Spinoza is often presented as an important source for Kant’s view on Judaism and the Old Testament. This claim is often made on the basis of the alleged affinity between the relevant ideas of the two thinkers. In this article, I agree with scholars who point out that Spinoza’s direct influence on Kant’s view of the Old Covenant can be doubted, and further argue that the substance of their ideas about the Hebrew Bible is fundamentally different. I discuss their views on biblical hermeneutics (here showing some affinity between them), the Mosaic law (its content and divinity), and especially the significance of Judaism for Christianity, where the discrepancy between Kant and Spinoza regarding the Old Covenant becomes particularly evident.
{"title":"Kant and Spinoza on the Old Covenant","authors":"Wojciech Kozyra","doi":"10.33392/diam.1806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1806","url":null,"abstract":"Spinoza is often presented as an important source for Kant’s view on Judaism and the Old Testament. This claim is often made on the basis of the alleged affinity between the relevant ideas of the two thinkers. In this article, I agree with scholars who point out that Spinoza’s direct influence on Kant’s view of the Old Covenant can be doubted, and further argue that the substance of their ideas about the Hebrew Bible is fundamentally different. I discuss their views on biblical hermeneutics (here showing some affinity between them), the Mosaic law (its content and divinity), and especially the significance of Judaism for Christianity, where the discrepancy between Kant and Spinoza regarding the Old Covenant becomes particularly evident.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49153622","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Materializm w odniesieniu do świadomości fenomenalnej zakłada, że świat zombi jest metafizycznie niemożliwy. Przy założeniu, że świat zombi jest pojmowalny w tym sensie, że nie można wykluczyć a priori, że nasz świat jest światem zombi, materializm sprowadza się do poglądu, że świat zombi jest metafizycznie niemożliwy, mimo że jest pojmowalny. Nie ma dobrych racji, by pogląd ten (materializm typu B) uznać za fałszywy, gdyż nie ma dobrych racji, by sądzić, że pojęcia fenomenalne nie odnoszą się do własności fizycznych/funkcjonalnych. Mimo to nie rozumiemy, jak materializm typu B może być prawdziwy. Zakładając bowiem, że świat zombi jest – pomimo swej pojmowalności – metafizycznie niemożliwy, nie jesteśmy w stanie wyjaśnić, jak świat zombi może być zarazem pojmowalny i niemożliwy.
{"title":"Pojmowalność, możliwość i materializm","authors":"Karol Polcyn","doi":"10.33392/diam.1663","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1663","url":null,"abstract":"Materializm w odniesieniu do świadomości fenomenalnej zakłada, że świat zombi jest metafizycznie niemożliwy. Przy założeniu, że świat zombi jest pojmowalny w tym sensie, że nie można wykluczyć a priori, że nasz świat jest światem zombi, materializm sprowadza się do poglądu, że świat zombi jest metafizycznie niemożliwy, mimo że jest pojmowalny. Nie ma dobrych racji, by pogląd ten (materializm typu B) uznać za fałszywy, gdyż nie ma dobrych racji, by sądzić, że pojęcia fenomenalne nie odnoszą się do własności fizycznych/funkcjonalnych. Mimo to nie rozumiemy, jak materializm typu B może być prawdziwy. Zakładając bowiem, że świat zombi jest – pomimo swej pojmowalności – metafizycznie niemożliwy, nie jesteśmy w stanie wyjaśnić, jak świat zombi może być zarazem pojmowalny i niemożliwy.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41647271","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the present paper we argue that the theory of contracts embraced by many libertarian scholars and relied upon by them in sundry important debates (e.g. over morality of the fractional reserve banking or loan maturity mismatching etc.), that is, the title transfer theory of contracts (TTT) should be rejected as not being able to account for the binding force of future-oriented contracts, including contracts deemed enforceable by those scholars themselves. The TTT claims that the only contracts that should be legally binding are these where the debtor’s failure to abide by them constitutes a violation of the creditor’s private property rights. However, as we argue, no default of the debtor in a future-oriented contract can in itself amount to such a violation.
{"title":"Contract Theory, Title Transfer, and Libertarianism","authors":"Łukasz M. Dominiak, Tate Fegley","doi":"10.33392/diam.1800","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1800","url":null,"abstract":"In the present paper we argue that the theory of contracts embraced by many libertarian scholars and relied upon by them in sundry important debates (e.g. over morality of the fractional reserve banking or loan maturity mismatching etc.), that is, the title transfer theory of contracts (TTT) should be rejected as not being able to account for the binding force of future-oriented contracts, including contracts deemed enforceable by those scholars themselves. The TTT claims that the only contracts that should be legally binding are these where the debtor’s failure to abide by them constitutes a violation of the creditor’s private property rights. However, as we argue, no default of the debtor in a future-oriented contract can in itself amount to such a violation.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49655971","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The present article deals with Heidegger’s research into boredom. The phenomenon cannot be simply described as an emotion but as a fundamental attunement, which represented a pathway to being qua being for Heidegger. Many scholars have argued that the philosopher’s treatment of the phenomenon led to sublimation or transgression in describing it beyond its phenomenological limits. While I agree with the general assessment, I also believe that there is a need to expand the argument further. I will argue that the cause of such transgression lies mainly in Heidegger’s inability to separate the truth from the notion of meaning or sense.
{"title":"Boredom That Wishes Not To Be","authors":"Borislav Mihačević","doi":"10.33392/diam.1744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1744","url":null,"abstract":"The present article deals with Heidegger’s research into boredom. The phenomenon cannot be simply described as an emotion but as a fundamental attunement, which represented a pathway to being qua being for Heidegger. Many scholars have argued that the philosopher’s treatment of the phenomenon led to sublimation or transgression in describing it beyond its phenomenological limits. While I agree with the general assessment, I also believe that there is a need to expand the argument further. I will argue that the cause of such transgression lies mainly in Heidegger’s inability to separate the truth from the notion of meaning or sense.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43190942","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
W świadomości społecznej religie politeistyczne uchodzą za „mniej dojrzałe” niż inne typy religijności. Również w starszych opracowaniach naukowych można napotkać przyjmowaną wprost gradację religii, która sytuuje wielobóstwo niżej niż monoteizm. Uznawanie istnienia wielu bogów jest jednak nieracjonalne tylko z perspektywy teologii monoteistycznej i wizji świata przyjętej pod jej wpływem. W rzeczywistości z wierzeń politeistycznych można wyabstrahować ciekawe założenia metafizyczne, są one zdolne również do wytworzenia bogatej, racjonalnej teologii. W artykule postaram się obronić politeizm przed zarzutami dotyczącymi jego filozoficznej jałowości. Najpierw spróbuję zdiagnozować błędy w powszechnej interpretacji wielobóstwa, następnie przedstawię różnice w mono- i politeistycznym rozumieniu pojęcia boga, by ostatecznie przedstawić możliwe strategie uzasadnienia wiary w osobowy i intencjonalny charakter bogów.
{"title":"Poli(?)teizm(?). Filozoficzna obrona racjonalności wielobóstwa","authors":"P. Paszkowski","doi":"10.33392/diam.1733","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1733","url":null,"abstract":"W świadomości społecznej religie politeistyczne uchodzą za „mniej dojrzałe” niż inne typy religijności. Również w starszych opracowaniach naukowych można napotkać przyjmowaną wprost gradację religii, która sytuuje wielobóstwo niżej niż monoteizm. Uznawanie istnienia wielu bogów jest jednak nieracjonalne tylko z perspektywy teologii monoteistycznej i wizji świata przyjętej pod jej wpływem. W rzeczywistości z wierzeń politeistycznych można wyabstrahować ciekawe założenia metafizyczne, są one zdolne również do wytworzenia bogatej, racjonalnej teologii. W artykule postaram się obronić politeizm przed zarzutami dotyczącymi jego filozoficznej jałowości. Najpierw spróbuję zdiagnozować błędy w powszechnej interpretacji wielobóstwa, następnie przedstawię różnice w mono- i politeistycznym rozumieniu pojęcia boga, by ostatecznie przedstawić możliwe strategie uzasadnienia wiary w osobowy i intencjonalny charakter bogów.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44383242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Filozofowie i naukowcy odwołują się do szczególnego, oczywistego dla wszystkich świadomych ludzi charakteru świadomości fenomenalnej. Do niedawna nie dysponowaliśmy żadnymi ustaleniami empirycznymi na temat potocznego poglądu na temat świadomości. W ostatnich latach, w ramach eksperymentalnej filozofii świadomości, takie badania zostały przeprowadzone. Zgodnie z wiodącą interpretacją ich wyników, fenomenalny aspekt świadomości nie jest jednak dostrzegany przez laików, osoby bez wiedzy akademickiej na temat świadomości. Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie czy możemy zaufać tym wynikom. Pokazuję, że istnieją poważne wątpliwości co do trafności przeprowadzonych badań. W konsekwencji, wiodąca interpretacja powinna zostać odrzucona, a tytułowe pytanie o potoczny charakter pojęcie świadomości pozostaje otwarte.
{"title":"Czy istnieje potoczne pojęcie świadomości fenomenalnej?","authors":"Michał Wyrwa","doi":"10.33392/diam.1751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1751","url":null,"abstract":"Filozofowie i naukowcy odwołują się do szczególnego, oczywistego dla wszystkich świadomych ludzi charakteru świadomości fenomenalnej. Do niedawna nie dysponowaliśmy żadnymi ustaleniami empirycznymi na temat potocznego poglądu na temat świadomości. W ostatnich latach, w ramach eksperymentalnej filozofii świadomości, takie badania zostały przeprowadzone. Zgodnie z wiodącą interpretacją ich wyników, fenomenalny aspekt świadomości nie jest jednak dostrzegany przez laików, osoby bez wiedzy akademickiej na temat świadomości. Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie czy możemy zaufać tym wynikom. Pokazuję, że istnieją poważne wątpliwości co do trafności przeprowadzonych badań. W konsekwencji, wiodąca interpretacja powinna zostać odrzucona, a tytułowe pytanie o potoczny charakter pojęcie świadomości pozostaje otwarte.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46409786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Luck egalitarianism (LE, henceforth) is a fairly prominent theory of justice. While there are many versions of LE, they all agree that, at least to some extent, it is unjust for individuals to lose the opportunity for welfare at least when that loss occurs through no fault of the individual’s own. Many writers take LE to have direct political implications; they write as if the truth of LE entails that resources should be taken from some – perhaps those who enjoy lots of unearned welfare – and delivered to those who suffer through no fault of their own. I argue that luck egalitarians should refocus their thinking on what I call a “Systemic Model” of compensation. This model holds that (a) what matters most to offsetting bad brute luck is that individuals have opportunities to make up for losses of welfare and (b) political systems should be designed to prevent some individuals from capturing resources in a manner that frustrates the ability of others to offset their own losses due to unearned bad luck and (c) political systems should aim to maximize the opportunities individuals have to make up for their own bad luck.
{"title":"Rethinking Compensation for Bad Luck","authors":"Lamont Rodgers","doi":"10.33392/diam.1769","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1769","url":null,"abstract":"Luck egalitarianism (LE, henceforth) is a fairly prominent theory of justice. While there are many versions of LE, they all agree that, at least to some extent, it is unjust for individuals to lose the opportunity for welfare at least when that loss occurs through no fault of the individual’s own. Many writers take LE to have direct political implications; they write as if the truth of LE entails that resources should be taken from some – perhaps those who enjoy lots of unearned welfare – and delivered to those who suffer through no fault of their own. I argue that luck egalitarians should refocus their thinking on what I call a “Systemic Model” of compensation. This model holds that (a) what matters most to offsetting bad brute luck is that individuals have opportunities to make up for losses of welfare and (b) political systems should be designed to prevent some individuals from capturing resources in a manner that frustrates the ability of others to offset their own losses due to unearned bad luck and (c) political systems should aim to maximize the opportunities individuals have to make up for their own bad luck.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45269302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper continues my discussion with Michael Dummett on Frege’s senses, published in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett and further developed in Diametros. In his reply to my original paper, Dummett came to agree with me that senses are neither objects nor functions, since they have a categorially different kind of linguistico-metaphysical function to perform. He then asks how we might quantify over senses, if they are neither objects nor functions. He discusses two main options, and finds one unviable and the other “very un-Fregean.” I then offer a Fregean or neo-Fregean option in my rejoinder. And I still hold that this way out will do the job, or is at least plausible enough that the burden of persuasion is on those who disagree. But I hope to show in this paper that on a more complete examination of Frege, there are at least twenty Fregean or neo-Fregean ways out, with the one I proposed being option (17).
{"title":"Twenty Fregean Ways to Quantify Over Frege's Senses","authors":"J. Dejnozka","doi":"10.33392/diam.1770","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1770","url":null,"abstract":"This paper continues my discussion with Michael Dummett on Frege’s senses, published in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett and further developed in Diametros. In his reply to my original paper, Dummett came to agree with me that senses are neither objects nor functions, since they have a categorially different kind of linguistico-metaphysical function to perform. He then asks how we might quantify over senses, if they are neither objects nor functions. He discusses two main options, and finds one unviable and the other “very un-Fregean.” I then offer a Fregean or neo-Fregean option in my rejoinder. And I still hold that this way out will do the job, or is at least plausible enough that the burden of persuasion is on those who disagree. But I hope to show in this paper that on a more complete examination of Frege, there are at least twenty Fregean or neo-Fregean ways out, with the one I proposed being option (17).","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43064239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An attempt is made to develop a basic framework for an existential-phenomenological perspective on personality disorders. Its starting point is taken from the psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński and the philosopher Józef Tischner. The former provides a clinical framework capacious enough to allow ethical, existential, and phenomenological explorations. This conceptual “space” is then explicitly recognized, addressed, and fulfilled by the latter’s investigation of personality dynamics proper to “the hideout.” In order to supplement this thread of thought with a specific illustration, a “case” provided by Fyodor Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground is investigated. Then, in turn, Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be is referred to, so that the deepest roots of personality disorders can be identified with an ontological dynamic proper to the avoidance of non-being. Finally, some brief remarks are made concerning how all the above relates to the idea of a normatively neutral science and how it can be integrated with more up to date clinical practice.
{"title":"The Hideout, the Underground, and Avoidance of Non-Being: Tischner, Dostoevsky and Tillich on Personality Disorders","authors":"Konrad Banicki","doi":"10.33392/diam.1738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1738","url":null,"abstract":"An attempt is made to develop a basic framework for an existential-phenomenological perspective on personality disorders. Its starting point is taken from the psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński and the philosopher Józef Tischner. The former provides a clinical framework capacious enough to allow ethical, existential, and phenomenological explorations. This conceptual “space” is then explicitly recognized, addressed, and fulfilled by the latter’s investigation of personality dynamics proper to “the hideout.” In order to supplement this thread of thought with a specific illustration, a “case” provided by Fyodor Dostoevsky in his Notes from the Underground is investigated. Then, in turn, Paul Tillich’s The Courage to Be is referred to, so that the deepest roots of personality disorders can be identified with an ontological dynamic proper to the avoidance of non-being. Finally, some brief remarks are made concerning how all the above relates to the idea of a normatively neutral science and how it can be integrated with more up to date clinical practice.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45636635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This is a short reply to Professor Reichlin’s comment on my book Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. The version of prioritarianism I rely on in the book is defended as the most plausible one. The general claim that there is convergence between all plausible theories on distributive justice is also defended with regard to assisted reproduction, disability, and enhancement.
{"title":"Setting Health-Care Priorities: A Reply to Massimo Reichlin","authors":"T. Tännsjö","doi":"10.33392/diam.1779","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.33392/diam.1779","url":null,"abstract":"This is a short reply to Professor Reichlin’s comment on my book Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. The version of prioritarianism I rely on in the book is defended as the most plausible one. The general claim that there is convergence between all plausible theories on distributive justice is also defended with regard to assisted reproduction, disability, and enhancement.","PeriodicalId":42290,"journal":{"name":"Diametros","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2021-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42182080","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：