Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.2009717
Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父
Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 philosophy was generated from unique historical circumstances in the 17th century. First of all, his philosophy as a whole touched on the cognitive aspects of several distinct processes, which he termed “inquiring the pattern through approaching concrete affairs” (ji shi qiong li 即事穷理), “governing the heart by the pattern” (yi li yu xin 以理御心 ), “crystallizing the way through [letting it] immerge in virtue” (ru de yi ning dao 入 德以凝 道 ), and “discerning the continuing through summarizing the changing” (yao bian yi zhi chang 要变以知常). Second, he examined the objective and contradictory movement of nature and human society with the dialectics of “integrating the manifold and synthesizing contrasts” (hui qi canwu, tong qi cuozong 会其参伍, 通其 错综), in order to put forward the dialectical historical view of nature and human society that “wholly realizes the change in the pattern of things and human affairs” (ji wuli renshi zhi bian 极物理人事之变). In addition, Wang also completed dialectical research on the process of cognition itself. By proposing that “the heart keeps pace with the coming of the affairs” (shi zhi lai, xin zhi wang事之来, 心之往) or, in other words, “how beginning and end form one structure and how outside and inside combine their properties” (shi zhong tong tiao, nei wai he de 始终同条, 内外合德), he established a unique dialectical epistemology. These three aspects in Wang’s naive materialistic dialectics mutually contain and correspond to each other, but they also have their own different categories and systems, and therefore it is possible to study them respectively. In this article I will provide an outline of Wang’s unique dialectics.
{"title":"An Outline of Wang Chuanshan’s Dialectics","authors":"Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.2009717","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.2009717","url":null,"abstract":"Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 philosophy was generated from unique historical circumstances in the 17th century. First of all, his philosophy as a whole touched on the cognitive aspects of several distinct processes, which he termed “inquiring the pattern through approaching concrete affairs” (ji shi qiong li 即事穷理), “governing the heart by the pattern” (yi li yu xin 以理御心 ), “crystallizing the way through [letting it] immerge in virtue” (ru de yi ning dao 入 德以凝 道 ), and “discerning the continuing through summarizing the changing” (yao bian yi zhi chang 要变以知常). Second, he examined the objective and contradictory movement of nature and human society with the dialectics of “integrating the manifold and synthesizing contrasts” (hui qi canwu, tong qi cuozong 会其参伍, 通其 错综), in order to put forward the dialectical historical view of nature and human society that “wholly realizes the change in the pattern of things and human affairs” (ji wuli renshi zhi bian 极物理人事之变). In addition, Wang also completed dialectical research on the process of cognition itself. By proposing that “the heart keeps pace with the coming of the affairs” (shi zhi lai, xin zhi wang事之来, 心之往) or, in other words, “how beginning and end form one structure and how outside and inside combine their properties” (shi zhong tong tiao, nei wai he de 始终同条, 内外合德), he established a unique dialectical epistemology. These three aspects in Wang’s naive materialistic dialectics mutually contain and correspond to each other, but they also have their own different categories and systems, and therefore it is possible to study them respectively. In this article I will provide an outline of Wang’s unique dialectics.","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"218 - 254"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42298242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.2009718
Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父
There is a strong contemporary interest in discussing issues of culture in China. These discussions commonly focus on the problem of searching for cultural roots. Regarding the meaning of this “search for roots” (xungen 寻根), there are many different accounts. One of these accounts concerns the question of whether China’s modernization is merely a passive response to the assault of Western culture, or whether the development of China’s long-standing culture has internal historical roots or a “living source” (huoshui yuantou 活水源头). If the latter, did this internal source for the renewal of a national cultural life exist in the distant past or did it develop in recent times? How should it be sought? Is it possible to develop science and democracy through seeking a “return to the root to open up the new” (fanben kaixin 返本开新 ) from within the orthodox Confucian tradition? Or is it necessary to thoroughly cast off all old traditions to be able to reconstruct and give new life to a national culture? The implications of these questions are very broad and have given rise to many debates. The author holds that although the gradual introduction of Western learning beginning in the 17th century had a great stimulatory effect on the development of modern culture in China, fundamentally, China’s modernization and cultural metamorphosis can only be a necessary result of long-term developments of Chinese history. For many years, we have been continually stuck in the intellectual swamp of the dilemma between “total Westernization” (quanpan xihua 全盘西化) and “conserving the national essence” (baocun guocui 保存国粹). Along with various forms of “displacement of substance and function” (tiyong cuozhi 体用错置), we are never able to escape from the mode of thought that views China and the West as going their separate ways, ancient as opposed to modern, and substance split asunder from function. In this we fail to distinguish the difference within sameness and the sameness within difference of the Chinese and Western trajectories of development, and we fail to seriously investigate the specific path taken by the Chinese intellectual enlightenment. Thus, faced with the violent impact of Western culture, we have frequently been too busy with its importation while neglecting its digestion and connection. We seldom think to unearth those cultural sprouts within our national tradition that share the same qualities in a different mode, constantly being unable to accurately or to practically grasp the historical points of connection between traditional culture and modernization. In contemporary discussions, locating the real starting point for China’s historical process of leaving behind medieval culture has become a point of debate. Scholars question whether the shifts in cultural and intellectual trends during the transition from the Ming (1368–1644) to the Qing
{"title":"A Brief Account of the Transformation in Style of Learning in the Late Ming Dynasty","authors":"Xiao Jiefu 萧萐父","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.2009718","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.2009718","url":null,"abstract":"There is a strong contemporary interest in discussing issues of culture in China. These discussions commonly focus on the problem of searching for cultural roots. Regarding the meaning of this “search for roots” (xungen 寻根), there are many different accounts. One of these accounts concerns the question of whether China’s modernization is merely a passive response to the assault of Western culture, or whether the development of China’s long-standing culture has internal historical roots or a “living source” (huoshui yuantou 活水源头). If the latter, did this internal source for the renewal of a national cultural life exist in the distant past or did it develop in recent times? How should it be sought? Is it possible to develop science and democracy through seeking a “return to the root to open up the new” (fanben kaixin 返本开新 ) from within the orthodox Confucian tradition? Or is it necessary to thoroughly cast off all old traditions to be able to reconstruct and give new life to a national culture? The implications of these questions are very broad and have given rise to many debates. The author holds that although the gradual introduction of Western learning beginning in the 17th century had a great stimulatory effect on the development of modern culture in China, fundamentally, China’s modernization and cultural metamorphosis can only be a necessary result of long-term developments of Chinese history. For many years, we have been continually stuck in the intellectual swamp of the dilemma between “total Westernization” (quanpan xihua 全盘西化) and “conserving the national essence” (baocun guocui 保存国粹). Along with various forms of “displacement of substance and function” (tiyong cuozhi 体用错置), we are never able to escape from the mode of thought that views China and the West as going their separate ways, ancient as opposed to modern, and substance split asunder from function. In this we fail to distinguish the difference within sameness and the sameness within difference of the Chinese and Western trajectories of development, and we fail to seriously investigate the specific path taken by the Chinese intellectual enlightenment. Thus, faced with the violent impact of Western culture, we have frequently been too busy with its importation while neglecting its digestion and connection. We seldom think to unearth those cultural sprouts within our national tradition that share the same qualities in a different mode, constantly being unable to accurately or to practically grasp the historical points of connection between traditional culture and modernization. In contemporary discussions, locating the real starting point for China’s historical process of leaving behind medieval culture has become a point of debate. Scholars question whether the shifts in cultural and intellectual trends during the transition from the Ming (1368–1644) to the Qing","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"259 - 273"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43339608","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.2009719
Xiao Jiefu
Did, after all, a teaching of an early Yin-Yang school (yin yang jia 阴阳家) in the intellectual history of pre-imperial China (before 221 BCE) really exist? In other words, was there a proto-science based on the “numbers and measures” (shu du 数度) of Yin and Yang before Zou Yan 邹衍, which was later inherited and developed by Zou Yan and his school? If such an early science did exist, what impact did it exert on Zou Yan’s thoughts and on the evolution from the divinatory manual of the Changes (Zhou yi 周 易 ) to the later exegetical traditions? These are valuable questions for historical and text-critical studies on ancient dialectics and the origin and development of the Changes. In the present study, I will give my own restricted opinions and look forward to your instruction.
{"title":"The Changes and the Teaching of the Early Yin-Yang School","authors":"Xiao Jiefu","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.2009719","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.2009719","url":null,"abstract":"Did, after all, a teaching of an early Yin-Yang school (yin yang jia 阴阳家) in the intellectual history of pre-imperial China (before 221 BCE) really exist? In other words, was there a proto-science based on the “numbers and measures” (shu du 数度) of Yin and Yang before Zou Yan 邹衍, which was later inherited and developed by Zou Yan and his school? If such an early science did exist, what impact did it exert on Zou Yan’s thoughts and on the evolution from the divinatory manual of the Changes (Zhou yi 周 易 ) to the later exegetical traditions? These are valuable questions for historical and text-critical studies on ancient dialectics and the origin and development of the Changes. In the present study, I will give my own restricted opinions and look forward to your instruction.","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"270 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48792470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.2009714
Guo Qiyong 郭齐勇
Xiao Jiefu (1924–2008) was born in Chengdu. His ancestral place is Jingyan (井研) in Sichuan province. Due to his efforts, traditional Chinese philosophy became established as an academic discipline at Chinese universities in the People’s Republic of China. He was a philosopher and a historian of philosophy. He graduated from the Department of Philosophy of Wuhan University in 1947. From 1951 to 1955, he served as the director of the Marxist–Leninist Teaching and Research Institute of West China University (Huaxi daxue 华西大学 ) and of Sichuan Medical University, further studied in the advanced theory class of the Central Party School in 1956, engaged in an advanced study in the Department of Philosophy of Peking University in 1957, and was transferred to the Department of Philosophy of Wuhan University in the autumn of the same year. From that time, he taught in this department and served as the director of the Teaching and Research Institute for the History of Chinese Philosophy and was a tutor of doctoral students. He was an internationally renowned scholar, the founder and academic leader of the national key discipline of Chinese philosophy at Wuhan University, and the first director of the academic committee of The Center of Traditional Chinese Cultural Studies of Wuhan University (a key research base of humanities and social sciences of the Ministry of Education). His social part-time jobs included vice president of the Society for the History of Chinese Philosophy; vice president of the Chinese Confucius Institute; academic advisor of the International Association of Confucianism; academic member of the International Association of Daoism; academic advisor of the Chinese Society for Studies on The Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) member of the international academic advisory group of the International Society of Chinese Philosophy; and tutor of the Chinese Culture Academy. He engaged in the teaching and research of Chinese philosophy and culture for a long time. He was a famous expert in the philosophy of Wang Fuzhi (王夫之 , 1619–1692) and the early enlightenment of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. He attended or hosted many academic conferences at home and abroad and published more than 100 academic papers in China and abroad. His main works include Blowing Sand Collection (a collection of his articles in 3 volumes), Introduction to Wang Fuzhi’s Philosophy, Sources of Historical Materials for the History of Chinese Philosophy, Development and Change of Enlightenment in the Intellectual History of Ming and Qing Dynasties (co-authored), Critical Biography of Wang Fuzhi (co-authored), and The History of Chinese Philosophy
{"title":"A Critical Biography of Xiao Jiefu","authors":"Guo Qiyong 郭齐勇","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.2009714","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.2009714","url":null,"abstract":"Xiao Jiefu (1924–2008) was born in Chengdu. His ancestral place is Jingyan (井研) in Sichuan province. Due to his efforts, traditional Chinese philosophy became established as an academic discipline at Chinese universities in the People’s Republic of China. He was a philosopher and a historian of philosophy. He graduated from the Department of Philosophy of Wuhan University in 1947. From 1951 to 1955, he served as the director of the Marxist–Leninist Teaching and Research Institute of West China University (Huaxi daxue 华西大学 ) and of Sichuan Medical University, further studied in the advanced theory class of the Central Party School in 1956, engaged in an advanced study in the Department of Philosophy of Peking University in 1957, and was transferred to the Department of Philosophy of Wuhan University in the autumn of the same year. From that time, he taught in this department and served as the director of the Teaching and Research Institute for the History of Chinese Philosophy and was a tutor of doctoral students. He was an internationally renowned scholar, the founder and academic leader of the national key discipline of Chinese philosophy at Wuhan University, and the first director of the academic committee of The Center of Traditional Chinese Cultural Studies of Wuhan University (a key research base of humanities and social sciences of the Ministry of Education). His social part-time jobs included vice president of the Society for the History of Chinese Philosophy; vice president of the Chinese Confucius Institute; academic advisor of the International Association of Confucianism; academic member of the International Association of Daoism; academic advisor of the Chinese Society for Studies on The Book of Changes (Zhouyi 周易) member of the international academic advisory group of the International Society of Chinese Philosophy; and tutor of the Chinese Culture Academy. He engaged in the teaching and research of Chinese philosophy and culture for a long time. He was a famous expert in the philosophy of Wang Fuzhi (王夫之 , 1619–1692) and the early enlightenment of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties. He attended or hosted many academic conferences at home and abroad and published more than 100 academic papers in China and abroad. His main works include Blowing Sand Collection (a collection of his articles in 3 volumes), Introduction to Wang Fuzhi’s Philosophy, Sources of Historical Materials for the History of Chinese Philosophy, Development and Change of Enlightenment in the Intellectual History of Ming and Qing Dynasties (co-authored), Critical Biography of Wang Fuzhi (co-authored), and The History of Chinese Philosophy","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"201 - 217"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47714100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.2009712
Guo Qiyong, D. Schilling
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the formation of academic philosophy depended much on the engagement and research of scholars like Xiao Jiefu 萧 萐父 (1924–2008). Xiao Jiefu was gifted with great literary talent and in his youth received a comprehensive education in Chinese traditional literature and thought. During the years of the Chinese–Japanese War, he enrolled in philosophy classes at Wuhan University, relocated to Leshan (乐山) in Sichuan province, and received training in Western philosophy. He graduated with a thesis on Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals in 1947. Later, as a teacher at the university level, he was assigned to reform the study of Chinese philosophy and established the Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy at Wuhan University. His scholarship and academic efforts led to Wuhan University becoming one of the leading institutes on philosophy, and his methodology and research had in general a great impact on the study of Chinese philosophy in China. Western philosophy (especially Marxist philosophy and German Idealism) shaped Xiao Jiefu’s approaches to Chinese philosophy. His interests, however, did not lie in proving the validity of Marxism or developing Marxist thought. Rather, he was interested in using Marxism as a methodological approach to explore the intellectual resources of the Chinese tradition and to stress the importance of philosophical thinking and reflection for the social development of contemporary society. Xiao’s philosophy broke new ground in two aspects: First, his systematic approach to dialectical conceptions contributed substantially to the study of Daoism and Buddhism, as well as to the Yi jing 易经 (Book of Changes). Dialectical relations are inherent in many dyadic figures of Chinese thought. This is so in natural philosophy (Yin and Yang, Qian and Kun, heaven and earth, etc.) as well as in epistemological and ethical conceptions, for instance, knowledge and action or the “self” (ji 己; wo 我) as subject of thinking with its relations to “things” (wu 物) as objects or conditions of action and thought. Since dialectics brings forth conceptual opposites, contrasts, differences, and contradictions, they exercise an intrinsic force on speculative thinking. In this way they push forward intellectual transmission and transformation, while simultaneously reflecting on and interfering with the social and historical contexts present. Second, Xiao Jiefu became well known as a historian of Chinese philosophy and praised for his contributions to the methodology of intellectual history. In the early
{"title":"The Historical Dynamics of Chinese Thought and the Thesis of Early Enlightenment: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Xiao Jiefu","authors":"Guo Qiyong, D. Schilling","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.2009712","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.2009712","url":null,"abstract":"After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the formation of academic philosophy depended much on the engagement and research of scholars like Xiao Jiefu 萧 萐父 (1924–2008). Xiao Jiefu was gifted with great literary talent and in his youth received a comprehensive education in Chinese traditional literature and thought. During the years of the Chinese–Japanese War, he enrolled in philosophy classes at Wuhan University, relocated to Leshan (乐山) in Sichuan province, and received training in Western philosophy. He graduated with a thesis on Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals in 1947. Later, as a teacher at the university level, he was assigned to reform the study of Chinese philosophy and established the Research Institute of Chinese Philosophy at Wuhan University. His scholarship and academic efforts led to Wuhan University becoming one of the leading institutes on philosophy, and his methodology and research had in general a great impact on the study of Chinese philosophy in China. Western philosophy (especially Marxist philosophy and German Idealism) shaped Xiao Jiefu’s approaches to Chinese philosophy. His interests, however, did not lie in proving the validity of Marxism or developing Marxist thought. Rather, he was interested in using Marxism as a methodological approach to explore the intellectual resources of the Chinese tradition and to stress the importance of philosophical thinking and reflection for the social development of contemporary society. Xiao’s philosophy broke new ground in two aspects: First, his systematic approach to dialectical conceptions contributed substantially to the study of Daoism and Buddhism, as well as to the Yi jing 易经 (Book of Changes). Dialectical relations are inherent in many dyadic figures of Chinese thought. This is so in natural philosophy (Yin and Yang, Qian and Kun, heaven and earth, etc.) as well as in epistemological and ethical conceptions, for instance, knowledge and action or the “self” (ji 己; wo 我) as subject of thinking with its relations to “things” (wu 物) as objects or conditions of action and thought. Since dialectics brings forth conceptual opposites, contrasts, differences, and contradictions, they exercise an intrinsic force on speculative thinking. In this way they push forward intellectual transmission and transformation, while simultaneously reflecting on and interfering with the social and historical contexts present. Second, Xiao Jiefu became well known as a historian of Chinese philosophy and praised for his contributions to the methodology of intellectual history. In the early","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"194 - 200"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46686976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.1977075
Y. Guorong
Abstract As human activity in the broad sense, affairs unfold through the entirety of the processes of human being. They are also intrinsic to each aspect of human being. Through affairs, humans create heaven and earth anew and thereby reconstruct being. Affairs are interconnected with action and manifest the essential human powers in which emotional attachments participate. The mark of action and the weight of emotional attachments, in sublating the original state of things and bestowing on them actuality, also give affairs diverse qualities. Affairs not only change objects; they also affect humans themselves. In the processes of “being capable in one’s affairs,” people also further “achieve their virtue.” The processes of enacting affairs both employ things and interact with other people, and behind human interactions with things lie the relations among persons. The unfolding of affairs thus occurs in the context of communicative interactions among humans and also constitutes the actual source of the formation of relations among them. Human being cannot be separated from concern for values and pursuit of meaning. As human activity, affairs also possess value content and are interrelated with the pursuit of meaning.
{"title":"Humanity: Existing Through “Affairs”","authors":"Y. Guorong","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.1977075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.1977075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract As human activity in the broad sense, affairs unfold through the entirety of the processes of human being. They are also intrinsic to each aspect of human being. Through affairs, humans create heaven and earth anew and thereby reconstruct being. Affairs are interconnected with action and manifest the essential human powers in which emotional attachments participate. The mark of action and the weight of emotional attachments, in sublating the original state of things and bestowing on them actuality, also give affairs diverse qualities. Affairs not only change objects; they also affect humans themselves. In the processes of “being capable in one’s affairs,” people also further “achieve their virtue.” The processes of enacting affairs both employ things and interact with other people, and behind human interactions with things lie the relations among persons. The unfolding of affairs thus occurs in the context of communicative interactions among humans and also constitutes the actual source of the formation of relations among them. Human being cannot be separated from concern for values and pursuit of meaning. As human activity, affairs also possess value content and are interrelated with the pursuit of meaning.","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"166 - 192"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46549701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.1977074
Y. Guorong
Abstract The actual world, which surpasses the original state of being, consists in “affairs” (shi). Affairs can be understood as human activity and its outcomes. From the perspective of an abstract metaphysics, “things” (wu) appear to be independent of affairs and to possess ontological priority. However, through properly understanding the actual world we see that in fact affairs manifest the more fundamental import. Humans interact with things through affairs, and in this sense, the relations of humans with things are mediated by the relations of humans with affairs. Things manifest their diverse meaning only through incorporation into affairs. Additionally, the actual world formed through human activity gives rise to both the realm of fact and the realm of value, and affairs thus provide fundamental grounds that unify fact and value. In understanding the actual world, we must avoid reducing affairs, first, to merely matters of the mind and second, to merely matters of language. Affirming that it is based in affairs means that the actual world surpasses the original state of being while also committing us to its reality.
{"title":"“Affairs” and the Actual World","authors":"Y. Guorong","doi":"10.1080/10971467.2021.1977074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10971467.2021.1977074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The actual world, which surpasses the original state of being, consists in “affairs” (shi). Affairs can be understood as human activity and its outcomes. From the perspective of an abstract metaphysics, “things” (wu) appear to be independent of affairs and to possess ontological priority. However, through properly understanding the actual world we see that in fact affairs manifest the more fundamental import. Humans interact with things through affairs, and in this sense, the relations of humans with things are mediated by the relations of humans with affairs. Things manifest their diverse meaning only through incorporation into affairs. Additionally, the actual world formed through human activity gives rise to both the realm of fact and the realm of value, and affairs thus provide fundamental grounds that unify fact and value. In understanding the actual world, we must avoid reducing affairs, first, to merely matters of the mind and second, to merely matters of language. Affirming that it is based in affairs means that the actual world surpasses the original state of being while also committing us to its reality.","PeriodicalId":42082,"journal":{"name":"CONTEMPORARY CHINESE THOUGHT","volume":"52 1","pages":"137 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48957208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.1977073
R. Carleo, Liang-Yen Liu
Yang Guorong is a contemporary philosopher with little need for introduction—and not only because he has been introduced here before. Professor Yang’s decades of prolific scholarship cover nearly all major fields of Chinese philosophy, from the pre-Qin Masters to neo-Confucian metaphysics on to modern academic philosophers. That scholarship is accompanied by a series of major works laying out his own original philosophy, comprised principally of his “concrete metaphysics.” Most recently he has expanded on that theorizing by formulating the philosophy of “affairs” introduced in the essays collected here. This introduction outlines and contextualizes their main arguments. So what is a philosophy of affairs? “Affairs” translates the Chinese shi, a most commonplace term. You shenme shi? (What’s up?) You shi ma? (Everything all right?) Zhe shenme shi? (What’s this?) Yet despite its everyday nature, the term itself is strikingly difficult to render into English— and this is in fact a defining feature of the philosophy. Yang argues that “affairs,” shi, offers a view of the world that is distinctively Chinese. It belongs to “Chinese philosophy,” shaping and shaped by a unique metaphysical outlook and, most importantly, giving us a unique philosophical framework for understanding our understanding. While we might identify this with the Chinese nation or tradition or ethnicity or culture, in the most deeply important sense Yang describes the ideas and arguments he puts forward here as Chinese in the sense of being deeply rooted in Chinese language and the particular philosophical systems that grew within and through it. We can thus say it is distinctively Chinese philosophy in both the sense of being a philosophy of China and its culture, zhongguo zhexue, and being a philosophy that operates in ways distinctive to and shaped by Chinese language, hanyu zhexue. In fact, it integrates the two in a way so inseparable that it calls into question the contemporary push to distinguish the two. The philosophy of affairs, that is, is shaped by the unique conceptual schemes of its original language; it was also a force that shaped the language itself. Perhaps the most troublesome thing about translating the term shi here is that its closest English equivalent is the informal, slang use of the word “thing”: wo you shi (I have a thing—in the sense of some engagement); zhe zhong shi (this kind of thing). But a main point of the essays that follow, in laying out the basic framework of the philosophy of affairs, is precisely the distinction between affairs and things, shi and wu. The core argument of the philosophy of affairs is to point out that it is necessarily through affairs that we engage with things in meaningful ways. Affairs must be conceptually
杨国荣是一位不需要介绍的当代哲学家，这不仅仅是因为他之前已经在这里被介绍过了。杨教授几十年来的丰富学术研究几乎涵盖了中国哲学的所有主要领域，从先秦大师到新儒家形而上学，再到现代学院派哲学家。这一学术成果伴随着一系列的主要著作，阐述了他自己的原始哲学，主要包括他的“具体形而上学”。最近，他通过在这里收集的文章中介绍的“事务”哲学，扩展了这一理论。这篇引言概述了他们的主要论点，并将其置于背景中。那么什么是事务哲学呢?“事”译为中文“事”，这是一个最常见的术语。你在说什么?(怎么了?)你是老师吗?(一切都好吗?)哲神神师?(这是什么?)然而，尽管这是一个日常用语，但这个术语本身却非常难以译成英语——这实际上是哲学的一个决定性特征。杨认为，“事务”提供了一种具有中国特色的世界观。它属于“中国哲学”，塑造和塑造了一种独特的形而上观，最重要的是，它给了我们一个独特的哲学框架来理解我们的理解。虽然我们可能会把这与中国民族、传统、种族或文化联系起来，但在最重要的意义上，杨将他在这里提出的观点和论点描述为中国人，因为他深深植根于中国语言，以及在中国语言中成长起来的特殊哲学体系。因此，我们可以说，它是一种独特的中国哲学，既是一种中国哲学，也是一种中国文化的哲学，也是一种以独特的方式运作的哲学，并受到中国语言的影响。事实上，它以一种不可分割的方式将两者结合在一起，以至于对当代将两者区分开来的努力提出了质疑。也就是说，事务哲学是由其原始语言的独特概念图式所塑造的;它也是一种塑造语言本身的力量。也许翻译“shi”这个词最麻烦的地方在于，它在英语中最接近的对应词是“thing”的非正式俚语用法:wo you shi(我有一件事——在某种参与的意义上);这种事。但在接下来的文章中，在阐述事务哲学的基本框架时，一个要点恰恰是区分事务与事物、是与物。事务哲学的核心论点是指出我们必须通过事务才能以有意义的方式参与事物。事务必须是概念性的
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Pub Date : 2021-05-24DOI: 10.1080/10971467.2021.1917942
Chen Bo
Abstract Jin Yuelin’s logical and philosophical thought was deeply influenced by the philosophy of Bertrand Russell. The same influence existed also in the case of his view on truth, which was considerably close to the views maintained by Russell in his phase of logical atomism. In their investigations, Russell and Jin not only focused on similar topics, but also occupied similar philosophical positions, such as realism in the domain of ontology, empiricism in epistemology, and the correspondence theory in the domain of the theory of truth. Nevertheless, Jin Yuelin’s view on truth was not only a mere imitation or recapitulation or even plagiarized copy of Russell’s, but also contained innovations and characteristics of its own. Jin, for example, emphasized certain general characteristics of truth, including the notion of truth as a relational quality, that truth is not a matter of degree, and that it is relative neither to time and space nor to the different types of knowledge. By so doing, Jin underlined the objectiveness, reliability, and transcendence of true propositions. By arguing that the correspondence theory of truth possessed strong foundations in common sense, Jin set out to defend the role of common sense in philosophy and science, maintaining that the former cannot be completely eliminated and arguing against the notion that any modification of a part of common sense would ultimately be founded on yet another segment of common sense. Moreover, Jin delivered his own response against the theory of the gap between “subject and object/the internal and the external,” which had been used to question the correspondence theory of truth, proposing a variety of cognitivist theory, which defined facts as “the given” (datum) that has been received and arranged. Most importantly, facts are cognitive constructs created on the basis of “the given” and encapsulate both subjectiveness and objectiveness. Jin Yuelin was a modern Chinese philosopher who had achieved profound erudition in both Chinese and Western thought, and, above all, an independent an profoundly original thinker.
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