ways, incorporates, complicates, and extends the borders of philosophy.
{"title":"Spaces of African Thought: A Critique of an Enactivist Rendering","authors":"Sanya Osha","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article addresses Bruce Janz’s “enactivist” reading of African philosophy from two perspectives. The space in which African philosophy finds itself remains problematic, and, thus, this article attempts to unpack this issue. Janz argues that African philosophy allows for only a few or no possibilities for radical thought. However, his own reading of the Nigerian philosopher Sophie Oluwole serves to debunk this claim. Oluwole’s thought highlights the challenges of building a modern African philosophy within the context of postcoloniality, in which problems of untranslatability are encountered when utilizing a metropolitan language, which, in her case, is English. But, beyond the problem of untranslatability, she is able to delineate a holistic cosmology that, in multiple ways, incorporates, complicates, and extends the borders of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.22.1.0010
Abraham Olivier
Abstract In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises.
在《非洲哲学与行动主义认知:思想空间》(2023)一书中，Bruce B. Janz介绍了他所谓的行动主义非洲哲学。这本书对非洲哲学做出了重大贡献，因为没有其他著作将非洲哲学与行动主义联系起来。这篇文章的目的是对这本书给出一个批判性的回应。首先，通过将Enactivist Cognition与Janz早期的《非洲哲学》(2009)联系起来，介绍一些背景知识。接下来是他对激进主义非洲哲学的介绍及其与非洲哲学文本的联系的简要讨论。文章最后讨论了Enactivist Cognition提出的一些问题。
{"title":"Enactivist African Philosophy: A Response","authors":"Abraham Olivier","doi":"10.5325/philafri.22.1.0010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.22.1.0010","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135857312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.2.0078
E. Ofuasia
Neglected monotheism is how Thaddeus Metz and Motsamai Molefe designate the common denominator among the various religious cultures found across sub-Saharan Africa. This is a product of their engagement with such traditional African religious themes as God’s nature, God’s will, life beyond death, and the duration of existence beyond or without a body consequent on death. This article uses traditional Yoruba theology and its ritual archive, the Ifa corpus, to argue that Metz and Molefe’s monotheistic proposal is a hasty generalization. In fact, on close inspection, the Ifa corpus turns out that traditional Yoruba theology is grounded in panentheism.
{"title":"“Who/What Neglected the Monotheism?”: A Panentheistic Rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz and Motsamai Molefe on African Traditional Religion","authors":"E. Ofuasia","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.2.0078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.2.0078","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Neglected monotheism is how Thaddeus Metz and Motsamai Molefe designate the common denominator among the various religious cultures found across sub-Saharan Africa. This is a product of their engagement with such traditional African religious themes as God’s nature, God’s will, life beyond death, and the duration of existence beyond or without a body consequent on death. This article uses traditional Yoruba theology and its ritual archive, the Ifa corpus, to argue that Metz and Molefe’s monotheistic proposal is a hasty generalization. In fact, on close inspection, the Ifa corpus turns out that traditional Yoruba theology is grounded in panentheism.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43933225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.2.0118
Victor Peterson II
Alain Locke’s theory of value and functional equivalence is placed within more recent formalizations of functional analysis, recursion, and composition toward the study of sociocultural and political formation. With these resources in hand, Locke’s theory is proved to be one undergirding and integral to current studies of diaspora and sociocultural analysis.
{"title":"Value and Culture","authors":"Victor Peterson II","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.2.0118","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.2.0118","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Alain Locke’s theory of value and functional equivalence is placed within more recent formalizations of functional analysis, recursion, and composition toward the study of sociocultural and political formation. With these resources in hand, Locke’s theory is proved to be one undergirding and integral to current studies of diaspora and sociocultural analysis.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47357524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.2.0100
J. Chimakonam, Dorothy N. Oluwagbemi-Jacob
In this research, an attempt is made to interrogate the practice of intercultural philosophy with a view to showing that the critical thinking mindset is imperative for a balanced, progressive, and respectful intercultural engagement. A world in which cultures relate to one another on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and recognition of one another’s identity and rights has remained elusive. The need for such a world and the dynamics of such transcultural relations form the central themes of intercultural philosophy. Specifically, this article argues that there can be no genuine intercultural discourse without the core values of critical thinking, such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual empathy, intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual integrity, and intellectual courage. This article’s claim is that genuine intercultural engagement devoid of ego politics and the geopolitics of marginalization and superiorization must transcend the barriers of egocentrism and sociocentrism. Using an example of the conversational method, the authors interrogate critical thinking as an integral component of a viable intercultural discourse.
{"title":"The Imperatives of Critical Thinking in Intercultural Philosophy","authors":"J. Chimakonam, Dorothy N. Oluwagbemi-Jacob","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.2.0100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.2.0100","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this research, an attempt is made to interrogate the practice of intercultural philosophy with a view to showing that the critical thinking mindset is imperative for a balanced, progressive, and respectful intercultural engagement. A world in which cultures relate to one another on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and recognition of one another’s identity and rights has remained elusive. The need for such a world and the dynamics of such transcultural relations form the central themes of intercultural philosophy. Specifically, this article argues that there can be no genuine intercultural discourse without the core values of critical thinking, such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual empathy, intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, intellectual integrity, and intellectual courage. This article’s claim is that genuine intercultural engagement devoid of ego politics and the geopolitics of marginalization and superiorization must transcend the barriers of egocentrism and sociocentrism. Using an example of the conversational method, the authors interrogate critical thinking as an integral component of a viable intercultural discourse.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46032940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.2.0063
J. Gwara, Diana Ekor, A. D. Attoe
To the authors’ knowledge, not much has been said or done in African philosophical circles with regard to providing a theoretical framework from which the discrimination against African women with disabilities can be addressed. In this article, the authors show how such a framework can be grounded in Innocent Asouzu’s complementarism. Their contention, one grounded in this framework, is that this discrimination has its roots in an isolationist, elitist, and exclusivist mindset/metaphysics. The authors further argue that one way to overcome this problematic mindset is to replace it with one that views each individual human being as a missing link of reality, that is, a complementary philosophy. The hope is that with this replacement the gaze that subconsciously views women living with disability as a group that is distinguishable from other human beings will be summarily abandoned.
{"title":"Discrimination and Violence against Women with Disabilities in Africa: Introducing Innocent Asouzu’s Complementarity","authors":"J. Gwara, Diana Ekor, A. D. Attoe","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.2.0063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.2.0063","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 To the authors’ knowledge, not much has been said or done in African philosophical circles with regard to providing a theoretical framework from which the discrimination against African women with disabilities can be addressed. In this article, the authors show how such a framework can be grounded in Innocent Asouzu’s complementarism. Their contention, one grounded in this framework, is that this discrimination has its roots in an isolationist, elitist, and exclusivist mindset/metaphysics. The authors further argue that one way to overcome this problematic mindset is to replace it with one that views each individual human being as a missing link of reality, that is, a complementary philosophy. The hope is that with this replacement the gaze that subconsciously views women living with disability as a group that is distinguishable from other human beings will be summarily abandoned.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45847708","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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