Richard Rorty suggests that we should stop looking for something common to us all, for universal justifi cations and truth. Rorty argues that focusing on a single truth sooner or later serves those who claim that there is a proper, true model of living. In the end, they use violence and cause pain, as they are driven by the idea that everyone should accept their truth. In this article I shall argue that such reasoning is not justifi ed and whether we are universalists or constructivists, our actions may be the same and cause pain. At the same time, having the same beliefs will not stop us from acting differently. What matters is how we use a particular concept in accordance with our interests and not the concept itself. I shall also argue that dialog can help to prevent violence and that while Rorty is right, there are also a number of problems with that proposition.
Richard Rorty建议，我们应该停止寻找我们所有人共同的东西，寻找普遍的理由和真相。Rorty认为，关注一个单一的真相迟早会为那些声称有一个正确、真实的生活模式的人服务。最终，他们使用暴力并造成痛苦，因为他们被每个人都应该接受自己的真相的想法所驱使。在这篇文章中，我认为这种推理是没有道理的，无论我们是普遍主义者还是建构主义者，我们的行为都可能是一样的，并造成痛苦。同时，拥有相同的信念不会阻止我们采取不同的行动。重要的是我们如何根据自己的兴趣使用特定的概念，而不是概念本身。我还认为，对话有助于防止暴力，尽管罗蒂是对的，但这一主张也存在许多问题。
{"title":"Abandoning Truth is not a Solution. A Discussion with Richard Rorty","authors":"Marcin Kilanowski","doi":"10.33392/DIAM.1243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/DIAM.1243","url":null,"abstract":"Richard Rorty suggests that we should stop looking for something common to us all, for universal justifi cations and truth. Rorty argues that focusing on a single truth sooner or later serves those who claim that there is a proper, true model of living. In the end, they use violence and cause pain, as they are driven by the idea that everyone should accept their truth. In this article I shall argue that such reasoning is not justifi ed and whether we are universalists or constructivists, our actions may be the same and cause pain. At the same time, having the same beliefs will not stop us from acting differently. What matters is how we use a particular concept in accordance with our interests and not the concept itself. I shall also argue that dialog can help to prevent violence and that while Rorty is right, there are also a number of problems with that proposition.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48426877","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores how moderate communitarianism could bring about a greater sense of political morality in the practice of democracy in contemporary Africa. Moderate communitarianism is a thesis traceable to Kwame Gyekye, the Akan philosopher. This thesis is a moderation of the infl uence of the community in the Akan, an African social structure. In ensuring good political morality in the Akan, and therefore the African community, Gyekye proposes moral revolution over the enforcement of the law. I perform two main tasks in this article: (i) I reinforce the view that in a democratic framework (such as the framework within which many African states now fi nd themselves), moderate communitarianism offers lessons on political morality, and (ii) I challenge the notion that moral revolution has greater prospects for bringing about political morality than law enforcement.
{"title":"Moderate Communitarianism and the Idea of Political Morality in African Democratic Practice","authors":"H. Majeed","doi":"10.33392/DIAM.1245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/DIAM.1245","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores how moderate communitarianism could bring about a greater sense of political morality in the practice of democracy in contemporary Africa. Moderate communitarianism is a thesis traceable to Kwame Gyekye, the Akan philosopher. This thesis is a moderation of the infl uence of the community in the Akan, an African social structure. In ensuring good political morality in the Akan, and therefore the African community, Gyekye proposes moral revolution over the enforcement of the law. I perform two main tasks in this article: (i) I reinforce the view that in a democratic framework (such as the framework within which many African states now fi nd themselves), moderate communitarianism offers lessons on political morality, and (ii) I challenge the notion that moral revolution has greater prospects for bringing about political morality than law enforcement.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42814664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknownness is insufficient. This common sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus on the intentional aspect of anonymity and develop a metaphor of an “anonymity game” between “perpetrator” and “detective”. Starting from common sense intuitions, we provide a formalized, critical notion of anonymity.
{"title":"The Logical Structure of Intentional Anonymity","authors":"Michał Barcz, Jarek Gryz, A. Wierzbicki","doi":"10.33392/DIAM.1246","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/DIAM.1246","url":null,"abstract":"It has been noticed by several authors that the colloquial understanding of anonymity as mere unknownness is insufficient. This common sense notion of anonymity does not recognize the role of the goal for which the anonymity is sought. Starting with the distinction between intentional and unintentional anonymity (which are usually taken to be the same) and the general concept of the non-coordinatability of traits, we offer a logical analysis of anonymity and identification (understood as de-anonymization). In our enquiry, we focus on the intentional aspect of anonymity and develop a metaphor of an “anonymity game” between “perpetrator” and “detective”. Starting from common sense intuitions, we provide a formalized, critical notion of anonymity.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49269438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents considerations on altruism and prosocial behaviour formulated on the basis of some experiments with the ultimatum game. In the first part it will discuss relations between expected utility theories, the characteristics of homo oeconomicus and a modern understanding of altruism. It will focus in particular on conceptual differences, indicating that we can find more than one definition of altruism in modern literature. The second part of the text will provide an overview of selected behavioural theories of prosocial behaviour. It will also present the manner in which needs, social determinants, norms, and individual psychological features affect the propensity to behave in a prosocial fashion.
{"title":"Ekonomia altruizmu – o racjonalności zachowań prospołecznych","authors":"M. Adamus","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1233","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents considerations on altruism and prosocial behaviour formulated on the basis of some experiments with the ultimatum game. In the first part it will discuss relations between expected utility theories, the characteristics of homo oeconomicus and a modern understanding of altruism. It will focus in particular on conceptual differences, indicating that we can find more than one definition of altruism in modern literature. The second part of the text will provide an overview of selected behavioural theories of prosocial behaviour. It will also present the manner in which needs, social determinants, norms, and individual psychological features affect the propensity to behave in a prosocial fashion.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-22"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41599243","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the article I discuss three types of non-formal curriculum: the hidden, informal and null curriculum. Their negative impact on the moral education of medical students and physicians is documented through the choice of examples from Polish medical schools and the statements of Polish physicians.I also justify the thesis that the teaching of medical ethics as ethics-as-tools is deeply rooted within the Polish moral cultural tradition. The polemic with Wladyslaw Bieganski serves as a means of showing the relation between the medical moral tradition and the belief that medical ethic is of little importance in the moral education of medical students and doctors.I also indicate that the lack of references to medical schools as moral entities within moral education condemns physicians to the solitude of their personal conscience when confronted with moral decisions. This, in turn, promotes the idea of defining this conscience in opposition to the law.
{"title":"Kurs pozaformalny w edukacji moralnej studentów medycyny i młodych lekarzy","authors":"K. Szewczyk","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1236","url":null,"abstract":"In the article I discuss three types of non-formal curriculum: the hidden, informal and null curriculum. Their negative impact on the moral education of medical students and physicians is documented through the choice of examples from Polish medical schools and the statements of Polish physicians.I also justify the thesis that the teaching of medical ethics as ethics-as-tools is deeply rooted within the Polish moral cultural tradition. The polemic with Wladyslaw Bieganski serves as a means of showing the relation between the medical moral tradition and the belief that medical ethic is of little importance in the moral education of medical students and doctors.I also indicate that the lack of references to medical schools as moral entities within moral education condemns physicians to the solitude of their personal conscience when confronted with moral decisions. This, in turn, promotes the idea of defining this conscience in opposition to the law.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"61-87"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"66244914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, to present the various arguments in favour of the doctrine in question. It argues that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which could serve as the truth-conditions of identity statements. The considerations presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that, although the Simple View is faced with many theoretical difficulties, it is still a lively intellectual position in the debate on personal identity.
{"title":"Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową","authors":"M. Grygianiec","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1234","url":null,"abstract":"In the debate on personal identity, different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. The criteria of identity have usually been taken to state the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are interpreted as providing truth conditions for relevant identity statements. The Simple View of personal identity is the thesis that there are no noncircular and informative metaphysical criteria of identity for persons. The paper intends to first deliver a precise and general formulation of the Simple View, and, second, to present the various arguments in favour of the doctrine in question. It argues that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which could serve as the truth-conditions of identity statements. The considerations presented in the paper lead to the conclusion that, although the Simple View is faced with many theoretical difficulties, it is still a lively intellectual position in the debate on personal identity.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"23-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44908758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The paper will compare two methods used in the design of diagnostic strategies. The first one is a method that precises predictive value of diagnostic tests. The second one is based on the use of Bayes’ theorem. The main aim of this article is to identify the epistemological assumptions underlying both of these methods. For the purpose of this objective, example projects of one and multi-stage diagnostic strategy developed using both methods will be considered.
{"title":"Twierdzenie Bayesa w projektowaniu strategii diagnostycznych w medycynie","authors":"Tomasz Rzepiński","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1235","url":null,"abstract":"The paper will compare two methods used in the design of diagnostic strategies. The first one is a method that precises predictive value of diagnostic tests. The second one is based on the use of Bayes’ theorem. The main aim of this article is to identify the epistemological assumptions underlying both of these methods. For the purpose of this objective, example projects of one and multi-stage diagnostic strategy developed using both methods will be considered.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"39-60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45155340","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The relation of the meditative state of jhāna to the development of insight and liberating knowledge is one of the most controversial issues in studies on early Buddhism. In the Suttapitaka and later Buddhist meditative texts, one can find discrepancies which are difficult to reconcile. In this paper, I propose a new model of meditative insight using an interdisciplinary approach based both on critical philological studies of the Suttapitaka and the results of the dynamically developing cognitive science. I also highlight and examine the difficulties related to the traditional Buddhist model of insight. In order to propose a plausible model of insight as an element organically linked to jhāna, I refer to several new developments in the field of cognitive science.
{"title":"Problematyka medytacyjnego wglądu i wiedzy wyzwalającej w soteriologii wczesnego buddyzmu. Krytyczna analiza problemu przy zastosowaniu podejścia interdyscyplinarnego","authors":"G. Polak","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1204","url":null,"abstract":"The relation of the meditative state of jhāna to the development of insight and liberating knowledge is one of the most controversial issues in studies on early Buddhism. In the Suttapitaka and later Buddhist meditative texts, one can find discrepancies which are difficult to reconcile. In this paper, I propose a new model of meditative insight using an interdisciplinary approach based both on critical philological studies of the Suttapitaka and the results of the dynamically developing cognitive science. I also highlight and examine the difficulties related to the traditional Buddhist model of insight. In order to propose a plausible model of insight as an element organically linked to jhāna, I refer to several new developments in the field of cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"17-38"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47487170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a superstition or is it a duly substantiated view?
{"title":"Pluralizm logiczny a relatywizm w logice","authors":"Bożena Czernecka-Rej","doi":"10.13153/DIAM.1206","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.13153/DIAM.1206","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the article is to analyze the situation of contemporary logic with reference to the issue concerning connections between the pluralism of logical systems and relativism in logic. Accordingly, I seek answers to the following questions: Can the plurality of logic, more specifically, a large number and variety of systems constructed by logicians, be justified in a rational way? Does pluralism in logic imply the thesis of relativism? Is logical relativism in the contemporary philosophy of logic just a superstition or is it a duly substantiated view?","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"51-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41794044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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