Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are not reliable measures of metaethical belief. We end by discussing the implications of our account for the philosophical and practical implications of research on the psychology of metaethics.
{"title":"Misunderstanding Metaethics: Difficulties Measuring Folk Objectivism and Relativism","authors":"Lance S. Bush, D. Moss","doi":"10.33392/diam.1495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1495","url":null,"abstract":"Recent research on the metaethical beliefs of ordinary people appears to show that they are metaethical pluralists that adopt different metaethical standards for different moral judgments. Yet the methods used to evaluate folk metaethical belief rely on the assumption that participants interpret what they are asked in metaethical terms. We argue that most participants do not interpret questions designed to elicit metaethical beliefs in metaethical terms, or at least not in the way researchers intend. As a result, existing methods are not reliable measures of metaethical belief. We end by discussing the implications of our account for the philosophical and practical implications of research on the psychology of metaethics.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"17 1","pages":"6-21"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46335028","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board.
{"title":"X-Phi and Impartiality Thought Experiments: Investigating the Veil of Ignorance","authors":"Norbert Paulo, T. Pölzler","doi":"10.33392/diam.1499","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1499","url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses “impartiality thought experiments”, i.e., thought experiments that attempt to generate intuitions which are unaffected by personal characteristics such as age, gender or race. We focus on the most prominent impartiality thought experiment, the Veil of Ignorance (VOI), and show that both in its original Rawlsian version and in a more generic version, empirical investigations can be normatively relevant in two ways: First, on the assumption that the VOI is effective and robust, if subjects dominantly favor a certain normative judgment behind the VOI this provides evidence in favor of that judgment; if, on the other hand, they do not dominantly favor a judgment this reduces our justification for it. Second, empirical investigations can also contribute to assessing the effectiveness and robustness of the VOI in the first place, thereby supporting or undermining its applications across the board.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"17 1","pages":"72-89"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43473341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC).
{"title":"Is epistemic safety threatened by Frankfurt cases? A reply to Kelp","authors":"Domingos Faria","doi":"10.33392/diam.1448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1448","url":null,"abstract":"I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC).","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47775366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The standard account of elsewhere is that it is any place that isn’t here. In this paper I argue against this account by demonstrating that (given some plausible assumptions) it results in a contradiction. In its place I offer a modifi ed account of elsewhere; where a place can only be elsewhere if it is in the same type of space as here.
{"title":"A Puzzle from Elsewhere: Against the Standard Account of Elsewhere","authors":"Morgan Luck","doi":"10.33392/diam.1268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1268","url":null,"abstract":"The standard account of elsewhere is that it is any place that isn’t here. In this paper I argue against this account by demonstrating that (given some plausible assumptions) it results in a contradiction. In its place I offer a modifi ed account of elsewhere; where a place can only be elsewhere if it is in the same type of space as here.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"17 1","pages":"34-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45570845","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Artykuł analizuje stosowanie standardu najlepiej pojętego interesu w opiece medycznej nad wcześniakiem na granicy zdolności do przeżycia. Stawia tezę, że jeżeli decyzje rodziców opierają się na rzetelnej lekarskiej ocenie stanu klinicznego i rokowania ich dziecka oraz nie wynikają z przesądów lub uprzedzeń, to profesjonaliści medyczni są zobowiązani respektować świadomą zgodę rodziców, nawet jeśli nie podzielają ich opinii. Profesjonaliści mogą kierować się przede wszystkim oceną kliniczną stanu i rokowania noworodka w ocenie jego interesów. Szczególne osobiste zaangażowanie rodziców w decyzję, wyznawane przez nich wartości oraz znany im rodzinny kontekst możliwej przyszłości ich dziecka czyni ich ocenę jego interesu istotnie bardziej wiarygodną od opinii innych podmiotów zaangażowanych w sprawę.
{"title":"Rola świadomej zgody rodziców w opiece nad noworodkami na granicy zdolności do przeżycia","authors":"Paweł Łuków","doi":"10.33392/diam.1321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1321","url":null,"abstract":"Artykuł analizuje stosowanie standardu najlepiej pojętego interesu w opiece medycznej nad wcześniakiem na granicy zdolności do przeżycia. Stawia tezę, że jeżeli decyzje rodziców opierają się na rzetelnej lekarskiej ocenie stanu klinicznego i rokowania ich dziecka oraz nie wynikają z przesądów lub uprzedzeń, to profesjonaliści medyczni są zobowiązani respektować świadomą zgodę rodziców, nawet jeśli nie podzielają ich opinii. Profesjonaliści mogą kierować się przede wszystkim oceną kliniczną stanu i rokowania noworodka w ocenie jego interesów. Szczególne osobiste zaangażowanie rodziców w decyzję, wyznawane przez nich wartości oraz znany im rodzinny kontekst możliwej przyszłości ich dziecka czyni ich ocenę jego interesu istotnie bardziej wiarygodną od opinii innych podmiotów zaangażowanych w sprawę.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"17 1","pages":"40-55"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43572188","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafi lozofi cznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym a poglądami fi lozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma fi lozofami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście. Słowa kluczowe: Henri Poincaré, Ernst Cassirer, epistem iczny realizm strukturalny, ontyczny realizm strukturalny, konwencjonalizm, idealizm, realizm, obiektywność.
{"title":"Sensy obiektywności. Henri Poincaré i Ernst Cassirer w kontekście realizmu strukturalnego","authors":"Damian Luty","doi":"10.33392/diam.1171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1171","url":null,"abstract":"Abstrakt: Celem artykułu jest częściowe uzasadnienie negacji tezy, którą nazywam tezą o genezie realizmu strukturalnego. Dotyczy ona postulowanych w obrębie pewnej metafi lozofi cznej narracji związków między współczesnymi stanowiskami zwanymi epistemicznym realizmem strukturalnym i ontycznym realizmem strukturalnym a poglądami fi lozofów z początku XX wieku. W artykule rekonstruuję wymienione dwa stanowiska, postulowane związki, jakie mają one mieć z dwoma fi lozofami, Henri Poincarém oraz Ernstem Cassirerem, a następnie przedstawiam, dlaczego te postulowane związki są nietrafnie rozpoznane. Niesie to za sobą wnioski dotyczące swoistości wymienionych stanowisk oraz pojęć obiektywności i rzeczywistości w ich kontekście. Słowa kluczowe: Henri Poincaré, Ernst Cassirer, epistem iczny realizm strukturalny, ontyczny realizm strukturalny, konwencjonalizm, idealizm, realizm, obiektywność.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":"1-17"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45957158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.
{"title":"Morality, Normativity, and the Good System 2 Fallacy","authors":"Wim De Neys","doi":"10.33392/diam.1447","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1447","url":null,"abstract":"In this commentary, I warn against a possible dual process misconception that might lead people to conclude that utilitarian judgments are normatively correct. I clarify how the misconception builds on (1) the association between System 2 and normativity in the dual process literature on logical/probabilistic reasoning, and (2) the classification of utilitarian judgments as resulting from System 2 processing in the dual process model of moral reasoning. I present theoretical and empirical evidence against both premises.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45421762","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The aim of the article is to answer how one can be a constructivist and treat science as one of the greatest achievements of contemporary societies at the same time. Since constructivism is a broad trend with many variations, the author focuses only on two of its members: Richard Rorty and Bruno Latour. He tries to show that, ,one can give a coherent answer to the question by combining selected aspects of their views. Although both Rorty and Latour reject a realistic account of science, they claim that science is an effective way of dealing with the world or, to use Latour’s term, with nonhumans. It is the pragmatic category of “dealing with reality”, rather than the philosophical ideas of representation or correspondence, that explains the high status of science. Both thinkers emphasize that the effective interactions with nonhumans are a consequence of the specific culture of cooperation and supervision which is typical of science.
{"title":"Konstruktywistyczny szacunek do nauki. O podejściu Richarda Rorty’ego i Bruno Latoura","authors":"T. Markiewka","doi":"10.33392/DIAM.1161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/DIAM.1161","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of the article is to answer how one can be a constructivist and treat science as one of the greatest achievements of contemporary societies at the same time. Since constructivism is a broad trend with many variations, the author focuses only on two of its members: Richard Rorty and Bruno Latour. He tries to show that, ,one can give a coherent answer to the question by combining selected aspects of their views. Although both Rorty and Latour reject a realistic account of science, they claim that science is an effective way of dealing with the world or, to use Latour’s term, with nonhumans. It is the pragmatic category of “dealing with reality”, rather than the philosophical ideas of representation or correspondence, that explains the high status of science. Both thinkers emphasize that the effective interactions with nonhumans are a consequence of the specific culture of cooperation and supervision which is typical of science.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"17 1","pages":"56-68"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46672686","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The idea of an eternal and immortal life like the one we lead now seems quite appealing because (i) it will be sufficiently like our own earth-bound life and (ii) we will have the same kinds of desires we have now to want to live an eternal life. This paper will challenge the view that we have a conception of what the conscious experience of an immortal is like, regardless of whether we might want to live it. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our own view of what it is like to live our own life and given that an immortal life may not be anything like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal.
{"title":"What Is It Like To Be Immortal?","authors":"Joseph Ulatowski","doi":"10.33392/diam.1264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1264","url":null,"abstract":"The idea of an eternal and immortal life like the one we lead now seems quite appealing because (i) it will be sufficiently like our own earth-bound life and (ii) we will have the same kinds of desires we have now to want to live an eternal life. This paper will challenge the view that we have a conception of what the conscious experience of an immortal is like, regardless of whether we might want to live it. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our own view of what it is like to live our own life and given that an immortal life may not be anything like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-12-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46144056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Review of Robert Sinclair (ed.). Science and Sensibila by W. V. O. Quine. The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 2019. pp. xiv-210. Hardcover ISBN 978-3-030-04908-9. USD 79.99.
{"title":"Quine: a Naturalist in a Physicalist World","authors":"A. Tuboly","doi":"10.33392/diam.1343","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1343","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Robert Sinclair (ed.). Science and Sensibila by W. V. O. Quine. The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 2019. pp. xiv-210. Hardcover ISBN 978-3-030-04908-9. USD 79.99.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"16 1","pages":"95-100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2019-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69657564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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