Advancement in artificial intelligence has gradually become a pressing concern for the world’s leading nations, especially the USA and China. In this article, the author confronts an argument made and alluded to in certain quarters: that when considered next to China’s, the US democratic culture leaves it disadvantaged in the development of artificial intelligence insofar as it stands in the way of decisive and coordinated action. The author deploys a variety of case study situations to analyse the claim and eventually finds that the apparent disadvantage is, at worst, inexistent and, at best, negligible. Instead, it is argued that the differences in democratic culture between the two countries may, in fact, be responsible for the still-leading innovation within artificial intelligence development in the USA. Through demonstrating the faults of this disadvantage thesis, the final aim of this article is to call on US law- and policy-makers to retain faith in their democratic culture.
{"title":"Democratic Culture and the Development of Artificial Intelligence in the USA and China","authors":"C. Abungu","doi":"10.1093/CJCL/CXAA032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CJCL/CXAA032","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Advancement in artificial intelligence has gradually become a pressing concern for the world’s leading nations, especially the USA and China. In this article, the author confronts an argument made and alluded to in certain quarters: that when considered next to China’s, the US democratic culture leaves it disadvantaged in the development of artificial intelligence insofar as it stands in the way of decisive and coordinated action. The author deploys a variety of case study situations to analyse the claim and eventually finds that the apparent disadvantage is, at worst, inexistent and, at best, negligible. Instead, it is argued that the differences in democratic culture between the two countries may, in fact, be responsible for the still-leading innovation within artificial intelligence development in the USA. Through demonstrating the faults of this disadvantage thesis, the final aim of this article is to call on US law- and policy-makers to retain faith in their democratic culture.","PeriodicalId":42366,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-01-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CJCL/CXAA032","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43913821","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The continued use of Wednesbury unreasonableness in the substantive review of administrative discretion has received considerable scholarly attention throughout the common law world. Recent local developments in proportionality review bring this debate to the fore in Hong Kong. It has been argued that the Court of Final Appeal’s articulation of a sliding scale of proportionality review has strengthened the case for the formal abolition of Wednesbury unreasonableness, on the basis that proportionality has now embraced an identical unreasonableness standard. This article challenges the claim that Wednesbury is now a redundant concept in Hong Kong public law. Descriptively, there remain material differences between Wednesbury and proportionality, even under its modified deferential form. Normatively, too, Wednesbury remains justified as a means to recognize the limited general basis in which common law substantive review can occur. A conflation of Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality can have the unintended consequence of diluting constitutional protections. Furthermore, the emergence of a sliding scale of Wednesbury review in Hong Kong reduces, rather than increases, pressure for its abolition in favour of proportionality.
{"title":"The Future of Wednesbury Unreasonableness in the Substantive Review of Administrative Discretion: A Hong Kong Perspective","authors":"M. Ramsden","doi":"10.1093/cjcl/cxaa033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The continued use of Wednesbury unreasonableness in the substantive review of administrative discretion has received considerable scholarly attention throughout the common law world. Recent local developments in proportionality review bring this debate to the fore in Hong Kong. It has been argued that the Court of Final Appeal’s articulation of a sliding scale of proportionality review has strengthened the case for the formal abolition of Wednesbury unreasonableness, on the basis that proportionality has now embraced an identical unreasonableness standard. This article challenges the claim that Wednesbury is now a redundant concept in Hong Kong public law. Descriptively, there remain material differences between Wednesbury and proportionality, even under its modified deferential form. Normatively, too, Wednesbury remains justified as a means to recognize the limited general basis in which common law substantive review can occur. A conflation of Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality can have the unintended consequence of diluting constitutional protections. Furthermore, the emergence of a sliding scale of Wednesbury review in Hong Kong reduces, rather than increases, pressure for its abolition in favour of proportionality.","PeriodicalId":42366,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa033","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46761879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Many jurisdictions have enacted laws in recent years to criminalize the use of image-based technologies to non-consensually observe a person’s private parts or a person engaging in a private act (voyeurism), to record images of a person’s private parts (‘upskirt photography’), or to possess, disseminate, or threaten to disseminate intimate images (‘revenge pornography’). No such offences have yet been adopted in Hong Kong, and the 2019 decision of the Final Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Cheng Ka Yee has closed the door on using the existing offence of access to computer with criminal or dishonest intent to prosecute some of these behaviours. In response, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong expeditiously prepared a report in 2019 calling for the enactment of offences to cover voyeurism and upskirt photography. The report does not, however, consider the need for offences to cover the related behaviour of non-consensually possessing, distributing, or threatening to distribute imitate images. This article, therefore, examines the need for, and advantages of, new offences to cover such behaviours. Based on a review of newly created offences in various Australian jurisdictions, England and Wales, and Singapore, a recommendation for reform in Hong Kong is developed.
{"title":"Criminalization of Voyeurism and ‘Upskirt Photography’ in Hong Kong: The Need for a Coherent Approach to Image-Based Abuse","authors":"Thomas Crofts","doi":"10.1093/cjcl/cxaa031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa031","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Many jurisdictions have enacted laws in recent years to criminalize the use of image-based technologies to non-consensually observe a person’s private parts or a person engaging in a private act (voyeurism), to record images of a person’s private parts (‘upskirt photography’), or to possess, disseminate, or threaten to disseminate intimate images (‘revenge pornography’). No such offences have yet been adopted in Hong Kong, and the 2019 decision of the Final Court of Appeal in Secretary for Justice v Cheng Ka Yee has closed the door on using the existing offence of access to computer with criminal or dishonest intent to prosecute some of these behaviours. In response, the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong expeditiously prepared a report in 2019 calling for the enactment of offences to cover voyeurism and upskirt photography. The report does not, however, consider the need for offences to cover the related behaviour of non-consensually possessing, distributing, or threatening to distribute imitate images. This article, therefore, examines the need for, and advantages of, new offences to cover such behaviours. Based on a review of newly created offences in various Australian jurisdictions, England and Wales, and Singapore, a recommendation for reform in Hong Kong is developed.","PeriodicalId":42366,"journal":{"name":"Chinese Journal of Comparative Law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/cjcl/cxaa031","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46278709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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