Pub Date : 2022-12-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.2.0134
I. Negedu
{"title":"African Metaphysics, Epistemology and a New Logic: A Decolonial Approach to Philosophy, by Jonathan O. Chimakonam and L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya","authors":"I. Negedu","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.2.0134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.2.0134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49355137","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.1.0045
P. English
{"title":"Reading Wiredu, by Barry Hallen","authors":"P. English","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.1.0045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0045","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45639777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.1.0028
A. Agadá
Kwame Gyekye has been called a dualist to the extent that he accepts the ontological distinction between mind and matter, with both phenomena interacting with each other. I argue in this article that Gyekye’s presentation of the sunsum as a universal animating principle that is itself nonmaterial and irreducible to a material base warrants a second look at his philosophy of mind to determine whether he can be considered a pan-psychist and whether a pan-psychist reading can resolve the Gyekyean problem of interaction. I assert that, while Gyekye’s interpretation of the Akan notion of sunsum invites a pan-psychist scrutiny, the interpretive difficulties surrounding the concept, as highlighted by Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame, render a pan-psychist conclusion problematic even if persuasive. I recommend that the notion of sunsum as a nonmaterial principle that underlies material entities is significant enough to warrant further interrogation by African philosophers of mind.
{"title":"Kwame Gyekye as a Pan-Psychist","authors":"A. Agadá","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.1.0028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0028","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Kwame Gyekye has been called a dualist to the extent that he accepts the ontological distinction between mind and matter, with both phenomena interacting with each other. I argue in this article that Gyekye’s presentation of the sunsum as a universal animating principle that is itself nonmaterial and irreducible to a material base warrants a second look at his philosophy of mind to determine whether he can be considered a pan-psychist and whether a pan-psychist reading can resolve the Gyekyean problem of interaction. I assert that, while Gyekye’s interpretation of the Akan notion of sunsum invites a pan-psychist scrutiny, the interpretive difficulties surrounding the concept, as highlighted by Kwasi Wiredu and Safro Kwame, render a pan-psychist conclusion problematic even if persuasive. I recommend that the notion of sunsum as a nonmaterial principle that underlies material entities is significant enough to warrant further interrogation by African philosophers of mind.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49055568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.1.0001
Olerato Kau Mogomotsi
Haydon White’s Metahistory (1973) interprets representations of history as inherently reflecting historians’ subjectivity. That is, the modes in which historians represent history are significantly determined and grounded by their ideological commitments. In this article, I offer a metahistorical analysis of the modes of doing history undertaken by the African Islamic intellectual historians Ousmane Kane and Souleymane Bachir Diagne. I critically evaluate the consistency between the object of history as they assume it to be and the discourses they (re)produce, taking account of their ideologically grounded mode of realizing their chosen object of history. Taking the general object of history for the African intellectual to be the resistance of the colonial library, I argue that, in their pursuit of this object of history, Kane and Diagne fall short owing to their use of the Islamic library to assert the existence of an African intellectual history.
{"title":"On the Object of History and Doing History in the Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa","authors":"Olerato Kau Mogomotsi","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.1.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Haydon White’s Metahistory (1973) interprets representations of history as inherently reflecting historians’ subjectivity. That is, the modes in which historians represent history are significantly determined and grounded by their ideological commitments. In this article, I offer a metahistorical analysis of the modes of doing history undertaken by the African Islamic intellectual historians Ousmane Kane and Souleymane Bachir Diagne. I critically evaluate the consistency between the object of history as they assume it to be and the discourses they (re)produce, taking account of their ideologically grounded mode of realizing their chosen object of history. Taking the general object of history for the African intellectual to be the resistance of the colonial library, I argue that, in their pursuit of this object of history, Kane and Diagne fall short owing to their use of the Islamic library to assert the existence of an African intellectual history.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43821195","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.1.0056
Stephen. Phiri
{"title":"Sankara Is Not Dead, dir. Lucie Viver","authors":"Stephen. Phiri","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.1.0056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0056","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45437188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.21.1.0013
L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues
Philosophers have been intrigued by the problem of evil for centuries: How can God and evil coexist? This article tries to answer this question by using Kongolese religious thought from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I contend that the Kongolese view gleaned from historical sources and complemented by contemporary African philosophical scholarship contains sufficient resources to reply to this problem coherently. Particularly, I argue that, from the Kongolese viewpoint, evil in the world can be explained as follows. God and other morally good entities (e.g., the morally good living dead) are not morally perfect and may commit moral errors. Moreover, God does not have unlimited power over morally bad entities who may commit moral wrongs. This view, I contend, deserves consideration since, unlike the mainstream Western perspective, it does not imply the unacceptable view that horrendous evils are morally justified.
{"title":"Christianity in the Kingdom of Kongo and Western Theism: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Evil","authors":"L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues","doi":"10.5325/philafri.21.1.0013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.21.1.0013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Philosophers have been intrigued by the problem of evil for centuries: How can God and evil coexist? This article tries to answer this question by using Kongolese religious thought from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. I contend that the Kongolese view gleaned from historical sources and complemented by contemporary African philosophical scholarship contains sufficient resources to reply to this problem coherently. Particularly, I argue that, from the Kongolese viewpoint, evil in the world can be explained as follows. God and other morally good entities (e.g., the morally good living dead) are not morally perfect and may commit moral errors. Moreover, God does not have unlimited power over morally bad entities who may commit moral wrongs. This view, I contend, deserves consideration since, unlike the mainstream Western perspective, it does not imply the unacceptable view that horrendous evils are morally justified.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47378281","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.20.2.0107
Kó.lá Abímbó.lá
This article advances the claim that the Òrìṣà tradition is best conceived of as a legal tradition. Notwithstanding the fact that scholars have written extensively about the tradition from the perspectives of religion (W. Abimbola 1976; Hucks 2012; Murphy 1995; Olupona & Rey 2008; Stewart 2005), philosophy (K. Abímbọ́lá 2018; K. Abímbọ́lá 2006; Hallen 2000; Makinde 1988; Taiwo 2004), the arts (Abiodun 1975; Thompson 1984; Pemberton III 1977), and many other domains of inquiry, I maintain that the extant scholarship has underrated the significance of tradition, and has almost completely overlooked the fact that the primary function of Òrìṣà is the improvement of social interaction through the governance and regulation of conduct—which makes it a legal tradition.
本文提出了Òrìṣà传统最好被视为法律传统的主张。尽管学者们从宗教的角度对这一传统进行了广泛的研究(W. Abimbola 1976;哈克2012;墨菲1995;Olupona & Rey 2008;Stewart 2005)，哲学(K. Abímbọ ? l 2018;K. Abímbọ·l 2006;哈伦2000;Makinde 1988;Taiwo 2004)，艺术(Abiodun 1975;汤普森1984;Pemberton III 1977)，以及许多其他研究领域，我坚持认为，现有的学术低估了传统的重要性，并且几乎完全忽视了一个事实，即Òrìṣà的主要功能是通过对行为的治理和监管来改善社会互动，这使其成为一种法律传统。
{"title":"The Òrìs.à Legal Tradition","authors":"Kó.lá Abímbó.lá","doi":"10.5325/philafri.20.2.0107","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.20.2.0107","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article advances the claim that the Òrìṣà tradition is best conceived of as a legal tradition. Notwithstanding the fact that scholars have written extensively about the tradition from the perspectives of religion (W. Abimbola 1976; Hucks 2012; Murphy 1995; Olupona & Rey 2008; Stewart 2005), philosophy (K. Abímbọ́lá 2018; K. Abímbọ́lá 2006; Hallen 2000; Makinde 1988; Taiwo 2004), the arts (Abiodun 1975; Thompson 1984; Pemberton III 1977), and many other domains of inquiry, I maintain that the extant scholarship has underrated the significance of tradition, and has almost completely overlooked the fact that the primary function of Òrìṣà is the improvement of social interaction through the governance and regulation of conduct—which makes it a legal tradition.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70869591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.20.2.0083
E. Ofuasia, Oladipupo Sunday Layi
This article takes its inspiration from Jacques Derrida to consider how deconstructionism can be done inadvertently. This possibility is underscored when one considers how a very significant phrase in Ifá texts— “A díá fún . . .” has been construed away from its transliteration as “Ifá divination was performed for . . .” by each of Oluwole and Karenga. Oluwole justifies her “deconstruction” on the grounds that such transliteration does not capture the philosophic cogs gravid within Ifá verses. Karenga, through his Kawaida methodology, “improvises” to suit the ethical inferences he seeks to deduce out of the corpus. On this showing, this research infers that each of these scholars have engaged in a reflective activity that passes, on Derrida’s reading, as deconstruction, unbeknownst to them. Would they admit that their intellectual drudgeries amount to postmodern philosophy? This is the primary research question that this disquisition interrogates.
{"title":"“Is it possible to do Postmodern Philosophy Unbeknownst?”: On Sophie Oluwole’s and Maulana Karenga’s “Deconstruction” of the Ifá Literary Corpus","authors":"E. Ofuasia, Oladipupo Sunday Layi","doi":"10.5325/philafri.20.2.0083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.20.2.0083","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article takes its inspiration from Jacques Derrida to consider how deconstructionism can be done inadvertently. This possibility is underscored when one considers how a very significant phrase in Ifá texts— “A díá fún . . .” has been construed away from its transliteration as “Ifá divination was performed for . . .” by each of Oluwole and Karenga. Oluwole justifies her “deconstruction” on the grounds that such transliteration does not capture the philosophic cogs gravid within Ifá verses. Karenga, through his Kawaida methodology, “improvises” to suit the ethical inferences he seeks to deduce out of the corpus. On this showing, this research infers that each of these scholars have engaged in a reflective activity that passes, on Derrida’s reading, as deconstruction, unbeknownst to them. Would they admit that their intellectual drudgeries amount to postmodern philosophy? This is the primary research question that this disquisition interrogates.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48334650","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.20.2.0168
A. D. Attoe
Examining the literature on the question of life’s meaning from an African perspective, I find that existing theories almost solely stem from the context of traditional African thought. Thus, very little, if anything at all, is said about contemporary African accounts of meaningfulness. It is this gap that this article fills. In this article, I identify two major accounts of meaningfulness that can be derived from the contemporary African context. The first is what I call “living a religious life (LRL)” theory and the second is a conglomeration of three theories of meaning, which I call the cluster view. The first view locates meaning in living honorably and pursuing the religious ideals of one’s religious sect. The second view locates meaning in a cluster of ideals (self-sufficiency, raising a child, and achieving certain socio-cultural milestones as well a high status in society) and in the pursuit of these ideals.
{"title":"Accounts of Life’s Meaningfulness from a Contemporary African Perspective","authors":"A. D. Attoe","doi":"10.5325/philafri.20.2.0168","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.20.2.0168","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Examining the literature on the question of life’s meaning from an African perspective, I find that existing theories almost solely stem from the context of traditional African thought. Thus, very little, if anything at all, is said about contemporary African accounts of meaningfulness. It is this gap that this article fills. In this article, I identify two major accounts of meaningfulness that can be derived from the contemporary African context. The first is what I call “living a religious life (LRL)” theory and the second is a conglomeration of three theories of meaning, which I call the cluster view. The first view locates meaning in living honorably and pursuing the religious ideals of one’s religious sect. The second view locates meaning in a cluster of ideals (self-sufficiency, raising a child, and achieving certain socio-cultural milestones as well a high status in society) and in the pursuit of these ideals.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48258441","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-01DOI: 10.5325/philafri.20.2.0129
D. C. Ude
This article theorizes the modernization dynamics of the Igbo world, using the Habermasian framework. Drawing on Habermas, it argues that Igbo modernity or, more precisely, the transformations associated with Igbo modernization, may be understood in terms of the “uncoupling” of systems from the Igbo lifeworld. Relatedly, it further argues that the crises and pathologies that attend modernity in Igboland owe largely to the “colonization” of the Igbo lifeworld by systems of modernity consequent upon this uncoupling. The article pays special attention to the realm of the lifeworld because it is a neglected sphere in the scholarship on the Igbo (African) experience of modernity. Besides, focusing on the Igbo lifeworld would provide the much-needed contextualized reading—one steeped in Africa—of Habermas’s important but rather rarefied theory of modernity. The significance of the article perhaps lies in this two-pronged engagement—the focus on lifeworld and the attempt to contextualize Habermas.
{"title":"Modernity and the Igbo Lifeworld: Theorizing the Modernization Dynamics of the Igbo World from the Habermasian Framework","authors":"D. C. Ude","doi":"10.5325/philafri.20.2.0129","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/philafri.20.2.0129","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article theorizes the modernization dynamics of the Igbo world, using the Habermasian framework. Drawing on Habermas, it argues that Igbo modernity or, more precisely, the transformations associated with Igbo modernization, may be understood in terms of the “uncoupling” of systems from the Igbo lifeworld. Relatedly, it further argues that the crises and pathologies that attend modernity in Igboland owe largely to the “colonization” of the Igbo lifeworld by systems of modernity consequent upon this uncoupling. The article pays special attention to the realm of the lifeworld because it is a neglected sphere in the scholarship on the Igbo (African) experience of modernity. Besides, focusing on the Igbo lifeworld would provide the much-needed contextualized reading—one steeped in Africa—of Habermas’s important but rather rarefied theory of modernity. The significance of the article perhaps lies in this two-pronged engagement—the focus on lifeworld and the attempt to contextualize Habermas.","PeriodicalId":42045,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Africana","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47322543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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